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Domestic violence occurs among all races and socioeconomic
groups.' An estimated four million American women are battered
I. See generally MARK A. SCHULMAN. A SURVEY OF SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
O
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each year by their husbands or partners.2 Approximately ninety-five
percent of all adult domestic violence victims are women An esti-
mated fifty percent of all American women are battered4 at some
time in their lives.' According to one national survey, violence will
WOMEN IN KENTUCKY (1980); Angela Browne, Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medi-
cal Practitioners, 267 JAMA 3184, 3186 (1992).
2. EVAN STARK Er AL., NATIONAL CLEARING HOUSE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WIFE
ABUSE IN THE MEDICAL SETTING: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HEALTH PERSONNEL (1981);
Browne, supra note 1, at 3185.
3. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983). Of all spousal violence reported in the Na-
tional Crime Survey, 91% were victimizations of women committed by husbands or ex-hus-
bands. PATSY A. KLAUS AND MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (1984). Analysis of police and court records
in North America and Europe have persistently indicated that women constitute 90-95% of
the victims of those assaults in the home reported to the criminal justice system. Russel P.
Dobash, The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 71, 74-75
(1992). Women were six times more likely than men to be victimized by a spouse, ex-
spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend. CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE
VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 1 (1991).
4. As used in this Article, the term "battered" includes unlawful acts committed against
a family member that may range from one incident to an ever increasing pattern of repeated
incidents. It includes all actions which would fall within a standard dictionary's definition of
"battery": "The unlawful beating of another including every willful, angry and violent or
negligent unlawful touching of another's person or clothes or anything attached to his person
or held by him." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 187 (3d ed. 1961).
Battering as discussed in this Article also includes all activities that are precluded by the
criminal laws and/or the civil protection order laws of each state. In general, however, most
of the battered women who come into contact with the legal system have been subject to an
escalating pattern of repeated abuse. Domestic violence is under-reported to police. Research
indicates that between 43% and 90% of the time, spousal abuse is not reported. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (1980). From 1979-87, 48% of battered women
stated that they did not report violence to the police because it was a private or personal
matter, or because they felt they could take care of it themselves, and 19% reported that they
did not call because they were afraid of reprisal by the offender or his family or friends.
HARLOW, supra note 3, at 3.
5. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 106 (1989) [hereinafter TERRIFYING LOVE].
Of all adult women, 50% have been victims of violence more than once by the man they
live with in a legal or quasi-legal marriage. This could mean up to 20 million adult married
women are at risk of abuse. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN at ix, 19 (1979)
[hereinafter BATTERED WOMAN]; see Murray A. Straus, Wife-Beating: Causes, Treatment and
Research Needs, in BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 154 (United States
Comm'n on Civil Rights ed., 1978) (estimating that domestic violence occurs in 60% of all
marriages). The National Institutes of Mental Health conducted a survey from which they
estimated that the incidence of physical marital violence is between 50% and 60%. Alan
Rosenbaum and K. Daniel O'Leary, Children: The Unintended Victims of Marital Violence,
51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 692 (1982).
An estimated 85% of all women with disabilities have been victims of domestic vio-
lence and 50% of all women over 60 who live with a male partner are abused by their part-
ners. Judge Richard L. Price, Love and Violence: Victims and Perpetrators, Remarks at the
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6occur at least once in twenty-eight percent of all marriages. Among
intact couples, one of every eight husbands carries out one or more
acts of physical aggression against his wife each year.' Repeated
severe violence occurs in one out of every fourteen marriages.8 In a
survey of American college students, twenty-one to thirty percent
reported at least one occurrence of physical assault with a dating
partner.9 Even these figures are likely to be low. Most national esti-
mates are obtained from surveys which have typically excluded the
very poor, those who do not speak English fluently, those whose lives
are especially chaotic, military families, and persons who are hospital-
ized, homeless, institutionalized, or incarcerated. ° Therefore, some
have estimated that the number of women battered each year is closer
to six million."
Domestic violence is the single largest cause of injury to women
in the United States-more significant than auto accidents, rapes, and
muggings combined. 2 Spousal abuse, specifically wife battering, may
exceed even alcoholism in its magnitude as a health problem. In a
seven-year period during the Vietnam War, the United States lost
39,000 soldiers in the line of duty; "during the same time period
(1967-1973) 17,500 American women and children were killed by
members of their families. '"3 According to the Attorney General's
New York City Coalition for Women's Mental Health (Jan. 1991). Further, 18% of hospital
injury visits by women over 60 are prompted by abuse. Evan Stark, Rethinking Homicide:
Violence, Race, and the Politics of Gender, 20 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 3, 21 (1990).
6. WoMEN's ACTION COALITION. WAC STATS: THE FACTS ABOUT WOMEN 55 (1993).
It is estimated that the number of women abused by their husbands in 1989 was greater that
the number of women who got married that year. Ten Facts About Violence Against Women:
Hearing on S.101-939 Before the Committee on the Judiciary on Women and Violence, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1990).
7. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTIONS TO
VIOLENCE IN 6,415 FAMILIES (Murray A. Straus et al. eds., 1987); Browne, supra note 1, at
3185.
8. DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 4 (1988).
9. TERRIFYING LOvE, supra note 4, at 42.
10. Angela Browne, Violence Against Women By Male Partners: Prevalence, Outcomes
and Policy Implications. 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 1077 (1993).
11. Senator Joseph Biden, Remarks in the Rotunda of Russell Senate Office Building at
the Opening of an Art Exhibition on Domestic Violence Sponsored by Senator Paul
Wellstone (Oct. 26, 1993).
12. Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Rec-
ommendations, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 58 (1992): Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Violence
Among Intimates: An Epidemiological View, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 293, 301
(Van Hassett et al. eds., 1987).
13. PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 19 (1990).
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Task Force on Family Violence, "[t]he legal response to family vio-
lence must be guided primarily by the nature of the abusive act, not
the relationship between the victim and the abuser."'4
Largely in response to the women's movement in the late 60's
and the 70's, significant legal reform efforts in the past twenty years
have been directed at ending domestic violence and creating a broad
array of legal remedies for battered women. Currently, all fifty states
plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico make civil protection
orders available to victims of domestic violence. Many of these state
statutes were enacted or significantly modified since the mid-eight-
ies.'5 In addition, an unprecedented number of appellate decisions
involving domestic violence have been reported during this same
period.
Domestic violence advocates, 6 judges, 7 and legislators must
have adequate grounding and training in the law and in the dynamics
of domestic violence. Domestic violence is an exceedingly complex
problem, presenting many unique challenges. In order to offer mean-
ingful relief to battered women, attorneys and advocates must become
familiar with court decisions from across the country.
This Article presents a comprehensive survey of civil protection
order statutes and state appellate opinions in all fifty jurisdictions, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.' 8 We examine recent develop-
ments and trends, and highlight innovations. We include recommenda-
14. WILLIAM L. HART ET AL., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIO-
LENCE 4 (1984).
15. For an overview of statutory provisions aimed at deterring domestic violence that
are being recommended jointly by judges, battered women's advocates, batterer's defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and other legal experts, see NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND
FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994) [herein-
after MODEL CODE].
16. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends that bar
associations provide training for attorneys on domestic violence as part of continuing legal
education programs. MODEL CODE. supra note 15, § 512.
17. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends that state
domestic violence codes contain provisions requiring and setting the course content for judi-
cial education on domestic violence. MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 510.
18. We have reviewed cases in order to provide an overview of what appellate courts
are doing in domestic violence cases. Additionally, we have included some trial level deci-
sions, including some that were either unreported or unofficially reported. These have been
included to illustrate how these courts are tackling important domestic violence issues. Our
review of statutes is current through September 1, 1993. Our review of civil protection order
cases is current through December 1993. Custody, divorce, and criminal cases are current
through December 1992 and include a representative sampling of decisions rendered through
December 1993.
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tions for further legislative reform and for creative development of
case law. We have incorporated available social science research, the
published policies and recommendations of judicial authorities, and
the legal literature written by domestic violence experts. Moreover,
our recommendations are based on our experience as domestic vio-
lence advocates. Each of us has represented battered women in court
for more than a decade.
In addition to civil protection orders, we discuss and analyze
statutes and judicial opinions from related areas of the law, including
custody and criminal laws specifically addressing domestic violence
issues. Advocates seeking to explore the full potential of the civil
protection order statutes in their states should use this research in
preparing briefs and arguments to persuade judges to issue bold and
effective protection orders in domestic violence cases.
I. CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
Civil protection orders are an important tool for protecting vic-
tims of domestic violence. However, a report from The National
Institute of Justice found that most judges have outdated, and even
improper, views concerning domestic violence.19 Prior to receiving
training, many judges believe that domestic violence consists of ver-
bal harassment or a rare shove, and that domestic violence was a
"relationship problem" amenable to marriage counseling.2" The Na-
tional Institute of Justice found that as judges learned about the dy-
namics of family violence relationships, they came to view domestic
violence as a complex problem of persistent intimidation and physical
injury"-in short, as a violent crime as serious as any other assault
19. PETER FINN AND SARAH COLSON, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 4 (1990) [hereinafter
NU CPO STUDY].
20. Id. This is a view held by many in our society who do not understand the dynam-
ics of domestic violence. Developing familiarity with these dynamics aids in developing solu-
tions that effectively assist battered women and stop the violence.
21. Anne L. Ganley, Domestic Violence: The What, Why and Who, as Relevant to Civil
Court Cases, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR
JUDICIAL EDUCATION 23, 33 (Jacqueline A. Agtuca et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES] ("[Domestic violence is] purposeful and instrumental be-
havior . . . directed at achieving compliance from and control over the abused party ....
The pattern is not impulsive or out of control, rather tactics have been selectively chosen by
the perpetrator because they work. Batterers choose to use violence to get what they want
from the victim. They choose times and places and types of abuse that will make the victim
most responsive and subject the abuser to the least risk of discovery.").
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and battery.' Unfortunately, judicial education on domestic violence
has only reached a relatively small number of judges across the coun-
try. Significant efforts are underway to help ensure that all judges
who hear domestic violence cases receive this crucial training.'
Judicial training is only one important step toward ensuring that
battered women and children can successfully turn to our courts for
effective protection. The National Institute of Justice Civil Protection
Order study found that these battered women are in direct need of
assistance from attorneys in civil protection order proceedings. 4
Women who appear in court with legal representation are much more
likely to receive civil protection orders than those women who appear
pro se, and those orders are much more likely to contain more effec-
tive and complete remedies.' However, the numbers of attorneys
22. See NIJ CPO STUDY. supra note 19.
23. In March of 1993, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges held
the first national judicial training on domestic violence. This conference was sponsored by the
State Justice Institute. Similar conferences are beginning to be planned on state and local
levels. Two important training manuals for judges presented and used at the national confer-
ence were also developed with State Justice Institute funds. The manuals should serve as
invaluable resources to judicial and attorney training on domestic violence in the future. See
generally JANET CARTER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
CRIMINAL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION (1991) [hereinafter
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES]; see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL
COURT CASES, supra note 21.
To be effective, all judicial and attorney training efforts on domestic violence must
also address gender bias that exists in our judicial system. "Studies of gender bias in the
courts document how courts too often disbelieve credible evidence of domestic violence and
discount its seriousness. Too often, judges ignore the substantive law along with the evidence.
Too often, their orders hurt women and children who come to court in family law cases."
Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from
Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1993). Czapanskiy, as well
as the majority of gender bias reports, confirm that gender-biased judicial behavior has a
profound effect on the credibility of women's testimony. See id. at 249, 254 n.18, 263; see
also ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS: DRAFr REPORT OF
THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS
30 (1991); THE FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN IN THE COURTS (1984); GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYS-
TEM (1991), reprinted in 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 706 (1992) (finding a "strong perception
by both the bar and the judiciary that, at least in rape and in domestic violence cases, a
female comes to court in Georgia bearing a credibility burden, a burden based on a
stereotypic view of gender that does not affect males in the same way. The effect of such
undue skepticism frequently places female litigants in a position where they must offer more
evidence than do male litigants. In cases involving domestic violence and rape, female vic-
tims must often defend themselves against suggestions and accusations that they themselves
provoked the act or are exaggerating the extent of the violence.").
24. NI CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 19.
25. Only approximately 11% of litigants in domestic violence cases were likely to re-
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who have been trained on domestic violence law and dynamics is
infinitesimally small. Significant attention needs to be given to in-
crease attorney training locally and nationally.26
Protection orders, when properly drafted and enforced, are effec-
tive in eliminating or reducing domestic abuse. The effectiveness of
protection orders may, however, "depend on whether they provide the
requested relief in sufficient detail."28 The effectiveness of protection
orders is also "determined largely by whether they are consistently
enforced."'29 Unfortunately, widespread enforcement of civil protec-
tion orders is lacking.' This severe problem can be reduced by in-
creasing judicial and lawyer education, and by increasing representa-
tion of petitioners in civil protection order cases."' Studies demon-
strate that offering protection and services to battered women signifi-
cantly reduces the number killed by their batterers,32 while at the
same time reducing the numbers of women who find no other way to
stop the violence but to kill their batterers 3
ceive needed legal assistance. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 251 (citing ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON FAMILY LEGAL NEEDS OF Low INCOME PERSONS, INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR
MARYLAND'S FAMILIES 49 (1992)).
26. A comprehensive training manual for attorneys representing battered women who
seek civil protection orders has been written by the authors of this Article. LESLYE E.
ORLOFF & CATHERINE F. KLEIN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A MANUAL FOR PRO BONO LAWYERS
(1993). This manual can assist attorneys by proceeding step by step through the civil protec-
tion order process. Although this training manual focuses on the law in the District of Co-
lumbia, much of its contents are equally applicable to other jurisdictions. The manual includes
almost 300 pages of sample pleadings and direct examination questions.
27. NI CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at I see also BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at
212; Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Effica-
cy 4 WOMEN & POL. 13-28 (1984) (providing detailed analyses of the effectiveness of re-
straining orders); Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 (1984).
28. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 2, 7.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id.
31. l. at 3. The failure to enforce protection orders is perhaps the weakest link in the
legal safeguards now available to women. In several well-publicized cases, women who had
obtained civil protection orders were then murdered by the same men who had been ordered
to stay away from them. This is a result of inadequate police enforcement and the judges'
unwillingness to jail men for violating such orders. See Eric Schmitt, Family Violence: Pro-
tection Improves but not Prevention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1989, at B1.
32. The numbers of shelters and services available to assist battered women in a state
positively correlates with a drop in the numbers of women killed by intimate partners. Karen
D. Stout, "Intimate Femicide": Effects of Legislation and Social Services, 4 AFFiLIA 25
(1989).
33. Research indicates that there is a correlation between an increase in legal protection
and services for battered women and a decrease in the number of homicides committed by
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All attorneys who practice family law represent battered women,
but many do not do so knowingly. Too few lawyers make the effort
to investigate whether their clients have been victims of domestic
violence, and therefore, often fail to present evidence of abuse at tri-
al' or may enter into mediated agreements that are dangerous to the
client because of the history of abuse. a5 Few family lawyers have
been specifically trained on domestic violence and the use, effective-
ness, and enforcement of civil protection orders.36 Furthermore, pro
bono attorneys need to be recruited and trained to help meet the
critical needs of battered women for trained quality legal representa-
tion. This Article is intended to be a major resource for attorneys and
advocates who assist battered women, for the judges who hear these
sensitive and important cases, and for the legislators who wish to
improve their jurisdictions' laws pertaining to domestic violence.
A. Nature of Relationship Between Parties for Which Protection
Orders Are Available37
1. Spouses and Former Spouses
The overwhelming trend in both state statutes and case law is to
grant protection orders against former spouses. 8 Forty-six states, as
well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, embrace this ap-
women against male partners. From 1979 to 1984. this type of homicide decreased by more
than 25%. Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Resource Availability for Women at Risk: Its
Relationship to Rates of Female-Perpetrated Homicide, Paper Presented at the American Soci-
ety of Criminology Annual Meeting (Nov. 11-14, 1987).
34. See Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 260.
35. Id.
36. For example, Washington State courts are statutorily required to give special treat-
ment to custody cases where a child or parent has been subjected to violence by the other
parent. A study of lawyer's practice found that almost 33% of all lawyers did not discuss
rights and remedies under this provision in the code with their clients or bring abusive be-
havior suffered by their clients to the attention of the court. Lawyers who failed to raise the
issue before the court stated that they did not believe their client's assertions about domestic
violence or they felt that the violence was too insignificant or unimportant to bring to the at-
tention of the court. Of all lawyers interviewed, none reported skepticism about clients who
claimed that they were not abusive. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 257, 258 n.33.
37. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 102(2).
38. Campbell v. Campbell. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the
issuance of a protection order for former wife when former spouse was soon to be released
from jail); People v. Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211 (II1. App. Ct. 1985); Christenson v.
Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279 (Iowa 1991); Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989); Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992); Thomas v. Thomas. 540
N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (affirming issuance of civil protection order against hus-
band even though divorce pending); Baldwin v. Moses, 386 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1989).
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proach.39 Moreover, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Ohio0
have statutorily overruled cases that denied protection orders against
former spouses.4 Statutory protection of former, as well as current,
spouses is a well-founded policy in light of the Justice Department's
National Crime Survey, which revealed that seventy-five percent of all
reported domestic abuse was reported by separated or divorced wom-
en.42 Violence is often triggered by the anger aroused by threatened
39. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.35.010, 25.35.060 (1991 & Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-103, 9-15-20 (Michie 1993); CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 70, 75 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-4-101 to -102
(Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-15, 46b-35 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10 §§ 945, 947 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001, -1005 (Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19-13-1, 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 586-1, 586-5.5 (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-6303 to -6304 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-3 to 112A-14 (1993);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 236.2-.5
(West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3102-3107 (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 403.720-.725 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2134 to
:2136 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §§ 762, 766 (West Supp.
1993); MD. CODE ANN., FA, . LAW §§ 4-501, -506 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
209A § 3. 8 (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-3 to -15 (1993); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 455-010 to -020 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (1993);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-903 to -924 (Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173.B:1 to
.B:4 (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 25:2C:20 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-13-2
to -3 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 50-B-1, to -3 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-07.1-01 to -02 (Supp. 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Andersen Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.705-.718
(1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6102, 6108 (1991 & Supp. 1993); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
8, §§ 602, 621 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-15-1, 15-15-3 (1988 & Supp. 1993);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-4-20, 20-4-040 (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 25-10-1. 25-10-3 (1984): TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601, 36-3-602, 36-3-605 (1991 &
Supp. 1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.01, 71.04 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 30-6-1 to -2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1103 (1989 & Supp. 1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 161-253.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.010,
26.50.030 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-2, 48-2A-4 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-21-102, 35-21-103 (Supp. 1993).
40. These states have statutorily removed the requirement that parties reside together for
a civil protection order to issue. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. §§ 4-501, 4-506 (Supp. 1993);
N.Y. FANi. CT. ACT § 821 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (An-
derson Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6102, 6108 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
41. Barbee v. Barbee. 537 A.2d 224 (Md. 1988) (holding civil protection orders are to
issue only to spouses, parents, children, or blood relatives who live together at the time of
the abuse); People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. 1969) (affirming holding that assault
whiLh occurs after divorce does not fall under the domestic violence statute); State v. Allen,
536 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Margoles v. Margoles, No. 1724, 1987 Phila. Cty.
Rptr. LEXIS 20 (C.P. Ct. Phila. Cty. June 23, 1987) (holding domestic violence statute only
applies to family members who reside together or formerly resided together where both par-
ties continue to have legal access to the residence).
42. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. REPORT TO THE NATION 3 (1988); HARLOW, supra
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loss and excessive feelings of dependency-making the period during
and after separation an extremely dangerous time.43 Women who are
divorced or separated are at higher risk of assault than married wom-
en.' The risk of assault is greatest when a woman leaves or threat-
ens to leave an abusive relationship.45 Nonfatal violence often esca-
lates once a battered woman attempts to end the relationship.46 Fur-
thermore, studies in Philadelphia and Chicago revealed that twenty-
five percent of women murdered by their male partners were separat-
ed or divorced from their assailants.47 Another twenty-nine percent of
women were murdered during the separation or divorce process."
State statutes need to protect women and children during and after the
break-up of relationships because of their continuing, and often
heightened, vulnerability to violence.
2. Family Members (Parents, Siblings, Aunts, Uncles,
Grandparents, and In-Laws)
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia provide for the
issuance of civil protection orders to family members.49 Case law
note 3, at 5 (stating that "separated or divorced women were 14 times more likely than
married women to report having been a victim of violence by a spouse or ex-spouse");
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NCADV VOICE (1992).
43. John Bowlby, Violence in the Family as a Disorder of the Attachment and
Caregiving Systems, 44 AM. J. PSYCHOANAL. 9, 22-23 (1984).
44. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 11, at 307-08.
45. See Ganley, supra note 21, at 24. Separated or divorced women are six times more
likely to be victims of violent crime than widows and four and one half times more likely
than married women. HARLOW, supra note 3, at 5; see also Elis Desmond, Post-Separation
Woman Abuse: The Contribution of Lawyers as "Barracudas", "Advocates", and "Counsel-
lors", 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCH. 403, 408 (1987).
46. David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge, 13
RESPONSE TO THE VICTIMIZATION WOMEN & CHILDREN 13 (1990). Perpetrators of domestic
violence view the abused party's attempts to leave the relationship as the ultimate act of
resistance and consequently increase their violence in response to attempts by the victim to
leave. Ganley, supra note 21, at 24.
47. Ganley, supra note 21, at 24.
48. Noel A. Casanave & Margaret A. Zahn, Women, Murder, and Male Domination:
Police Reports of Domestic Homicide in Chicago and Philadelphia, Paper Presented at the
American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting (Oct. 1986). This paper additionally found
that husbands were commonly motivated to kill their wives because they felt abandoned or
feared they were losing control over them. In one study of spousal homicide, over one-half
of the male defendants were separated from their victims. Franklin E. Zimring et al., Intimate
Violence: A Study of Intersexual Homicide, 50 U. CHt. L. REV. 910, 916 (1983).
49. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993) (parent, child,
grandparent, grandchild, member of the same social unit); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie 1993) (parents and children, persons
related by blood within the fourth degree of consanguinity); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West
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has also recognized various kinds of family relationships for purposes
of issuing a protection order. Protection orders may be issued to
prevent violence and harassment from a sibling," a step-sibling," a
parent, 2 a step-parent, 3 and an in-law.'
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1004 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1
(Supp. 1993) (includes foster child and parent); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (West Supp. 1993) (must
be adult family member of the same household); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Supp. 1992);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Michie/ Bobbs-Merill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2132(3) (West Supp. 1993) (includes foster child and parent); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(h) (Supp. 1993); MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B-01 (West Supp. 1993) (parents, children, and persons
related by blood); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-010
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903
(Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.B:1
(Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 25:2C:20 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie
Supp. 1993) (including relative); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 846 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102
(1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985)
(must be adult family member of the same household); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01 (1992) (in-
cludes foster child and foster parent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West Supp. 1992)
(must be adult family member of the same household); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp.
1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813-122 (West Supp. 1993) (adult family member); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993) (parents and adult children).
50. See, e.g., State v. Wong, 861 P.2d 759 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming issuance of
a protection order to a brother); State v. Scott. 555 A.2d 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (granting sister a restraining order against her brother); S. v. S., 311 N.Y.S.2d 169
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (granting sister a protection order against her brother whose child she
bore); State v. Taylor, No. 57679, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4749 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1,
1990) (holding brother and sister relationship covered).
51. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 583 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding grant of
civil protection order between minor step-brother and step-sister).
52. See, e.g., Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989) (affirming grant of a
protection order to wife and son against the son's father); In re Price, 593 A.2d 1185 (Del.
1992) (defining "family" for purposes of the family court jurisdiction to include related per-
sons whether or not they live in the same home; in this case, a protection order was issued
where the parties were father and son living under different roofs); Thomas v. Thomas, 477
A.2d 728 (D.C. 1984) (affirming propriety of granting civil protection order to father against
son); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 541 N.E.2d 872 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989) (affirming where son
and his wife obtained civil protection order against son's mother); Anthony T. v. Anthony J..
510 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986) (granting son civil protection order against his father
for making harassing telephone calls); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980) (affirm-
ing grant of civil protection order to 18 year old daughter against father who attempted to
1993]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics supports this ap-
proach.55 A survey of domestic violence victims from 1979 through
1987 which studied reports of women who suffered rape, robbery, or
assault at the hands of a family member found that more women
were battered by other relatives56 than were battered by current
spouses.' It is therefore exceptionally important for victims of do-
mestic violence at the hands of any family member to receive protec-
tion. This protection must be available whether or not the victim
resides with the family member perpetrating the violence. 8
Domestic violence statutes must offer coverage to a wide range
of extended family relationships to fully reflect the reality of Ameri-
can family life. In the past, and increasingly in the future, extended
families, composed of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins, share
households or remain in close daily contact with each other to meet
have an incestuous relationship with her); Murray v. Murray, 623 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (upholding grant of petition for protection order and reversing custody award
where step-mother dragged her step-daughter by the hair, pushed her down, and pounded her
head against the floor); Reynoldsburg v. Eichenberger, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1613 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1990) (temporary protection order issued against father on behalf of mother
and child).
53. See, e.g.. Johnson v. Miller. 459 N.W.2d 886 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming deci-
sion below wherein step-daughter received restraining order against step-father). In the only
published decision limiting this coverage, Evans v. Evans, a Florida court refused to issue a
civil protection order based on a step-parent relationship because the parties never lived to-
gether. 599 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). However, the Florida legislature later
overruled the case by amending the statute to extend coverage to person's related by blood
or marriage regardless of whether the parties ever resided together. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(b) (West Supp. 1993).
54. Caldwell v. Coppola. 268 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (awarding protection
order to sister-in-law, even though she did not live with the petitioner); Clifford v. Krueger,
297 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (granting brother-in-law civil protection order); Peo-
ple v. Harkins. 268 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1966) (holding that "family members" in-
cludes brother-in-law for purposes of issuing a civil protection order); People v. Keller, 234
N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1962) (holding that a mother-in-law, who did not live in the
same house, was a "family member" under the statute).
55. HARLOW, supra note 3, at 1-3.
56. This category would include, for example, in-laws, uncles, cousins, and extended
family members.
57. Among reported cases for rape, robbery, and assault: 9.6% were abused by another
relative, 9.1% were abused by a current spouse, 5.5% were abused by a sibling, 3.3% were
abused by a parent, and 2.7% were abused by a child. The largest categories of abusers were
ex-spouses (34.5%) and boyfriends (31.8%). HARLOW, supra note 3, at 1-3.
58. See, e.g., In re Price, 593 A.2d 1185 (Del. 1992) (defining "family" to include
persons who did not live under the same roof); Caldwell v. Coppola, 268 Cal. Rptr. 453
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (protection order awarded to sister-in-law, even though she did not live
with the petitioner); People v. Keller, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1962) (mother-in-law,
who did not live in the same house, was a "family member" under the statute).
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both economic and emotional needs.59 This is particularly true for
various racial and ethnic communities in the United States who con-
sistently embrace the extended family model.' For example, the La-
tino community, which is the fastest growing segment of the Ameri-
can population, relies heavily on extended family relationships."
The Supreme Court has recognized the significant role extended
families play in American life. In Moore v. East Cleveland," the
Court struck down an East Cleveland zoning ordinance that attempted
to restrict extended family members from living together in the same
household as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause.63 The Court held that the Constitution protects this
larger conception of family,' and clarified that the state can neither
lightly deny the choice of individuals to live with extended family
members, nor force people to live in certain narrowly defined family
patterns."
Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their powerful concurrence,
focused on the "cultural myopia" of the arbitrary line drawn by the
zoning ordinance.' These Justices concluded that the ordinance dis-
played a "depressing insensitivity toward the economic and emotional
needs of a very large part of our society."' In particular, they noted
that the "nuclear family" pattern is most often found in white subur-
bia but that the extended family model was dominant among early
ethnic immigrants and remains prominent in many minority communi-
ties.6" The extended family remains a vital and indeed growing part
of American society which the state may not arbitrarily restrict.69
Both the majority opinion and the concurrence in Moore demon-
59. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Nancy Feigenbaum, Ties that Bind Keep Hispanics Far from Capital,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 1994, at B4.
61. Id.
62. 431 U.S. 494.
63. Id. at 505-06.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 507-08.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 508.
69. Id. at 506-13. Lower courts have also issued decisions based on Moore's "Extended
Family Doctrine." See, e.g., Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding liberty
interest of a half-sister in continued foster care of her half-sister and half-brother); Delta v.
Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1984) (striking down as unconstitutional a zoning ordinance
which limited the occupation of a single family dwelling to persons related by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage and not more than one unrelated person).
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strate the respect which the state must accord the extended family
model. The rationale of the Moore decision makes it incumbent upon
states not to arbitrarily preclude extended family relationships when
considering whether civil protection order statutes should safeguard a
particular family or household member. The definition of "family
members" embraced by civil protection order statutes must be equally
applicable to all concepts of family as they exist in the reality of our
diverse family relationships. The vitality of nuclear families and ex-
tended families in many communities in the United States must be
recognized, and protections against all violence in all families must be
provided.
3. Children
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia issue civil pro-
tection orders on behalf of the minor children of one or both par-
ties.7" Moreover, protection orders may be issued to children as
household members related by blood or marriage.7 In several states,
70. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie 1993); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 70 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101 (West Supp. 1993);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (west Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945
(1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993) (in-
cludes foster children); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303
(1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Supp.
1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2132(4) (west Supp. 1993) (includes foster children); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (Supp. 1993); MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § I (west Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B-01 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3
(Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455-010 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (separate civil protection
order for children); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.018 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT
§ 846 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West
1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1984); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01 (1992)
(includes foster child); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1101 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.122 (West Supp. 1993) (adult family mem-
ber).
71. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie 1993); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 70 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101 (West Supp. 1993);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945
(1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993) (includes foster children); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1
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emancipated minors may petition for their own protection order.72
Furthermore, most courts issue civil protection orders based on peti-
tions filed by parents or other adults on behalf of children.73 A pro-
(Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merill Supp. 1993); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2132(4) (West Supp. 1993) (includes foster children); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 762 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B-01 (West Supp. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp.
1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455-010 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (separate civil protection order for
children); MONT. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-40121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Supp.
1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 846 (McKinney
Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(Anderson Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6102 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law.
Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601
(1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01 (1992) (includes foster child); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-253.1 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.122 (West Supp. 1993) (adult family
member); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993).
72. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(2) (1989) ("Any person 19 years of age or older, or who oth-
erwise is emancipated."); IND. CODE ANN. § 344-5.1-1 (1992) ("person" who may petition
any court for a protection order includes human beings aged 18 or older, and emancipated
minors) (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(4) (1982) ("adult [who may
seek relief alleging abuse] means . . . any person under the age of eighteen who has been
emancipated by marriage or otherwise"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 1992) ("victim
of domestic violence means . . . any person who is 18 years of age or older or who is an
emancipated minor"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1992) ("An adult or emancipated
minor may seek relief under this chapter .... ); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (Supp. 1993)
("'Cohabitants': emancipated minors or persons eighteen (18) years of age or older, not relat-
ed by blood or marriage, who together are not the legal parents of one or more children, and
who have resided together . . . or who are residing in the same living quarters."); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-21-102(a)(1) (Supp. 1993) ("'Adult' means a person who is sixteen years of age
or older.").
73. See, e.g., Harriman v. Harriman, 1990 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1200 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 25, 1990) (holding that a father can obtain a temporary restraining order on behalf of
his child where he can prove that he or the child had been subjected to abuse as defined
under the state statute); Robinson v. United States. 317 A.2d 508, 510-12 (D.C. 1974) (hold-
ing that director of social services petitioned on behalf of child for a protection order against
the child's mother's boyfriend with whom she and the child had lived for three years and
with whom the mother had two children in common); Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So. 2d
125 (Fla. App. 1991) (affirming that a father's sexual battery of his three year old daughter
warranted the mother's petitioning for the issuance of a temporary protection order against
him); Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So. 2d 1083 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming decision granting
non-custodial mother a temporary protection order under the domestic abuse assistance statute
on behalf of her minor child alleging that the custodial father had engaged in sexual behavior
with the minor child); Harper v. Harper, 537 So. 2d 282, 283-85 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (hold-
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tection order for an abused mother may also include protection for
her children, who are not abused themselves.74 The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals' reasoning in Cruz-Foster v. Foster" would
support the granting of protection orders to children in such cases,
even where no recent physical or sexual abuse exists.76 The Cruz-
Foster decision requires court consideration of the "entire mosaic" of
past abuse to adequately determine the need for protection.'
In Missouri, children may receive a civil protection order sepa-
rate from that issued to the petitioning parent." Case law also sup-
ports the issuance of civil protection orders based on sexual abuse of
minor children.79 In S. v. S.,' the court issued a civil protection or-
der to a minor sister against her minor brother who raped and im-
pregnated her."1
Some courts have, however, limited the forum in which civil
protection orders issued against minors may be enforced. In Diehl v.
ing that where the husband constantly made threats to his wife, tried to pull her from her
car, had a bad temper and scared their child, the finding of domestic abuse was sufficient to
entitle the wife to file for a civil protection order on behalf of the child); Cooke v. Naylor.
573 A.2d 376, 377-79 (Me. 1990) (acknowledging the mother's right to file a petition for
domestic abuse on behalf of her minor children); Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335, 336-38
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24, 26 (Miss. 1990) (affirming grant of
order to father on behalf of his children after he kidnapped his children from Utah and took
them to Mississippi, because the children's mother, his wife, had substantially abused and
neglected them); Flury v. Howard, 813 P.2d 1052, 1053 (Okla. 1991) (issuing protection
order based on petition by minor girl's parents against the girl's minor boyfriend); McCoy v.
McCoy, 621 A.2d 144 (Pa. 1993) (affirming issuance protection order on behalf of minor
child against her father and step-mother who hit her child in face with a belt buckle and
slapped her); Keith v. Keith, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462, 462-63 (C.P. 1984).
74. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Patricia K. McCoy, 625 N.E.2d 883 (Il1. App. Ct.
1993) (holding that abuse of one household member is sufficient to extend protection to chil-
dren and other household members who may be at risk of retaliation by respondent).
75. 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991).
76. Id. at 931-32.
77. Id.
78. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455-010 (1992).
79. Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. App. 1991) (upholding temporary pro-
tection order against father for sexual battery of his three year old daughter); Keneker v.
Keneker, 579 So. 2d 1083 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding grant of temporary protection
order to non-custodial mother against custodial father on behalf of their minor child alleging
inappropriate sexual behavior); McCleod v. United States, 568 A.2d 1094 (App. D.C. 1990)
(civil protection order issued against father on behalf of minor son based on father's sexual
abuse of child). But see Keith v. Keith, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462 (C.P. 1984) (where the court
refused to renew a civil protection order beyond a year against a father who sexually abused
his two minor children even though his close proximity caused them stress, fear, and emo-
tional strain, since no new acts of abuse had occurred within the proceeding year).
80. 311 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. 1970).
81. Id.
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Drummond,2 the court issued a civil protection order against the
petitioner's sixteen year old boyfriend. 3 The Diehl court held that
while a civil protection order may issue against a minor, enforcement
of the order must occur in the juvenile court." This approach allows
the courts to intervene to offer civil protection against child defen-
dants, while placing enforcement in the court most able to protect the
rights of juvenile defendants and offer juveniles appropriate sentenc-
ing alternatives.85 As our civil protection order issuing courts are
appropriately moving toward protecting victims of dating violence and
are seeing more drug-related assaults by juveniles on family members,
we urge all jurisdictions to adopt this balanced approach.
Courts may also issue a civil protection order to a parent against
an adult child. 6 Courts in large cities are beginning to see greater
numbers of cases in which parents seek civil protection orders against
their adult or minor children who are abusing drugs. Civil protection
orders can offer families experiencing these problems an opportunity
to intervene to protect themselves and obtain help for their children
before they might be required to turn to the criminal justice system
for help. For example, in Wright v. Wright,87 the court issued a civil
protection order to a mother against her husband's minor son based
on the son's sexual abuse of the mother's minor daughters.8
Civil protection orders are also regularly issued to adult children.
Courts have issued civil protection orders based on an attempted in-
cestuous relationship with an adult child, 9 and for harassment of an
adult child.' Courts have also issued civil protection orders to an
adult child who was injured as a result of an attempted assault by her
82. 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 376 (C.P. 1989).
83. Id. at 378-79.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Thomas v. Thomas, 477 A.2d 728 (D.C. 1984) (issuing civil protection order against
son restraining him from visiting his father's house, removing any items from the house, and
from molesting, assaulting, threatening, or physically abusing his father).
87. 583 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
88. Id.
89. Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (N.D. 1980) (affirming lower court issu-
ance of a civil protection order against father based on an attempt to have an incestuous
relationship with his 18 year old daughter).
90. See Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 541 N.E.2d 872, 873-74 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (af-
firming civil protection order issued to adult son and his wife against his mother based on
harassment); Anthony T. v. Anthony J., 510 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811-13 (Fam. Ct. 1986) (issuing
civil protection order against father for making harassing telephone calls to his son).
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step-father on her mother."
Courts have also addressed the issue of whether adoption severs
the parent-child relationship for purposes of issuing a protection order.
In Robert R. v. Eve. M.,92 the family court held that an adoption
with the consent of the biological father terminated the parent-child
relationship for purposes of issuing a protection order and therefore
denied a civil protection order to a biological father against his bio-
logical daughter based on harassment.93
4. Parents of a Child in Common
Unmarried parties who share a child in common are frequently
eligible for protection orders.9' Forty-one states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico issue civil protection orders between parents
of a child in common.9" A child in common between parties may
also serve as a basis for issuance of a protection order between one
party's child and the other party. In Robinson v. United States, 9 the
court held that a protection order may issue on behalf of a child
91. Johnson v. Miller, 459 N.W.2d 886 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
92. 517 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
93. Id. at 116-17.
94. See Maksuta v. Higson, 577 A.2d 185, 186-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(affirming grant of mutual civil protection order issued between unmarried cohabitants who
shared three children in common).
95. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp.
1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144-101 (West Supp.
1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 945 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.2 (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-
501 (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 455-010 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-018 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-20 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT §§ 846, 812 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1992); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 602 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-440 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-60 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71-01 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.120 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.122 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993).
96. 317 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1974).
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against the child's mother's boyfriend with whom she and the child
had lived for three years and with whom the mother had two children
in common.97
However, despite this coverage some victims of abuse still fall
through dangerous gaps in the statutes. An important issue is whether
a civil protection order may issue against a putative father and
whether a civil protection order may issue when the petitioner is
pregnant with the respondent's child. Some state statutes explicitly
address this issue and permit coverage.98 In other states, case law
addresses this concern. In Lydia B. v. Pedro G.,99 the court held that
the petitioner's allegation that the parties share children in common
establishes eligibility for a civil protection order against the respon-
dent." The court rested its decision, in part, on the legislative his-
tory and intent of amendments to the statute which extended coverage
to former spouses and persons who share a child in common.'' The
court concluded that any construction of the act which distinguished
between putative and adjudicated fathers or required such adjudication
to file a petition would
undermine the intent of the statute, as amended, to extend protection
to persons outside of the conventional marital family. In view of the
fact that it can take at least as many months to resolve a paternity
action ... a petitioner would be denied access to this court, which
might unnecessarily endanger not only the natural mother, but the
child as well.02
Case law is divided, however, on whether a petitioner is eligible
for a civil protection order when she is pregnant with the
respondent's child. Some courts have held that a pregnant woman
97. Id. at 510-14.
98. Five state statutes explicitly address these issues. The Illinois and Minnesota statutes
affirmatively extend coverage to parents of an alleged child in common. 750 ILCS 60/103
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1993). Arizona, Minnesota
and Tennessee explicitly grant civil protection order eligibility when the pregnancy of a child
in common is involved. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A) (Supp. 1993) ("[i]f the victim
or the defendant is pregnant by the other party"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (Supp. 1993)
("a man and woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is alleged to be the father, re-
gardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time"); TEM.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(4)(E) (1991) ("persons whose sexual relationship has resulted in a
current pregnancy").
99. 576 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Fam. Ct. 1991).
100. Id. at 179-80.
101. Id. at 180.
102. Id. at 179.
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may receive a civil protection order because she comes within the
purpose and intent of the "child in common" provision of the state
domestic violence statute. 3 In Gloria C. v. William C.,"°4 the
court held that the mother of an unborn child could petition and
receive a protection order on the child's behalf after her husband
punched her in the stomach and threw her to the floor.'05 The
child's birth was not a condition precedent to the order's enforce-
ment.1 6 The court extended protection to the fetus where the peti-
tioner wanted to continue her pregnancy and her husband told her he
was trying to force her to have a spontaneous abortion. The court
noted that the respondent consciously directed his violence toward the
unborn child.
In two cases where courts ruled that pregnant women were not
covered under the civil protection order statute, the courts expressed
dissatisfaction with this limitation and specifically recommended that
statutes be changed so as to remedy this problem. In Woodin v.
Rasmussen,'08 and Gina C. v. Stephen F.,"° the courts, through
very strict statutory interpretation, reluctantly denied standing to ob-
tain civil protection orders to petitioners who were pregnant with the
respondents' children."0 The courts concluded that an unborn child
was not a child within the meaning of the statutes."' However, in
each case the court recognized that this interpretation left a dangerous
gap in the statute."' The court in Woodin specifically noted its con-
cern about the continuing relationship between the parents of an un-
born child in common, which leads to continuing risk."' The
Woodin court concluded that the legislature may wish to extend pro-
tection to the petitioner."'4 Moreover, the court in Gina C."5 spe-
cifically called on the legislature to remedy the statutory oversight
and confer civil protection order protection to a pregnant woman
103. Alvarez v. Itoh, IF 343-87 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1987).
104. 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fan. Ct. 1984).
105. Id. at 998.
106. Id. at 993-98.
107. Id. at 991.
108. 455 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
109. 576 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Fam. Ct. 1991).
110. Woodin. 455 N.W.2d at 536-37; Gina C., 576 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
111. Woodin, 455 N.W.2d at 536-37: Gina C., 576 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
112. Woodin, 455 N.W.2d at 537; Gina C., 576 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
113. 455 N.W.2d at 537.
114. Id.
115. 576 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
carrying the respondent's child."6
Social science research demonstrates the importance of extending
civil protection order coverage not only to parties who share a child
in common, but also to pregnant women who are carrying the
batterer's child."7 Data gathered on pregnancy and battering reveal
that pregnant women face significant and increased risk of physical
abuse."8 Recent research indicates that 37% of all obstetrical pa-
tients across race, class, and educational lines are physically abused
while pregnant.'19 Abuse often begins or escalates during pregnan-
cy. 12  Among battered women, 17% have been physically abused
during pregnancy,' with 60% of those women reporting more than
116. Id. The only other case which deals with the issues of pregnancy and standing is
rather unusual. In Robert F. Z v. Michelle McG., the court refused to issue a civil protection
order based on a child in common when the petitioner, the putative father of the respondent's
unborn child, denied paternity of the fetus in a parallel paternity suit. 513 N.Y.S.2d 628,
628-29 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
117. Violence occurs during pregnancy in almost one quarter of the families reporting
violence. Richard J. Gelles, Violence and Pregnancy: A Note on the Extent of the Problem
and Needed Services. FAMILY COORDINATOR, Jan. 1975, at 81.
118. A disproportionately large number of women are assaulted while they are pregnant.
Battered women are 3 times more likely to be injured while pregnant. Evan Stark & Anne E.
Fliteraft, Woman-Battering, Child Abuse and Social Heredity: What is the Relationship?, in
MARITAL VIOLENCE 147 (N. Johnson ed. 1985).
119. Browne, supra note 1, at 3187; A. Henton et al., Battered and Pregnant, 77 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1337, 1337-39 (1987). Among pregnant women, 59% report that battering oc-
curred during their first pregnancy, 63% during the second, and 55% during their third preg-
nancy. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4. One study indicated that 63% of the clients in a
battered women health center were battered during pregnancy. WILLIAM STACEY & ANSON
SHUPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 219 tbl. 5-3 (1983); Gelles,
supra note 117, at 81-86. A Texas survey found that between 20% and 25% of all obstetri-
cal patients are abused women. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 11, at 307-08; see also
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Nursing Assessment for Risk of Homicide with Battered Women,
ADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE, July 1986, at 36, 38 (finding 20-25% of all pregnant wom-
en are battered). Among women reporting abuse during pregnancy, 60% reported two or more
episodes of abuse. Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing for Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity
and Frequency of Injuries and Associated Entry Into Prenatal Care, 267 JAMA 3176 (1992).
120. Abuse may begin during pregnancy or may increase during the prenatal period.
Campbell, supra note 119, at 78. Mere notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for
battering and violence within the family. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey,
112 S.Ct. 2791, 2827 (1992). Most battered women report that the battering became more
acute during the pregnancy and the child's infancy. STACEY & SHUPE, supra note 119, at 31-
32 (1983). Approximately 29% of battered women report that battering increased after they
became pregnant. Judith McFarlane, Battering During Pregnancy: Tip of the Iceberg Revealed,
15 WOMEN AND HEALTH 69, 71-72 (1989).
121. FAMILY VIOLENCE COALITION, BROKEN BODIES AND BROKEN SPIRITS: FAMILY VIO-
LENCE IN MARYLAND AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1991); McFarlane, supra note
120, at 71-72. Nearly 50% of abusive husbands batter their pregnant wives. Ten Facts About
Violence Against Women: Hearing on S.101-939 Before the Committee on the Judiciary on
1993]
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one incident. 122 The primary predictor of battering during pregnancy
is prior abuse; in one study, 87.5% of women battered during the
current pregnancy were physically abused prior to pregnancy.'" Of-
ten the worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy.'24 Battering
during pregnancy increases the risk of miscarriage and low-birth
weight births."2 The March of Dimes reports that more babies are
born with birth defects as a result of the mother being battered during
pregnancy than from the combination of all the diseases for which we
immunize pregnant women. 26
The most effective way to address these dangerous oversights in
the statutes and extend civil protection order coverage to abuse vic-
tims, whether they have a child in common with the respondent,
claim to have a child in common, or are presently pregnant with the
respondent's child, is to follow the lead of Alaska, California, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Washington, and Puerto
Women and Violence, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1990). Men who batter pregnant women are
three times more likely to be violent and commit crimes outside the home. ANNE S. HELTON,
PROTOCOL OF CARE FOR THE BATrERED WOMAN: PREVENTION OF BATTERING DURING PREG-
NANCY 5 (1986); see also ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WOMEN
ABUSE: FREQUENT AND SEVERE (1983) (30%); Diane Bohn, Domestic Violence and Pregnan-
cy, 35 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 86, 88-91 (1990) (40%); Campbell, supra note 119, at 45
(45.6%); Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 11, at 309 (28%).
122. McFarlane et al., supra note 119, at 3176.
123. Id.
124. Battering during pregnancy often involves blows to the victim's abdomen and stom-
ach resulting in miscarriages and injuries to their reproductive organs. See Gelles, supra note
117, at 83; see also CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-
DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 52 (1989). Some abuse during pregnancy was focused on the head
and abused women were twice as likely as non-abused women to begin prenatal care during
the third trimester. McFarlane et al., supra note 119, at 3177.
125. MARCH OF DIMES, ALL PREGNANT WOMEN SHOULD BE EVALUATED FOR BATTERING
DURING ROUTINE PRENATAL CARE (1992); Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 11. Battered wives
are four times more likely to bear infants of low birth weight. Ten Facts About Violence
Against Women: Hearing on S.101-939 Before the Committee on the Judiciary on Women
and Violence, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1990). Battered women are four times more likely
than non-battered women to deliver low-birthweight babies. McFarlane, supra note 120, at 69;
Gelles, supra note 117, at 83.
126. NATIONAL COMMISSION TO PREVENT INFANT MORTALITY, DEATH BEFORE LIFE: THE
TRAGEDY OF INFANT MORTALITY 16 (1988); MARCH OF DIMES. supra note 125. at 3. see
also Ten Facts About Violence Against Women: Hearing on S.101-939 Before the Committee
on the Judiciary on Women and Violence, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 135 (1990); Stark &
Flitcraft, supra note 11 (finding increased risk of injury to the child); Sara Buel, Remarks at
the Opening Plenary Session of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
Conference entitled Courts and Communities: Confronting Violence in the Family (March 25,
1993). Low-birthweight babies are more likely to have birth defects and are 40 times more
likely to die in the first month of life. MARCH OF DIMES, supra note 125, at 1-2.
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Rico.' These statutes have amended statutory language to cover
dating relationships and all intimate partners. Such statutory changes
will result in the ability to more fully reach those relationships in
which violence occurs, and will prevent victims of abuse from falling
dangerously through statutory cracks.
5. Unmarried Persons of Different Genders Living as Spouses
Forty-four states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico will
issue civil protection orders to unmarried parties who live together as
spouses.' Courts look at a range of circumstances to determine
whether parties "reside together" within the meaning of the domestic
violence statutes. When defining "residing together," courts have in-
terpreted the phrase to include live-in relationships of varying lengths
and duration, whether or not the relationship produces children. 29 In
127. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West 1993);
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § I (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1
(Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-01 (Supp. 1993) (including any other substantial
relationship); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§ 602, 621 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.010 (West Supp. 1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 813.122 (West Supp. 1993). Additional-
ly, Illinois' criminal procedure statute covering domestic violence authorizes a court to issue a
criminal protection order based upon a dating relationship or an engagement. 750 ILCS
60/103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993).
128. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-1-101 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith Hurd
Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2
(West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 762 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(h) (Supp. 1993); MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § I (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B-01 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3
(Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455-010 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-
121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.B:1 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2C:20
(West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 846
(McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.705 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1992); P.R. LAWS. ANN.
tit. 8. §§ 602, 621 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.01 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-2 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813-122 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-
102 (Supp. 1993).
129. State v. Sirny, 772 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (live-in girlfriend);
1993]
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Yankoskie v. Lenker, the court outlined five factors which indicate
that the parties are "persons living as spouses": 1) the duration of the
relationship, 2) the frequency of contact, 3) the parties financial inter-
dependence, 4) whether the parties raised children together, and 5)
whether the parties engaged in tasks designed to maintain a common
household. 3
Weighing various factors, courts have concluded that maintenance
of a separate residence does not bar a finding of "residing togeth-
er."'' In Yankoskie, the court held that the parties, a boyfriend and
girlfriend, did live as spouses even though they maintained separate
residences.3 2 The parties had three children in common, he visited
her apartment almost daily with her consent, and they had shared a
residence in the past. 3 In Sapon v. Fisher,'"4 the court found a
Maksuta v. Higson, 577 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (parties who lived to-
gether for 28 years and had two children together but had never married); Cooper v. Merkel,
470 N.W.2d 253 (S.D. 1991) (parties who lived together for seven years). But see State v.
Taylor, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4749. at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1. 1990) (holding proper
the dismissal of a criminal domestic violence prosecution where the defendant abused a wom-
an he previously had lived with and with whom he had two children, where the criminal
domestic violence statute at the time placed a one year time bar on previous cohabitants and
did not extend coverage to persons who share a child in common). Today, however, both the
Ohio civil protection order statute and the criminal domestic violence statute have been
amended and would extend coverage to the petitioner if the parties share a child in common.
See Robinson v. United States, 317 A.2d 508, 510-14 (D.C. 1974) (holding that a protection
order may issue on a child against the child's mother's boyfriend with whom she and the
child had lived for three years and with whom the mother had a child in common); Hawaii
v. Ibous, 857 P.2d 576 (Haw. Sup. Ct. 1993) (extending coverage to a live-in girlfriend).
130. 526 A.2d 429, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). But see Jackson v. United States. 357
A.2d 409 (App. D.C. 1976) (holding no mutual residence for purposes of issuing a protection
order where the couple only lived together for three months, the defendant did not pay rent,
the petitioner considered the apartment hers, the couple had no children in common, and the
defendant gave his mother's address as his residence). Jackson. however, illustrates why dat-
ing relationships should be covered as well.
131. See Sapon v. Fisher, IF 745-89 (D.C. Superior Court 1989) (finding mutual resi-
dence where girlfriend and boyfriend had for some period of time spent every night together
at each other's apartments, she had clothing at his apartment, and her mother wrote her at
his apartment); see also People v. Holifield, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (hold-
ing the parties were cohabitating where respondent lived with victim in her hotel room for
more than half of the three months proceeding the assault, the respondent had no regular
place to stay, brought his belongings with him each time he came and slept with and had
occasional sex with the victim); People v. Ballard. 249 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding the defendant was living with victim for two years where they often shared the
same bed even though he had his own apartment); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that parties were living as spouses even though they maintained
separate residences, where the petitioner bore the respondent three children in three years,
visited her apartment daily, and they shared a residence in the past).
132. Yankoskie, 526 A.2d at 432.
133. Id. at 430-31.
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
mutual residence where a boyfriend and girlfriend alternated between
sleeping at each other's apartments for some period of time, where
she kept clothing at his apartment, and where her mother wrote her at
his apartment.'35 In State v. Tripp,t36 the court found that the par-
ties were co-residents for purposes of the domestic violence statute
where the defendant stayed with his girlfriend approximately three
times a week for less than 14 weeks at a house where the victim was
housesitting, where there was no certainty of continued use, where
neither paid rent, where both had alternative separate residences, and
where the defendant kept his clothes, did his laundry, ate his meals,
and slept at the house on a continuous basis.'37 In a criminal do-
mestic violence case, People v. Holifield 35 a court interpreted "re-
siding together" to include the respondent sleeping with and having
occasional sex with the victim in the victim's hotel room for half of
the three months proceeding the assault where the respondent had no
regular place to stay and where he brought his belongings with him
when he came.'39
In addition to interpreting "residing together" to include circum-
stances where the parties maintain separate residences, courts have
held that parties were cohabitating even if they did not plan to mar-
ry,14  and in criminal prosecutions, even absent a finding of any
sexual relationship. In People v. Ballard,4' the court held that for
purposes of a criminal felony cohabitant abuse statute, it need not
find a sexual relationship to establish jurisdiction.42 The court noted
that "[c]ohabitation means simply to live or dwell together in the
same habitation; evidence of lack of sexual relations is irrelevant."'
43
134. IF 745-89 (D.C. Superior Court 1989).
135. Id.
136. 795 P.2d 280 (Haw. 1990).
137. Id. at 281-83.
138. 252 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
139. Id.
140. Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (holding parties
lived together even though they were not going to marry because the petitioner wanted chil-
dren and the respondent did not).
141. 249 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
142. Id. at 809.
143. Id.; see also State v. Wagner. 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3986 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
11, 1993) (holding parties resided together where they shared a residence for two weeks, the
defendant expressed intention to stay, and they had a sexual relationship). But see State v.
Allen. 536 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that evidence of sexual relations
alone, without any other evidence of cohabitation, may not be sufficient to establish that
parties were "residing together." The victim initially stated that she and the defendant never
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Courts should issue civil protection orders even where the defen-
dant will be incarcerated for the duration of the protection order. In
Maldonado v. Maldonado,'" the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals reversed, as an abuse of discretion, a trial judge's decision not
to extend a civil protection order based solely on the fact that the
husband would be incarcerated during the duration of the civil pro-
tection order. 4 The appellate court noted that the defendant could
escape or be released prior to the expiration of the extended civil
protection order and that he had the potential to continue, from jail,
to threaten and harass the petitioner via the mail, telephone, or a third
party."4 Understanding the danger release from incarceration poses
to domestic violence victims, courts will issue protection orders where
a defendant will soon be released from jail and pose a potential threat
to the petitioner. In Campbell v. Campbell,47 the court issued a pro-
tection order to a petitioner where her husband was incarcerated for
sexual battery of their daughter but would soon be released. 48 The
court held that the injunction was proper because the "husband had a
violent temper, behaved violently in the past, blamed [the petitioner]
for the arrest, and ...would soon be released from jail." 49
6. Intimate Partners of the Same Gender
For state civil protection order statutes to address fully the do-
mestic violence crisis, they must recognize and combat violence in
both homosexual and heterosexual intimate relationships. The civil
protection order statutes of thirty-four states, Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia extend their coverage to homosexual relation-
ships by providing protection to those who have lived together or
who have had an intimate relationship. 5 Other jurisdictions offer
lived together, but later recalled that he had lived with her for three or four months three or
four years ago. The court found that since she had only pointed to evidence of sexual rela-
tions, there was insufficient evidence of cohabitation).
144. 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 227 (D.C. Ct. App. June 22, 1993).
145. Id. at *6.
146. Id. at *8.
147. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1991).
148. Id.
149. ld. at 26. But see Vanderhurst v. Rice, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 225. 228 (C.P 1980)
(refusing to hold that the respondent's five year incarceration constituted a constructive mutual
residence with petitioner to establish "residing together" for purposes of the domestic violence
statute).
150. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.060 (1993) (dating or courtship relationship); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 70 (West Supp. 1993) (dating relationship); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-101
(Supp. 1993) (intimate relationship); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a (West Supp. 1993)
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this relief by case law and statutory interpretation by trial courts. In
Bryant v. Bryant,' the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly inter-
preted their amended statute as applying to homosexual relationships
which turn violent.
152
Ohio case law states affirmatively that its criminal domestic
violence statute applies to relationships between persons of the same
gender living together. In State v. Hadinger,'53 the appellate court
vacated a trial court's decision to dismiss a domestic violence prose-
(persons "presently residing together or who have resided together"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1001 (1992) (parties who share or have shared a mutual residence); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
13-1 (Supp. 1993) ("other persons living or formerly living in the same household"); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992) ("persons jointly residing or formerly residing in the same
dwelling unit"); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993) ("persons who reside or have resided togeth-
er"); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (persons who have or formerly shared a
common dwelling); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.2 (West Supp. 1993) (persons cohabitating); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Supp. 1992)
(persons who reside together or formerly resided together where both parties continue to have
access to the residence); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992) (persons
presently or formerly living together as sexual partners); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-
501 (Supp. 1993) (persons in a sexual relationship who live or have lived together); MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. § 209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1993) (substantive dating relationship); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 1986) ("person residing or having resided in the same
household"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993) (persons presently or previous-
ly resided together); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Supp. 1992) (persons residing together or
who have resided together); NEV. REV. STAr. ANN. § 33.018 (Michie 1986) (person with
whom residing or with whom previously resided); N.H. REX,. STAT. ANN. § 173.B:I (Supp.
1992) (current or former sexual or intimate partners); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West
1992) (present or former household member); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp.
1993) (present or former household member); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993)
(persons in a dating or other sufficient relationship); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(Baldwin Supp. 1992) (person cohabitating with respondent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.1 (West 1992) ("persons living in the same household or who formerly lived in the
same household"); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (1991) (persons who are cohabiting or previ-
ously cohabitated); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1991) (sexual or intimate partners);
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 602 (Supp. 1990) (intimate consensual relationship); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 8-8.1-1 (Supp. 1992) (persons who shared an intimate sexual relationship within the
last six months); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1984) (persons who live or have
lived together); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (1991) (persons jointly residing in same dwell-
ing unit); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01 (West Supp. 1993) (persons who live or previously
lived together); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.010 (West Supp. 1993) (dating relationship); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (West Supp.
1992) ("current or former sexual intimate partners"); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp.
1993) (person currently or previously residing in a place of abode with another person);
WYo. STAT. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993) (includes other adults sharing common living orders).
151. 624 A.2d 584 (NJ. 1993).
152. Id. (stating that the act applies to "lesbians and gay men caught in violent relation-
ships").
153. 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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cution where one woman bit the hand of another woman with whom
she was "living as a spouse," remanding the case."4 The appellate
court focused on the fact that the parties lived together rather than on
their sexual relationship, and rejected a construction of the statute
which would require the parties' ability to marry under state law as a
prerequisite for coverage.' The court noted that since the statute
defined "person living as a spouse" to include a person "who other-
wise is cohabitating with the offender," it reflected the legislature's
intent to protect domestic violence victims regardless of gender or
gender preference. 6 The Ohio criminal domestic violence statute
and civil protection order statute contain identical definitions of "per-
son living as a spouse."' 7 Since the standard for criminal prosecu-
tion is higher than that for issuance of a civil protection order, civil
protection order issuing courts in other jurisdictions should extend
coverage to homosexual relationships as well. In Glater v.
Fabianich,' the appellate court upheld a decision below to grant a
petition for a protection order to a man whose male roommate pushed
him, choked him, and repeatedly threatened him after their intimate
relationship ended. 9 The lower court granted the protection order
after an analysis of the parties' living arrangements."6 The petitioner
had stayed at the respondent's apartment every night for three
months, kept clothing there, spent 90% of his time in the apartment,
and contributed to household expenses.'
The policy considerations which compel the state to act to pro-
tect victims of domestic violence in heterosexual relationships are
equally applicable to homosexual relationships." Domestic violence
exists in homosexual as well as heterosexual relationships. 6  The
154. Id. at 1191.
155. Id. at 1192-93.
156. Id. at 1193.
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31.
158. 625 N.E.2d 96 (II1. Ct. App. 1993).
159. Id. at 98.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 99.
162. NANCY HAMMOND, NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BAT-
TERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Bat-
tered Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony For Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Part-
ners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993); Ruthan Robson. Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Vio-
lence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567 (1990); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in
Work on Woman Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992).
163. The New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project noted a 180% increase
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dynamics of violence in abusive homosexual and lesbian intimate
relationships resembles the patterns of abuse in heterosexual relation-
ships. The rate of occurrence of the violence, its severity, and its
tendency to escalate over time are very similar. Studies indicate that
abuse occurs in approximately 20% of all homosexual and lesbian
relationships." 4 Like battered partners in heterosexual relationships,
homosexual intimates also report physical assaults, assaults with
weapons, rape, property damage, harassment, death threats, and psy-
chological abuse, including threats of exposure of the victims sexual
orientation.65 The dynamics of violence in homosexual relationships
also reveal the same tendency of the violence to escalate in both fre-
quency and severity as the relationship progresses." Significant sep-
aration violence during and closely following the end of the relation-
ship also exists in abusive homosexual and lesbian relationships. 67
Finally, homosexual and lesbian victims, like their heterosexual coun-
terparts, also typically make several attempts before they are success-
ful and finally leave their batterer.'6 Consequently, state protection
order statutes must also extend coverage to homosexual and lesbian
victims of intimate abuse.
7. Dating Relationships
Twelve progressive state statutes in Alaska, California, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsyl-
vania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Washington, and West Virginia
extend coverage of protection orders to parties in dating relation-
ships.69 Courts in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma support
in domestic violence cases recorded between 1990 to 1991. In 1991, domestic violence cases
comprised 31% of its case load. NYC GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991).
164. Bricker, supra note 162, at 1388.
165. Id. at 1389-91.
166. Id. at 1392.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1393.
169. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993) ("person ... in a dating, courtship, or
engagement relationship with the respondent"); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West Supp. 1992)
("person with whom the respondent has had a dating or engagement relationship"); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762(4) (1992) ("includes individuals presently or formerly living togeth-
er as sexual partners"); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A. § I (West 1992) ("persons who ...
are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship, which shall be adjudged
by district, probate or Boston municipal courts consideration of the following factors: (1) the
length of time of the relationship; (2) the type of relationship; (3) the frequency of interac-
tion between the parties; and (4) if the relationship has been terminated by either person, the
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this innovative approach of issuing civil protection orders based on a
dating relationship.'
Social science research that documents violence in dating rela-
tionships supports offering broader civil protection order coverage to
dating partners and adolescents.'" A study of teen dating violence
found that roughly one in four students experienced actual violence,
either as victims or as perpetrators.' A 1985 survey at a midwest-
length of time elapsed since the termination of the relationship"): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:1 (Supp. 1992) ("intimate partners means persons currently or formerly involved in a
romantic relationship, whether or not such relationship was ever sexually consummated");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993) (person with whom petitioner has continu-
ing personal relationship); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-01 (Supp. 1993) ("family or household
member means . . . persons who are in a dating relationship . . . [or] any other sufficient
relationship to the abusing person"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1992) ("sexual or
intimate partner"); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 602 (Supp. 1990) ("Marital relationship shall
mean . . . those who have or have had an intimate consensual relationship."); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 8-8.1-1 (Supp. 1992) ("persons who shared an intimate sexual relationship within the
past six (6) months"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993); ("per-
sons sixteen years of age or older with whom a respondent sixteen years of age or older has
or has had a dating relationship . . . . 'Dating relationship' means a social relationship of a
romantic nature. Factors that the court may consider in making this determination include: (a)
the length of time the relationship has existed; (b) the nature of the relationship; and (c) the
frequency of interaction between the parties"); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1993) ("cur-
rent or former sexual or intimate partners").
170. Flury v. Howard, 813 P.2d 1052 (Okla. 1991) (issuing order against person with
whom petitioner had a dating relationship); Diehl v. Drummond, 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 376 (C.P.
1989) (issuing order against petitioner's 16 year old boyfriend); Banks v. Pelot, 460 N.W.2d
446 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990) (issuing order to girlfriend against respondent who she had dated
on and off for two years).
171. In some domestic violence cases the perpetrator and/or the victim may be adoles-
cents who are engaging in the same pattern of abusive behavior as occur in adult relation-
ships. See Ganley, supra note 21, at 22.
Estimates of the rates of physical violence in dating relationships range from 20% to
67%. See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 42 (1987) (21%-30%);
RICHARD GELLES & CLAIRE PEDRICK CORNELL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 65 (1987)
(10%-67%); NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, STATISTICS
PACKET: 1992 ADDENDUM ONLY 14 (1992) (stating that "studies of high school and college
students conducted during the 1980s have reported rates of dating violence ranging from 12%
to 65%"); NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, Family Violence:
The Facts, 1 JUV. AND FAM. JUST. TODAY 21, 21 (1993); Lisa Morrell, Violence in Premari-
tal Relationships, 7 RESPONSE 17 (1984) (21.2%); Nona K. O'Keefe et al., Teen Dating Vio-
lence, SOCIAL WORK, Nov./Dec. 1986. at 465, 465-66 (12%-26.9%); Linda P. Rouse et al..
Abuse in Intimate Relationships: A Comparison of Married and Dating College Students, 3 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 414, 422-23 (1988) (reporting that 28.2% of heterosexual dating
students had been pushed, shoved, or grabbed by a dating partner, and that 30% of battered
women eventually marry someone who had abused them during courtship); Stark & Flitcraft,
supra note 11, at 301 (discussing four studies of premarital or courtship violence on college
campuses, with findings of physical aggression or threats in 13.5%, 19%, 31.5%, and 42% of
the relationships, respectively); Price, supra note 4 (33%).
172. O'Keefe, supra note 171, at 467 (12%-26.9%) (noting that high school students who
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em university found higher rates of violence in dating relationships
than between married couples. Another study reported that 32% of
domestic violence offenders are boyfriends or ex-boyfriends
These studies demonstrate that the prevalence of violence in
dating relationships rivals and may surpass the rate of violence be-
tween married or cohabitating couples. Authorizing the use of civil
protection orders to protect against dating violence provides an impor-
tant opportunity to intervene early to halt escalating violence and
teach youthful offenders that violence in intimate relationships will
not be tolerated. Learning this lesson while young may prevent many
future cases of adult domestic violence. To address fully the domestic
violence crisis, all state statutes should be amended to extend civil
protection order coverage to dating relationships.
8. Persons Offering Refuge
Two forward-looking state statutes, from Hawaii and Illinois,
explicitly extend civil protection order protection to persons with
whom the abused party seeks refuge. 5 California case law also
supports this approach.'76 This innovative extension of civil protec-
tion order coverage recognizes that batterers often direct violence and
intimidation against persons who give aid and refuge to abused par-
ties. Batterers may seek to control and isolate the abused party by
making threats against persons who give shelter or assistance."V By
reported spousal violence between their parents had a statistically greater rate of violence in
their dating relationships. More than 51% of students who witnessed their parents being abu-
sive to each other had been involved in an abusive relationship. Furthermore, 47% of the
students who were abused as children had been in a dating relationship in which violence
occurred.)
173. lan. E Stets & Murray A. Strauss, The Marriage License as a Hitting License: A
Comparison of Assaults in Dating, Cohabiting, and Married Couples, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTION TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 227,
227-44 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds., 1990).
174. HARLOW, supra note 3. at 2.
175. HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp. 1992) ("The order may be granted to any person
who . . . filed a petition on behalf of a family or household member"); 725 ILCS 5/112A-4
(Smith Hurd Supp. 1993) ("Persons protected by this Act [include] . . . any person residing
or employed at a private home or public shelter which is housing an abused family or
household member").
176. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Coppola, 268 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding
issuance of civil protection order to protect both the petitioner and her sister who gave her
refuge).
177. Ganley, supra note 21. at 19, 37, 53 ("Domestic violence ripples out into the com-
munity as the perpetrator's violence also results in the death or injury of those attempting to
assist the victim .... " Assaults and threats can be directed toward persons offering refuge
19931
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extending coverage to persons offering refuge and assistance, these
civil protection order statutes undermine the batterer's ability to intim-
idate others from aiding the abused party, and reduce the abused
party's reluctance to seek assistance from others.
Separated women are very vulnerable to continued abuse from
their husbands or intimate partners. Violence often escalates after
separation.'78 Batterers often stalk their partners who leave them and
will threaten or harass not only their intimate partner, but also the
persons who shelter her."9 The stalking and harassment may contin-
ue for months, or even years, after separation.8" Many battered
women will resist seeking shelter and assistance from friends and
family out of fear of placing them and their children in danger from
the batterer."8'
Perhaps most importantly, providing civil protection order pro-
tection to persons who offer refuge undermines the batterer's sense of
control, alleviates the abused party's sense of isolation, and signifi-
cantly improves the abused party's safety. Further, extending civil
protection order coverage to persons offering refuge may also vastly
improve the quality of evidence that can be presented in civil protec-
tion order contempt trials and criminal domestic violence proceedings.
It may help prevent batterers from scaring off key witnesses who
might otherwise assist the victim by testifying. Offering protection to
persons who offer refuge to battering victims may help limit the
batterer's access to them, while also calming their legitimate fears of
the batterer.
9. Other Persons Covered
Progressive jurisdictions extend civil protection order coverage to
other persons who are not currently family members or intimates. For
and others both inside and outside the courtroom.).
178. H.M. Hughes, Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children of Battered Women, 2 VIOLENCE
UPDATE 1, 1-11 (1992).
179. Id.
180. Id. 1-11: see also BROWNE, supra note 171, at 114. Women who fled have been
forced back at gunpoint, forced to return when the batterer held a gun to a child's head,
tracked across state lines to get them to return, and tracked down after seven years. CHARLES
P. EWING, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIF1-
CATION 28 (1987).
181. According to one researcher, 80% of batterers engage in violent behavior towards
other targets, including acting abusively towards other people. Lenore E. Walker, Eliminating
Sexism to End Battering Relationships, Remarks at the American Psychological Association
(1984).
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example, Florida and Oklahoma protect the present spouse of the
batterer's ex-spouse.8 2 Forty states and the District of Columbia
protect persons who formerly lived as spouses."3 Thirty-seven states
recognize that violence may extend to all persons living in the home
when a victim is stalked and harassed by the batterer. I" To ensure
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West
1992); see also 750 ILCS 601103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (providing that a criminal protec-
tion order will issue to a person related by a present or prior marriage).
183. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp.
1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-101
(Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a (West Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1001 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1
(Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1992); 750
ILCS 601103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Supp. 1992);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19. § 762 (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 1
(West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 455.010 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903
(Supp. 1992); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:I (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2
(Michie Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5OB-1 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01
(1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Baldwin Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.1 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102
(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-60 (Supp.
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (Supp.
1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.120 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp.
1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-102 (Supp.
1993).
184. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp.
1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West
Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144-101 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-38a (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1992); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1993) IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (West
Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1992); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (Vest 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1993); MO.
REV. STAT. § 455.010 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-903 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:1 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B-I (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(Baldwin Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.705 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1
(Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-10-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-60 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.120 (West 1992); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12
(West Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993).
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a safe living environment for women whom shelters cannot accommo-
date, 185 these states grant civil protection order coverage to unrelated
household members.'86 Four states limit this protection to unrelated
household members who are present or past sexual partners."s Thir-
ty-five states extend civil protection order coverage to former unrelat-
ed household members.' The New Mexico statute provides for is-
185. Battered women's shelters can accept only a fraction of the battered women and
children who turn to them for help. Women and Violence, Hearings on S.101-939 Before the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 128 (1990): Olga Dwyer & Eileen
Tully, N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. HOUSING FOR
BATTERED WOMEN 9 (1989). Domestic violence is the main reason most families with chil-
dren are homeless in the United States. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL-
OPMENT, REPORT ON THE 1988 NATIONAL SURVEY OF SHELTERS FOR THE HOMELESS 14
(1989).
186. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp.
1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West
Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-101 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-38a (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1992); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith Hurd Supp.
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (West
Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1992); MtCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1993); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 455.010 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-903 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:I (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 5OB-I (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(Baldwin Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.705 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1991); R.I. GEM. LAWS § 8-8.1-1
(Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-10-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-60 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.120 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12
(West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993).
187. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2132 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); W.
VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1993).
188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103
(Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 70 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-4-101 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1992); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2
(West Supp. 1993) (applying where parties lived together within past year); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3102 (Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992) (applying
to past or present sexual partners); MASS. GEN. L,. ANN. ch. 209A, § I (West Supp. 1992);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West
Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121
(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (Michie
1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp.
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
suance of a civil protection order to a person with whom the petition-
er has a continuing relationship,"9 and North Dakota offers protec-
tion to a member of any "sufficient" relationship with the abuser."
The approach adopted by New Mexico and North Dakota allows the
court to intervene and offer protection to stop violence in a broad
array of cases. Under such statutes, civil protection orders may issue
against stalkers or against a person who consistently pursues the peti-
tioner with unwanted advances. 9 t Finally, Illinois recognizes the in-
creased vulnerability of persons with disabilities, and therefore explic-
itly extends coverage to the assistants of dependent adults.'92
In Sandoval v. Mendez,'93 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals refused to overturn the dismissal of a petition for a protec-
tion order against a household member with whom the trial court
found the petitioner did not share an intimate relationship. The peti-
tioner lived with her boyfriend, her boyfriend's cousin, and the
cousin's boyfriend.'94 She filed for a civil protection order against
the boyfriend of her boyfriend's cousin.' 95 The Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal of the petition based on what it described as the
trial court's "not plainly wrong" factual finding of no intimate rela-
1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Baldwin
Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705
(1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-60 (Supp.
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West
1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1993) (applying to past and present sexual partners);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp. 1993).
189. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D) (Michie Supp. 1993) ("'household member'
means . . . a person with whom the petitioner has had a continuing personal relationship.
Cohabitation is not necessary to be deemed a household member for purposes of this sec-
tion").
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-01.4 (Supp. 1993) (defining "[family or household
member" as including any "person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing person as
determined by the court").
191. This approach is being proposed by the Federal Anti-Stalking Task Force of the De-
partment of Justice Programs. George Lardner, Federal Task Force Suggest States Make
Stalking a Felony Offense, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993, at 19.
192. 750 ILCS 601103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); see also 725 ILCS 5/112A-3 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993). The Illinois criminal statute on domestic violence allows for the issuance
of a criminal civil protection order to persons with disabilities and their assistants. Approx-
imately 85% of all women with disabilities have been victims of domestic violence in their
intimate relationships. Price, supra note 4.
193. 521 A.2d 1168 (D.C. 1987).




tionship.' % It concluded that the trial court's failure to consider
whether an intimate relationship required a sexual relationship was
harmless error.'97 The strong dissent, however, argued that the ma-
jority ignored the issue of law of what constitutes an "intimate rela-
tionship."'98 The dissent argued that the trial court had indeed con-
cluded that an intimate relationship within the meaning of the statute
requires a sexual relationship.' The dissent concluded, however,
that based on the legislative history of the code section as well as
common understanding of the meaning of "intimate," which is broad-
er than "sexual," the trial court erred by not finding an intimate rela-
tionship.' °
The Sandoval majority failed to recognize the danger present in
household relationships which are neither familial or sexual in na-
ture.2 ' The need to protect against violence happening behind
closed doors is equally compelling in these relationships. In Sandoval,
the parties included extended-family members living under the same
roof where the boyfriend of one cousin beat the other cousin's female
partner.2 2 Extending the Supreme Court's ruling in Moore v. East
Cleveland2 3 to this context, it becomes even more compelling that
domestic violence statutes should extend to both extended family
members and unrelated household members, because they are vulnera-
ble to abuse in their own home and may be forced to leave their
home to avoid violence.
B. Who May File For Protection Under
Civil Protection Order Statutes
1. Abused Party
Statutes and case law in all states and the District of Columbia
provide that the adult abused party may petition the court for an
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1172-73.
199. Id. at 1172.
200. Id. at 1173.
201. But see, e.g., People v. Sirvano, 21 Cal Rptr. 2d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
wife's housemate to be a "cohabitant" in the context of a criminal case); In re Marriage of
Patricia McCoy, 1993 WL 512877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that issuance of protection
order to petitioner may extend protection to petitioner's household members. Abuse of one
household member is sufficient basis to include other household members in protection order
aimed to prevent respondent's retaliation).
202. Id.
203. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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order of protection.2 Kentucky statutorily provides that any resident
who has fled within the state in order to escape domestic violence is
eligible to file a petition for a protection order in the district court of
their usual residence, or the district court of their current resi-
dence. 5 The courts of New York have made that state the first in
the country to extend eligibility to file for a civil protection order to
anyone who has fled there in order to avoid abuse, as long as the
respondent has minimal contacts with the state."° Several states al-
204. ALA. CODE § 30-5-5 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (Supp. 1962); ARi.. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Michie Supp. 1993);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 75 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 (Supp.
1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 946 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West
Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6304 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West Supp. 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104 (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Baldwin Supp.
1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 764 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-504 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4) (West Supp. 1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.020 (Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 404-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.020 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (1990); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 846 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (1989); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-02 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Baldwin Supp. 1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.710 (1991); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-2 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 204-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-3 (1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-602 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15. § 1103 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-4 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-21-103 (Supp. 1993); see, e.g., State Ex reL Patrick v. Kidd, 631 S.W.2d 666, 668
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the policy not allowing pro se petition under the Protec-
tion from Abuse Act when the person seeking to do so is represented by counsel in a pend-
ing action for dissolution of marriage was contrary to the intent of the Act); Lucke v. Lucke,
300 N.W.2d 231, 232, 234 (N.D. 1980) (holding an eighteen year old may file for her own
protection as an adult); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 301.
205. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1992) ("Any family member
who has been a resident of this state or has fled to this state to escape domestic violence
and abuse may file a verified petition in the District Court of the county in which he re-
sides. If the petitioner has left his usual place of residence within this state in order to avoid
domestic violence and abuse the petition may be filed and a proceeding held in the District
Court in the county of his usual residence or the District Court in the county of current
residence.").
206. Pierson v. Pierson, 555 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (Jurisdiction over a Florida
resident was upheld. After having experienced repeated threats and assault on herself and her
son by her husband, petitioner left Florida and moved to New York with her son where she
filed for a protection order. Her husband appealed the order on the ground that the New
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low an emancipated minor to file on his or her own behalf,27 and
most state courts allow a parent or other adult to file for a civil
protection order on behalf of a minor child."°
There is a clear consensus that in order to be most effective,
civil protection orders must be available to victims with or without an
attorney. Domestic violence experts recommend that state statutes
specify the availability of pro se procedures for the filing, service,
and enforcement of civil protection orders, and that sample forms
should be developed and used.2° Of those few jurisdictions that
originally required a government attorney to file the petitioners' pro-
tection orders, most have now adopted a pro se process.21 Although
York Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Family Court held that where the
defendant was personally served with legal process, the family court had subject matter juris-
diction of the family offense proceeding notwithstanding the fact that all of the incidents
occurred outside the state. The defendant's return to New York satisfied the "minimal con-
tacts" requirement, and had the appellant remained in Florida the risk of continued family
violence would have dissipated unlike in the present situation.).
207. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(2) (1989) ("Any person 18 years of age or older, or who oth-
erwise is emancipated."); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1 (West Supp. 1993) ("person" who may
petition any court for a protection order includes human beings aged 18 or older and
emancipated minors); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(1) (West 1982) ("adult [who may seek
relief alleging abuse] means any person under the age eighteen who has been emancipated by
marriage or otherwise"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992) ("victim of domestic vio-
lence means . . . any person who is 18 years of age or older or who is an emancipated
minor"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(A) (1992) ("An adult or emancipated minor may
seek relief under this chapter."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1 (Supp. 1993) ("'Cohabitants':
[elmancipated minors or persons (18) years of age or older, not related by blood or marriage,
who together are not the legal parents of one or more children, and who have resided togeth-
er . . . or who are residing in the same quarters."); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-102(a)(1) (Supp.
1993) (filing may be completed by anyone sixteen years of age or older).
208. See supra note 73.
209. Hart, supra note 11, at 25. Courts must not only ensure that court forms are devel-
oped, but also that they be made and kept readily available to pro se petitioners. When
forms are unavailable, victims must seek and often pay for legal representation to assist them
in obtaining a civil protection order. Lack of access to lawyers combines with unavailability
of forms to bar battered women from relief through the courts. See Gender and Justice in
the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias
in the Judicial System (1991), reprinted in 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 539, 586 (1992).
210. For example, the District of Columbia's original civil protection order statute had a
policy that required the city's prosecuting attorney to file on behalf of the victim. A pro se
process was established in 1982 largely in response to the very limited number of state fund-
ed attorneys available to represent battered women, leaving many victims without access to
the courts. The legislative history of the 1982 amendment sheds light on the purpose of
allowing victims to file on their own behalf:
Section 4 amends D.C. Code, sec. 16-1003 to create a victim's right to pursue
privately a civil protection order in addition to the current right to seek protection
through a petition filed by the Office of the Corporation Counsel. The creation of
a private right of action is designed: (1) to promote a prompt resolution of an
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requiring an attorney may have appeared to be beneficial to the
abused party on its face, as it gives her theoretical representation by a
skilled professional, in practice it hinders access to the judicial
system's protection. The right to petition either with or without a
lawyer enables more abused parties to swiftly seek assistance from
the courts, and can serve to empower them in their struggle to com-
bat and terminate the violence which has plagued their lives. As the
National Institute of Justice concluded "[piro se petitioning, partic-
ularly in cases in which legal counsel is not generally available to
lower and middle-income victims, is an important component in guar-
anteeing access to protection. '
In recognizing the benefits of the pro se process, however, it is
also necessary to acknowledge the problems. While we need a pro-
cess that guarantees access to all needy abused persons, battered
women who can obtain legal assistance from trained counsel are
much more likely to receive civil protection orders which contain
complete and effective relief."2 Ideally, the country needs more at-
torneys who are able and willing to act as battered women's advo-
cates." 3
Another solution to the lack of legal representation for battered
women is to increase the role of lay advocates. Ideally, battered
women's advocates' services to battered women in court will comple-
ment services available from volunteer and legal services attorneys.
intrafamily offense problem- and (2) to facilitate the effectiveness of the civil pro-
tection remedy by not requiring all alleged victims to go through the already
heavily burdened Office of the Corporation Counsel.
COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REPORT 83 (May
12. 1982) (committee report on The Proceedings Regarding Intrafamily Offenses Amendment
Act of 1982).
211. NiJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 24.
212. Id. at 19.
213. TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, FINAL REPORT 146, 161 (May 1992) [herein-
after D.C. TASK FORCE] (finding that civil protection orders are more likely to be awarded
after trial if petitioner is represented by counsel and fewer cases are returned to files without
court action. The report concluded that counsel should be appointed to represent petitioners in
civil protection order contempt actions for enforcement and that representation of petitioners
by members of the private bar should be encouraged). For a full discussion of attorney repre-
sentation of petitioners in civil protection order cases, see infra notes 1612-23 and accompa-
nying text.
As violence continues, greater numbers of battered women turn to informal and formal
sources for help. Between the first and last violent incident, the use of lawyers rises from
6% to 50%, while that of social service agencies increases from 8% to 43%. SUSAN
SCHECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 232 (1982).
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This solution requires cooperation between lawyers and non-lawyer
advocates, who should be authorized to represent battered women
who go to court seeking civil protection orders. Lay battered women's
advocates can help battered women prepare court papers, talk with
them in the halls of court houses about their rights, and assist bat-
tered women who have uncomplicated cases. Cases that present com-
plex or contested issues would be referred for representation by attor-
neys." 4 Both the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges and the National Institute of Justice strongly recommend the
expansion of the use of lay advocates to assist victims of domestic
violence." 5
2. Adults Authorized To File Civil Protection Order Petitions
on Behalf of Other Adults, Children, and Incapacitated
Persons
Two state statutes specify that an adult may file for another adult
who is unable to go to court." 6 Ohio has taken the lead by provid-
ing that an adult can file on behalf of any other abused adult in the
household, whether or not the adult petitioner is related to the vic-
tim.217 This statute expands upon the Ohio appellate court's finding
in Carney v. Pankey1 5 that the mother of an adult victim can peti-
tion for a civil protection order on the victim's behalf."9
Most states, either by case law, statute,20 or practice, routinely
permit adult household members or other adults to file for a protec-
tion order on behalf of a minor child or incompetent.22' Courts have
214. See infra notes 1606-11 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the
benefits of lay advocacy.
215. Richard J. Gable & Ellen H. Nimick, Evaluation of the Family Violence Project of
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, 41 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 45, 47
(1990); see also NU CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 24-26.
216. 725 ILCS 40/103(12) (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(h) (West 1992).
217. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(c) (Baldwin 1992).
218. No. 87 C.A. 85, 1988 WL 34644 (Ohio Ct. App. March 4, 1988)
219. Id. (holding that the statute stating that any parent or adult household member may
seek relief on behalf of another family or household member applied to adult victims of
domestic violence); see also In re Matter of J.E.P., 432 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
220. ALA. CODE § 30-5-5 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Michie 1992); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3102 (1992); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403-25(2) (Baldwin, 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2134 (West 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Baldwin 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.50.020 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (1992).
221. See supra part I.A.3 for further discussion of the coverage of children in civil pro-
tection orders. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 301.
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allowed both custodial and noncustodial parents to file for civil pro-
tection orders on behalf of their children against the other parent,2'
the boyfriend of the other parent," step-siblings or half-siblings,'
or the child's paternal aunts.' Statutes also authorize government
attorneys to file for civil protection orders on behalf of domestic
violence victims.2
26
222. See, e.g., Harriman v. Harriman, 1990 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1200 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 25, 1990) (holding that a father can obtain a temporary restraining order on behalf of
his child where he can prove that he or the child had been subjected to abuse as defined
under the state statute); Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that a father's sexual battery of his three year old daughter warranted allowing the
mother's petition for the issuance of a temporary protection order against him, despite the
petition having been procedurally improper); Ellibee v. Ellibee. 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1991);
Wright v. Wright, 583 N.E.2d 97 (ill. App. Ct. 1991); Tillman v. Snow, 571 N.E.2d 578
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So. 2d 1083 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding
grant of a temporary protection order to noncustodial mother under the domestic abuse assis-
tance statute on behalf of her minor child alleging that the custodial father had engaged in
inappropriate sexual behavior with the minor child); Harper v. Harper, 537 So. 2d 282 (La.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that where the husband constantly made threats to his wife, tried to
pull her from her car, had a bad temper, and scared their child, the finding of domestic
abuse was sufficient to entitle the wife to file for a civil protection order on behalf of the
child); Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 376 (Me. 1990) (acknowledging the mother's right to file
a petition for domestic abuse on behalf of her minor children); Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d
335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990) (holding that under
the protection order statute, a civil protection order may be issued to a father on behalf of
his children where the children's mother, his wife, had substantially abused and neglected
them); Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992); In re Penny R., 509 A.2d 338 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 504 A.2d 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that
the mother could only obtain temporary visitation rights and ancillary relief against sexually
abusive father regarding her minor children because the Protection From Abuse Act was not
meant to establish procedure for determining permanent custody of children); Keith v. Keith,
28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462 (C.P. 1984). But see Holcombe v. Foster, 388 S.E.2d 807 (S.C. 1990)
(holding mother may not seek a protection order for her emancipated 18 year old daughter).
223. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Eldert, 511 N.E.2d 945 (il App. Ct. 1987) (upholding
the grant if two ex parte orders awarding custody to father when he alleged that the
mother's boyfriend spanked and battered his child).
224. Wright v. Wright, 583 N.E.2d 97 (l. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that order of protec-
tion pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 may be entered against a minor,
in this case, the father's son).
225. Tillman v. Snow, 571 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding a civil protection
order prohibiting contact between the child and her natural father and paternal aunts).




C. Conduct Sufficient to Support Issuance of a
Civil Protection Order227
The following sections discuss the various types of acts which
courts have identified as abuse sufficient to support the issuance of a
protection order. In Knuth v. Knuth,"8 the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals discussed generally the broad range of acts which may warrant
a civil protection order.2 9 The court held that a civil protection or-
der may issue not only for actual physical harm, but also for acts
which inflict the fear of imminent bodily injury.' While the court
must find some overt action indicating present intent to do harm or
cause fear of imminent harm, the court does not need to find an
overt physical act.' A verbal threat can be sufficient to inflict fear
of imminent physical harm?2 The cases which follow reflect this
broad approach to defining domestic abuse.
Victims of domestic abuse experience a cycle of violence which
escalates over time. 3 Victims of domestic violence suffer various
types of abuse during the course of their relationships with batterers.
The various forms of abuse that can form the basis for issuance of a
civil protection order may include emotional abuse, threats, harass-
ment, and stalking. Such abuse often escalates into attempts to harm
the victim, sexual assault, and battery.' As the frequency of batter-
ing episodes increase, the more severe each battering incident often
becomes. When battering continues over years, it becomes more and
more dangerous, progressing from punches to the use of weapons.2
Since the cycle of violence in an abusive relationship tends to esca-
late into more violent behavior, civil protection orders should issue
based on a wide range of abuse in order to permit early intervention
and prevention of more serious injuries. 6
227. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at §§ 102, 201.





233. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 4, at 30.
234. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 4. at 44 (indicating that 66% of women reported
battering becoming more frequent, 65% reported that physical abuse worsened, and 73% re-
ported psychological abuse becoming more severe); BROWNE, supra note 171. at 68.
235. GILLESPIE. supra note 124, at 129 (stating that the number of women hit with an
object in the most serious incident of violence was twice the number hit with an object in
the first incident); see also TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 4.
236. Domestic violence is cyclical. The violence increases in both frequency and severity
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1. Criminal Acts
A wide range of criminal acts may form the basis for a civil
protection order. State statutes specifically authorize protection orders
based on almost any criminal act,"s7 including physical abuse of the
petitioner or a child,238  criminal trespass," kidnapping,24
unless there is outside intervention. Ganley, supra note 21, at 23. Ganley emphasizes that:
Domestic violence consists of a wide range of behaviors, including some of the
same behaviors found in stranger violence. Some acts of domestic violence are
criminal (hitting, choking, kicking, assault with a weapon, shoving, scratching, bit-
ing, rape, unwanted sexual touching, forcing sex with third parties, threats of vio-
lence, harassment at work, stalking, destruction of property, attacks against pets,
etc.) while other behaviors may not constitute criminal conduct (degrading com-
ments, interrogating children or other family members, suicide threats or attempts,
controlling access to the family resources: time, money, food, clothing, shelter, as
well as controlling the abused party's time and activities, etc.). Whether or not
there has been a finding of criminal conduct, evidence of these behaviors indicates
a pattern of abusive control which has devastating effects on the family.
Id.
237. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(3) (West 1992); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1002 (1992); LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (West 1992); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812
(McKinney Supp. 1994).
238. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1992), ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.060 (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601 (1992); CAL FAM. CODE § 5500 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-4-101 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1992); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 945 (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-100 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1992);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-
6303 (1992); 725 ILCS 40/2311 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-1 (1992); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.2 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.720 (Baldwin 1992) (issuing for threats of physical and sexual abuse as well); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 26 (1992); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § I (West 1992);
MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 93.21 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1992);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (1992); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-121 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018
(1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-19 (West 1992);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie 1992); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 812 (McKinney Supp.
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-I (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (1992); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 322-60.1 (West 1992);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-15-1 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.01 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101
(1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-233 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West
1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(3) (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813-12 (West 1992);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-122 (1992).
239. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19
(1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020
(1992).
240. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020 (West 1992).
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burglary,24 t  malicious mischief,242  interference with child custo-
dy,243 and reckless endangerment.2"
Research data supports this approach. Of violent crimes by inti-
mates reported by female victims, 85-88% were assaults, 10-11%
were robberies, and 2-3% were rapes.245 Approximately one-quarter
of the assaults were aggravated, meaning that the offender had used a
weapon or had seriously injured the victim. The remaining assaults
were simple, indicating either a minor injury-bruises, black eyes,
cuts, scratches, swelling, or undetermined injuries requiring less than
2 days of hospitalization-or a verbal threat of harm.2 46 One-half of
these incidents classified as "simple assaults" actually involve bodily
injury at least as serious as the injury inflicted in 90% of all robber-
ies and aggravated assaults.247 If reported, one-third of all domestic
violence cases would have been charged as felony rape or felony
assault if they had been committed against strangers.24  Epidemio-
logic surveys found that abuse ranged from being slapped, punched,
kicked, or thrown bodily to being scalded, choked, smothered, or bit-
ten.24 Typically, assaultive episodes involve a combination of as-
saultive acts, verbal abuse, and threats. Over 80% of all assaults
against spouses and ex-spouses result in injuries. Victims of marital
violence have the highest rates of internal injuries and unconscious-
ness.' The injury rate is only 54% for victims of stranger vio-
241. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020
(West 1992).
242. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(l) (McKinney 1993) (de-
fining the offense of disorderly conduct to include conduct not in a public place); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020 (West 1992).
243. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); see also Gasaway v. Gasaway, 616 N.E.2d
610 (Ind. 1993) (awarding protection order based on respondent's attempt to kidnap his
child).
244. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(l) (McKinney 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.020 (1992).
245. HARLOW, supra note 3, at 2; see also KLAUS & RAND. supra note 3.
246. Id.
247. NIl CPO STUDY. supra note 19. at 4; see also PATRICK A. LANGAN & CHRISTO-
PHER A. INNES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1, 3 (1986).
248. Women and Violence: Hearings on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of
Violent Crime Against Women Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaty, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 72 (1990) (statement of Helen R. Newborne, Executive Director, and Sally Goldfarb.
Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on Violence Against Women).
249. Browne, supra note 1, at 3186. In a study of abusive men, one-third reported that
their partners sustained broken bones or other substantial injuries as a result of their violence.
James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE
135 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bogard eds., 1988).
250. Browne, supra note 1, at 3186. Women are three times more likely than men to re-
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lence." t
Case law indicates that battery is the most common criminal
ground for issuance of a civil protection order. Courts issue civil
protection orders for striking and kicking the petitioner, 2 beating
the petitioner,21 3  breaking an infant's leg,' shoving an infant's
face against a door, 5 yanking the petitioner by the hair, 6 pulling
out the petitioner's hair, 7 throwing the petitioner on the floor, 25
bruising a child's back, legs, and buttocks, 9 physically restraining
the petitioner, 60 twisting the petitioner's wrist,261 pounding the
petitioner's head on the floor,262 choking the petitioner,63 slapping
quire medical care for injuries sustained in family assaults. Glenda Kaufman et al., The
Dnmken Bum Theory of Wife Beating, 34 SOC. PROBS. 218 (1987).
251. Browne, supra note 1, at 3186.
252. See generally People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
issuance of order where respondent grabbed and hit petitioner, held her outside of a window
and made her urinate on the floor); Colorado v. Brockelman, 1993 Colo. App. LEXIS 270
(Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1993) (affirming order where defendant hit victim in face several times
and choked her); Todd v. Todd, 772 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming order where
respondent stuck and kicked his wife); Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fam. Ct.
1984) (granting petition where respondent hit the petitioner in the head, punched her in the
stomach while pregnant, and threw her to the floor); Commonwealth v. Smith, 552 A.2d 292
(Pa. Super. CL 1988) (issuing order where respondent hit petitioner with his car and struck
petitioner on head and neck with an open and closed fist).
253. Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming grant where
respondent beat petitioner on one occasion); Delisser v. Hardy, 749 P.2d 1207 (Or. Ct. App.
1988) (holding protection order properly issued on basis of defendant's forced entry into
petitioner's apartment, physical abuse of petitioner and his threats to get her fired from her
job).
254. Yankoskie v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding civil protection
order properly issued where the respondent broke his infant son's leg and shoved his son's
face against a cellar door).
255. Id.
256. Pierson v. Pierson, 555 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Fam. Ct. 1990); see also Sielski v. Sielski,
604 A.2d 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (granting a protection order where defendant
yanked petitioner from her bed by her hair, slapped her about the face and neck, attempted
to push her face in the toilet, threw cold water on her, and yanked at her pubic hair).
257. Pierson, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
258. Id.; see also Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (granting
petition where respondent hit the petitioner in the head, punched her in the stomach while
pregnant, and threw her to the floor); Murray v. Murray, 623 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993).
259. Pierson, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 227. But see Harriman v. Harriman, No. 97826, 1990
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1200, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 1990) (holding that spanking a
child on one occasion is insufficient to issue a civil protection order).
260. Synder v. Synder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1993).
261. Sell v. Sell, No. 00063, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1746 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 6, 1991)
(holding that wife's need to seek medical treatment after husband twisted her wrist was suffi-
cient to issue a civil protection order).
262. Murray, 623 N.E.2d 1236.
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the petitioner on the face and neck,2" attempting to push the
petitioner's face in the toilet,21 throwing cold water on the petition-
er,266 yanking at the petitioner's pubic hair, 67 punching a pregnant
petitioner in the stomach,26 and ordering trained dogs to attack the
petitioner.269
Other criminal acts which are grounds to issue a civil protection
order include: firing shots into the petitioner's home,7" assaulting
the petitioner's friend,27' forcibly or unlawfully entering the
petitioner's home,272 and breaking down petitioner's door.273
Several courts have specifically issued civil protection orders
based on criminal acts involving a motor vehicle. 4 These have in-
cluded striking the petitioner with a car,27 pursuing the petitioner in
a high speed chase,276 attempting to pull the petitioner from her
car, 2n  and driving away quickly while the petitioner had her hands
on the car, cauing her to be thrown into a tree. In Christenson v.
263. Colorado v. Brockelman, 1993 Colo. App. LEXIS 270 (Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 21,
1993); see also Synder, 629 A.2d 977.




268. Gloria C. v. William C.. 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fain. Ct. 1984).
269. Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (Fain. Ct. 1984).
270. Clifford v. Krueger, 297 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
271. People v. Stevens, 506 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (issuing a protection
order where respondent unlawfully entered wife's home and assaulted her friend).
272. Id.; see also People v. Williams, 300 N.Y.S.2d 89 (N.Y. 1969) (holding protection
order properly granted where defendant refused to leave his grandparents' home and threat-
ened his uncle with a knife when confronted); Delisser v. Hardy, 749 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Or.
Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the grant of an order where defendant, inter alia, forced his way
into petitioner's apartment); State v. Kilponen. 737 P.2d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
defendant's conviction for armed burglary was sufficient basis for issuing protection order);
Johnson v. Miller, 459 N.W.2d 886 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (entering step-daughter's residence
by force sufficient to support protection order).
273. People v. Stevens, 506 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 tSup. Ct. 1986).
274. See, e.g., Christenson v. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279 (Iowa 1991); see also Harper
v. Harper, 537 So. 2d 282 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Smith, 552 A.2d 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
275. Smith, 552 A.2d at 292.
276. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d at 279.
277. Harper, 537 So. 2d at 282; see also Synder v. Synder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993).
278. Capps, 715 S.W.2d at 547. In one 1968 case, Seymour v. Seymour, 289 N.Y.S.2d
515 (Fain. Ct. 1968), the court held that a husband's attempt to force his wife's car off the
road by abruptly swerving his car in front of her did not constitute a family offense because
it did not constitute an assault resulting in physical pain or injury or disorderly conduct un-
der the Penal Code. Today, many jurisdictions, including New York, would issue a civil
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Christenson,79 the court issued a protection order to the petitioner
when the respondent initiated a high speed car chase, rejecting the
respondent's argument that the car chase did not amount to an as-
sault."l The court liberally construed the domestic violence act, not-
ing that it served a protective, rather than punitive, function.28' It
held that the pursuit of the petitioner at high rates of speed qualified
as an assault since the defendant had the ability to strike the
petitioner's car during the chase, which could have led to a collision
resulting in physical injury.
282
Finally, courts will also appropriately issue a civil protection
order when someone other than the petitioner is injured by violence
directed toward the petitioner. In Johnson v. Miller,83 the court is-
sued a civil protection order where a step-father physically injured his
step-daughter during an attempt to injure her mother.2u The court
noted that:
[w]hether [the defendant's] anger was directed exclusively at [his
step-daughter] or at both women--or neither-is beside the point.
His violent conduct [during the step-daughter]'s presence in the
home in which she resided-and which resulted in physical injury
to her-coupled with his return and forcible entry into [her] resi-
dence, provides an adequate foundation for a determination that
he "may [have] engage[d] in domestic abuse" of [her].'
This decision recognizes that a civil protection order should be issued
even if the defendant's violence injures someone other than his in-
tended target. By the batterer's own violent actions, he creates a
dangerous environment where unintended victims may be injured. In
these cases, a civil protection order should issue based on the attempt,
or based on the battery via transferred intent.86
protection order in such a case based on attempts or harassment. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes,
500 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
279. 472 N.W.2d 279 (Iowa 1991).
280. Id. at 280-81.
281. Id. at 280.
282. Id.
283. 459 N.W.2d 886 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
284. Johnson, 459 N.W.2d at 887.
285. Id. at 887 (quoting Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West 1990)).
286. The concept of transferred intent is well established in both criminal and tort law.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Follette, 462 F.2d 1041, 1047 n.10 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Yates v.
Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1886 (1991). The concept of transferred intent first appeared in crim-
inal law and then became part of tort law. The criminal rule finds guilt in cases where a
shooting, striking, throwing of an object, or poisoning results in an unexpected injury to an
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Criminal domestic violence cases also illustrate criminal acts
which could warrant and support issuance of a civil protection order.
Successful criminal domestic violence prosecutions include where the
defendant beat the victim with a breadboard,87 stabbed the vic-
tim,2 8 punched the victim in the face resulting in memory loss,"'
sodomized the victim,2" held the victim outside of a window,29'
forced the victim to urinate on the floor,292 assaulted the victim,29
forced the victim into her car, drove on the wrong side of the road,
and threatened to kill them both,29 and drove the victim onto a dirt
road, pulled out a knife, and ordered her to strip.295
2. Sexual Assault and Marital Rape
State statutes and case law in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and all U.S. territories 296 recognize marital
rape and sexual assault of a spouse or a cohabitant as domestic vio-
lence. Thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
issue civil protection orders based on sexual abuse of the peti-
tioner.297 In five additional states, the rape of a spouse or a cohabi-
unintended person. The intent to injure is transferred from the intended to the unintended
victim. In tort law as well, cases hold the defendant liable for a battery to an unintended
person where the intent was to commit a battery against another person. See WILLIAM L.
PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 37-39 (5th ed. 1984).
287. People v. Thompson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 516, 517 (Ct. App. 1984).
288. Arizona v. Layers, 814 P.2d 333 (Ariz.). cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 343 (1991).
289. State v. Harper, 761 P.2d 570, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
290. Thompson, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
291. People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806, 807 (Ct. App. 1988).
292. Id.
293. People v. Singleton, 532 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Crim. Ct. 1988); see also Hawaii v. Ibuos,
857 P.2d 576 (Haw. 1993).
294. State v. Hobbs, 801 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
295. Gilbert v. Georgia, 433 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
296. Sexual Abuse Act of 1986 § 87(b), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-45 (1993).
297. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35 (1993); ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-15-206 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 55-231 (West 1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 945-46 (1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-1001. 16-1004 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-13-1, 19-13-4 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/102. 60/210
(1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766
(West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-501, 4-506 (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
209A, §§ 1, 3 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1992); MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 455.010, 455.020 (Vernon 1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33.018, 33.020 (Michie
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-3, 2C:25-13
(West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-13-2, 40-13-3 (Michie 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 842 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60.1, 60.2 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (1992); 23
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tant is a violation of the criminal code, and thus is a criminal act
which supports the issuance of a civil protection order.29 Only sev-
en states define a rape or sexual assault sufficient to issue a civil
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6102(a), 6107(b) (1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8. § 601 (1990);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-1, 30-6-2 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.010, 25.050.030
(West 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-2, 48-2A-5 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813-12 (West
1993); WYo. STAT. §§ 35-21-102, 35-21-103 (1993).
In four of these states, husbands and cohabitants can be charged with rape of their
wives or girlfriends. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 265, § 22
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1992).
Seventeen of these states' statutes authorize issuance of a civil protection order based
on a definition of rape or sexual assault of a family member that is broader than that de-
fined in the states' criminal statutes. Since civil protection order proceedings are civil and
preventative in nature, states have been willing to issue civil protection orders based on
broader definitions of sexual assault and rape than that required when the offender is being
charged criminally with rape or sexual assault. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406
(1993) (charging husband with sexual assault of wife if husband used force or threat); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1993) (charging husband with rape if force or threat was used
and if wife reports rape within 90 days, unless wife is mentally incapacitated); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 1993) (requiring that spouse/cohabitant be charged with more
than first degree rape); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1993) (charging husband with rape only
when he uses force, violence, threat of immediate and great bodily harm, intoxicating sub-
stance, narcotic or anesthetics, or if wife is mentally incapacitated); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.41 (West 1993) (charging husband/cohabitant with rape only if there is a court order of
separation or an order prohibiting physical or sexual abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349
(West 1993) (charging husband with rape only if spouses are living apart or if one party has
filed for legal separation); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.373 (Michie 1993) (charging hus-
band with rape only if force or threat was used); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A2, 632-A3,
& 632-A5 (1992) (charging husband with rape of wife only if wife is mentally incapacitated
or under the age of consent); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10, 30-9-11 (Michie 1993) (charging
husband with rape only if the parties are separated or legal action has been filed for divorce
or separation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1993) (charging husband with
rape only if force or threat of force is used, unless wife is mentally incapacitated); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 1994) (charging husband with rape only if he used
force or threat of force); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (1993) (providing that hus-
band/cohabitant can only be charged with lesser crime of spousal sexual assault); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-1 (1993) (providing husband cannot be charged with first degree rape unless
wife is mentally incapacitated, and is chargeable only with rape in all other circumstances);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (charging husband with rape only if parties
are separated); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1993) (providing that husband cannot be with
rape); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.010, 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050 (West 1993) (limiting
rape charges against husbands to first degree and second degree rape only); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-8B-6 (1993) (charging husband with lesser offense of sexual assault of a spouse).
For a full discussion of marital rape, see DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE
375-81 app. H (1990).
298. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3402 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 13A-6-60 to
-61 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-424-1(b) (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (1992);




protection order as narrowly as they do criminal rape.'
Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes au-
thorizing civil protection orders based on sexual abuse of a child.'
Courts have also issued civil protection orders based on sexual abuse
of the petitioner's child."' Defendants have been convicted for sexu-
299. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-730 to 707-732 (1992) (charging husbands with first
through third degree rape only, not fourth or fifth degree rape); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2-.4
(West 1993) (charging only husband with first or second degree rape; both husbands and
cohabitants can be charged with third degree sexual abuse of a mate, which carries a lesser
penalty, unless wife is mentally incapacitated); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. §§ 21-3501, 21-3502
(Vernon 1993) (charging husband with rape); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502. 45-5-503
(1993) (providing that husbands/cohabitants can be charged with rape and sexual assault);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1993) (providing that husband can be charged with rape regard-
less of whether the parties are separated); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1993) (provid-
ing that husband who rapes wife can be charged with marital sexual assault where there is
physical injury if wife reports assault within 10 days); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-302 to -307
(1993) (providing that husband can be charged with first or second degree rape but not with
third or fourth degree rape).
300. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp. 1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 91-15-206 (1993); CAL. FAm. CODE § 55 (West 1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1004 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (1993);
750 ILCS 60/102, 60/201 (1993); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3107 (Vernon 1993);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 46:2132 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19. § 766 (West
1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 1, 3 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-3, 93-21-15 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010, 455.020
(Vernon 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-018 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2
(Michie 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 60.1 (West Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (1993); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 8. § 601 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law. Co-
op. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-1, 30-6-2 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104
(1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.010, 26.050.030 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2
(1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 813-12 (West 1993); WYo. STAT. §§ 35-21-102, 35-21-103
(1993).
301. E.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. 1991) (issuing a protection
order where father committed sexual battery on his three year old daughter); Wright v.
Wright, 583 N.E.2d 97 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991) (issuing mother a civil protection order against
her husband and his son, both of whom were sexually abusing her daughters); Keneker v.
Keneker, 579 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (granting non-custodial mother a tem-
porary protection order on behalf of her minor child based on custodial father's alleged inap-
propriate sexual behavior toward the child); Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 376, 377 (Me. 1990)
(holding court properly issued civil protection order on behalf of minor child based on al-
leged sexual abuse); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 232 (N.D. 1980) (affirming issuance
of civil protection order against father who attempted an incestuous relationship with his 18
year old daughter); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 504 A.2d 350. 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (grant-
ing protection order where respondent sexually abused his 10 year old daughter); see also
Tung v. Oshima, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 691 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 1993) (reversing
denial of a protection order predicated on alleged sexual abuse upon finding an abuse of
discretion in accepting respondent's explanation of why he was bathing with his seven year-
old and four year-old).
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al assault of their wives. 2 Clearly, courts may issue civil protection
orders based on marital rape and sexual assault in those jurisdictions
where the state may criminally prosecute a defendant on that basis.
Marital rape is an integral part of marital violence a. 3  Numerous
studies confirm that between 33% and 46% of battered women are
raped and/or sexually assaulted by their abusive partners.34 Between
50% and 85% of women who have experienced rape in an intimate
relationship such as marriage indicate that they have been sexually
assaulted at least 20 times by their partners. 5 Research indicates
the most violent assaults often include sexual as well as physical
attacks, and that battered women who are sexually assaulted by their
partners typically experience more severe non-sexual attacks than
302. State v. Schackart, 737 P.2d 398 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding conviction where
defendant ordered estranged wife to remove her clothes and sexually assaulted her); People v.
Thompson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming defendant's conviction for spousal
rape where wife reported at least two incidents); State v. Ulen, 623 A.2d 70 (Conn. App. Ct.
1993) (upholding conviction for sexual assault where evidence showed defendant violated a
protection order, forced wife to engage in sex at gunpoint, and inserted barrel of gun into
her vagina); State v. Wendling, No. 12015, 1990 WL 197957 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6. 1990)
(affirming decision holding respondent in contempt of civil protection order based on marital
rape); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (convicting husband
who came to wife's residence while they were separated, threatened her with a knife, and
forced her to have oral sex and vaginal intercourse).
303. See WOMEN'S ACTION COALITION, WAC STATS: THE FACTS ABOUT WOMEN 49, 55
(1993) [hereinafter WAC STATS].
304. BROWNE. supra note 171, at 2-5; RUSSELL, supra note 297; Irene H. Frieze &
Angela Browne. Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: CRIME AND JUSTICE, A REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 163 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989). Research by the State of Ken-
tucky found 79% of domestic violence victims had experienced forced sexual relations with a
spouse and 21% with a live-in partner. The majority of victims were assaulted more than
once and many indicated several different types of sexual abuse: 75% forced vaginal inter-
course, 57% forced sex after being beaten, 36% forced oral-genital sex. 30% forced anal
intercourse, 16% forced sex with an object, and 8% forced sex in the presence of others.
FREDERICK J. COWAN, ATIORNEY GENERAL, ADULT ABUSE, NEGLECT AND EXPLOITATION: A
MEDICAL PROTOCOL FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND COMMUNITY SERVICE AGENCIES 129
(1991). Almost 80% of battered women are forced to have sex with their abuser after the
battered women has said "no." Lenore E. Walker, Eliminating Sexism to End Battering Rela-
tionships, Paper Presented at the American Psychological Association (1984). Fifty-nine per-
cent of battered women reported being repeatedly sexually abused, and an additional 13.9%
reported being raped by their batterer at least once. Campbell, supra note 119, at 36.
305. DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES
23 (1985) (finding that 10% of women report at least one sexual assault in response to force
or threat by a husband or partner and that 50 to 87% of women who experienced rape in an
intimate relationship were sexually assaulted at least 20 times). Approximately 14% of wives
are sexually assaulted in some manner by their husbands. OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENER-
AL, SEXUAL ASSAULT/ABUSE: A HOSPITAIJCOMMUNITY PROTOCOL FOR FORENSIC AND MEDI-
CAL EXAMINATION 3 (1991); Frieze & Browne, supra note 304, at 188.
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other abused women."° Approximately 75% of battered women who
killed or tried to kill their abusers had been raped by them.'
Clearly, both state legislatures and a growing number of courts recog-
nize that sexual assault can often be an integral part of the cycle of
violence in an abusive relationship, and protection against continued
sexual assaults must be available.
3. Interference with Personal Liberty
A batterer may resort to tactics which, although not necessarily
violent in and of themselves, seek to control and frighten an abuse
victim. Such conduct often serves to restrict or interfere with the
victim's activities and freedom. Consequently, eight states and Puerto
Rico provide by statute that civil protection orders will issue based on
interference with the petitioner's personal liberty.' Case law delin-
eates the variety of acts which might constitute interference with
personal liberty forming the basis for issuance of a civil protection
order. These have included: concealing children and parental kidnap-
ping,' locking the petitioner out of the marital home and threaten-
ing to physically remove her,"' physically restraining petitioner
from leaving her home or calling the police,31 1 and grabbing the
steering wheel of petitioner's car while she is driving, pulling the car
out of gear, and attempting to pull the car to the side of the road.
31
An Illinois court criminally convicted a man for unlawful restraint of
his wife, based on a violation of an existing order of protection.3
306. LEE H. BOWKER, BEATING WIFE BEATING 52-54, 56-59 (1983).
307. Campbell. supra note 119: see also EWING. supra note 180, at 9.
308. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945
(1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-3 (1993): NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.018 (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
8, § 601 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 1104 (1992); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-102 (1993).
309. Sanders v. Shepard, 541 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (enforcing a civil pro-
tection order issued based on concealment of child and parental kidnapping).
310. Wagner v. Wagner, 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 148, 151-52 (C.P. 1980) (issuing civil pro-
tection order where respondent locked the petitioner out of the marital home and threatened
to physically remove her from the home).
311. In re Marriage of Blitstein, 569 N.E.2d 1357, 1358-59 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (affirm-
ing protection order issued where respondent physically restrained petitioner from calling the
police or leaving her home).
312. Ickes v. Ickes. 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 166 (C.P. 1989) (issuing protection order where
respondent grabbed steering wheel of petitioner's car three times while she was driving, tried
to pull the car out of gear, and tried to pull the car to the side of the road).
313. People v. Williams, 582 N.E.2d 1158, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding convic-
tion for unlawful restraint where respondent grabbed petitioner from behind and refused to let
her go).
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Indeed, many states' statutes will specifically issue protection orders
based on false imprisonment."4 The courts and legislatures need to
continue to identify and broaden the range of behavior which restrict
a petitioner's movement and activities that may serve as grounds for
issuance of a civil protection order.3"5
4. Threats
Protection orders may also issue on the basis of threats of vio-
lence or acts which place the petitioner in fear of imminent bodily
harm. Threats are acts of domestic violence because they seek to
intimidate and control the petitioner. Social science research reveals
that threats and harassment, left unchecked, frequently escalate to
greater violence.3"6 Although the common stereotype of "domestic
violence" tends to be that of relatively minor assaults and squabbles,
41% of battered women report being regularly threatened by their
abusers, 317 and over one-third of domestic assaults involve severe
actions, such as punching, kicking, choking, beating up, and threaten-
ing with or using a gun or a knife.3"' Many battered women's lives
are threatened." 9 Of all women killed by their abusers, 41% to 50%
previously had been threatened with death and 39% had been threat-
ened or assaulted with a weapon.32 Threats are often effectively
314. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 766 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505 (Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B:01 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (Vernon Supp. 1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-020 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4
(Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108
(1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (Supp. 1993).
315. Examples of other tactics batterers use to restrict a domestic violence victim's move-
ment and/or ability to flee a violent relationship that could serve as a basis for issuance of a
civil protection order under this theory might include threats to turn the domestic violence
victim in for deportation if she flees or threats that if she leaves, she will never see her
children again.
316. GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at 129.
317. Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive
Relationships, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 107, 113 (1990).
318. Angela Browne, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Dec.
1990).
319. EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER. BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS 6
(1988) (finding 70% of battered women have their lives threatened); ILLINOIS COALITION
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WOMAN ABUSE: FREQUENT AND SEVERE 1991 (50% of bat-
tered women have their lives threatened).
320. Sometimes, these threats lead the battered woman to retaliate when she believes her
death is imminent. See P.D. Chimobos, quoted in Leslie Henderson, Till Death Do Us Part:
Abuse by Husband Drove Woman to Murder, KNOXVILLE J. Feb. 28, 1984, at p. Al; see
also EWING, supra note 180.
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used by batterers to secure the return of battered women to abusive
homes.32
Consequently, nearly all states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico issue civil protection orders based on threats of physical
abuse.3" Courts specifically recognize a wide range of behaviors
which constitute threats. A threat to kill the petitioner is the most
common threat for which a court will issue a civil protection or-
der.323 In Pendleton v. Minichino,324 a Connecticut court found
present and immediate danger sufficient to issue a civil protection
order based on the respondent's prior history of depression and his
recent remark to petitioner that "[t]his time I'm not going alone. You
321. Joel Dvoskin, Legal Alternatives for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 6
BULLETIN OF THE AAPL 335, 350 (1978).
322. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25-35.010 (1991); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); CAL. PAM. CODE § 5650 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-4-102 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO
CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 750 ILCS 5/112A-14 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5 (West
Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE § 60-
3107 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill Supp.
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766
(West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN.
cl. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 93-21 (West 1992); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (Supp. 1993); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 455-050 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Supp. 1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (Supp. 1992); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1993);
N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 841 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (1991); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1984); TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.11 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104 (1989); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-253.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.030 (West Supp. 1993);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-21-103 (1988).
323. See, e.g., Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96 (11. Ct. App. 1993) (finding threat
where respondent said he "wanted [petitioner] erased"); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (upholding order of protection based upon husband's threats to
kill his wife); Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5282 (1993); Strollo v.
Strollo, 828 P.2d 532, 534-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reversing dismissal of application for
protection order based on respondent's threat to kill the petitioner if she served him with
divorce papers); People v. Salvato, 285 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1991); Hall v. Hall, 408
N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding issuance of order where husband made threats
to kill wife during custody proceedings).
324. 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 915 (Super. Ct. 1992).
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better watch your back.' '32" While other evidence of abuse existed,
including physical assault and property damage, the court concluded
that the threat alone could constitute family violence sufficient to
issue a protection order.326 Other conduct which courts have held
constitutes a threat sufficient to support a civil protection order in-
cludes threats of violence,327 threatening and following the petition-
er,328 leaving a threatening note,329 threatening to physically re-
move petitioner from the home if she did not voluntarily leave,"
threatening to burn down petitioner's home with her in it,331 threat-
ening to get the petitioner fired from her job,332 and verbally and
physically abusing the petitioner in front of their child.333 Courts
have also perceived intimidating threats in acts such as leaving a
shredded marriage certificate 33 or, in the criminal context, tomato
juice covered clothes, on the victim's doorstep.335
Several cases recognize a threat sufficient to issue or extend a
protection order where the defendant will be or has been recently
released from jail. In Campbell v. Campbell,36 the Florida District
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the
respondent's release from jail, in the context of past violence, sexual
battery of his child, and expressed resentment against his wife, posed
a threat sufficient to support the issuance of a civil protection or-
der.337 In Cruz-Foster v. Foster,335 the District of Columbia Court
325. Id. at *4-*5.
326. Id. at *24-*25.
327. Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96 (IlL. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming a finding of dan-
ger where respondent told petitioner "[w]e're going to have a chat and it won't be pretty");
Harper v. Harper, 537 So. 2d 282 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a protection order based
on husband's constant threats); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding verbal threats of violence sufficient); Synder v. Synder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. 1993)
(finding a threat where respondent threatened to have sex with petitioner).
328. Banks v. Pelot, 460 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding issuance of civil
protection order based on respondent following and threatening the petitioner) (unpublished
decision; full text at 1990 WL 130858).
329. Boniek v. Boniek. 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding issuance of a
civil protection order based on respondent leaving parties' marriage certificate cut up into
little pieces with a threatening note on petitioner's doorstep, his driving around the
petitioner's home, and his becoming physically aggressive toward an insurance salesman he
found in the petitioner's home).
330. Wagner v. Wagner, 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 148 (C.P. 1980).
331. Ickes v. Ickes, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 166 (C.P. 1989).
332. Delisser v. Hardy, 749 P.2d 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
333. In re Marriage of Ingram. 531 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
334. Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
335. People v. Salvato, 285 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1991).
336. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
337. Id. at 126.
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of Appeals vacated the trial court's decision not to extend a protec-
tion order to the petitioner where the respondent had been recently re-
leased from jail after serving a sentence for contempt of a prior civil
protection order, and where the respondent came to and telephoned
the petitioner's work place.339 The appellate court held that the "en-
tire mosaic" of past abuse is critical to a trial court's determination
whether to extend a protection order.' The Court of Appeals vacat-
ed and remanded the trial court's decision because the judge did not
consider the entire history of past events, including severe and fre-
quent abuse, threats to kill, false imprisonment, and chronic violations
of an existing protection order, which might have suggested the truly
threatening nature of the defendant's behavior in lurking about the
petitioner's work place and calling her.41
In Maldonado v. Maldonado, 2 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals recognized the seriousness of threats made by an incar-
cerated defendant.4 3 The appellate court reversed the trial court's
denial of an extension of a protection order where the trial court's
sole' basis for denying the extension was the fact that defendant was
incarcerated during the duration of the civil protection order.' The
court of appeals specifically noted that:
with respect to the portion of the original order barring threats
directed at the wife and children and the telephoning of the wife,
the wife would be left open to harassment or threatening commu-
nications from the husband should he gain access to a telephone. In
addition, threats can be communicated by mail or through third
parties. Although threats to commit physical harm by one incarcerat-
ed may, in some instances, not rise to the level of seriousness that
physical abuse does, such conduct nonetheless can have significant
adverse effects upon the victim .... At a minimum, the wife is
entitled to be free of abuse or threats by the husband whether com-
mitted by telephone or the mail.345
A California court has also criminally convicted a defendant for
338. 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 931.
341. Id. at 932.
342. 631 A.2d 40 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 44.
345. Id. But see Trowell v. Meads. 618 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1988) (refusing to issue perma-
nent protection order where defendant threatened petitioner by telephone from prison).
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
acts which included making threats over the telephone to his wife.'
Having provided the basis for a criminal prosecution, this behavior
should also be sufficient to issue a civil protection order.
Batterers often make threats of suicide as a method of exerting
control over their battered intimate partner. These threats are often
made in an effort to convince her that she should dismiss a civil
protection order petition or recant previously given testimony.' 47 Un-
fortunately, recent threats of suicide by the respondent may not be
sufficient to issue a civil protection order where there have been no
concurrent acts of violence. In Bjergum v. Bjergum," the court re-
versed the entry of a full civil protection order, despite the
petitioner's allegations that the respondent had threatened to commit
suicide as recently as a week prior to the hearing."
In Hayes v. Hayes,35 the court dismissed a former wife's peti-
tion for a civil protection order which had been based on her former
husband's threat to shoot her and her boyfriend and bum down her
house, since the statement was made to her daughter and the respon-
dent did not authorize or understand that the daughter would relay the
threat to the petitioner.35' However, the analysis used in Hayes is
inconsistent with other case law which holds a person criminally
liable for threats to another person even where the threat is communi-
cated only to a third party. The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, in United States v. Baish,352 held that a person threatens an-
other when he utters words which are intended to convey a desire to
inflict physical injury and these words are communicated or conveyed
to someone-either the object of the threat or to a third party. 53
Therefore, in the Hayes case, the defendant committed a criminal
threat when he conveyed to his daughter as a third party his intent to
physically injure his former wife. The threat is just as dangerous
whether or not the third party relays the threat directly to the person
threatened.
346. People v. Salvato, 285 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding conviction where
respondent left threatening messages on victim's telephone machine. Respondent's message
stated that there would be "bad trouble" if the petitioner did not agree to his property settle-
ment terms).
347. Ganley, supra note 21. at 19. 23.
348. 392 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
349. Id. at 606.
350. 500 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Fain. Ct. 1986).
351. Id. at 478.
352. 460 A.2d 38 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983).
353. Id. at 42.
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5. Attempts To Harm
Protection orders should issue based on an attempt to harm the
petitioner. This is a particularly important ground for issuance of a
civil protection order because of the role attempts play in controlling
a victim of abuse. A court's refusal to issue a civil protection order
based on an attempt to injure the petitioner may reinforce, in both
parties' minds, the legitimacy of the batterer's behavior. Law enforce-
ment officials and the courts should act against attempts to harm, as
they are clear precursors to further violence, serious injury, or
death.3"
An attempt to harm a family member demonstrates that the re-
spondent is disposed to violence not only on that occasion but on
others as well.35 Attempts are punished as crimes under criminal
codes because a defendant who attempts to commit a crime "has
sufficiently manifested [his] dangerousness."3" Consequently, the
legislatures of thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico authorize courts to issue civil protection orders based on at-
tempts to harm.3"7 Case law illustrates the variety of behavior that
354. Domestic violence tends to escalate in both frequency and severity over time.
BROWNE, supra note 171, at 68; Geraldine Butts Stably, Victim Rights and Issues: Special
Problems of Battered Woman as Victim/Witness in Partner Abuse Cases, Paper Presented at
the Western Society of Criminology Conference, Los Vegas, Nevada (Feb. 27, 1978). The
pattern of abuse has a distinct and predictable cycle. GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at 129.
Typically episodes involve a combination of assaultive acts, verbal abuse and threats. Browne,
supra note 1, at 3186. In a study of abusive men, one third reported that their partners sus-
tained broken bones or other substantial injuries as a result of their violence. See James
Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 135
(Kersti Yllo & Michele Bogard eds. 1988).
355. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 499 (2d ed. 1986).
356. Id. at 495.
357. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25-35.010 (1991); ARmz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5650 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1005 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Supp. 1993);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. Civ. PROc. CODE § 60-3107
(Vernon Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (west 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 766 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L.
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (west Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (west Supp. 1993);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455-050 (Vernon Supp.
1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:4 (Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-3 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5
(1989); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 841 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3
(1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.718 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8. § 621
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constitutes attempts to harm sufficient for issuance of a civil protec-
tion order. This behavior includes: the respondent repeatedly grabbing
the steering wheel of the petitioner's car while petitioner was driving,
and pulling the car out of gear and attempting force the car to the
side of the road;35 the respondent attempting to have an incestuous
relationship with his eighteen-year-old daughter;359 and the respon-
dent attempting to assault the petitioner.3" Courts have identified
why attempts to harm are sufficient to find domestic violence. In
Ickes,"6 the court found domestic abuse sufficient to issue a civil
protection order where the respondent attempted to force the
plaintiff's car off the road "[b]ecause the inquiry focuses on the fear
generated in plaintiff and not on any actual injury inflicted."362 Most
courts will issue protection orders based on attempts. Those few cases
in which the court failed to issue a civil protection order despite sub-
stantial evidence of an attempt to harm the petitioner have occurred
in a minority of jurisdictions, where the statute authorizing civil pro-
tection orders at the time the cases were decided incorporated a high-
er criminal standard of proof for attempt. 63 Criminal attempt re-
quires, 1) the intent to do an act or bring about certain circumstances
proscribed by law, and 2) an act beyond mere preparation in further-
(Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. § 71.11 (West Supp.
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (1989);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (Supp. 1993);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-103 (1988).
358. Ickes v. Ickes, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 166 (C.P. 1989); see also Gilbert v. Georgia, 433
S.E.2d 664 (Ga. 1993) (convicting defendant where evidence sufficient to support of finding
of reasonable apprehension of fear without harm. Defendant drove wife to dirt road, pulled
knife on her and forced her to strip).
359. Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980).
360. Yankoskie v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
361. 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 166.
362. Id.
363. The court in Popeski v. Popeski, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 200 (C.P. 1989), denied a peti-
tion for a civil protection order where respondent threw a set of keys which struck her son
and threw a butcher knife across the room, because the court found insufficient evidence of
intent to harm. The court in Seymour v. Seymour. 289 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fam. Ct. 1968), dis-
missed a petition for a civil protection order assuming that respondent had attempted to force
petitioner's car off the road, because the statute at that time required a finding that
respondent's actions had resulted in physical pain or injury. In Stanzak v. Stanzak, the Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed the grant of a civil protection order issued following an incident
where the respondent backed up a car near the petitioner. 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3958 (Ct.
App., Sept. 10, 1990). The court found insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
respondent attempted or threatened to injure the petitioner.
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ance of the intent.6'
In family violence cases, state legislatures, courts, and law en-
forcement officials need to address attempts to harm as strong indica-
tors of a person's propensity for more serious and deadly violence in
the future. Courts should issue civil protection orders based on at-
tempts, whether such attempts are intentional or undertaken with reck-
less disregard for an intimate's safety. This approach is grounded in
research documenting the escalating nature of domestic violence.'
It is also supported by legal scholars who urge that, in criminal cases,
recklessness should constitute sufficient mens rea for a conviction for
an attempt to commit a crime."
6. Harassing Behaviors
Harassment is another powerful ground for issuing a protection
order. A swift and determined official response to harassment will
often stave off later, more violent behavior. Batterers use a broad
variety of harassing tactics to exert continued control over their inti-
mate partners, including emotional abuse.367 Some women have been
followed and harassed for months, even years, after leaving an abu-
sive partner."a The longer that violence continues in a relationship
the more serious and dangerous it becomes.3" Moreover, batterers
feel less remorseful and more justified in their violence as the abuse
continues.37 If the police and courts respond swiftly, seriously pun-
ishing harassing behavior, they may often impede the cycle of vio-
lence from continuing further by undermining the batterer's growing
sense of legitimacy in his violence.
Twelve state statutes issue protection orders based on harassment
of the petitioner,371 and courts in many states have interpreted a
364. LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra note 355, at 495.
365. See supra note 354.
366. LAFAVE & ScoT, supra note 355, at 502.
367. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 113 (discussing six different types of emotional
abuse and the resulting impact on the victims).
368. BROWNE, supra note 171, at 114. Women who fled their batterers have been forced
back at gunpoint, forced to return when the batterer held a gun to their child's head, and
tracked across state lines to get them to return and tracked down after many years. EWING,
supra note 180, at 28.
369. GILLEsPiE, supra note 124, at 129.
370. Angela Browne, Assault and Homicide at Home: When Battered Women Kill, Paper
Presented at the National Family Violence Research Conference (Aug. 1984), reprinted in 3
ADVANCES IN APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 68.
371. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (Supp. 1993) ("engaging in a course of alarming or
distressing conduct in a manner which is likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response
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wide range of behavior to constitute harassment sufficient to issue a
civil protection order. Harassing behavior includes following the peti-
tioner, 72  threatening the petitioner,373  calling the petitioner a
"bitch,"374 preventing the petitioner from leaving a room, 375 pulling
telephone cords out of the wall to prevent the petitioner from calling
the police, 76  driving around the petitioner's home,31 cutting up
the parties' marriage certificate and leaving it with a threatening note
on petitioner's doorstep,378  initiating a high speed car chase,379 in-
terfering with petitioner's living,380 calling the petitioner at work
seventy-five times within a period of a month, 8' filing frivolous le-
gal actions against the petitioner,382 moving within two blocks of the
petitioner's house,38 3 loitering in front of the battered women's shel-
ter where the petitioner stayed,a" pounding nails into the petitioner's
or which is likely to cause humiliation, degradation, or fear in another person"); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6303 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-3 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West
Supp. 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.010 (Vernon 1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018
(Michie 1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2
(Michie Supp. 1993) (including telephone contact and repeatedly driving by residence or
workplace): N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr Law § 812(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-15-1 (1988) (criminal statute); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.122 (West Supp. 1993).
372. In re The Marriage of McCoy, 1993 WL 512877 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 9, 1993) (issu-
ing protection order where husband followed and approached children in violation of a pro-
tection order); Banks v. Pelot, 460 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming issuance of
issued protection order where respondent followed and threatened the petitioner); State v.
Sarlund, 407 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. 1987) (affirming that defendant's acts, in constantly writing
petitioner letters, confronting her friends and dates, contacting her parents and employers, and
following her to and from school, constituted harassment sufficient to support a protection
order).
373. In re Marriage of Hagaman, 462 N.E.2d 1276, 1278-79 (il. App. Ct. 1984); Roe v.
Roe, 601 A.2d 1201, 1206-07 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Kilmer v. Kilmer, 486
N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1981);
Banks, 460 N.W.2d at 446 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
374. Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
375. In re Marriage of Blitstein, 569 N.E.2d 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
376. Id.
377. Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
378. Id.
379. Christenson v. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Iowa 1991).
380. In re Marriage of Hagaman, 462 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); see also Rogers
v. Rogers, 556 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 1990).
381. Johnson v. Cegielski, 393 N.W.2d 547 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
382. Id.




car tires,3"5 opening the petitioner's mail,3"6 making unwanted tele-
phone calls to the petitioner,"' constantly writing the petitioner let-
ters,3 8 meeting with the petitioner's friends and dates,38 9 contacting
the petitioner's parents and employers 3  repeated calls and letters
implying that force would be used in an effort to visit with the
parties' child,391  entering the petitioner's car,392 entering the
petitioner's home, 93 standing outside the petitioner's apartment three
or four times a day screaming curses at her,3 4 sending the petitioner
unwanted pizza and service calls, 95 throwing things at the petition-
er,3  and pushing the petitioner down stairs and out the door.397
The court's decision in Traiforos v. Mahoney3  illustrates the
importance of issuing protection orders based on harassing behavior.
In Traiforos, the petitioner filed for a protection order under the do-
mestic violence statute based on harassment a.3' The trial court, ap-
plying its broad discretionary powers, converted an action for domes-
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Thomas v. Maryland, 1993 Md. LEXIS 172 (Dec. 6, 1993) (holding 30 unsolicited
phone calls in one month constituted harassment, despite petitioner's acceptance of collect
calls); Cote v. Cote, 599 A.2d 869, 871 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Anthony T. v. Anthony
J., 510 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
388. State v. Sarlund, 407 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. 1987).
389. Id.
390. Id.; see also Delisser v. Hardy, 749 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
issuance of protection order where defendant forced his way into petitioner's apartment, physi-
cally abused her, threatened to get her fired from her job, and called her employer).
391. Tillman v. Snow, 571 N.E.2d 578, 579-580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming issuance
of civil protection order against natural father and paternal aunts which prohibited contact
with the parties' child where the natural father made repeated attempts to visit child through
telephone calls and letters to mother and adoptive father stating that "I want to see my
daughter and I will" and stating that the father would come to see the children and would
not be stopped. These communications were held to constitute abuse and were sufficient to
show mental abuse and harassment disturbing the petitioner's peace in light of the natural
father's prior abuse of the mother). However, some courts have ignored real harassment of
the petitioner. For example, in Grant v. Wright. 536 A.2d 319 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988), the court found no harassment sufficient to issue a permanent restraining order where
there was no actual physical abuse but where respondent removed petitioner's belongings
from their mutual residence, placed them in storage while the petitioner was away from the
home and left the storage key in petitioner's car.
392. Cote v. Cote, 599 A.2d 869, 871 (Md. 1992).
393. Id.
394. Goldring v. Goldring, 424 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (App. Div. 1980).
395. Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W. 2d 841, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
396. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 574 N.Y.S.2d 115 (App. Div. 1991).
397. Id.
398. 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 633 (Ct. App. July 7, 1992).
399. ld.
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tic abuse to one for harassment, and issued a no harassment or-
der.' The appellate court, finding that the petitioner would have re-
ceived a functionally similar order had she filed under the correct
statute, upheld the no-harassment order.
401
Courts have placed some reasonable limits on the issuance of
civil protection orders based on harassment. For example, in Didonna
v. Didonna,"2 the court held that the husband's constant and unre-
lenting discussions with his two teenage daughters about the impend-
ing break up of his marriage did not constitute harassment for purpos-
es of issuing a civil protection order.f3 The court found these dis-
cussions to be the unfortunate, albeit annoying, result of the marriage
break up.' In Rouse v. Rouse, 5  the Florida District Court held
that a wife's faxed letters to the husband petitioner's business place
politely requesting to schedule visitation with their children did not
constitute harassment or frustrate the petitioner's business.'
7. Emotional Abuse
Thirteen innovative state statutes recognize some forms of emo-
tional abuse as bases to issue a protection order.f 7 The Immigration
400. Id. (noting that under the domestic violence statute, a protection order cannot issue
based on harassment, and fashioned a response as appropriate for the situation).
401. Id. at *6.
402. 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fam. Ct. 1972).
403. Id.; see also E.K. v. G.K., 575 A.2d 883 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (uphold-
ing refusal to issue a restraining order based on harassment when the mother disciplined child
in manner which the father disapproved, even though the child was injured accidently, since
no evidence existed that the mother acted to harass the father); Roofeh v. Roofeh, 525
N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (refusing to issue a civil protection order prohibiting the re-
spondent wife from smoking in the presence of her husband and children. However, the court
ordered the wife to limit her smoking to the sitting room not in the presence of the chil-
dren.).
404. Didonna, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
405. 595 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
406. Id. at 1014.
407. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (Supp. 1992) (insulting, taunting other conduct like-
ly to cause humiliation, degradation or fear); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1993) (emo-
tional distress); 725 ILCS 5/112-3A(6) (1993) (intimidation, such as creating a disturbance at
petitioner's place of employment; repeatedly telephoning petitioner's place of employment,
home, or residence; repeatedly following petitioner about in a public place; repeatedly keeping
the petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside of her home, school, place of
employment, vehicle or other place occupied by the petitioner or by peering in the
petitioner's window; repeatedly threatening to improperly remove a child of petitioner from
the jurisdiction, improperly concealing that child from petitioner or making a single such
threat following an attempted or actual improper removal or concealment; threatening physical
force, confinement or restraint on one or more occasions); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
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and Naturalization Act's Battered Spouse Waiver provisions recognize
that emotional abuse is a form of spousal abuse.4°" Under this law
and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, battered spouse
waivers are granted upon a showing of extreme cruelty, allowing
battered spouses to move from conditional to permanent residen-
cy. 4
Case law supports recognizing both mental and physical abuse.
In Lucke v. Lucke,4 t° the court held that adult abuse was not limited
to physical abuse or the threat of imminent physical harm, but also
included mental abuse.4" In Lucke, the court issued a civil protec-
tion order against a father when he attempted to initiate an incestuous
relationship with his eighteen year old daughter.4 2 In Boniek v.
Boniek,4 3 the court considered evidence of mental abuse during
twenty-five years of marriage to support the issuance of a civil pro-
tection order.4 4 The defendant left the parties' mutilated marriage
certificate on the petitioner's doorstep, drove around her home, and
physically assaulted a salesperson in her home. I The court con-
cluded that "[v]iewing the evidence in its totality, and in light of
[respondent's] history of abusive behavior, sufficient evidence exists
§ 26 (West Supp. 1992) (tormenting); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.010 (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("Ha-
rassment [is] engag[ing] in purposeful or knowing course of conduct involving more than one
incident that alarms or causes distress to another person and serves no legitimate purpose.
Conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner."); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33.018(5) (Michie 1986) (knowing, purposeful or reckless course of conduct to
harass); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:I (1990 & Supp. 1992) (intimidation); N.J. STAT.
ANN. . § 2C:25-19 (West Supp. 1993) (intimidation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(c)(2)
(Michie Supp. 1993) (severe emotional distress); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT. § 821-1(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1994) (menacing); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1992); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-2 (Michie Supp. 1993) (psychological abuse; intimidation); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813-
122 (West 1993) (intimidation).
408. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186 (Supp. IV 1992).
409. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a) (Supp. IV 1992); 8 C.F.R.
§ 216.5(e)(3)(i) (1993) (defining "'was battered by or was the subject of extreme cruelty' as
including, but [] not limited to, being the victim of any act or threatened act of violence,
including any forceful detention, which results or threatens to result in physical or mental
injury. Psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including rape, molestation, incest (if the
victim is a minor) or forced prostitution shall be considered acts of violence").
410. 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980).
411. Id. at 234.
412. Id. at 233.
413. 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
414. Id. at 198.
415. Id. at 196.
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to infer present intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm. '
The court further noted that the history of abuse included both phys-
ical and mental abuse. In Melora v. Melora,417 the court upheld is-
suance of a protection order without a finding of physical abuse
where a family offense had been committed by the respondent, the
petitioner was in fragile health due to a heart condition, and emotion-
al abuse led petitioner to fear the respondent." 8 In Tillman v.
Snow,4 9 the court affirmed the issuance of a civil protection order
against a natural father and paternal aunts. The court prohibited con-
tact with the parties' child where the natural father made repeated
attempts to visit the child through telephone calls and letters to the
mother and adoptive father stating that "I want to see my daughter
and I will. 42  The aunts called and stated that the father would
come to see the children and would not be stopped.42" ' The court
held that these communications, in light of the natural father's prior
abuse of the mother, constituted mental abuse and formed the basis
for a no-contact order.4' In Gasaway v. Gasaway,4" the court is-
sued a protection order based on harassment and emotional distress
where the respondent attempted to improperly remove and conceal the
parties' child.424
As in the case of civil protection orders based on harassment, the
courts do place some limits on issuing civil protection orders based
on emotional abuse. In Didonna v. Didonna,42 the court refused to
issue a civil protection order based on a husband's constant conversa-
tions with his two teenage daughters about the impending break up of
his marriage, finding that such discussions did not constitute sufficient
emotional distress to issue a civil protection order.426
Social science research indicates that battered women often suffer
extreme psychological abuse, including forced isolation from
416. Id. at 198.
417. 536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1989).
418. Id.
419. 571 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
420. Id. at 580.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. 616 N.E.2d 610 (il1. 1993).
424. Id.
425. 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fam. Ct. 1972).
426. Id.; see also Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984 (N.J. 1993) (reversing issuance of
protection order, holding respondent's pre-divorce statements of an absence of sexual attraction
insufficient to issue order).
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friends427 and actual confinement in their homes.42 One survey re-
ports that 72% of battered women indicate that the emotional abuse
had a more severe impact on them than the physical abuse.429 Esca-
lating emotional abuse was an indicator of forthcoming physical abuse
for 54% of battered women.43 Women who suffered severe emo-
tional abuse were more likely to believe that their batterer would
carry out his threats or that his behavior or claims were somehow
justified.43' Among women who are physically abused, 98% report
incidences of emotional abuse as well. 432 Further, verbal and emo-
tional abuse often escalate into more violent behavior.43
Despite this evidence, some courts underestimate the seriousness
of emotional abuse. In Keith v. Keith,434 the court denied a protec-
tion order against a father who had previously sexually abused his
minor daughters, even though his close proximity caused them stress,
fear and emotional strain.435 In dicta, a Connecticut superior court in
Pendleton v. Minichino436 concluded that verbal abuse or argument
minus any present danger or likelihood of physical violence does not
427. Batterers are able to psychologically control their victims using a combination of
isolating tactics and disinformation tactics. Victims are isolated from social networks and
support systems. Psychological control over the victims can increase to the point where the
abuser literally determines reality for his victim. This often prevents discovery of the violence,
while the allowing the abuser to avoid being held accountable for his behavior. Ganley, supra
note 21, at 20.
This isolation works very effectively to the batterer's advantage. At least 43% of
battered women who had been abused tell no one about the abuse. Where they do seek
someone to talk to about the problem of the abuse, they most often turn to a family member
(61%) or friend (49%). SCHULMAN, supra note 1, at 4; Angela Browne, Assault and Homi-
cide at Home: When Battered Women Kill, Paper Presented at the National Conference for
Family Violence Research (August 1984).
428. EWING, supra note 180. at 9-10. Nearly 50% of battered women were forbidden by
their batterers to have personal friends or to have such friends in the home. Actual physical
imprisonment was reported by 30%. These women reported having been locked in closets,
locked in or physically confined to their homes, and tied to furniture. Id.
429. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 114.
430. Id. at 115.
431. Id. at 114-115. Ridicule was rated the "worst" form of emotional abuse by 45% of
battered women. Ganley, supra note 21, at 22-23 (noting that physical and psychological
abuse are closely interwoven by abusers. Their attacks are aimed at the victim's particular
sensibilities and vulnerabilities. When victims learn from experience that verbal threats will be
backed up with physical assaults, psychological battery becomes a very effective means to
control the victim's behavior).
432. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 113.
433. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 4, at 44.
434. 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462 (C.P. 1984).
435. Id at 465.
436. 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 915 (Super. Ct. April 2, 1992).
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constitute family violence for purposes of issuing a civil protection
order.437 These cases fail to recognize the interrelatedness of physi-
cal abuse and emotional abuse that most domestic violence victims
suffer. Courts which adopt this approach ignore the preventative pur-
pose of protection order proceedings, and opt instead to require that
the victim suffer at least one actual beating.
8. Damage to Property
Batterers often damage property to terrorize, threaten, and exert
control over a victim of domestic violence. 38 Consequently, nine
progressive state statutes issue civil protection orders based on mali-
cious property damage.439 Recognizing that damage to property is a
form of abuse, courts have found various kinds of property damage to
be sufficient grounds to support issuance of civil protection orders.
Protection orders have issued, in part, based on property damage
which includes pulling telephone cords from a wall while the petition-
er tried to call police,4' destroying furniture, breaking a window
and skylights, chopping holes in roof with an axe, and driving a truck
through a garage wall," damaging the petitioner's car,"2 and de-
stroying jointly owned household property." 3 Other property damage
which should serve as a basis for the issuance of a civil protection
order includes injuring or killing a family pet, 4 damaging the
437. Id. at *21.
438. Ganley, supra note 21, at 23. Sentimental and personal property was damaged by
59% of batterers. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 113. Approximately 80% of batterers
engage in violent behavior towards other targets, such as harming pets and destroying objects.
Lenore E. Walker, Eliminating Sexism to End Battering Relationships. Paper Presented at the
American Psychological Association (1984).
439. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 945 (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (Michie
Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1 (West
Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19
(West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
601 (1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020 (West Supp. 1993).
440. In re Marriage of Blitstein, 569 N.E.2d 1357 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991).
441. Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
442. Pendleton v. Minichino, No. 506673, 1992 Conn. Supr. LEXIS 915 (Super. Ct. Apr.
2, 1992) (issuing an ex parte temporary protection order suspending visitation where respon-
dent destroyed petitioner's car and jointly owned household property, including a shower
curtain, pushed and shoved petitioner, struck petitioner and threatened that "[t]his time I'm
not going alone. You better watch your back").
443. Id.; see also Iowa v. Zeien, 505 N.W.2d 498 (Iowa 1993) (holding criminal convic-
tion for damaging contents of estranged wife's home proper even though property damaged
was marital property).
444. There is a strong connection between family violence and animal abuse. In 83% to
88% of families where children are abused, animals in the home are also abused, usually by
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petitioner's clothing, and destroying other items of sentimental value
to the petitioner.
9. Stalking
Both state statutes and case law authorize issuance of civil pro-
tection orders based on stalking behavior intended to harass and in-
timidate the petitioner. States have begun to recognize stalking as a
ground to issue a civil protection order. 5 Courts have issued civil
protection orders on behalf of petitioners who are stalked by their
intimates. Stalking includes following and threatening the petition-
er,446 cutting up the parties' marriage certificate and leaving it with
a threatening note on the petitioner's doorstep,"7 driving around the
petitioner's house,44 moving within two blocks of the petitioner's
house," 9 and loitering in front of the battered women's shelter
where petitioner stayed.4"e Like harassing and threatening behavior,
stalking often escalates into more violent conduct.45 ' Courts and the
police need to be authorized to address this behavior early to prevent
further violence.
In recent years, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have
enacted stalking statutes which criminalize stalking behavior. 52 A
the abusive parents. WASHINGTON HUMANE SOCIETY, CHILD ABUSE AND CRUELTY TO ANI-
MALS.
445. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19
(West Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-
59-2 to -3 (Supp. 1993).
446. Banks v. Pelot, 460 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1990) (holding that a court may issue a pro-
tection order based on the respondent following and threatening the petitioner); Knuth v.
Knuth, No. C1-92-482, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 696 (Ct. App. June 19, 1992) (upholding
court extension of civil protection order based on respondent moving within two blocks of
the petitioner's home, loitering around the domestic violence shelter where the petitioner had
stayed, following petitioner, opening the petitioner's mail and pounding nails into her car
tires).
447. Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding issuance of
civil protection order based on former husband leaving the parties' shredded marriage license
with a threatening note on the petitioner's door step, driving around the petitioner's home,
and becoming aggressive with an insurance salesman in the petitioner's home).
448. Id.
449. Knuth, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS at *696.
450. Id.
451. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN. STATISTICS
PACKET 30 (1990).
452. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (Supp. 1993); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.260 to .270
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-71-229, 5-13-301, & 5-71-208 to -209 (Supp. 1993);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (1990 &
Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181(c) & (d) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
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federally funded task force on anti-stalking legislation, created by
Congress in 1992, recommends that states amend their statutes to
make stalking a felony." 3 The task force, operating under the aus-
pices of the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, is
developing a model anti-stalking statute.4m The task force's report
notes that stalking contains an "element of escalation that raises what
initially may be bothersome and annoying-but legal-behavior to the
level of obsessive, dangerous and even violent acts. Stalking victims,
therefore, need to be provided with appropriate means to protect
themselves against potential violence before it occurs. ' '455 To achieve
this preventive goal, the task force recommends that stalking victims
receive civil protection orders. 41 The task force predicts that protec-
tion orders will provide early intervention in stalking cases and pre-
vent later violence.457
The recently released National Institute of Justice Report "Project
To Develop A Model Anti-Stalking Code For States" compiled by the
federal task force provides a profile of the existing state stalking stat-
ANN. tit. 11. § 1312(A) (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 165-90 to -91 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 5/12-7.3
to -7.4 (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-1-1, 35-45-10 (1986 & Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 708.11 (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.140 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (Supp. 1993);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h-I (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.746 (1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.010 & 455.085 (Supp. 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02 to .05 (Supp. 1992);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173:1-7 (Supp.
1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-1 to -4
(Michie 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-14 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-277.3 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17 to -07.1 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2903.21 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. § 133.310 (Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-59-1 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-1 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17 to -315 (Supp. 1993);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1061-63 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie
Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9a.46.020 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-
2-9a (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-126
(Supp. 1993).
453. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF JUSTICE, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL ANTI-STALKING




457. George Lardner, Jr., Federal Task Force Suggest States Make Stalking a Felony
Offense. WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993, at A19.
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utes.458 The report found that state statutes vary considerably in the
definitional elements of stalking. Most typically define stalking as
"wilful, malicious, and repeated following and harassing of another
person."459 However, most statutes require threatening behavior and
criminal intent on the part of the defendant to find stalking. Thirty-
four jurisdictions define stalking to include behavior which would
cause a reasonable person to feel threatened even where there is not
verbal threat.' State stalking statutes also consistently require a
"course of conduct" which is typically defined as a series of acts over
a period of time evidencing a continuity of purpose.46' Many state
codes also provide both misdemeanor and felony classifications for
stalking. 2 For example, a recent amendment to California's stalking
law now makes it a misdemeanor for an identified batterer to enter
the property of a battered women's shelter without consent. 3 Six
states provide for conditions for pre-trial release including no contact
with the victim." Commentators on the stalking laws have also
urged the adoption by courts of a partially subjective "reasonable
battered woman" standard which recognizes that acts not normally
threatening to an average person may terrify an abuse victim.465
D. Jurisdiction and Venue/Choice of Forum
1. Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction4:
Subject matter jurisdiction over requests for protection orders in
family violence cases can be obtained when an incident of domestic
violence has occurred in the state. 7 Personal jurisdiction over the
458. MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE, supra note 453, at 13.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 21.
462. Id.
463. Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Signs Get-Tough Bills Aimed at Stalking: Legislation:
One Measure Widens Definition of Crime. Others Stiffen Criminal and Civil Penalties, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30. 1993, at 28.
464. MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE, supra note 453, at 28.
465. Note, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1498, 1535
(1993).
466. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 303.
467. See 750 ILCS 60/203 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133
(West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.510 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-123
(1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-3 (1989
& Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3 (Supp. 1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 801.50 (West
Supp. 1993); see, e.g., McDonald v. State, 487 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding
that jurisdiction in a criminal action resides solely in the courts of the state where the crime
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batterer is based on the fact that an act was committed which caused
a tortious injury in the state. Jurisdiction lies in any state where any
part of the act was committed,468 whether or not any of the parties
actually reside in the state where the act was committed. The pres-
ence of danger to a petitioner in the state may also serve as a basis
for issuance of a civil protection order whether or not incidents of
violence occurred within the jurisdiction.' New York has extended
the family court's subject matter jurisdiction to include matters where
the respondent was personally served with legal process in the state,
notwithstanding the fact that all the incidents occurred outside the
state."'
2. Service of Process
The respondent must be served with process providing notice of
a civil protection order hearing in a particular court in order for that
court to have personal jurisdiction over him. Many jurisdictions statu-
torily provide specific restrictions on serving respondents in civil
protection order proceedings.
In some states that require "personal service," service may be
achieved by serving either the respondent or a person of suitable age
and discretion who resides at the respondent's home.47 Nineteen
states and the District of Columbia specifically require personal ser-
vice upon the defendant.4' Texas requires service to be made more
is committed. The site of the crime can be established by circumstantial evidence which
supports an inference that beating occurred in the state and the defendant did not supply any
evidence that the crime was committed outside of the state); Anthony T. v. Anthony J., 510
N.Y.S.2d 810 (Farn. Ct. 1986) (holding that family court had subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause an oral or written statement made by means of telecommunication is considered to
have taken place in the state or county the phone call was made and the state of county the
call was received).
468. Anthony T., 510 N.Y.S.2d 810 (holding that telephone harassment initiated outside
state but received in state could serve as a basis for issuance of a protection order); see also
Adair v. United States, 391 A.2d 288 (D.C. 1978); United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38
(D.C. 1983).
469. See, e.g., Pierson v. Pierson, 555 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Fain. Ct. 1990) (holding
respondent's presence in the state constituted a risk to petitioner and New York's interest in
attempting to end the violence and in obtaining protection for the victim was compelling
regardless of the fact that all of the predicate incidents occurred in Florida).
470. Id. But see Jane OJ. v. Peter LJ., 532 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Fam. Ct. 1988) (holding that
long-arm out-of-state personal service is impermissible in family offense proceedings).
471. See. e.g., N.Y. F,.i. Cr. ACT § 826(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
472. ARvz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-204
(Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/210 (Smith Hurd Supp.
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than forty-eight hours before the hearing.473 Ten states require at
least five days notice474 and Alaska requires at least ten days no-
tice.4" Three states condition effective service upon summons to the
defendant issued by a clerk of the court.476 Nineteen states authorize
valid service by the police.4 ' Illinois stipulates that service can be
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.745 (Baldwin
Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 93-21-3 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 404-
123 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-25 (West
Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 826 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31 (Baldwin Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 1992); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6112 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-4 (1984); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1105 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.050 (West Supp. 1993); WYO.
STAT. § 35-21-106 (Supp. 1993).
473. TEx. FAM. CODE Ann. § 71.09 (West Supp. 1993).
474. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-204 (Michie 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15
(West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1992);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.040 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-50 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-4 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-605 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.050 (West 1992).
Note that Missouri, by case law, has relaxed the five-day requirement when the peti-
tioner is attempting to extend an existent civil protection order. In Jenkins v. Jenkins, 784
S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that personal service upon the husband was
not required for extension of the original order since the husband had been personally served
with the original petitioner for order of protection, the motion to extend was filed prior to
the expiration of the subsequent extensions and the husband had actual notice of wife's mo-
tion to extend and of the hearing. The court upheld the validity of one day's notice before
the hearing as opposed to the five day's notice statutorily required. In jurisdictions that set
minimum notice requirements, trial courts generally adopt the approach that the minimum
days notice requirement does not affect the validity of the service of process upon the re-
spondent. Instead, if notice is not served in sufficient time in advance of the hearing, respon-
dent may, upon request. receive a brief continuance of the matter to a date that meets the
notice requirements. If such a continuance is granted, courts generally issue a temporary
protection order to protect the petitioner pre-trial. See, e.g.. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 826(a),
828(3) (McKinney 1992) (providing when the hearing less than three days after service court
may extend temporary protection order upon granting a continuance).
475. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (1991).
476. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-4(a) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.730
(Baldwin Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2 (1989).
477. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.040 (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp.
1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 540 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6310 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.4 (1981 & Supp.
1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A.
§ 7 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.040
(Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-926 (Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:7
(1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5OB-3 (1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6112 (1992); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4.1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1105 (1989); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-4 (1992).
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performed by a hired special process server478 and Minnesota, West
Virginia, and Washington authorize service by published notice.479
Additionally, the new Delaware statute states that where an order
recites that defendant appeared in person the need for further service
is waived.48
In order to most effectively assure protection to victims of do-
mestic abuse, restrictions on who can serve respondents with notice of
a scheduled civil protection order hearing should be minimal. An
ideal policy would have service of process by police as a primary
form of service,48' while authorizing service to be accomplished in
the alternative by a private process server. In difficult cases where the
respondent is effectively avoiding service, notice by publication may
be appropriate. Only the petitioner, the petitioner's attorney, and any-
one else who would receive protection under the terms of the protec-
tion order should be precluded from serving the respondent with
process.482 Since service upon the respondent of notice of either the
court hearing date for issuance of a protection order or of notice of
the existence of a protection order issued ex-parte is a prerequisite to
enforcement of civil protection orders in all states, it is extremely
important that service of process can be easily obtained over civil
protection order defendants. Preventing only those with an interest in
the action from effecting service substantially increases the chances of
respondent receiving the required notice of the proceedings. This
approach assures that protection order proceedings are free to com-
mence and is thus crucial to preserving the victim's safety.
Some state statutes provide for obtaining jurisdiction over a non-
resident respondent in a civil protection order case using the state's
long arm statute.48 Courts have also ruled that when the acts under-
lying the family violence offense occurred outside of the state, juris-
diction over the perpetrator may be obtained if the perpetrator has
478. 750 ILCS 60/210 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993).
479. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.050 (Supp. 1993) (providing for service by publication with court permission); W.
VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (Supp. 1993).
480. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 974 (Supp. 1992).
481. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
482. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Coppola, 268 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
sister of petitioner who was named in and protected by a temporary restraining order under
the Domestic Violence Protection Act was a party to the proceeding and, as such, could not
validly effect personal service).




minimum contacts with the state.4
In re Marriage of Lenhardt485 illustrates another way in which
a court can obtain personal jurisdiction over a party. In Lenhardt, the
court held that any appearance at which the defendant/respondent
argues the merits of the case is a general appearance and constitutes
submission to personal jurisdiction.' 6 It contrasted this to a limited
appearance in which the defendant comes to court for the limited
purpose of contesting jurisdiction.' The appellate court held such a
limited appearance does not automatically provide a court with ju-
risdiction."'
3. Jurisdiction on Federal Land
Even where the petitioner for a protection order lives on federal
land within a state's borders, the state has subject matter jurisdiction
over the case.489 Jurisdiction over the parties in a civil protection
order action may be had even though the parties live in a federally
owned installation; however, enforcement of the protection order must
be carried out by military authorities." °
Where the petitioner lives on Indian lands, jurisdictional issues
become more complex. This complexity arises from the fact that
within the United States there are over 500 tribes and therefore an
equal number of tribal customs, laws and codes.49' Each tribe deter-
484. See, e.g., Pierson v. Pierson, 555 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Far. Ct. 1990) (upholding jurisdic-
tion where non-resident perpetrator personally served in New York). But see Anthony T. v.
Anthony J., 510 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Fam. Ct. 1986) (dismissing a petition for protection where the
respondent was served out of state). In State v. Medina, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that a respondent who had actual knowledge of a restraining order which provided that he
could not contact the petitioner and who then proceeded to contact the petitioner could not
be held in contempt of the order where he was never personally served with it. 824 P.2d
106 (Haw. 1992). The only exception to personal service is where the defendant was present
at the hearing at which the order was issued. But see Jane OJ. v. Peter OJ., 532 N.Y.S.2d
955 (Fam. Ct. 1988) (petitioner sought an order of protection on the grounds that her hus-
band was mentally harassing and physically abusing her, but the court held that out of state
personal service of process was improper).
485. 531 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
486. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 974 (Supp. 1992); State v. Medina, 824
P.2d 106 (Haw. 1992).
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. See, e.g., Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989) (holding wife's status as a
member of the United States Armed Forces, residing and working at a military installation in
an area ceded to the federal government, did not preclude the issuance of an abuse protection
order. The protection order was effective in the ceded area, absent any indication that the
order interfered with a federal function).
490. Tammy S. v. Albert S., 408 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Fain. Ct. 1978).
491. Conversation with Professor Nell J. Newton, The Washington College of Law, The
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mines whether its tribal code allows for protection orders.492 While
theoretically state and tribal courts may respect and enforce the
other's law and orders, they are not required to do so. In practice,
state and tribal protection orders often operate independently. The
Wisconsin Appellate Court, in considering a jurisdictional conflict
between state and tribal governments, held that a state court lacked
authority to enter an domestic abuse injunction prohibiting one tribal
member from having contact with his former co-habitant, another
tribal member.493 The court explained that the State's jurisdictional
exercise violated the tribe's right to tribal government, and held that
the existence of a tribal domestic abuse ordinance nearly identical to
the state statute gave the tribe exclusive jurisdiction." Domestic
violence advocates recommend that domestic violence victims who
live or work on Native American reservations should seek both a
state civil protection order, enforceable off the reservation, and a
tribal civil protection order, which is effective on the reservation.
Practically, however, there may be no cross enforcement and the
victim should not expect that her tribal or state protection order will
be enforced outside of the respective jurisdictions.495 The full faith
and credit provisions of the Violence Against Women Act' may
help remedy this problem.
4. Conflicts Between Civil Protection Orders and Other Family
Court Orders
In most states, civil protection orders may be issued in any di-
vorce or family law proceeding or in a separate civil protection order
action.497 In addition to being available from a civil protection order
court, civil protection orders are available upon the petitioner's filing
for divorce,49 when a divorce is pending in either the same or a
American University, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1993).
492. Id.
493. St. Germaine v. Chapman, No. 93-0138 19 F.L.R. 1493 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 24,
1993) (reversing lower court's grant of injunction).
494. Id.
495. Interview with Charon Asetoyer, Director, Native American Women's Health Re-
source Center in Lake Andes, North Dakota (Oct. 5, 1993).
496. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 221 (1993) (providing that any issued protection
order that meets minimal requirements set forth in the bill "shall be accorded full faith and
credit by the court of another State or Indian tribe . . . and enforced as if it were the order
of the enforcing State or tribe"); H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1993) (same).
497. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(0 (Michie 1993) (a protection order petition
may be filed regardless of whether there is any pending litigation between the parties).
498. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 545 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ill. 1989) (affirming
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distinct proceeding49 or after a divorce has been finalized.' Pro-
tection orders can be made part of a divorce decree.' Further, civil
grant of an ex parte domestic violence order of protection granting her temporary custody of
the couple's minor child issued contemporaneously with her filing for dissolution of the mar-
riage); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing petition
for divorce and for civil protection order to be filed simultaneously in divorce proceedings);
Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5282 (Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1993) (holding
that petitioner does not forfeit the right to obtain a protection order simply because she has
filed or is filing for divorce); Mallin v. Mallin, 541 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (af-
firming grant of protection order by motion in a divorce proceeding); Strollo v. Strollo, 828
P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (affirming issuance of protection order to wife who filed for
divorce where there was a past history of abuse and husband threatened to kill wife if she
filed for divorce). But see Walters v. Walters, 540 So. 2d 1026 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that Louisiana state statute requires petition for protection order be filed with separation or
divorce suit. Failure to timely file results in an order unenforceable by means of a later di-
vorce action. Therefore, no contempt action exists where the temporary restraining order in-
junction was abated by a later issued divorce judgment containing no injunction).
499. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-25 (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-02
(Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (1992); In re Marriage of Blitstein. 569 N.E.2d
1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding grant of protection order while divorce action was pend-
ing. The wife filed for and renewed a protection order requiring her husband to vacate the
marital residence after he had harassed her and damaged property); In re Marriage of Ingram.
531 N.E.2d 97, 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (during pendency of a dissolution proceeding, the
husband obtained an interim order of protection in which he alleged that his wife and a male
friend had physically and verbally abused and threatened him in the presence of their son);
Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming decision that petition
for a protection order was permissible even though there was a pending suit for dissolution
of marriage before another judge); Todd v. Todd, 772 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (af-
firming issuance of civil protection order in pending divorce action); Capps v. Capps, 715
S.W.2d 547, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding remedies under Adult Abuse Act are avail-
able to petitioner regardless of whether dissolution of marriage proceedings have begun);
Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (holding proper the entry of a civil
protection order in a pending divorce proceeding); State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987) (affirming grant of domestic abuse injunction obtained during pending divorce
action). But see In re McGraw. 359 S.E.2d 853, 856 (W.Va. 1987) (holding the magistrate
acted properly in refusing to issue a domestic violence protection order since such orders are
prohibited during the pendency of a divorce).
500. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Moses, 386 S.E.2d 487, 488-89 (W. Va. 1989) (affirming
jurisdiction to grant any relief pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act to a
petitioner who is being abused by her ex-husband. who is not presently a member of her
household, where the parties are divorced and their final divorce order permanently enjoins
each of them from molesting, interfering or annoying the other).
501. See, e.g., Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 60-62 (Alaska 1987) (holding that even
where the court has no specific authorization to issue no contact order as part of a divorce
decree, the trial court hearing the divorce had the authority to impose the remedies pursuant
to its equitable power); People v. Lucas, 524 N.E.2d 246 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988) (temporary
protection order may be issued in a dissolution proceeding); Krietz v. Krietz, 750 S.W.2d
681, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a determination that an injunction enjoining hus-
band from entering the marital home at any time may be issued as part of a divorce decree);
Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (allowing certain judges to issue a
protection order and rule on divorce actions); Malin v. Malin, 541 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1988)
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protection orders cannot be denied to a household member threatened
with domestic violence based solely on the fact that there is a divorce
action pending between the parties. 2 These policies, which address
the relationship between divorce and civil protection orders ensure
that a person suffering from spousal abuse who has elected divorce
may choose to bring her request for court protection before the court
hearing the divorce action. This approach reduces both the number of
courts and court hearings, and promotes consistency of orders and
better enforcement, since one judge will hear all aspects of the do-
mestic violence case.
Case law sheds additional light on how various jurisdictions have
approached the relationship between divorce and domestic violence
proceedings and court orders in domestic violence cases involving the
same parties and issues. Divorce and civil protection orders are often
inextricably related, as the abuse may be the very reason for the
divorce. As a result, courts have specifically held that evidence of do-
mestic violence is admissible in a divorce action to prove cruelty, 3
constructive desertion,- to overturn a prenuptial agreement and to
(holding that court hearing divorce action may order protection order remedies, including
issuance of a "vacate" order without requiring the filing of a separate petition for a protec-
tion order).
502. See, e.g., Arlyn T. v. Harold T., 435 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (Farn. Ct. 1981); Hrab v.
Hrab. 332 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 1972): Thomas v. Thomas, 540 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1988); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 304.
503. See, e.g., Pomraning v. Pomraning, 682 S.W.2d 775 (Ark. 1985) (holding refusal to
speak to spouse for days on end, public criticism of housekeeping and parenting, and physi-
cal abuse cruelty sufficient to support a divorce); In re Marriage of Reeder, 570 N.E.2d 876
(i11. 1991) (defining "mental cruelty" as unprovoked, offensive conduct toward one's spouse
which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish, rendering the spouse's life miserable
and unendurable); In re Marriage of Davenport, 416 N.E.2d 88 (111. 1988) (dousing spouse
with kerosene while in bed and lighting the bed afire held to be cruelty); Devereaux v.
Devereaux, 493 So. 2d 1310 (Miss. 1986) (holding cruelty existed where children observed
father strike mother 15 to 20 times and verbally vilify her); Echevarria v. Echevarria. 386
N.Y.S.2d 653 (holding a single act of violence sufficient cruelty to grant divorce); Yaron v.
Yaron, 378 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1975) (granting divorce on grounds of cruelty where husband
physically assaulted wife, causing her to fear for her life, and insulted her judgment); Harwell
v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. 1980) (granting divorce on grounds of cruelty where hus-
band called wife a "bitch," embarrassed her in front of others, tried to push her down stairs
in front of their children, physically assaulted her, and locked her out of the marital resi-
dence, forcing her to spend the night in her car); Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99,
101 (Tenn. 1973) (granting divorce on grounds of cruelty where husband called wife vile
names and denied that their child was his).
504. Merdiken v. Merriken, 590 A.2d 566 (Md. 1991) (finding constructive desertion
where husband locked wife out in snowstorm); see also Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 569 N.Y.S.2d 107
(N.Y. 1991) (finding constructive eviction where wife forced to leave because of abuse).
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establish fault for property distribution, 5 that the marriage has been
irretrievably broken,' debt assignment,' award exclusive use of
marital home to abused spouse,' and support.' A Minnesota
505. Domestic violence is a factor that should be considered in divorce cases where
property is being divided. For a complete discussion of this issue, see Jill Davies. Termina-
tion of Marriage, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES, supra note 21, at 273-80;
see also Doyle v. Doyle, 579 So. 2d 651 (Ala. 1991) (holding extreme cruelty to wife rele-
vant to property division); Palombizio v. Palombizio, 1993 WL 451472 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Oct. 25, 1993) (holding 25 year history of physical and emotional abuse relevant to property
distribution); In re Marriage of Licak, 416 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. 1981) (awarding all marital prop-
erty to wife's estate where husband killed wife, who was sole support of family for four to
five years); Mount v. Mount, 476 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1984) (holding property division properly
influenced by fact that husband beat wife, and hired men to rob and assault her): Handrahan
v. Handrahan. 547 N.E.2d 1141 (Mass. 1989) (overturning award of 25% of marital assets to
abusive husband); Burt v. Burt, 386 N.W.2d 797 (Minn. 1986) (holding that even where fault
is not be considered in property distribution, court may consider wife's needs due to chronic
health problems caused by husband's abuse). Manz v. Manz 805 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. 1990)
(holding evidence of abuse during marriage properly admissible on issue of property division);
Buchert v. Buchert, 768 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1989) (awarding 75% of marital assets to wife
based upon husband's abuse); i re Usreg, 781 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1989) (awarding wife 72%
of all real estate holdings based upon husband extreme physical beatings of children); Kretiz
v. Kreitz, 750 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1988) (awarding wife marital home where husband violated
protection order by smashing windows and driving his truck in the garage wall); D'Arc v.
D'Arc, 421 A.2d 602 (N.J. 1980) (holding husband's abuse relevant to property division);
Brancoveanu v. Brancoveanu, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. 1988) (holding husband's attempted
murder of wife relevant to issue of property division); Behm v. Behm, 427 N.W.2d 332
(N.D. 1988) (allowing evidence of abuse to be admitted on issue of property division); In re
Marriage of Clark, 538 P.2d 145 (Wa. 1975) (holding evidence of abusive husband's exces-
sive drinking and dissipation of marital assets admissible on issue of property division); Leon-
ard v. Leonard, 552 A.2d 394 (Vt. 1988) (holding sexual abuse of step-child relevant to
property distribution).
506. Manz v. Manz, 805 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. 1990) (holding wife's testimony concerning
mental and physical abuse admissible to prove marriage irretrievably broken).
507. Szensy v. Szensy, 557 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. 1990) (holding it proper to award marital
debts to abusive husband).
508. In re Marriage of Hofstetter, 430 N.E.2d 79 (Il1. 1981) (awarding exclusive posses-
sion of marital residence to wife, where husband beat wife over head with gun, beat her with
his fists, kicked her, pointed gun at her, and shot her twice); Grogg v. Grogg, 543 N.Y.S.2d
582 (1989) (awarding home to wife where husband broke into residence and removed wife's
and son's belongings); Minnus v. Minnus, 405 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1978) (awarding exclusive
rights in marital residence to wife who had received protection order against abusive hus-
band); Florence v. Florence, 388 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1965) (awarding wife exclusive use of
marital residence pendant lite when husband, who had been absent from the home for 18
months, threatened violent re-entry).
509. In re Marriage of Foran, 834 P.2d 1081, 1090-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
evidence that wife was abused during their marriage was properly admitted for the purpose of
examining the procedural circumstances surrounding the execution of the prenuptial contract
and with respect to the wife's need for spousal maintenance despite her husband's contention
that the trial court erroneously considered fault in making its disposition of property and
maintenance); see also Doyle v. Doyle, 579 So. 2d 651 (Ala. 1991) (holding extreme cruelty
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court held that a court may address property issues in a civil protec-
tion order proceeding even if there have been previous property
awards as part of a divorce action.1 A Pennsylvania court held that
separation under a civil protection order can count toward separation
required for divorce."' A Missouri court ruled that a divorce court
may take judicial notice of a civil protection order action.'
Minnesota's protection order statute provides that the court issuing the
protection order shall provide a copy to a court hearing a pending
dissolution or separation proceeding." 3
Civil protection orders can also be granted in conjunction with
custody proceedings" 4 and custody orders may be issued as part of
a civil protection order.5"5 In either of these proceedings, when a
court hearing a domestic violence matter is made aware of a custody
award issued in a prior proceeding, a finding that domestic violence
has occurred since the last custody determination constitutes a finding
of a change of circumstances for the purpose of modifying the custo-
to wife and children relevant to alimony award); Palombizio v. Palombizio, 1993 WL 451472
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1993) (upholding admissibility of 25 year history of abuse as
relevant to determination of alimony); Barrett v. Barrett, 305 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1974) (award-
ing rehabilitative alimony where husband's abuse reduced wife's earning capacity); Williams
v. Williams. 375 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 1988) (denying abusive husband alimony).
510. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming
trial court determination to address the petitioner's request for the return of appellant's be-
longings which she can identify with some degree of particularity even if the divorce decree
had granted relief).
511. McBride v. McBride. 484 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (upholding that portion of
the three year separation of the parties was due to an order entered under the Protection
From Abuse Act); see also Nuss v. Nuss. 828 P.2d 627. 632-34 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (liv-
ing arrangements under a civil protection order must meet the "separate and apart" require-
ment in order to count towards separation needed to receive a divorce; husband living in
cabin attached to wife's home did not constitute such a separation).
512. Manz v. Manz, 805 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judicial notice could be
taken of prior adult abuse proceedings in the context of a request for divorce).
513. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B:01.6(e) (West 1993).
514. See. e.g., Spoto v. McCarroll, 593 A.2d 375 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (issu-
ing temporary protection order issued in custody action). But see Danna v. Danna, 364 S.E.2d
694 (N.C. App. 1988) (holding no error when the judge, after having declined to exercise
jurisdiction over a custody dispute between petitioner and her husband in Florida pursuant to
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (the "UCCJA") did not err by failing to address
petitioner's claims of domestic abuse in the custody case).
515. See, e.g.. Sweep v. Sweep, 358 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the maternal grandparents under the
child's stepmother's domestic abuse proceeding against the child's father); Rosenberg v.
Rosenberg, 504 A.2d 350, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (awarding temporary custody to mother,
after both spouses filed petitions under the Protection from Abuse Act, because custody was
an immediate and pressing issue).
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dy and/or visitation provisions of that pre-existing order."s 6 The
court in Sparks v. Sparks517 confirmed that when a civil protection
order custody award expires, custody does not automatically revert
back to the parent who had lost custody."' In Sparks, the civil pro-
tection order provided that the father had custody, following the
mother's attempts to kill him.519 The court held that upon expiration
of the protection order, custody did not revert to the mother."0 Oth-
er courts have placed some limits on what additional claims the civil
protection order court can hear. For example, in Basile v. Basile,52" '
the court held that the respondent may not file a counterclaim in a
protection order case to have child's name changed.s"
When several court proceedings involving the same issues and
parties occur simultaneously, and may potentially conflict, many states
have provided guidance by statute. Four states provide that a civil
protection order does not preclude other relief from the courts."
Twelve states provide that a subsequent domestic relations case super-
sedes portions of a prior civil protection order.524 Wyoming is
unique in that it specifically provides that if the subsequent action is
a divorce action, rulings in the divorce action shall not supersede an
order of protection.5" In practice, however, most jurisdictions pro-
vide that a subsequent family court order may alter some forms of
relief granted (i.e. visitation parameters or child support amounts) but
will not overrule or negate protection order provisions which protect
the victim from continued abuse (i.e. stay away provisions, no contact
orders, police assistance, batterer's counseling). Nine of these states
516. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 404.
517. 747 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
518. Id. at 193.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. 604 A.2d 693 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
522. Id. at 894-95.
523. 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM, LAW § 4-510 (Supp.
1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(3) (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5C (Michie
1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 304 (an order of protection is in addition to
and not in lieu of any other available civil or criminal proceeding).
524. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(12) (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741-30(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/I12A-14 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.765 (MichielBobbs-Merill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134(D) (West
Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-9(3) (Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-12(3)(a) (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-5(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(H) (West 1992); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.722 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993).
525. WYo. STAT. § 35-21-106 (Supp. 1993).
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authorize the superseding case to control on issues of child sup-
port;526 ten of these states authorize the superseding domestic rela-
tions case to control issues of child custody;527 and three authorize
the superseding domestic relations case to control on issues of child
visitation.
5 21
Kansas and Nebraska alternatively provide that a civil protection
order controls when in conflict with another court order.529 Texas
and Wyoming have a general provision that a civil protection order or
temporary protection order prevails over domestic relations cases.53
The Minnesota and Texas statutes specify that a prior civil protection
order prevails over a subsequent domestic relations case on issues of
domestic violence.531 Minnesota adds that notice is required for a
divorce order to modify a civil protection order and the court in a
subsequent custody order may consider, but is not bound by, a civil
protection order finding of domestic violence. 32 These states which
give precedence to civil protection orders when they come into con-
flict with other proceedings and orders have preferable policies as
they place paramount importance on the protection of the victim of
domestic abuse. Custody, support, and visitation provisions of civil
protection orders should supersede prior court orders regarding these
matters as resolution of these volatile issues is directly related to
successfully maintaining the safety of the family.
Only five minority jurisdictions provide that a civil protection
526. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(12) (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741-30(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(3) (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-12(3)(b) (1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5C (Michie Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(H)
(West 1992): OR. REV. STAT. § 107.730 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993).
527. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(12) (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741-30(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
209A. § 3 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(3) (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-12(3)(b) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5C (Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(H) (West 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.730 (1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993).
528. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(3)(b) (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(H)
(West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp 1993).
529. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(b) (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(4) (Supp.
1992). Texas. however, does not allow the civil protection order any power where it conflicts
with court orders other than domestic relations cases. TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.13(b) (West
Supp. 1993).
530. TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.15(b) (West 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-106(b) (1992).
531. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.13(c) (West Supp. 1993).
532. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993).
19931
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
order court is bound by a prior custody award 33 and only two pre-
clude a civil protection order from superseding an order on child
support. 53" New Hampshire alone bars a civil protection order from
prevailing over an order concerning possession of a residence or
furniture. 35 Statutes which limit a civil protection order court's abil-
ity to amend prior custody or child support awards or which bind a
protection order court from offering relief that may be central to stop-
ping the violence significantly undermine the protection order court's
ability to provide effective relief. For this reason, this restrictive ap-
proach has been abandoned by most jurisdictions.
Courts have placed a premium on safety by assuring unrestricted
access to civil protection order courts.536 When faced with divorce
cases and civil protection order actions which are brought separately
but involve the same parties, courts have delineated the relationship
between the two proceedings. For example, in Steckler v. Steckler,5 37
the court held that a protection order which altered the pickup and
delivery points of the children and suspended the respondent's contact
with the mother on visitation issues did not amount to an impermissi-
ble modification of the divorce decree visitation rights since the sub-
stance of the divorce decree was preserved and the objective of the
protection order in protecting the mother from further abuse could not
be achieved absent the modification.535 In Campbell v. Campbell,539
the petitioner obtained a temporary injunction against her ex-husband
prohibiting him from visiting their child because she feared additional
violence."  She obtained the injunction pursuant to a Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure.541 Her ex-husband appealed the order on the
ground that the rule was not intended for such use. 2 The court
held that while the rule should not be used to file a domestic vio-
lence claim, the wife's petition substantially followed the form out-
533. MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 455.050.3(1) (Vernon 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:41I (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-5(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(H) (West 1992).
534. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:411 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5C (Michie
Supp. 1993).
535. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:41I (1991).
536. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 304.
537. 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992).
538. Id. at 81-82.
539. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
540. Id. at 126.
541. Id.; Fla. R. Civ. Proc. 1.610.
542. Campbell, 584 So. 2d at 126.
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lined in Florida's domestic violence statute and therefore considered it
to be a petition filed under that statute." The court added that
"[s]urely fear that a custodial parent will be assaulted or battered by a
non-custodial parent constitutes an act of domestic violence as to their
child." Although the Florida court expressly separated the domes-
tic violence issue from the other civil issues procedurally, the holding
reflects an enlightened court's efforts to tie the issues together and
adjudicate them as one problem.
Courts have also placed some limitations on their own ability to
address the issues raised before it. In Ardis S. v. Sanford S., the
court held that a court with jurisdiction over a divorce proceeding
may not stay a protection order issued by the court with exclusive
original jurisdiction over domestic violence cases.' In Duello v.
Hoester,"7 the appellate court held that the lower court judge ex-
ceeded his jurisdiction by entering an order relating to matters in the
parties' dissolution case when the parties were before the court solely
to hear the wife's petition under the Protection From Abuse Act and
had never been given notice of nor consented to the court hearing
matters in the dissolution case. "  In Story v. Story,5"  the court
held that an award of custody of a minor child in a divorce proceed-
ing could not be based upon the state's domestic violence statute
where the incidents of abuse alleged in the wife's pleadings in the di-
vorce action took place prior to the enactment of the statute.55°
In response to the complex problems that arise when cases and
orders conflict, the growing trend in progressive jurisdictions is to
consolidate family law actions before one court when domestic vio-
lence is present.5 ' Judicial authorities recommend consolidation of
separate actions such as civil protection order, divorce, child support
543. Id.
544. Id. at 127.
545. 389 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Fain. Ct. 1976).
546. Id. at 530-31.
547. 618 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
548. Id. at 243-44.
549. 291 S.E.2d 923 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
550. Id. at 926; see also Hayes v. Hayes. 597 A.2d 567 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991)
(holding wife was not entitled to enforce a child support order granted pursuant to domestic
violence order in the divorce proceeding because such orders are only intended to bridge the
emergent situation and wife failed to avail herself of other order processes for fixing sup-
port).
551. In a few states, such as Virginia and Hawaii, the courts have consolidated all crimi-




and child custody before a single judge to the greatest extent possi-
ble. 52 This practice improves civil protection order effectiveness by
encouraging consistent and expeditious enforcement of civil protection
orders. Nine states authorize consolidation of a separate civil protec-
tion order action with other divorce, custody or family matters pend-
ing before the court. 53 Six of these jurisdictions provide that a civil
protection order case may be consolidated with other civil actions."
In two of these jurisdictions, a civil protection order must be consoli-
dated with divorce, legal separation, or annulment action.55 One ju-
risdiction, North Dakota, allows the same judge presiding over civil
protection order hearings to preside over divorce proceedings.5"
The trend in case law parallels that found in these statutes. 7
This emerging trend creates a favorable policy responsive to the needs
of domestic violence victims, recognizing that information generated
in each separate cause of action is usually interdependent. To inter-
vene effectively to prevent future violence, courts must be able to
552. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE
PROJECT, Family Violence: Improving Court Practice, 41 JUV. FAM. CT. J. 31 (1990).
553. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602N (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(a)
(1993); 750 ILCS 60/202 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2134(D) (West Supp. 1992);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768.2 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West
Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.040.3 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(d) (Law.
Co-op. 1992); Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986).
554. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(a) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/202 (1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-2134 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768.2 (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.040.3 (Michie
1992).
555. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602N (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(d)
(Law. Co-op. 1992).
556. See, e.g., Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986).
557. See, e.g., In re M.D., 602 A.2d 109 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992) (continuing the condi-
tions of civil protection order in a child abuse and neglect proceeding that has been consoli-
dated with the protection order case after the civil protection order has ended); People v.
Williams, 582 N.E.2d 1158. 1160 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming issuance of civil protection
order while divorce proceeding pending); Vogt v. Vogt, 455 N.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Minn.
1990) (consolidating civil protection order with divorce action); Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390
N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (allowing same judge to hear divorce proceedings as issued civil
protection order).
Note further that some jurisdictions have allowed women suffering from domestic
abuse to join their interspousal tort claims with their dissolution proceedings. See, e.g.,
Hutchings v. Hutchings, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 498 (Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993) (allowing
joinder of interspousal tort claim with divorce. Ironically, one argument against joinder which
was considered by the court was that joining the tort claim would further enrage the abuser
and subject the abused spouse to more harm. The court neglected to consider the counter
argument that the benefit to the abused spouse was a contemporaneous resolution of all dis-
putes, thereby reducing the number of confrontations between abuser and abused to one.).
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understand the full history of the relationship between the parties as
well as the parties' and their children's needs and concerns. If a prior
divorce decree contains a child visitation provision which has proven
unworkable or which has led to more violence, the judge considering
a protection order should have this relevant information to be able to
craft the most effective order in the domestic violence case.
58
The same judge should hear interrelated cases not only because
their outcomes are dependent upon each other, but also because it
reduces the contact between the victim and her batterer. The majority
of battered women seeking protection orders appear pro se.559 This
can compound an already terrifying experience for the victim who
must face her abuser in court. Contact between the parties should be
minimized and matters of conflict between them should be resolved
efficiently through consolidating related proceedings. For many vic-
tims the court issuing the protection order can resolve most, if not
all, of the outstanding issues between the parties including custody,
child support and division of personal property. Particularly, in those
cases where the parties are not married or do not for religious or
other reasons intend to divorce, the civil protection order action may
be the only action in which these parties need to be brought together
before the court.
If the judge was authorized to issue child custody, visitation, and
support provisions in civil protection orders that were to last until the
children reach majority, the victim and batterer would not be required
to return to court to file separate court actions for permanent child
support and custody as is now required in the vast majority of juris-
dictions. The recommended practice is to allow custody, visitation and
child support and personal property division clauses in civil protection
order orders to remain in effect until amended by a future court or-
der. If either party wishes to request amendment or modification of
these civil protection order provisions, or wishes to litigate issues of
custody, child support, or visitation more fully, they may file an
action in the appropriate court, serve notice, and fully litigate any
558. Leslye E. Orloff, Issuance of Civil Protective Orders, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
CIVIL COURT CASES, supra note 21, at 75, 78-79.
559. For example, in the District of Columbia, 65.8% of battered women seek protection
orders pro se and 15.6% are represented by the Office of Corporation Counsel. The remain-
der are represented by private (usually pro bono) counsel or law school clinics. D.C. TASK
FORCE, supra note 213. at 143. In other jurisdictions, the rate of domestic violence victims
who proceed with counsel is even lower. In Maryland, only 11% receive legal assistance.
Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 250 n.11.
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contested matters. However, in all other cases in which the terms of
the civil protection order are working effectually, the parties need not
return to court for appearances in multiple court actions. This ap-
proach will minimize continued violence by reducing arenas of poten-
tial conflict and opportunities for contact between the parties at re-
peated court hearings. s'
5. Requiring Petitioner to Notify Court of Other Pending
Actions
Eleven states statutorily provide that the petitioner must notify
the court of other pending actions at the time she files for a civil
protection order. 6' Three states further assert that notification is a
continuing duty throughout protection order proceedings, 2 while
another three states specifically require disclosure when a divorce is
pending.: 3 Only two states require the petitioner who seeks child
custody to meet UCCJA reporting requirements,' and Mississippi
stipulates that if a child involved in the protection order proceeding is
subject to other court actions, such as juvenile or neglect proceedings,
the petitioner must inform the court of those actions and attach orders
related to such actions. 65 These notification policies help courts
identify existing court orders, and to better assess what types of pro-
visions would best protect the petitioner. Once aware of other pending
proceedings, the civil protection order court can make better informed
decisions, can resolve conflicts with pre-existing orders, and can make
changes appropriate in light of the violence. By learning the family's
560. This approach has been recommended by the District of Columbia Task Force. D.C.
TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 143. "[Tlhe Task Force sees no reason why parties who are
often unrepresented should be required to file separate court actions for permanent custody,
visitation and support if the issues have been resolved fully in the CPO proceeding." Id. at
155 n.278.
561. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602B.4 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-
6304(4) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/203a (1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504(b)(1)(ii)(3)
(Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-3.C (Michie Sup. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.710(3) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-15-2 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(6) (Supp. 1993).
562. 750 ILCS 60/203(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LA. ANN. ch. 209A,
§ 3(1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(5)(1992); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15.
§ 304.
563. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3662(B)(4) (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134(B)
(West 1992); MtSS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(2) (1992).
564. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.710(4) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-6304(5) (Supp. 1993).
565. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(5) (1993).
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legal history, both past and present, the court will have a more com-
plete understanding of the dynamics of the parties' relationships.
a. Conflicts of Law
When city and state domestic laws conflict, state laws control. In
City of Columbus v. Patterson,"6 the defendant was convicted of
violating a temporary protection order. 67 He failed to vacate the res-
idence he shared with his victim and under a city ordinance, such a
violation was a misdemeanor. 6 The Ohio Court of Appeals re-
manded the case, finding that the city ordinance conflicted with state
law, which classified such a violation as a civil contempt charge.569
6. Venue
Among various courts within a state, venue generally lies where
the petitioner resides,"0 where she is currently living, either perma-
nently or temporarily in a shelter, 7  where the respondent
resides, 72 where either party resided at the time of the civil protec-
566. No. 82AP-47, 1982 WL 4556 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1982).
567. Id. at *1.
568. Id. at *1.
569. Id. at *3.
570. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Michie 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 946(c)
(1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-2 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6304(6) (1993); 750 ILCS
60/209 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2133 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A. § 2 (1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01(3) (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.503 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-123 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.2(A) (west 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1992); TEx. FAM. CODE
Ann. § 71.03 (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1102 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.020(6) (west Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.50(5r) (West Supp. 1993).
571. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 946(c) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6304(6) (1992);
750 ILCS 60/209 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Michie 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133 (west 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 763 (West
1982); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 2 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 (1990);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(6) (West 1993).
572. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Michie 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 946(c)
(1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-2 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6304(6) (Supp. 1993); 750
ILCS 60/209 Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133 (West 1992); MINN.
STAT. § 518B:01(3) (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455-503 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 404-123 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:13 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
28(a) (West 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.(A) (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
4-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. § 71.03 (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.020(6) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3(b) (Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 801.50(5r) (West Supp. 1993); see also Forster v. Forster, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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tion order violation or incident giving rise to the request for a civil
protection order, whether temporarily573  or permanently, 74  and
where a divorce action may be brought.75 Twenty jurisdictions stat-
utorily authorize the petitioner to file for a civil protection order in
any general court; 76 six jurisdictions authorize filing in circuit
court;5' ten in district court;7 . six in family court; 57 9 and one in
family or juvenile court."* When confronted with the question of
which court, county, or district has original jurisdiction to issue pro-
tection orders, courts have held that original jurisdiction is concur-
rent.
5 t
258 (1993) (affirming trial court's transfer of case to county where defendant resided upon
his motion. The wife had fled the county to escape abuse and filed in her new county of
residence. The court held that a plaintiffs right to trial in a county other than the residence
of the defendant is an exception rather than the general rule); Selland v. Selland, 494 N.W.2d
367 (N.D. 1992) (holding that court should have granted defendant's motion to transfer the
trial).
573. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Michie 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 946(c)
(1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(3) (West 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3
(1990).
574. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Michie 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 943
(1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 763 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-2
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-3 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.020(6)
(West Supp. 1993).
575. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3(b) (Supp. 1993).
576. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (1992); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3602 (1992);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-3 (Supp. 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 763 (1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 2 (West 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(3) (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3(c) (1973 &
Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-123 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Supp.
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(3)(B) (1991); TEXAS
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1102 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
253.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3(a) (Supp. 1993).
577. ALA. CODE § 30-5-9 (1992); 750 ILCS 60/207 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.502 (Supp. 1993);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.710 (19912); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (1992).
578. ALA. CODE § 30-5-9 (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West 1992); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3104(a) (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Michie 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 761-A (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-.02.1 (1991): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22. § 60.2(A) (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 71.111 (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1102 (1989).
579. HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-2 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West 1993);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ANN. § 812 (McKinney 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(B)
(Baldwin Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-30
(Law. Co-op. 1993).
580. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134 (West 1992).
581. See, e.g., Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989) (holding that county court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court to issue protection order enjoining father
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7. Election of Remedies
In nearly every jurisdiction, domestic violence victims may si-
multaneously seek protection as a petitioner in a civil protection ac-
tion and as the victim in the state's criminal prosecution of the
batterer for his crimes against the victim. To fully safeguard domestic
violence victims, protection must be available in both forums. The
civil protection order action is brought by the victim to secure her
own protection; the criminal case is brought by the state to punish
the batterer for his criminal actions.
Only New York denies domestic violence victims the protection
of both the civil and criminal courts. It has adopted an extremely
complex and confusing system in which the petitioner is required to
elect whether criminal or family court will hear her claim.582 She is
barred from seeking relief in both courts. After three days, her elec-
tion is permanent and may not be changed.583 The procedural diffi-
culties of this system have impeded speedy adjudication of issues of
domestic violence. Respondents have often successfully used the New
York system strategically in an attempt to have the charges against
them dismissed. The problems with this system are evident by the
great volume of litigation it has generated.5 One New York court
from contacting his minor child); see also Harman v. Frye, 425 S.E.2d 566. 575 (W. Va.
1992) (holding that the circuit and magistrates courts have concurrent jurisdiction over domes-
tic violence proceeding under W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3).
582. By way of an old line of cases, New York has specified that the Family Court has
jurisdiction over harassment and assault charges and the criminal court has jurisdiction over
trespassing, endangering the welfare of the child, and criminal contempt charges. See, e.g.,
Clifford v. Krueger, 297 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that to qualify as an assault
under the domestic violence statute, the assault need not take place in the family home.
Family Court, therefore, has jurisdiction over matters of assault that have occurred outside the
home if the requisite parties are involved); People v. Singleton, 532 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Crim. Ct.
1988) (holding criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction over some offenses not enumerated as
family offenses such as endangering the welfare of a child, criminal trespass in the second
degree and criminal contempt in the second degree); People v. Hawkins, 268 N.Y.S.2d 482
(Cty. Ct. 1966) (holding that the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over case involving
assault of one family member against another); Keller v. Keller, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct.
1962) (holding that the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over cases of assault between
members of the same family even if these members do not live in the same household).
583. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 821(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
584. See, e.g., People v. Holdip, 541 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding
that defendant's plea of guilty functioned as a waiver of the trial court's failure to comply
with procedures for family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act §' 812); People
v. Williams, 551 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Crim. Ct. 1990) (holding that defendant's wife's initial filing
of family court petition did not bar her from initiating a criminal proceeding within 72
hours); People v. Falzone, 537 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Crim. Ct. 1989) (holding that the complainant's
petition in the Family Court charging her husband with assaulting and threatening her consti-
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said in dicta that the present system of advising complainants on the
best choice of forum does not always guarantee an informed or intel-
ligent choice on the part of victims of domestic violence.s This
restriction in New York should be eliminated.
8. Choice of Forum For Civil Protection Order Enforcement
Courts and legislatures have struggled with the effect the parallel
systems of relief in criminal and civil courts have on civil protection
order enforcement. One Pennsylvania court has held that only the juv-
enile court has jurisdiction in the matter of the enforcement of a civil
protection order against petitioner's minor boyfriend.s" Oklahoma
tuted a final choice of forum and barred a subsequent criminal action against husband based
on same incident. Complainant must be informed of the ramifications of election of forum
between the family court and the criminal court when filing her petition alleging spousal
abuse); People v. Singelton, 532 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Crim. Ct. 1988) (holding complainant's deci-
sion to pursue charges in Family Court precluded Criminal Court's jurisdiction over these
charges despite complainant being uninformed); People v. Perez, 440 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Crim. Ct.
1981) (holding that where more than 72 hours had expired after the criminal complaint was
filed in the criminal court, the victim had irrevocably elected to proceed in that forum and
was barred from subsequently seeking an order of protection in the Family Court); Hawley v.
Hawley, 355 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Fain. Ct. 1974) (transferring assault case from family court to
criminal court, where husband assaulted wife and she subsequently died, making reconciliation
impossible); People v. McGraw, 524 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Cty. Ct. 1988) (holding that the criminal
court is not deprived of jurisdiction over criminal contempt count by virtue of a family
court's action, as the state, not the petitioner, started the subsequent criminal action); People
v. Bauman, 545 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Dist. Ct. 1989) (holding that under Section 812 of the Family
Court Act, the filing of an accusatory instrument in criminal court or a petition in family
court constituted a final choice of forum after 72 hours have elapsed from such filing and
bars any subsequent proceeding in an alternative court based on the same offense); People v.
Vaughn, 417 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (finding concurrent jurisdiction existed between
the family court and the criminal court where the wife was charged with attempted murder of
her husband); People v. Revell, 402 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Dist. Ct. 1978) (holding the statute grant-
ing the criminal court concurrent jurisdiction over family offenses is not unconstitutionally
vague nor does it result in a deprivation of due process of equal protection); People v.
Brady, 283 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Dist. Ct. 1967) (in vesting concurrent jurisdiction in family court
and criminal court, the domestic violence statute did not intend that an act defined in penal
law was to be considered a crime, merely because the parties involved were spouses); People
v. Fisher, 580 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Just. Ct. 1991) (holding that where wife filed two claims, one
in family court and one in criminal court, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law and the
Family Court Act, that the family court had jurisdiction because it was the final choice of
forum. The case can be returned to the criminal court if the interests of justice required, but
the choice belongs to the family court with the petitioner's consent. Here, the petitioner con-
tended that the Family Court advised her to move back into criminal court. The advice,
however, must be in the form of an order. Petitioner had no order, and therefore defendant's
motion was granted).
585. People v. Williams. 551 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Crim. Ct. 1990).
586. Diehl v. Drummond, 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 376 (C.P. 1989) (a minor can be named as
a respondent and have protection orders issued against him but enforcement must be brought
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has determined that, because a violator of a protection order is liable
for criminal penalties, the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive
and final jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a protection order to deter-
mine the legal sufficiency and efficacy of the criminal process trig-
gered for the enforcement of an emergency protection order.5 In
Arkansas' unique system of chancery courts, the conflict between the
roles of civil and criminal courts in cases of domestic violence result-
ed in denying jurisdiction over such cases to the civil courts, due to
the availability of remedies in the criminal courts. 8 The state legis-
lature, however, has subsequently resolved the issue by concluding
that because injunctive relief was needed to combat the problem of
domestic abuse and because injunctive relief is equitable in nature,
the chancery courts, as courts of equity, did have subject matter juris-
diction over cases of domestic violence.5 89
There may also be conflicts in the relationship between civil and
criminal courts when a civil protection order is violated. A state may
enforce its civil and temporary protection orders either through civil
or criminal contempt or as a misdemeanor. Thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia enforce protection orders through contempt."
in juvenile court).
587. Flury v. Howard. 813 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Okla. 1991)
588. Bates v. Bates, 793 S.W.2d 788 (Ark. 1990). The Arkansas Supreme Court invali-
dated the Arkansas Domestic Abuse Act on the ground that it impermissible enlarged the
chancery court's jurisdiction. The Court held that the legislature lacked power under the
state's Constitution to expand the jurisdiction of the chancery courts beyond what they had at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Since the circuit courts in Arkansas have origi-
nal jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters at law, petitioner in this case had an ade-
quate remedy at law barring actual or threatened abuse, including obtaining a peace bond.
Thus, the court held, equity would not enjoin the commission of a crime and infringe upon
the abuser's right to trial by jury.
589. In 1991, the General Assembly rewrote the statute in accordance with the Bates
decision. The statute now provides for injunctive relief which is equitable in nature and there-
fore is under the jurisdiction of the chancery courts. The state legislature explained:
[t]he General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds that this
chapter is necessary to secure important governmental interests in the protection of
victims of abuse and the prevention of further abuse through the removal of of-
fenders from the household and other injunctive relief for which there is no ade-
quate remedy in current law. The General Assembly hereby finds that this chapter
shall meet a compelling societal need and is necessary to correct the acute and
pervasive problem of violence and abuse within households in this state. The equi-
table nature of this remedy requires the legislature to place proceedings contemplat-
ed by this chapter under the jurisdiction of the chancery courts.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-101 (Michie 1993).
590. See ALA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-10(b) (1989); ARtZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602H
(1992); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-105
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Twenty-four of those states enforce a civil protection order by civil or
criminal contempt. 9 ' Three states will hold a respondent in civil
contempt only,592 and five states only enforce civil protection orders
through criminal contempt. 93
Thirty-seven states prosecute a violation of a protection order as
a misdemeanor." Twenty-four states enforce civil protection orders
(1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(f)
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-30(9)(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
13-6(a) (1991); 750 ILCS 60/223 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West
1985 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760
(Michie 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM LAW
§ 4-508 (1991 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1987); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(6) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14(c) (West
1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:81I (1990); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West 1993); N.Y. FAM Cr. ACT § 846-a (McKinney Supp. 1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.720(4) (1991);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-3 (Supp. 1993); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-610 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.-279.1C (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(3) (West 1986); W.
VA. CODE § 48-2A-7 (Supp. 1993).
591. See ALA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-10(b) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602H
(1992); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-105
(1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-30(9)(a)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(a) (1991); 750 ILCS 60/223 (Smith
Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3110 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760 (Michie 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 769 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM LAW § 4-508 (1991 & Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(6) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14(c) (West 1990);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:811 (1990); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West 1993); N.Y. FAM CT. ACT § 846-a (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.720(4)
(1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-3 (Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.-279.IC (Michie Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(3) (West 1986); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-7 (Supp.
1993).
592. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(e) (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A. § 7
(West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-4 (1987).
593. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137(B) (West 1992); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2950(6) (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-06 (1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6114; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989).
594. See ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.740 (Supp. 1993); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-15-207 (Michie 1992); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2042 & 5807 (West 1992);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-107
(West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(e) (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741-31 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(b) (1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-11 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312(i) (Supp. 1993);750 ILCS 60/223 (Smith
Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-6-3(h) (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107
(Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.763(2) (Baldwin 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
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through either contempt proceedings or as a misdemeanor. 95 Texas',
Missouri's, North Dakota's, Ohio's, and Washington's civil protection
order statutes now prosecute some violations of a protection order as
felonies." The Supreme Court, in United States v. Dixon,"
cleared the way for ensuring that a battered woman could enforce a
civil protection order through criminal contempt without immunizing
their batterers from criminal prosecution. 9'
19, § 769 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509 (1992 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
L. ANN. CH. 209A, § 7 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.14(6) (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14(a) (West 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455-085(8) (Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-626 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT § 42-924(3) (Supp. 1992);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.100 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8
(1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-06 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(1)(a)
(Baldwin Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6(A) (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-15-3 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-6(5) (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1030 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
253.2 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(1) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-10 (1992); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(8) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-21-106(i) (1988).
595. See ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-207 (Michie 1992);
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2042 & 5807 (West 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5 (West
1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-107 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 950(e) (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-31 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-6(b) (1991); 750 ILCS 60/223 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3107 (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.763(2) (Baldwin 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509 (1992 & Supp.
1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.14(6) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14(a) (West 1990); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:8 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-06 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(L)(1)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(1) (West Supp.
1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-7 to -10 (1992).
596. Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.085(7) (designating as a felony a civil protection order viola-
tion if evidence of prior violations within the last five years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.-07.1-
06 (Supp. 1992) (designating second violation as a felony); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 2919.27 (1992) (designating as a felony a temporary protection order violation if two or
more violations of this or other protection order); TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.16 (West Supp.
1993) (designating separate acts of family violence as a felony); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.110 (Supp. 1993) (designating as assault).
597. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
598. The outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, makes
it incumbent for states to adopt procedures that will maximize communication between peti-
tioners seeking to enforce civil protection orders and prosecutors in the criminal justice sys-




E. States Place No Time Limitations Within Which an
Abused Party Must File For a Protection Order
1. Lack of Filing Deadlines
Due to the cyclical nature of domestic violence,"9 introduction
of evidence of the relationship's history of abuse and patterns of
power and control' is vital in allowing a court to fully compre-
hend the risk posed to a particular petitioner. Reports indicate that
thirty-two percent of domestic violence victims will be abused again
within six months and many are abused as often as once a week."I
Since violence often escalates in a relationship 2 and increases in
frequency and severity over time, 3 evidence of past abuse is rele-
599. BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 4. Battering is rarely an isolated event. National
survey data indicates that two-thirds of women who have been beaten reported two or more
violent incidents a year, with over half of the women being beaten five or more times a
year. ADELE HARRELL, A GUIDE TO RESEARCH ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 12 (1993).
600. ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26. at 21-26. Eighty percent of batterers engage in
violent behaviors against multiple targets, including spouse, children, parents, and pets. Over
50 percent of batterers also abuse their children. Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman
Syndrome, in FAMILY ABUSE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 139-48 (G.T. Hotaling et al. eds.,
1988); see also TERRIFYING LovE, supra note 4, at 71. Men who batter their wives do not
do so by accident, mistake or as a result of loss of control. Domestic battery is intentional
violence directed at women partners in order to gain or maintain control over them. HARLOW,
supra note 3.
601. KLAUS & RAND, supra note 3. According to one report, 47% of men who admit
battering their wives report three or more assaults per year. MURRAY A. STRAUS E AL.,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 41 (1980). The cycle of vio-
lence may end in either death of the victim or separation. When violence ends in either of
these ways, batterers often move on to a new victim. Violence may also be stopped follow-
ing negative experiences which may include social and legal sanctions. Jeffery Fagan, Cessa-
tion of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 377 (Lloyd Ohlin
& Michael Tonry eds. 1989); HARRELL, supra note 599, at 23.
602. GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at 129.
603. BROWNE, supra note 171, at 68. Approximately 25% of the victims of spousal or
ex-spousal attacks have been the victims within the previous six months of a series of at
least three similar crimes. KLAUS & RAND, supra note 3, at 3. For about 25% of the vic-
tims, the battering will be regular and ongoing. Judge Richard Lee Price, Love and Violence:
Victims and Perpetrators, Remarks at New York City Coalition for Women's Mental Health
(January 1991). Approximately 50% of battered women in shelter reported violence occurring
once a week and another 25% reported monthly beatings. ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE. WOMAN ABUSE: FREQUENT AND SEVERE (1983). Forty-one percent (41%)
of those assaulted are victimized again within 15 months. LQUISE BAUSCHARD, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE SECOND NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON FEMALE OFFENDERS 13 (1987). One
national survey found that 57% of the most frequent perpetrators of severe violence during
year one continued using severe violence on their wives in year two. Sharon Wofford et al..
Continuities in Marital Violence, J. FAM. VIOLENCE, June 1992. For many battered women,
each of the assaults is so similar that they can not remember them distinctly. HARLOW. supra
note 3, at 2-3.
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vant to a court's determination of both the need for a protection order
and the type of remedies required to stop the violence.' Thus,
courts should elicit evidence about the history of abuse, and use that
information to guide their decisions.
Most state statutes recognize the relevance of a past abusive act
to provide a context to evaluate present fear and danger. Forty-four
states and the District of Columbia place no time limitations within
which an abused party must file for a protection order.'S Massachu-
setts specifically states that a court may not deny a civil protection
order petition solely because it was not filed within a particular time
period after the last incident of abuse.'
Courts regularly consider the history of violence in the parties'
relationship and past abuse as evidence of the need for a current
protection order. Protection orders are issued when the victim fears
further violence based on abuse which may have occurred sometime
604. Ganley, supra note 21, at 20. ("Domestic violence is a pattern of behavior that
consists of multiple, often times daily behaviors, including both criminal and noncriminal acts.
While the legal process tends to focus on individual behaviors, it is the entire pattern of
abuse that shapes how the abuser and the abused party function in court and how each re-
sponds to interventions").
605. All of the following state statutes are silent as to time restrictions: ALA. CODE
§ 30-5-2 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.035.020 (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2036.5 (West
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-14-102 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15
(West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921 (1975 & Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1004 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
13-3 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-6304 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214 (Smith Hurd Supp.
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-2 (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANn. § 60-3104 (Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.725
(Michie 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 764.2 (Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504 (1991 & Supp. 1993); MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A. § 3 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 93-21-3 (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.4 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9
(Supp. 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.510 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-122
(1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.050 (1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West Supp. 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3 (Michie 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821 (McKinney Supp. 1994);
N.C. G N. STAT. § 50B-2 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106 (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-15-3 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-10-3 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE Ann.
§ 71.04 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1104 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.030 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-4 (Supp. 1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(5) (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-21-103 (1988); see also MODEL CODE. supra note 15, § 309 (protection order shall not
be denied solely based on lapse of time between an act of domestic violence and the filing
of the petition).
606. MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 1992).
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in the past. Courts have considered evidence of past abuse when the
petitioner has present fear of harm;' evidence of prior protection
orders;' evidence of incidents of abuse which occurred prior to the
domestic violence act's enactment, to show a trend toward the current
violence;' the history of past altercations, to evaluate present
threats;"' evidence of a prior domestic violence conviction when it
is an element of the aggravated crime charged;6" evidence of a his-
tory of domestic violence to defeat an abuser's claim of self-de-
fense;6"2 and the history of abuse when deciding whether to extend
a civil protection order.613
These courts recognize the importance of past abuse in determin-
ing the present need for a protection order. In Boniek v. Boniek,"4
the court issued a protection order after "[v]iewing the evidence in its
totality, and in light of the [defendant]'s history of abusive behav-
ior."'615 In Strollo v. Strollo, the court upheld a civil protection order
607. Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding evidence of past
abuse admissible to show present intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst. 793 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the last incident of abuse, which occurred two months prior to the civil protection order peti-
tion, was admissible when accompanied by present fear of violence from respondent husband
when he was served with divorce papers); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992) (evidence of prior acts of domestic violence was properly admitted into evidence,
pursuant to the domestic violence act); Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah App. Ct. 1992)
(holding court below properly admitted evidence of past abuse, coupled with present fear of
future abuse, where defendant threatened to kill petitioner if she divorced him and he had
beaten her for eight and a half years, most recently seven months before).
608. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d at 196.
609. See Smittle v. Smittle, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 476 (C.P. 1979) (admitting evidence of an
incident of violence which occurred prior to Protection From Abuse Act since the statute
does not create a new category of prohibited acts but merely provides a new remedy. Such
abuse is particularly relevant, since the petitioner still suffers from the injury).
610. Hall v. Hall. 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that verbal threats to kill
the petitioner if she "jerks him around with custody" in the context of past physical abuse
can inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault and is sufficient to sup-
port civil protection order).
611. State v. Wendling, No. 12015. 1990 WL 197957 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1990)
(holding that where the crime charged included a specification of a previous conviction, evi-
dence of defendant's prior domestic violence conviction properly admitted).
612. Garibay v. United States, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 303 (D.C. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1993)
(holding where abusive defendant claims self-defense to defeat criminal domestic violence
prosecution, evidence of history of abuse admissible to prove motive and intent as a state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule).
613. Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that court
should consider all episodes of violence during parties' marriage to determine appropriateness
of extension of civil protection order beyond one year).
614. 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. App. 1989).
615. Id.
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based in part on abuse which occurred seven months before, reason-
ing that "[t]he statute clearly protects those who are reasonably in
fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct coupled with a
present threat of future harm. Otherwise, the prophylactic purpose of
the statute would be defeated. '616 In Cruz-Foster v. Foster,"7 the
court stated that a trial court which evaluates the need to extend a
protection order "must consider the entire history of [the petitioner's]
relationship with [the batterer], as reflected in the record, in determin-
ing whether [the petitioner] has presented evidence sufficient to war-
rant the relief sought.!1t In Steckler v. Steckler, t9 the court up-
held the issuance of a temporary protection order against a former
husband, based in part on evidence of visitation violations, physical
abuse after the divorce, and evidence of past verbal and physical
abuse during the marriage. The court held that the past abuse is rele-
vant, and can assist the court in determining imminent danger and
predicting violence in the future.62
Specifically, in Pendleton v. Minichino,62' the Connecticut Su-
perior Court found present and immediate danger sufficient to issue a
civil protection order, based in part on the respondent's remarks to
petitioner that he was depressed and that "[t]his time I'm not going
alone. You better watch your back."'6n The order was granted even
though the petitioner waited seven hours to call the police and seven
days to file for the ex parte order.6' The court concluded that the
fact that the petitioner's fear of present and immediate danger did not
materialize within seven hours or seven days did not dismiss the
probability that such danger continued unabated until the issuance of
the ex parte order.24
616. 828 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah App. Ct. 1992).
617. 597 A.2d 927.
618. Id. at 930 n.3.
619. 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992).
620. Id. at 81.
621. No. 506673, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 915 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 3, 1992).
622. Id. at *6-*7.
623. Id.
624. Id. at *7. But see Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (denying protection order where substantiated abuse occurred 23 months and 20 months
prior to the petition plus unsubstantiated allegations that the respondent abused the children as
recently as three months before the petition and that the respondent made suicide threats as
recently as the week prior to the petition); Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (concluding that four-year old allegations of physical abuse did not provide a
sufficient basis for a civil protection order where the petitioner escaped her ex-husband's
abuse four years earlier and moved 124 miles away to secure her safety, and where petitioner
1993]
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Evidence of a history of violence in the relationship is not only
crucial to a court's determination of whether a civil protection order
should be issued, but it is also extremely important for the determina-
tion of what remedies the civil protection order must contain to effec-
tively stop the violence. Courts cannot issue effective civil protection
orders in a vacuum. Although the remedies needed will vary from
case to case, evidence of the history of violence in the relationship
will help courts issue civil protection orders that will work best to
stop the violence.
2. Retroactive Effect of the Act
When considering abusive acts which occurred before the enact-
ment of a state's domestic violence statute, some jurisdictions have
made the act retroactive.6' In Smittle, the court held that because
the Protection From Abuse Act626 does not create any category of
prohibited acts, but merely a new remedy, an action may properly be
brought under the act after its effective date, particularly as here,
where the plaintiff is still suffering from the injury.627 In Boyle v.
Boyle,62 the court held that when a court considers incidents of
abuse which occurred prior to enactment of the Protection From
Abuse Act,629 it does so to add weight to the possible development
of a trend culminating in the recent acts which give rise to the peti-
tion.63 The court explained that the Act seeks proscriptively to end
the violence, not to punish the defendant for past conduct.63" ' The
Boyle court, in allowing courts to consider incidents that occurred
before the statute was enacted, created a favorable policy which rec-
could only testify that she thought she saw a car that she believed to be the respondent's car
following her car on a public street); Yoba v. Yoba, 583 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) (upholding the trial court's dismissal of a petition for a protection order where some
of the information which the petitioner sought to include was not relatively contemporaneous
with the order which was sought within seven weeks of abuse).
625. See, e.g., Smittle v. Smittle. 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 476 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1977).
626. Protection From Abuse Act of October 7, 1976, 1976 PA. LAWS 1090 (codified as
amended at 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6101 to 6116 (1991)).
627. Id. But see Story v. Story, 291 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (award of custody
of minor child in divorce proceeding could not be based upon domestic violence statute
where the incidents of domestic violence alleged in the wife's pleadings took place prior to
the enactment of the civil protection order statute. Custody award to wife was sustained on
other grounds).
628. 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (C.P. Ct. of Pa. Cty. 1979).
629. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6101-6116.
630. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d at 778.
631. Id.
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ognizes that prior acts of abuse are inextricably related to the most
recent violent outbursts and are strong indications of the present dan-
ger to the victim. When a statute is amended, the amendments should
apply retroactively in the same manner as the act itself.632
F. Constitutionality of Domestic Violence Statutes
1. Constitutionality of Domestic Violence Statutes Has Been
Universally Upheld
State courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of
domestic violence statutes.633 In Johnson v. Cegielski,6 4 the court
held that the state's domestic violence statute is presumed constitu-
tional, and the party challenging the statute must put forward an
affirmative case supported by argument or by citation to authority.635
Furthermore, courts may not issue advisory opinions holding a state
domestic violence statute unconstitutional.6'
Courts have generally determined that the language in domestic
violence statutes, civil protection orders, and harassment statutes is
not unconstitutionally vague. In Gilbert v. State,637 the court held
that a protection order which ordered the defendant not to "visit" the
victim and not to "otherwise interfere" with his wife was not uncon-
stitutionally vague."' In Kreitz v. Kreitz,639 the court held that a
dissolution decree following an ex parte protection order which en-
joined the husband from entering the marital residence at any time
was not vague, overboard, or harsh in light of severe property dam-
age committed by the husband."4 In State v. Tripp,64 the court
632. Id. at 777 ("This court does not believe the presenting of testimony on prior inci-
dents of abuse vitiate the proceedings when there are also alleged the recent occurences hap-
pening almost immediately prior to the presenting of the petition.").
633. The only statute to be struck down on any constitutional basis was the Arkansas
statute, which was found to be unconstitutional under the Arkansas state constitution and
Arkansas' unique chancellory court system. Bates v. Bates, 793 S.W.2d 788 (Ark. 1990). In
response, the Arkansas legislature clarified that the Chancellory courts have jurisdiction in
equity and that protection orders are equitable relief. This clarification makes the Arkansas
domestic violence statute consistent with the state constitution.
634. 393 N.W.2d 547 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam).
635. Id.
636. See, e.g., Sabio v. Russell, 472 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
the trial court has no authority to issue an advisory opinion finding the state domestic vio-
lence statute unconstitutional where the defendant was never served with process and was not
before the trial court).
637. 765 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
638. Id. at 1210.
639. 750 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
640. Id. at 685. Some courts have, however, been reticent to hold batterers in contempt
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held that the domestic violence statute's definition of family and
household members was not unconstitutionally vague where it includ-
ed persons formerly residing in the same dwelling unit. 42 In that
case the court upheld a protection order issued against the respondent
since he and the victim lived together at her house, he kept clothes
there, slept there, had meals there, and did laundry there on a contin-
uous basis. 43 Finally, court decisions have also held that domestic
violence statutes which proscribe physical abuse are not void for
vagueness, since persons of ordinary intelligence would have reason-
able opportunity to know that punching a person in the face or shov-
ing them so that they fall against a wall is illegal behavior.'
Courts have also routinely upheld statutes which proscribe "ha-
rassing" behavior as not unconstitutionally vague."4 Only orders
containing the phrase "abstain from offensive conduct against" have
been held to be unconstitutionally vague. 6' California courts have
upheld the constitutionality of a penal statute which makes it a felony
to impose corporal injury on a cohabitant of the opposite sex.7
for willful violation of a protection order when the violation amounted to an erroneous but
plausible interpretation of the terms of the protection order. Kuenen v. Kuenen. 504 N.Y.S.2d
937 (App. Div. 1986). The court overturned a contempt finding and five day jail sentence
where the protection order did not give a clear and explicit directive as to the conduct that
was proscribed. In that case the respondent removed personal property and furniture after the
family court issued an order which permitted him to remove clothing and other personal
items. The appeals court held that the removal of the furniture did not amount to a wilful
violation of the protection order.
641. 795 P.2d 280 (Haw. 1990).
642. Id. at 282.
643. Id. at 283.
644. See State v. Kealoha, 753 P.2d 1250 (Haw. 1988) (upholding the domestic violence
statute against a vagueness challenge to the term "physical abuse" since persons of ordinary
intelligence would have reasonable opportunity to know that punching someone in the face,
causing injury to a person's eye and lips would constitute physical abuse).
645. People v. Whitfield, 498 N.E.2d 262, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that
defendant's behavior of following former wife in a car constituted harassment and that the
statute proscribing "harassing" conduct was not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Sarlund,
407 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. 1987) (holding that the harassment injunction statute was neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad); Banks v. Pelot, No. 89-2106, 1990 Wise. App.
LEXIS 640 (V/is. Ct. App. July 3, 1990) (holding that the harassment statute was understand-
able and comprehensive).
646. People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 767 (Crim. Ct. 1989) (holding that the provi-
sion in the temporary protection order which required the defendant to "abstain from offen-
sive conduct against" his wife could not support the charge of criminal contempt because the
terms in the order were vague and indefinite and the order must spell out the specific "offen-
sive" conduct prohibited).
647. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 217 Cal. Rptr. 616 (Ct. App. 1985) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute which prohibits either spouse from inflicting corporal punishment
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They have specifically held that the term "cohabitating" in those
statutes is not constitutionally infirm."
Courts have consistently rejected a variety of specific constitu-
tional challenges to state domestic violence statutes. They have held
that civil protection order statutes rationally and reasonably effectuate
the state interest in preventing domestic abuse, 9 do not deprive the
respondent of liberty interests in his home,6" do not deprive the re-
spondent of his family65 or his reputation,652 do not inflict cruel
and unusual punishment,653 do not violate equal protection' and
due process rights,655  do not violate freedom of association
rights, 56 and do not violate free speech. 7 In Gilbert v. State, the
that results in a traumatic condition).
648. People v. Holifield. 252 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the statute
which prohibited the infliction of corporal injury on a person of the opposite sex with whom
the defendant is cohabitating was not void for vagueness on the grounds it did not compre-
hensively define what constitutes "cohabitating"); People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that "cohabitating" as used in a felony statute proscribing infliction of
corporal injury on a cohabitant was not unconstitutionally vague where the defendant lived
with the victim although he had his own apartment).
649. Master v. Eisenbart, No. 90-2897, 1991 Wise. App. LEXIS 1270 (Wis. Ct. App.
Sept. 18, 1991) (dismissing respondent's constitutional challenge which was based on the
argument that the civil protection order statute was irrational and unreasonable to effectuate a
statutory purpose: deprives him of liberty interests in his home, family and reputation; results






654. Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
spousal abuse statute does not restrict the defendant's free speech rights or violate equal
protection or due process rights); see also State v. Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding no equal protection violation where a higher penalty is imposed under
criminal protection order statute than civil statute because they serve different purposes and
the former protects witnesses in criminal prosecutions).
655. Id.
656. State v. Sutley, No. 90-A-1495. 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520 (Ct. App. Dec. 14,
1990) (holding that a probation order which restricted the defendant from one quadrant of the
city where petitioner resided and prevented him from interacting with the victim or the vic-
tim's family did not violate the defendant's right to free association).
657. People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding respondent in
contempt of civil protection order for calling his ex-wife a "fucking whore" and a "dead
bitch," and telling her he had a plot waiting for her did not violate the respondent's first
amendment free speech rights); Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App.
1988) (holding that a protection order issued under the domestic violence statute did not
violate right to free speech where respondent was held in contempt for threatening the peti-
tioner over the telephone because rights to free speech do not apply to threatening and abu-
sive communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for protection from immediate
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court held that the defendant's right to free speech was not violated
when he was held in contempt for violating a protection order. 8
The right to free speech does not apply to threatening and abusive
communications directed toward a person who has demonstrated a
need for protection from immediate and present danger. 9 In Com-
monwealth v. Rexach,' the court held that the police could conduct
warrantless searches and seizures of weapons consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, since police officers are obligated to protect
abuse victims and without such police action, the purpose of the
domestic violence statute would be frustrated. 66'
Procedural aspects of civil protection order statutes have also
been held constitutional. Courts have held that civil protection order
statutes do not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial. In Cooke
v. Naylor, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the Pro-
tection From Abuse Act' a is civil in nature and does not violate the
constitutional right to jury trial in criminal cases, even though the
court may later impose criminal sanctions for violations of the protec-
tion orders.' In Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub,'5 the court held that
the section of the Prevention From Abuse Act' providing for a jail
sentence for contempt without a right to a jury trial enjoys a strong
presumption of constitutionality, because it does not plainly violate
the constitutional right to jury trial, where the maximum sentence was
six months in jail plus a $1000 fine. 7
Finally, courts have also held that provisions in civil protection
order statutes which permit court clerks to assist petitioners in filing
for protection orders are not unconstitutional. In State v.
Errington, " the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that subsections
of the Domestic Abuse Act69 which required court employees to
and present danger); Schramek, 429 N.W.2d at 501 (holding that spousal abuse statute does
not restrict the defendant's free speech rights or violate equal protection or due process).
658. Id. at 1208.
659. Id. at 1210.
660. 478 N.E.2d 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
661. Id. at 746.
662. 573 A.2d 376 (Me. 1990).
663. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 761-770 (West Supp. 1992).
664. Cooke, 573 A.2d at 377-78.
665. 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
666. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6113, 6114 (1992).
667. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d at 920.
668. 310 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1981).
669. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B (West Supp. 1993).
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assist petitioners with writing and filing petitions for protection orders
do not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.67
Courts have also addressed the issue of the constitutionality of
marriage license fees and divorce surcharges to fund domestic vio-
lence programs and victim services.6" In Browning v. Corbett,672
the court quite clearly saw the relationship between marriage and
domestic violence. It held that a $12 surcharge fee on both parties in
a marriage dissolution action does not violate equal protection or due
process because the fees are rationally related to the state's legitimate
interest in providing assistance to domestic violence victims.673 The
court explicitly found a rational relationship between domestic vio-
lence victims and fees on applicants for divorce and for marriage li-
censes.674 The court concluded that the state legislature may reason-
ably and rationally determine that the majority of persons who will
benefit from the domestic violence fund will be those who marry or
divorce in the state.675
2. Standing
In order for a party to have standing in court, the party must
have a sufficient stake in a controversy to obtain judgment on his or
her behalf.676 A plaintiff with standing has a protectable interest in
the legal outcome of a case.6' The court in Sweep v. Sweep"
recognized that a non-adoptive step-parent who was a victim of do-
mestic violence had standing to appeal a custody order involving her
670. Errington, 310 N.W.2d at 682-83.
671. A number of states mandate such fees be paid to fund domestic violence programs.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 18305 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.01 (West
1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-5210 (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-7-13 (Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 52-6-105 (1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.060 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 161-11.2 (1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.34 (Baldwin 1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-1-10 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2C-6 (1992).
672. 734 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
673. Id. at 1032-33.
674. Id.
675. Id. However, an Illinois court struck down a marriage license fee which funded
domestic violence programs. In Boynton v. Kusper, 494 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1986), the court
held that a marriage license fee designated to fund domestic violence shelters and service
programs was unconstitutionally levied on a narrow class of people who may or may not
become eligible for domestic violence services. The court found the relationship between the
purchase of a marriage license and domestic violence too remote to satisfy the constitutional
rational basis test. Id.
676. Sierra Club v. Horton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1971).
677. Guidry v. Roberts, 331 So. 2d 44, 47 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
678. 358 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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step-child in a domestic violence proceeding.679 In this case, peti-
tioner requested an order of protection from her husband on behalf of
herself, their three children, and respondent's daughter, Tracy, who
had been living with them.' At the domestic abuse hearing, custo-
dy of Tracy, whose biological mother was dead, was granted to her
maternal grandparents." Petitioner appealed the custody order, and
her ability to appeal such an order was contested."2 The court held
that the petitioner, the non-adoptive step-parent in the domestic abuse
case, has standing to appeal an order of protection granting custody
of her husband's child to the child's mother's parents as she had a
sufficient parental interest in the matter."3
This ruling is consistent with the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (the "UCCJA"), adopted in most states, which provides
that if the court learns from information furnished by the parties or
from other sources that a person not a party to the custody proceed-
ing has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or
visitation rights with respect to the child, it shall order that person to
be joined as a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the
proceeding and of his or her joinder as a party.'
G. Remedies Available to Petitioners In Civil Protection Orders
1. The Court's Inherent Power to Award Any Constitutionally
Defensible Relief
Each victim of domestic violence faces different dangers, and
must be protected by the court in accordance with her individual
needs. As the National Institute of Justice found in its Civil Protec-
679. Id. at 453.
680. Id. at 452.
681. l
682. Id.
683. Id. at 453.
684. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4510(a) (1992).
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tion Order Study, the vast majority of jurisdictions685
explicitly grant judges the latitude to grant any constitutionally de-
fensible relief that is warranted . . . . Such a provision means, for
example, that the court does not need specific statutory authority to
impound the victim's address (that is, to keep it secret) if this mea-
sure is considered necessary to protect her safety.'
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recom-
mends that judges employ any constitutionally defensible relief that is
warranted. 6' By interpreting their statutory mandate broadly, courts
have the power necessary to craft remedies that will counter the wide
variety of perilous situations each victim of domestic violence faces.
In Powell v. Powell,"' the court articulated a philosophy embraced
by enlightened courts and legislatures across the country. The Powell
court held that the domestic violence statute must be interpreted
broadly in light of its purpose, and explained that courts have broad
discretion to fashion any remedy appropriate to stop violence and to
effectively resolve the matter.689
685. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (1993); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(D)(4) (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(6) (Michie 1993); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West 1992); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 945, 948, 949(11) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp.
1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 750 ILCS
60/214(b)(13) (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 344-5.1-5 (Bums Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.4.2 (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(g) (Michie Supp. 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766
(West 1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN.
ch. 209A, § 3 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 404-121 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-29(b) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-5 (Michie 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 842 (McKinney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(b) (Baldwin 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22. § 60.4(C)-(D) (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(d) (1992);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11 (West
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(6) (Michie 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (1993);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4) (West 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(vi) (1993); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1992).
686. NU CPO STUDY. supra note 19, at 33.
687. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES. FAMILY VIOLENCE
PROJECT. FAMILY VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES (1990), reprinted in 41 JUV.
& FAM. CT. J. at 17-18 (1990) [hereinafter FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT].
688. 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988).
689. See also Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 62 (Alaska 1987) (holding that a court
19931
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
2. Catch-all Provisions 690
Civil protection order statutes in thirty-six states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico contain catch-all provisions that authorize
courts to offer domestic violence a broad range of relief."' Statutory
catch-all provisions which authorize all remedies needed to prevent
future abuse have been interpreted broadly by the courts. Under these
provisions, courts have ordered monetary relief and child support pay-
ments,692 the permanent transfer of jointly owned real estate, 3 the
removal of a family dog,6' and compensatory and punitive damag-
es.69' The court in Powell confronts a situation in which it was nec-
hearing a divorce action has the authority to hear a variety of causes and impose remedies it
sees fit, including a no contact order).
690. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
691. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(d) (1991); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(D)(4) (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(6) (1993); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2035 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993);
DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 945(4), 948(b), 949(a)(11) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1005(c)(10)(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4)(b)(g) (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-
5(b) (1987 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(e) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(17)
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2) (1985 & Supp. 1993); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(h) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46-2136 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(I)(K) (West 1981
& Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(a)(11) (West 1990
& Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.030(1)(e) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4(1) (1990); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(5) (Michie 1989 &
Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02.4 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.312(E)(1)(h) (Anderson
1989 & Supp. 1992)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4C., D. (West 1992); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 6108(a) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(6) (1984);
Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(1)
(1989 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1.A(6) (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(e) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-6(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(vi) (1988); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
8, § 621 (Supp. 1990).
692. See, e.g., Powell, 547 A.2d at 975 (ordering respondent to pay monetary relief in-
cluding child support and mortgage payments under domestic violence statute's catch-all pro-
vision although there was no explicit authorization for the remedies in the D.C. statute).
693. See, e.g., Rayan v. Dykeman, 274 Cal. Rptr. 672, 675 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the court had the authority to enter and enforce the order in light of the nonexclusive reme-
dies provision of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the stipulation of the parties that
plaintiff would permanently transfer jointly owned real estate property to the defendant).
694. See, e.g., Jane Y. v. Joseph Y.. 474 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (ordering
the removal of the family dog where the dog was trained by the wife's husband to attack
her and anyone who was the subject of his wrath).
695. See, e.g., Sielski v. Sielski, 604 A.2d 206 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (holding
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essary to utilize the catch-all provision, and demonstrates how and
why these provisions work in the context of domestic violence.6'
The court held that the trial court has the authority to grant monetary
relief in a civil protection order proceeding, although this remedy was
not specially provided for by statute.69 Petitioner argued that be-
cause her financial dependency on her husband was a major factor in
the perpetuation of violence in the family, the only effective means of
stopping the abuse and protecting the wife was for the husband to
vacate the home and make it financially and physically secure for the
wife."9 The court recognized that the legislative intent in amending
the statute to include a catch-all provision was to enable courts to
find individualized and supremely effective resolutions for each
case.' It found additional authority for awarding such relief in the
fact that several provisions in the statute deal with temporary adjust-
ment of property interests, which is a form of monetary relief
7 1
The case of Anne B. v. State Board of Control,70' although not
involving a civil protection order, illustrates the need for courts to at
times go beyond powers specifically enumerated in statutes, and to
fashion remedies which address the problems unique to individual
victims of domestic abuse. Anne. B. was brutally raped by Percy B.
Because of their previous relationship, however, the district attorney
decided not to prosecute the case.' 2 Anne B. was then approached
that the award of compensatory damages of and punitive damages was supported by the
intent of the legislation and was appropriate in order to deter the defendant from repeating
violent behavior); Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2. 3 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (uphold-
ing protection order and stating that punitive damages may be awarded in addition to com-
pensatory damages for losses suffered as a result of the violence).
696. Powell, 547 A.2d at 975.
697. Id. at 975.
698. Id. at 974; see generally FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT. supra note 687, at 17-18 (urg-
ing judges to order child support and other financial support even in ex parte orders because
"economic dependence is frequently the reason the victim returns to the offender").
699. Id.
700. Powell, 547 A.2d at 974; see also Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40 (D.C.
1993). In order to best protect the victim of domestic violence the court included certain
provisions in the civil protection order which were not specifically authorized by the District
of Columbia's domestic abuse statute. The order stated that:
[hiusband shall relinquish possession and/or use of the wife's pocketbook, wallet,
working permit, ID card, bank card, Social Security card, passport, and any other
items of the children's personal belongings, table, four chairs and dishes . . . the
husband shall not withdraw the application for permanent residence that he had
filed on behalf of the wife.
Id. at 41.
701. 209 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1984).
702. Id. at 85.
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by a state victim assistance program and was encouraged to seek
therapy at the expense of the state.7 3 The State Board, however, re-
fused to pay and refused to hear her appeal.7 The trial court de-
nied issuance of a writ commanding the State Board to hear the
appeal.05 The appellate court, however, granted Anne B. a new
hearing on the issue of therapy payment.7" This court realized that
therapy, although not a remedy specifically mentioned in the statute,
may be found necessary to best protect this particular victim."'
While statutes and courts offer a broad variety of relief to do-
mestic violence petitioners, some courts have limited the relief
batterers can obtain at the civil protection order hearing. In Basile v.
Basile,7°0 the court held that the domestic violence statute was not
broad enough to authorize the court to hear respondent's counterclaim
for a change of the parties' daughter's surname. °9 Other courts have
denied relief that was deemed unrelated to the protection of the vic-
tim."' Judicial authorities urge courts to gain an understanding of
the characteristics of domestic abuse, and have recognized that "judg-
es should provide all of the relief that the victim needs given the par-
ticular circumstances of the case." '
3. No Further Abuse Clauses
Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
statutorily provide no further abuse clauses in civil protection or-
ders." 2  Of the remaining states, South Carolina"3  and
703. Id.
704. Id. at 86.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 88.
707. See id. at 87.
708. 604 A.2d 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
709. Id. at 694.
710. See, e.g., Leffingwell v. Leffingwell. 448 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (App. Div. 1982) (im-
posing a weekend curfew is not necessary to forestall offensive conduct where husband is or-
dered to vacate marital home).
711. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 17; see also Swenson v. Swenson,
No. C4-92-816, 19 FLR 1022 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1992) (stating that although remedial
legislation is generally accorded a liberal construction, such construction must be solely in
favor of the injured party and not in favor of the abuser and holding that the court erred in
excluding the abused wife from the marital residence).
712. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(1) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b)(1) (1993): ARZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 D (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 (West 1993);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-15(b) (West 1993). DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10. § 949 (1993);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4)(b) (West Supp. 1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE
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Wisconsin"4 have recognized no further abuse clauses in their case
law, and Arkansas and New York can include no further abuse claus-
es by way of their statutory catch-all provisions.715 These clauses
effectively prohibit many actions that respondents direct toward peti-
tioners," 6 petitioners' children,"t7 and petitioner's other family"'
§ 39-6306 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1(a)(1) (West Supp.
1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4.2(a) (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(1)
(Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1) (Michie 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2135(A)(1) (West 1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West Supp. 1992); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West
Supp. 1993); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 455.050 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
924(1) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(a) (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-Bi:(I) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-
5 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-B-I (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
02(4)(a) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(a) (Baldwin 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(C)-(D) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107-716 (1992); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(d) (1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-15-3(i)(a) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-10-5 (1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a)(l) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
279.1.4.1 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-6 (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-I05(a)(1) (1992); see also MODEL CODE. supra note
15. §§ 305, 306.
713. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 41 (D.C. 1993) (involving civil
protection order which barred husband from molesting, assaulting or in any manner threaten-
ing or physically abusing the petitioner); Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp.
314, 317 (D. S.C. 1987) (conceming civil protection order forbidding husband to follow,
physically abuse, harass or harm petitioner).
714. Banks v. Pelot, No. 89-2106, 1990 Wise. App. LEXIS 640 (Wis. Ct. App. July 3,
1990) (noting that the court may issue a protection order based on respondent following and
threatening petitioner and may constitutionally enjoin harassment of individuals).
715. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-206(6) (Michie 1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 842
(McKinney 1992).
716. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(1) (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 D (1993);
DEL CODE ANN. tit 10. § 949 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS
60/214(b)(1) (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.4.2(a) (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(1) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1) (Michie 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(1) (West 1992);
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(a)
(Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1:(I) (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5
(Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-B-1 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(a) (Supp.
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(a) (Anderson 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-
3(0)(a) (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1103(a)(1) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1.4.1 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-6 (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(1) (1992); see Turner, 675 F. Supp. at 314 (no
further abuse of petitioner); In re Marriage of D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 797-98 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1991) (same); Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989) (same); Smart v. Smart, 297
S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (same); Wagner v. Wagner, 564 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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or household members."9 They can command respondents not to act
recklessly,' 0 not to perform conduct intended to cause physical or
emotional harm,"' not to disturb the peace by telephone,7 and
not to threaten,7" harass, 724  intimidate, 7  stalk,7  attack or
1989) (same); Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same); Cooper
v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253 (S.D. 1991) (same); see also Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 40 (in-
volving civil protection order which barred husband from molesting, assaulting or in any
manner threatening or physically abusing the petitioner); MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§§ 305, 306.
717. ALA. CODE § 30-3-7(a)(1) (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(1) (Supp. 1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp.
1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(a) (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(d)
(1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a)(1) (1992); W.
VA. CODE § 48-2A-b (1993); Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989) (no further
abuse of petitioner's children); In re Marriage of McCoy, 635 N.E.2d 883 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (same); D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d at 796 (same); Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d at 918 (same); see
also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
718. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(a)(4)
(1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(d) (1992); Caldwell v. Coppola, 268 Cal. Rptr.
453 (Ct. App. 1990) (no further abuse of petitioner's family); Stuckey, 768 P.2d at 694
(same); D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d at 796 (same); Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d at 918; see also MODEL
CODE, supra note 15. §§ 305, 306.
719. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:I.4(a)(4) (1990 & Supp. 1992); Caldwell, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (no further abuse of
petitioner's household members); Stuckey, 768 P.2d at 694 (same); D'Attomo. 570 N.E.2d at
796 (same); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
720. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:I.4(a)(4)
(1990 & Supp. 1992).
721. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:I.4(a)(4)
(1990 & Supp. 1992).
722. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note
15, §§ 305, 306.
723. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993): COLO. REV, STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:41.(a)(4) (1990 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.a
(1991); Wagner v. Wagner, 564 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (sentencing for violation of
an order not to threaten); Banks v. Pelot, No. 89-2106, 1990 Wise. App. LEXIS 640 (Wis.
Ct. App. July 3, 1990) (no threats); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
724. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10.
§ 949 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2135A.(1) (West 1982); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173B:41.(a)(4) (1990 & Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22. § 60.1(3)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990); Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314 (D. S.C.
1987) (no harassment); Caldwell v. Coppola. 268 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding an
order may enjoin harassment although void for improper service); State v. Brockelman, 862
P.2d 1040 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (same); In re D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796 (Il1. App. Ct.
1991) (enjoining harassment); Wagner, 564 A.2d at 162 (sentencing from a violation of an
order prohibiting harassment); Banks, 1990 Wise. App. LEXIS at *640 (holding court may
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strike,727  contact,72' approach, 729  molest,730  interfere with,7 1
infringe upon the personal liberty of,
732  follow, 733  assault71
sexually assault,735 and/or physically abuse736 protected persons.
No further abuse clauses have survived constitutional challenge.
In Banks v. Pelot,737 a respondent appealed a civil protection order
enjoining him from harassing the petitioner, stating that the injunction
was impermissibly broad under the terms of the statute and en-
croached upon his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.738
The court held that the statute, which allows courts to issue injunc-
constitutionally enjoin the harassment of individuals); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15.
§§ 305, 306.
725. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 949 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4I.(a)(4) (1990 & Supp. 1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
8, § 621 (1992); Brockelman. 862 P.2d at 1040.
726. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a)(2) (1991).
727. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b)
(West Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993).
728. See, e.g., Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989); Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768
P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
729. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d at 1161.
730. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(a) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(1) (1990 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-02.4.a (Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1)(a) (Supp. 1993); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp.
1990); Brockelman. 862 P.2d at 1040 (no intimidation); State ex reL Emery v. Andisha, 805
P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
731. See, e.g., State ex rel. Emery v. Andisha, 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
732. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:41(a)(1) (1990); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1103(a)(1) (1989).
733. See, e.g., Turner v. City of North Charleston. 675 F. Supp. 314 (D. S.C. 1987) (no
following); Banks v. Pelot, No. 89-2106, 1990 Wisc. App. LEXIS 640 (Wis. Ct. App. July
3.1990) (holding that a court may issue a protection order based on respondent following and
threatening petitioner).
734. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(l)(a) (Supp. 1993); Smart v. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982).
735. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5505, 2035 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15b
(West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:41(a)(4) (1990 & Supp. 1992).
736. Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314 (D. S.C. 1987); In re Mar-
riage of D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991); Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161
(Mass. 1989); Wagner v. Wagner, 564 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Eichenlaub v.
Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253 (S.D.
1991).
737. No. 89-2106, 1990 Wisc. App. LEXIS 640 (Wis. Ct. App. July 3, 1990).
738. Id. at *1.
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tions against harassment of individuals, is understandable and compre-
hensive.739 The court explained that "where the purpose of the in-
junction is clear, the injunction has little chance of infringing upon
constitutionally protected speech."7' In Gilbert v. State,"' the de-
fendant appealed from an order of the court which determined that he
had violated protection orders by kicking down his wife's door,
breaking out the rear window and damaging the grill of her car, and
threatening her over the telephone. He based his challenge on the
grounds that he was not notified of the prohibited conduct toward his
wife due to the vagueness of the state's Protection From Abuse Stat-
ute.742 The Criminal Court of Appeals held that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague and that the defendant was not denied due
process in connection with the protection orders.743
4. Stay Away Provisioris
Stay away provisions are standard in virtually every state's civil
protection order statute.7' The National Council of Juvenile and
739. Id. at *4.
740. Id.
741. 765 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
742. Id. at 1210.
743. Id. at 1210-11; see also State v. Sutley, No. 90-A-1495, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
5520 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1990) (holding that probation order which restricted the defen-
dant from one quadrant of the city where petitioner resided and prevented him from interact-
ing with the victim or victim's family did not violate the defendant's freedom of association
rights); People v. Whitfield, 498 N.E.2d 262 (i11. App. Ct. 1986) (finding defendant in viola-
tion of protection order where he followed his former wife in his car and holding that such
behavior constituted harassment and the statute proscribing "harassing" conduct was not un-
constitutionally vague); State v. Sarlund. 407 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. 1987) (holding that the ha-
rassment injunction statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad); Master v.
Eisenbart, No. 90-2897, 1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1270 (Vis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1991) (dis-
missing respondent's constitutional challenge which stated that the civil protection order stat-
ute was irrational and unreasonable to effectuate a statutory purpose: deprives him of liberty
interests in his home, family and reputation; results in cruel and unusual punishment and
violates the fundamental rights implied in the Ninth Amendment); State v. Kiser, No. 90-
1192-CR, 1990 WL 250437 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990) (holding that harassment injunc-
tion statute not unconstitutionally vague where defendant held in contempt for making five
collect telephone calls to the petitioner within a thirty minute period); Banks v. Pelot, No.
89-2106, 1990 Wise. App. LEXIS 640 (Wis. Ct. App. July 3, 1990) (holding that the harass-
ment statute was understandable and comprehensive).
744. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(4)(b) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-
6306 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 766 (West Supp. 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
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Family Court Judges recommends: "civil protection orders should
remove the offender from the home and allow the victim and children
to remain with appropriate protection, safety plans, and support." '745
Courts and legislatures have ordered the respondent to stay away
from the petitioner," petitioner's children,747  family members or
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13
(Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-924(1). (2)
(Supp. 1992); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030 (Michie 1988); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:14 (1990 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.b.(6) (West Supp. 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.b (Supp.
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 60.4(C),(D) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.716 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(d) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3
(Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11 (West
Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1
(Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-6 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12.(4) (West Supp. 1993); WYO.
STAT. § 35-21-105.(a) (1977); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
745. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 10.
746. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 1992); Turner v. City of North
Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314 (D. S.C. 1987) (involving permanent restraining order forbid-
ding husband from following wife); Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989) (prohibit-
ing respondent from contacting son and son's mother); Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161
(Mass. 1989) (requiring respondent to stay away from petitioner); Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d
2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that court may bar husband from marital home
and order him to have no contact with his wife); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990
(Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting husband from contacting wife); State ex reL Emery v.
Andisha, 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (restraining defendant from interfering with plain-
tiff); Harris v. Corley, No. 01-A-01-9012-CH-00446, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 1. 1991) (prohibiting respondent from coming about petitioner); Lee v. State, No.
191-88. 1990 Tex Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 1990) (ordering respon-
dent not to go within 200 yards of former wife's work place); State v. Kilponen, 737 P.2d
1024, 1028 (Wash. CL App. 1987) (requiring that respondent not approach petitioner and stay
away from family residence); State v. Lewis, 508 N.W.2d 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Hamilton, No. 90-2392-CR. 1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS 795 (Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 1991) (or-
dering respondent to stay away from petitioner's residence, the parking lot of her building,
the hallways of her apartment and all areas of the apartment which she has the right to use
with other tenants); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
747. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 1992) (providing that a court can
order respondent to stay away from petitioner's family); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 842
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) (providing that a court can order respondent to stay away
from petitioner's children); Stuckey, 768 P.2d at 694 (precluding defendant from approaching,
threatening, molesting or injuring son and son's mother); Andisha, 805 P.2d at 718 (Or. Ct.
App. 1991) (restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff and the minor chil-
dren in her custody and from entering her home, school, church and the children's day care
center); Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (excluding defendant
from the marital home and prohibited him from abusing plaintiff and the children); see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
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household members,748 the general location of the petitioner,7"
petitioner's property,' petitioner's residence," the parking lot of
petitioner's apartment building,752 the hallways of petitioner's apart-
748. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.b.(6) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a
court can order respondent to stay away from petitioner's family and household members);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) (providing that a court can order
respondent to stay away from petitioner's spouse and child); State v. Sutley, No. 90-A-1495,
1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1990) (involving a probation order
which excluded defendant convicted of domestic violence from one quadrant of his home
county and ordered to stay away from the victim and members of her family); City of
Reynoldsburg v. Eichenberger, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (prohibiting respondent
from visiting or approaching family or household members including at their place of resi-
dence, employment, or school without the consent of the court); see also MODEL CODE,
supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
749. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (Michie 1993); Lewis. 508 N.W.2d at 75 (requiring
respondent to stay away from any premises temporarily occupied by petitioner).
750. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.b.(6) (West Supp. 1993).
751. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. AN. § 13-3602 (Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035
(West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144-102 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(4)(b) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6306 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 766 (West Supp. 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.2950
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-
13 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(l),(2)
(Supp. 1992); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.030 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:4I (1990 & Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.b.(6) (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie Supp.
1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.b (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(C),(D) (West 1992);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.716 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1991); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-606 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-6 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.060 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (Supp. 1993); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 813.12.(4) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105.(a) (1977); Maldonado v.
Maldonado, No. 93-FM-199, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 227 (D.C. Sept. 13, 1993); State v.
Wiltse, 386 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Rogers v. Rogers, 556 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App.
Div. 1990); State ex rel. Emery v. Andisha. 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel.
Delisser v. Hardy, 749 P.2d 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253
(S.D. 1991); Harris v. Corley, No. 01-A-01-9012-CH-00446, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 1991); Lee v. State, No. 191-88, 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 195
(Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 1990); State v. Gibson, No. 18624, 1989 W. Va. LEXIS 173 (W.
Va. July 27, 1989); St. Germaine v. Chapman, 505 N.W.2d 450 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Lewis,
508 N.W.2d at 75; State v. Hamilton, No. 90-2392-CR, 1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS 795 (Wis.
Ct. App. May 2, 1991); Johnson v. Miller, 459 N.W.2d 886 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§§ 305, 306.
752. Hamilton, 1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS at 795.
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ment,753 the areas of petitioner's apartment that she has a right to
use in common with other tenants,' the marital or family
home,55  petitioner's work-place,756  petitioner's business,5 7
petitioner's school,758 petitioner's church,759 the day care center
where the petioner's children stay,7' and the homes, schools, and
work-places of other family or household members. 6  In Johnson v.
753. Id.
754. Id.
755. See, e.g., Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (ordering respon-
dent to stay away from marital residence occupied by petitioner); Mugan v. Mugan. 555 A.2d
2 (NJ. 1989) (same); Merola v. Merola. 536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1989) (amending
order to require husband to stay away from family home); Kilmer v. Kilmer. 486 N.Y.S.2d
483 (App. Div. 1985) (ordering respondent to stay away from marital residence occupied by
petitioner); Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (ordering respon-
dent to stay away from marital residence occupied by petitioner); State v. Kilponen, 737 P.2d
1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (excluding defendant from family home).
756. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (Michie 1993) (providing for exclusion of
abusing party from petitioner's place of employment); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.b(6) (West
Supp. 1993) (same); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (same); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-6 (Supp. 1993) (same); Maldonado v. Maldonado, No. 93-FM-199, 1993 D.C. App.
LEXIS 227 (D.C. Sept. 13, 1993) (requiring respondent to stay away from wife's work
place); Lee v. State, No. 191-88, 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov.
28, 1990) (prohibiting respondent from going within 200 yards of former wife's home or
work place). Harassment on the job by a batterer, combined with the burden of time spent
waiting to appear in court and the need for multiple court appearances, reduce a battered
women's ability to maintain or secure employment. Women and Violence: Hearings on S.
2754 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1990) (statement
of Helen Neuborne, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund); see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
757. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (Michie 1993) (excluding abusing party from
petitioner's place of business); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (Supp. 1993) (same); see also MOD-
EL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
758. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (Michie 1993) (exclude abusing party from
petitioner's school); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (same); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29 (West 1992) (same); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (1992) (same); State ex rel. Emery
v. Andisha. 805 P.2d 718 (Or. CL App. 1991) (restraining defendant from entering the
plaintiff's school); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305. 306.
759. See, e.g., State ex rel. Emery v. Andisha. 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
760. See, e.g., id.
761. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (providing that court can
order respondent to stay away from other specified places); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.b.(6)
(West Supp. 1993) (providing that court can order respondent to stay away from specified
places frequented by petitioner's family and household members); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6
(Supp. 1993) (providing that court can order respondent to stay away from school, business
and place of employment of petitioner's family or household members); Maldonado v.
Maldonado, No. 93-FM-199, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 227 (D.C. Sept. 13, 1993) (requiring
petitioner to stay away from children's school); City of Reynoldsburg v. Eichenberger, No.
CA-3492, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1613 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1990) (prohibiting respon-
dent from visiting or approaching petitioner's family or household members including at their
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Miller,762 the court upheld an order requiring the defendant to stay
away from plaintiffs home, even where he owned the mobile home
in which she lived and leased it to her.763
Detailed stay away provisions are crucial if civil protection or-
ders are to be effective in offering the victim protection. Abusers are
often diligent in finding ways in which to test and evade protection
orders. One of the first ways batterers will attempt to test the strength
of civil protection orders is by violating the order's stay away provi-
sions.76" Incomplete or ambiguous orders that are difficult to enforce
send a message to batterers that the courts will not take violations of
civil protection orders seriously.
Including forceful and all encompassing stay away provisions in
protection orders and enforcing those provisions can help ensure that
the beating which brought the petitioner to court to obtain the order
is her last. In any case, where the history of domestic violence has
included sexual abuse, enforcement of stay away provisions is partic-
ularly critical.7' Battered women who are victims of sexual abuse
by an intimate partner are at risk for contracting IV infection from
their batterers.7' Domestic violence programs across the country are
beginning to see growing numbers of battered women whose batterers
have infected them with the HIV virus. For battered women who are
being sexually abused by their batterers, strict and swift enforcement
of stay away orders is absolutely essential to prevent HIV transmis-
sion.
When the addresses of petitioner's home, work-place, school, or
place of residence, employment or school).
762. 459 N.W.2d 886 (Wis. App. 1990).
763. Id. at 886.
764. ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26. at 15.
765. More than 1 in every 7 women who have ever been married have been raped by
their spouse during the marriage. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 87 (1990). At
least 60% of battered women are sexually abused by their partners. WAC STATS, supra note
303, at 55.
766. Twenty-nine percent of women are infected with HIV through heterosexual contact.
ACT UP, WOMEN, AIDS, AND ACrIVIsM (1990). Heterosexual transmission outnumbers all
other categories by which people acquire the H1V virus and may account for more than 80%
of HIV transmission by the end of the 1990's. WAC STATS, supra note 303, at 12 (citing
Dr. King Holmes, Director of Center for AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Seattle,
Washington). 98% of heterosexual transmission of the HIV virus is from men to women and
only 2% of transmission is from women to men. Id. at 13 (citing UNrrED AIDS COALITION,
WOMEN, GET FACTS ABOUT AIDS (1992)). From 1987 to 1991 AIDS moved from being the
8th to the 5th leading cause of death form women of child-bearing age in the United States.
Id. at 11 (citing THE WOMEN's AIDS GROUP, WORLD (1992)).
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
child care provider are already known to the batterer at the time the
civil protection order is entered, the order should list the specific
addresses the respondent is to avoid. Listing locations known to the
respondent may improve the order's enforceability. Many battered
women, however, live, work, and have child care arrangements at
locations unknown to the batterer. Civil protection orders must main-
tain the confidentiality of all undisclosed addresses, in order to avoid
placing the victim in further jeopardy.767 Where the petitioner is in
hiding, the court should order the defendant to stay away from the
petitioner's residence without revealing its location. The court should
also order the defendant not to attempt to discover the location of the
petitioner's home, and not to enlist the assistance of others in locating
the petitioner.7'
Several cases illustrate the type of stay away orders many vic-
tims need. These orders contain very specific descriptions of the
places from which the respondent is barred. In State v. Hamilton,7 9
the civil protection order required the respondent to stay away from
petitioner's residence, including the hallways of her apartment build-
ing and all areas of her apartment building that the victim has the
right to use in common with other tenants."
The courts also regularly include minimum distances that the
respondent must keep away from the petitioner. In Lee v. State,7'
the order prohibited respondent from going within 200 yards of his
former wife's home or work-place. 72 In Harris v. Corley, the
767. Sixteen state statutes specifically limit disclosure of the abused party's home address.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (1989 & Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5517 (West
1993); 750 ILCS 60/203 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.770 (Michie
Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766-A (West 1964); MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. 4-504(b)(2) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 209A, § 8 (West 1987); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(7) (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.510(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3 (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(b) (West 1993); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6112 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-15-3(1)(e) (Supp. 1993); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.111 (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040(1)(c)
(West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.125 (West Supp. 1993). The District of Colum-
bia protects the confidentiality of the abused party's address through court rules. D.C. Sup.
CT. IF R. 6(c).
The California statute prevents disclosure not only of petitioner's home address, but
also the address of petitioner's school, job, children and child care service. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 5517 (West 1993).
768. Leslye Orloff, Issuance of Civil Protection Orders, in DOMESTIc VIOLENCE IN CtVIL
COURT CASES, supra note 21, at 75, 101.
769. No. 90-2392-CR, 1991 Wise. App. LEXIS 795 (Wisc. Ct. App. May 2, 1991).
770. Id. at *11-*12.
771. 799 S.W.2d 750, (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
772. Id. at 751.
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order restrained respondent from parking his car or any car which he
was driving or in which he was a passenger within 100 yards of the
residence of the petitioner.' The Texas statute has a provision for
specifying the minimum distance that respondent must stay away from
petitioner. 5
In light of the crimes which underlie the issuance of civil protec-
tion orders, stay away provisions in civil protection order statutes
should be interpreted to be coextensive with the type of stay away
orders issued against domestic violence perpetrators in criminal court
cases. In State v. Sutley, 6 as part of the defendant batterer's proba-
tion order, the court ordered the defendant to remain outside the
northwest quadrant of his home county, and to stay away from the
victim and members of her family.' This probation restriction was
found to be proper in a criminal domestic violence prosecution, since
it was related to the crime. It also helped to insure that the defendant
would remain law abiding by keeping him away from the victim, the
area where she resided, and where the crime took place.77 The
Sutley approach should be adopted in civil domestic violence actions.
Domestic violence presents the same dangers to the victim whether
the case is brought to the courts as a criminal or civil action, since
both actions grow out of violent conduct perpetrated by a batterer
against a family member. Stay away orders issued to protection order
petitioners in civil cases should be as restrictive as stay away orders
issued in criminal domestic violence actions." 9
Research reveals that violence often escalates when the victim
attempts to leave the relationship. A National Institute of Justice study
concluded that the victim is especially vulnerable to retaliation and
threats by the defendant during the pre-trial period."8 "In a study of
domestic homicides committed in Chicago and Philadelphia, research-
ers found that over twenty-eight percent of women killed by their
773. No. 01-A-01-9012-CH-00446, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1,
1991).
774. Id. at *3-*4.
775. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b) (West Supp. 1993).
776. No. 90-A-1492, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1990).
777. Id. at *2-*3.
778. Id. at "9-*I0.
779. The National Institute of Justice found that "[o]ffenders who understand that they
will likely be punished for violating an order will not view the approach as 'soft,' whether
the setting is a criminal court or a civil one." NIJ CPO STUDY. supra note 19, at 3.
780. GAIL A. GOOLKASLN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSnCE, CONFRON-NG DOMESTIC ViOLENCE:
THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL COURT JUDGES 4 (1986).
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male partners were attempting to end the relationship at the time of
their murder.""78 As a result of these findings, the Family Violence
Prevention Fund in its State Justice Institute funded national curricu-
lum on domestic violence concludes that judges need to be aware
"that a history of domestic violence may be a reliable indicator that
further violence will occur, particularly during the pre-trial peri-
od "
782
5. No Contact Provisions
Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia statutorily pro-
vide that no contact orders are a standard provision in civil protection
orders.783 Some states have made their statutes more detailed: fifteen
states specify no contact with petitioner;7M twelve states specify no
781. DOMESTIC VIOLENcE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 73.
782. Id. at 74.
783. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b) (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(0(3)
(Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5505 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102
(West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10. § 949(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §16-1005(c) (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.30(7)(a) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 586-4 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(3) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.750(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(1) (West
1982 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West Supp. 1992); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(2) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(b)
(West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.050
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (1992); NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.030
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(a)(3) (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6)
(West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(3) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14.07.1-02(4)(a) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(a)(6) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1)(a) (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
3-606 (1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11(b) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
6-6(2)(b) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(l)(g) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a) (Supp.
1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(iii)
(1988); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15. §§ 305. 306.
784. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(0(3) (Supp. 1992); CAL FAM. CODE § 2035
(West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS
60/214(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985 & Supp.
1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(2) (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 33.030(1)(c) (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(a)(3) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp.
1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b)
(West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(2)(b) (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.06 0(1)(g) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a) (Supp. 1993); see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
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contact with petitioner's children;7" seven states provide for no con-
tact with petitioner's household members;7 and six states require
no contact with petitioner's family.787
Nevada and New Jersey statutes adopt a very enlightened ap-
proach by also requiring no contact with petitioner's employer, em-
ployees, or coworkers.788 Nationally, worker absenteeism due to do-
mestic violence costs employers three to five billion dollars annual-
ly.7"9 Harrassment on the job by batterers, as well as the burden of
time spent waiting to appear in court, reduce a battered woman's
ability to maintain secure employment.7" One study, conducted by
the Victim's Service Agency in New York, found that harassment
causes sixty-four percent of battered women to be late for work."'
Among battered women, 9.3% reported taking time off from their
jobs because of domestic violence, with nineteen percent of those
who were severely assaulted spending time away from work.792 In
the end, twenty percent of battered women lose their jobs due to the
effect their batterers and the violence have on their work environ-
ment.
793
785. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1989); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6306(3)(g) (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(l)(A) (West Supp. 1992); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(7) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3
(West 1992); NEv. REV. STAT. § 33.030(l)(c) (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4
(1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6)
(1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(6) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.060(1)(g) (West Supp. 1993).
786. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)
(Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6) (1991);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(e) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(6)
(Supp. 1993).
787. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West
1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b)
(West Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(e) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(6) (Supp. 1993).
788. NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.030(1)(c) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(7) (West
1993).
789. Women and Violence: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 128 (1990) [hereinafter Women and Violence] (state-
ment of Helen R. Neuborne).
790. Id.
791. Milt Freudenheim, Employers Act to Stop Family Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
1988, at Al.
792. Women and Violence, supra note 789, at 68-69 (statement of the NOW Legal De-
fense Fund).
793. SCHECTER & GRAY, Abuse Victimization Across the Life Span, in A FRAMEWORK
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Courts have generally granted no contact provisions in civil
protection orders,7" and have uniformly upheld no contact orders
with a spouse,.95 former spouse29 the co-parent of respondent's
children,797 petitioner's children,79 ' and members of the petitioner's
household."9 Clearly, courts have recognized that those in relation-
ships with the petitioner and those that are near the petitioner are also
at risk of harm perpetrated by the respondent."
FOR UNDERSTANDING AND EMPOWERING BATTERED WOMEN 242 (Martha Strauss ed., 1988).
794. See, e.g., Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989) (upholding order which
precluded defendant from approaching, threatening, calling, molesting or injuring son and
son's mother); Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1992) (holding that the entry of an
order against father which prevented him from having contact with his children was supported
by evidence that he had administered a severe spanking to his son which left several visible
bruises); Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989) (granting abuse prevention order
against husband which barred him from approaching, contacting or abusing wife); State ex
rel. Emery v. Andisha, 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (entering restraining order under
the Family Abuse Prevention Act against defendant); Commonwealth v. Zerphy, 481 A.2d
670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (issuing civil protection order which provided that respondent could
not telephone or have further contact in any way with the petitioner); Dunkelberger v. Penn-
sylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 593 A.2d 8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding that
respondent's contact with petitioner and her daughter in violation of protection order consti-
tutes criminal contempt); St. Germaine v. Chapman, 505 N.W.2d 450 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
795. See, e.g.. Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989); Marquette v. Marquette,
686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Moore, No. 89-0553-CR, 1989 Wise. App.
LEXIS 915 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1989); State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987).
796. See, e.g., Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57 (Alaska 1987) (upholding order which
prohibited respondent from contacting former spouse).
797. See, e.g., Andisha, 805 P.2d at 718 (upholding order which prohibited respondent
from contacting his child's mother); Dunkelberger, 593 A.2d at 8 (same).
798. See, e.g., Stuckey, 768 P.2d at 699-70; Ellibee, 826 P.2d at 467-68; Tillman v.
Snow, 571 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Andisha, 805 P,2d at 719; Dunkelberger, 593
A.2d at 8.
799. Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d 841, 842-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (finding viola-
tion of protection order which forbade respondent from having personal or third party contact
with the plaintiff after petitioner and her parents received phone calls and hang ups, unwant-
ed pizza, flowers and service calls).
800. Eighty percent of batterers engage in violent behaviors against multiple targets, in-
cluding spouse, children, parents, and pets. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 35.
The most serious cases of child abuse resulting in emergency room treatment are often
extensions of the battering rampages launched against the child's mother, with 70% of the
serious injuries to children. Women and Violence: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1990); Lee H. Bowker et al., On the
Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE 162 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bogard eds., 1988); Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the
Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 1 (1982); STRAUS Er AL., NATIONAL WOM-
AN ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT. UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FACT SHEETS 3
(1980). Children in homes where domestic violence occurs are physically abused or neglected
at a rate 1500% higher than the national average. Sherry Ford, Domestic Violence: The Great
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Statutes and case law show that the courts can enjoin the respon-
dent from communicating with the petitioner,'" and from contacting
the petitioner generally, 2 verbally, 3 by phone,' through third
parties,' and in writing.' No contact provisions have been prop-
American Spectator Sport, OKLA. COALITION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT,
July-Aug. 1991, at 3.
Many fathers inadvertently injure children while throwing about furniture or other
household objects when abusing the woman. The youngest children sustain the most serious
injuries, such as concussions and broken shoulders and ribs. MARIA Roy, CHILDREN IN THE
CROSSFRE 89-90 (1988). Very young children, held by their mothers in an attempt to protect
them, are hurt when the men continue to beat the mothers without any regard for the
children's safety. ParER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATrERED WOMEN 26 (1990).
801. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b)(3) (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West
1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(a) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(b)(7) (West 1993); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b) (West Supp. 1993); W.VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-6(a)(8) (Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
802. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b) (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F)(3)
(Supp. 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5505 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102
(West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. §16-1005 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(3) (1993);
750 ILCS 60/214(b)(3) (1992); IOwA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2.c (West 1992); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 403.750(a) (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(1) (West 1992); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (1992); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13 (1992); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 455.050 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(1)&(2) (1992); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 33.030(c) (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4(a)(3) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(b)(6) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5A(3) (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-
02.4.a (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(C&D); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §6108(a)(6) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-15-3 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11(b)
(Vernon 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6-3 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279 (1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(g) (1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(6) (1992);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4) (West 1992); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(iii) (1992); Stuckey
v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989); Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1992); Cobb
v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989); Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Canitia, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3119 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 1993);
Deacon v. Landers, 587 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d
990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); State ex rel. Emery v. Andisha, 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App.
1991); Commonwealth v. Zerphy, 481 A.2d 670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Dunkelberger v. Penn-
sylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 593 A.2d 8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); State v. Teynor,
414 N.W.2d 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
803. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 541 N.E.2d 872 (I11. App. CL 1989).
804. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 5505 (West 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(7) (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(8)
(Supp. 1993); Stuckey, 768 P.2d at 695; Maldonado v. Maldonado, No. 93-FM-199. 1993
D.C. App. LEXIS 227 (D.C. Sept. 13, 1993); Zerphy, 481 A.2d at 671; Rosenbaum, 541
N.E.2d at 873; State v. Williams, 1993 Wise. App. LEXIS 1247 (Wisc. Ct. App. Sept. 30,
1993).
805. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (1985); 750 ILCS 60/214 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20(e) (Law. Co-op. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
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erly included in divorce decrees. 7 Those jurisdictions which have
barred respondents from third party contact with petitioners' are
sensitive to the victim's fear, and acknowledge that indirect contact
can be as likely to terrorize the victim as direct contact by the
batterer. A Texas statute allows communication only through
petitioner's attorney or a court appointed person."
The court in State v. Moore"' provided further detail in a civil
protection order by stating that contact includes contact at work,
school, and in public places. 1' Combining stay away and no contact
provisions can improve enforcement of a protection order by making
it clear that the respondent is not allowed to communicate in any
manner with the petitioner. If the order leaves open any avenue for
contact and/or communication, a respondent will often use it to avoid
compliance with the order. Routinely including specific terms such as
those in Moore in civil protection orders can impede the respondent
from reaching the petitioner. If an avenue remains open, the respon-
dent may try to communicate in a manner that he can later claim
protects him from legal action. No contact provisions protect petition-
ers from continued threats and harassment, while instructing respon-
dents that they may best avoid future court proceedings for contempt
if they have absolutely no contact with the petitioner.
Many states have recognized the need for specificity, and have
included a list of places where respondent is not allowed to contact
protected persons." 2 Statutory provisions include no contact at
§ 33.030(1) (1986) (prohibiting respondent from communication with the petitioner or her
children directly or though an agent); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b)(2) (West Supp.
1993) (prohibiting respondent from communicating a threat through any person to the peti-
tioner, her family or household members); Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (involving protection order which forbade petitioner from personal contact or
communication or third party contact with the petitioner); State v. Moore, No. 89-0553-CR,
1989 Wise. App. LEXIS 915 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1989) (ordering respondent not to con-
tact or cause any person other than his attorney to contact his wife unless she consented in
writing).
806. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(7) (West 1992); Moore, 1989 Wise. App.
LEXIS 915.
807. See, e.g., Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 59 (Alaska 1987).
808. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
809. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.1I(b)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993).
810. Moore, 1989 Wise. App. LEXIS 915.
811. Ud at *1.
812. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F)(3) (Supp. 1993) (including contact at
petitioner's home, work and school); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(l)(g) (Anderson
Supp. 1992) (same); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (including contact at
petitioner's home or work); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993)
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petitioner's home,813  work,814  school," 5  children's school,816  or
other specified or regularly visited places." 7 This approach offers
the petitioner the best protection because it clearly and explicitly pre-
cludes all communication between the parties. Provisions which bar
all forms of communication with the petitioner, her family members,
and household members close off the primary means most batterers
use to continue exerting control over battered women and children
after civil protection orders are in place. No contact orders that fail to
block communication can empower the batterer by giving him unpro-
hibited means to maintain access to the victim, causing her to live in
fear of future violence. Solid wording of civil protection orders helps
to assure that the respondent, the police, a future judge, and any other
reader of the order will correctly interpret the its meaning." 8
(same); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d) (Supp. 1993) (including contact at petitioner's
home, work, school, children's school or other specified places); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(6) (West Supp. 1993) (including contact at petitioner's work); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4(a)(3) (1992) (including contact at petitioner's work or school); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6) (1991) (same); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6)(West 1993) (in-
cluding contact at petitioner's home, work, school or at any other regularly visited places by
petitioner and petitioner's family); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b) (West Supp. 1993) (in-
cluding contact at petitioner's home, work, school or at children's school); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-6(a)(6) (Supp. 1993) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(2)(e) (Supp. 1993) (includ-
ing contact at petitioner's home, work or at other specified places).
813. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F)(3) (Supp. 1993); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 750 ILCS 601214(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
11993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 4-506(d)(3) (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West 1993); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 71.11(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(2)(e) (Supp. 1993).
814. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F)(3) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 4-506(d)(5) (Supp. 1993); MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(8) (West Supp. 1993);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(a)(3) (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §6108(a)(6) (1991);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West 1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(b)(3) (West
Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(6) (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(2Xe)
(Supp. 1993).
815. See, e.g., AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F)(3) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(5) (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:4(a)(3) (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(6) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(6) (Supp. 1993).
816. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(5) (Supp. 1993); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 71.11(b)(4) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(6) (Supp. 1993).
817. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(6) (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(2)(3)
(Supp. 1993).
818. The civil protection order study conducted by the National Institute of Justice pro-
vides an example of when lack of specification in protection orders concerning contact proves
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No contact orders, even those issued ex pane, have survived
constitutional challenges. In Marquette v. Marquette, 9 the court
held that an ex parte order cutting off batterer's visitation rights for
ten days does not violate due process.820 The court, relying on
Matthews v. Eldrige,"t reasoned that the respondent's due process
rights are not violated where the ex parte order is issued as part of a
civil protection order system which includes the procedural safeguard
of a hearing within a short time after the issuance of the order, par-
ticularly in light of the state's interest in providing immediate protec-
tion for abused parties.8"
6. Vacate Orders
If the perpetrator of violence has access to the victim, abuse is
likely to continue. Therefore, vacate orders, which evict respondent
from his residence, have been regarded by many judges as one of the
most effective ways of terminating domestic abuse.8" Vacate orders
should issue whenever a court finds abuse, the victim wishes to sepa-
rate from her abuser, and the victim has not chosen to seek shelter in
an undisclosed location. 4 Responding to the victim's need for pro-
tection, forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
have statutorily provided for the inclusion of a vacate order in a civil
protection order.' The two states without such statutes, Michigan
harmful to the victim of abuse. It relays a story of one batterer who "terrified his wife by
repeatedly parking across the street from where she worked so she could see him from her
desk. Her supervisor became angry as her work began to deteriorate." When the victim asked
for assistance, "the police reported [that] there was nothing they could do because this behav-
ior was not specifically prohibited in the [existing] protection order. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra
note 19, at 42.
819. 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
820. Id. at 995-96.
821. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
822. Marquette, 686 P.2d at 995-96.
823. NIJ CPO STUDY. supra note 19. at 41-42.
824. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends that vacate
orders be available to all upon request whenever violence has occurred or is threatened. FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 21.
825. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(2) (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.5.010(a)(2) (1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(1) (Michie
1993); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5751, 2035(c) (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(2)(B) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(a) (West Supp. 1993); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 949(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(4) (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4)(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §19-13-4(a) (1993);
HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-4(b) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(l)(c) (1993); 750 ILCS
60/214(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(3)(a) (Supp. 1993);
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and New York, issue vacate orders under the authority of their catch-
all provisions or case law.826 Some statutes list the places from
which respondent can be ordered to vacate, and include the house-
hold, 27  multi-family dwelling, 2' petitioner's work place,
829
petitioner's school, 3 ' jointly owned property, and leased proper-
ty.831
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3107(a)(2) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1)(C)
(West Supp. 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(4) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(c) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13 (Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.1(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2)(c) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
924(2) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(1)(b) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4(1)(a)(2) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a) (1989); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.b (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1) (Anderson Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(C). (D) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.716(2)(b) (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(2) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
§ 2.1(b) (Supp. i990); PI. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1)(b) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
4-60(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-606 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a)(2) (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-279.1A3 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(h) (West
Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(1) (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4);
WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(i) (1988); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 305(3)(c)
(allowing a court-ordered law enforcement officer to "[riemove and exclude the respondent
from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence").
826. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West 1986); N.Y. FAM. Cr. AcT
§ 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994); Merola v. Merola, 536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (holding that upon determination that husband had committed family offenses, in-
cluding harassment and disorderly conduct, lower court should have directed defendant to
vacate and stay away from the family home and that court erred in permitting husband to
return to the home on the condition that he would comply with the terms of the protection
order).
827. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(c) (West Supp. 1993).
828. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A. §§ 1, 3(c) (West Supp. 1993).
829. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(2) (Michie 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A. §§ 1, 3(c) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(8) (West Supp.
1993).
830. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(2) (Michie 1993).
831. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(2) (1989); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035(c) (West 1994); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(4) (1989); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(l)(C)
(West Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.1(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(a)(2) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(a)(2) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEx. FAM. CODE
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Courts consistently have upheld the issuance of a civil protection
order with a vacate order.832 In Merola v. Meroa,33 the court held
that upon determining that the husband had committed family offens-
es, including harassment and disorderly conduct, the lower court
should have directed defendant to vacate and stay away from the
family home.8" The trial court erred in permitting the husband to
return to the home on the condition that he would comply with the
terms of the protection order.835 Even where a perpetrator of vio-
lence had a serious medical condition and the home was deemed to
be the best place for him, the court found that the victim's need to
be protected necessitated him leaving the home.'
In Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 37 the court ordered not only the hus-
band who perpetrated the violence but also the family dog to vacate
the parties' home. 38 Vacating the dog from the home was necessary
to protect the victim from abuse because the dog was trained by the
husband to attack anything which angered him, and was therefore a
source of continuing, imminent danger to his wife and their chil-
ANN. § 71.11(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
832. See, e.g., State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Wright v. Wright,
583 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Marriage of Blitstein, 569 N.E.2d 1357 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991); In re Marriage of Hagaman, 462 N.E.2d 1276 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984); Anders v.
Anders. 618 So. 2d 452 (La. 1993); Cote v. Cote, 599 A.2d 869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 553 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1990); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh,
626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982); Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Jane
Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fam. CL 1984); Bryant v. Burnett, 624 A.2d 584 (N.J.
1993); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Maksuta v. Higson,
577 A.2d 185 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super.
CL App. Div. 1989); Merola v. Merola, 536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1989); Smart v. Smart,
297 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Eichenberg v. Eichenberg, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
5282 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1993); Mallin v. Mallin, 541 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988); Tanagho v. Tanagho, No. 92AP-1190. 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 120 (Feb. 23, 1993)
(reversing order to vacate home that defendant, who was convicted of domestic violence,
shared with victim); Synder v. Synder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Boyle v. Boyle,
12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1979); Nuss v. Nuss, 828 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992). But see Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
order which granted respondent use of the home in a temporary protection order); Bjergum v.
Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that evidence that the husband
had previously abused his wife and unsubstantiated allegations that he had abused their chil-
dren was insufficient to establish the husband's present intention to do harm or inflict fear of
harm and thus did not warrant a protection order excluding him from the parties' home).
833. 536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1989).
834. Id. at 842-43.
835. Id.
836. Kilmer v. Kilmer, 486 N.Y.S.2d 483 (App. Div. 1985).
837. 474 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fain. Ct. 1984).
838. Id
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dren. 39 As the court itself surmised,
[the dog's] sense of loyalty has been perverted by the respondent to
such a degree as to make the dog an unwitting instrument for per-
petrating family offenses. As such it is quite reasonable that [he] be
required to leave the family home in order to "stop the violence,
end the family disruption and obtain protection."'
The Jane Y. case reflects the use of vacate orders to establish mean-
ingful relief for victims of domestic violence.
One 1984 case poses an alternative approach, which has been
rejected by all other courts and statutes to date. In Cunningham v.
Cunningham,"' the lower court entered an order excluding the peti-
tioner wife from the residence and awarding her $300 per week main-
tenance, although she was the party who brought the suit under the
Adult Abuse Act. Such an approach raises serious due process ques-
tions, in that it makes a battered woman, against whom the court has
not made a finding of any wrongdoing, subject to a court order that
should properly be enforced between her batterer and the court."2
For this and other public policy reasons, this approach has not been
favored by other courts, as it punishes and burdens the domestic vio-
lence victims by forcing them to leave their homes and find alternate
shelter.
Finding alternative shelter is difficult for battered women, who
are often isolated from their communities due to the control their
batterers have exerted over them. 3 For many who are willing to
seek shelter, there are no shelter beds available." If they have chil-
839. Id. at 682-83.
840. Id. at 683.
841. 673 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
842. See also Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the trial court erred when it granted a protection order which required the abuse victim
to vacate the marital home because the purpose of the domestic violence statute is to autho-
rize the court to order the abuser to vacate the parties' dwelling); Lucke v. Lucke, 300
N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980) (voiding an order against oldest daughter who had been sexually
abused by father which forbade her presence in the family residence where she was never
brought in as a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff).
843. For many battered women whose batterers have isolated them from friends and
family to maintain power and control in the relationship, leaving the home to secure shelter
is exceptionally difficult. EWING, supra note 180, at 13; SCHULMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
844. Women and Violence, supra note 789, at 128. In Boston, for every two women and
children that have access to shelter, there are 5 battered women and 8 children turned away.
Women and Violence, supra note 789, at 128; OLGA DWYER & EILEEN TuLLY, N.Y. STATE
OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, HousING FOR BATTERED WOMEN 9
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dren, finding alternative shelter becomes even more difficult. 5 Fi-
nally, getting into a shelter is no guarantee of escaping abuse; most
shelters only allow short stays.' After being shelte,red thirty-one
percent of abused women return to their batterers, primarily because
they could not locate permanent housing.'
When vacate orders are entered, it is important that the civil
protection order also specifies how it will be implemented. Smart v.
Smart" demonstrates a safe means of accomplishing a vacate order.
In Smart, the court upheld a temporary protection order which gave
the wife exclusive use of the marital home, and the husband was or-
dered to remove his personal effects and turn over his keys to the
police. 9 Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia require
the police to assist a petitioner in removing the respondent and gain-
ing possession of the residence.'" Eleven states and Puerto Rico re-
(1989). Research indicates that only 42% of women who had been struck once in a marriage
sought some type of intervention. RICHARD GELLES. FAMILY VIOLENCE 112 (2d ed. 1987). If
greater numbers of battered women seek help, shelters will be less able to meet the ever
growing need.
845. The majority of abused women who use shelter services bring their children. In one
study, 72% of the women brought children to the shelter;, 21% were accompanied by three or
more children. NATIONAL WOMAN ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT, EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE ON CHILDREN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEETS 2 (1987).
846. The average stay at a battered women's shelter is less than two weeks. Jean Giles-
Sims, A Longitudinal Study of Battered Children of Battered Wives, FAM. REL., Apr. 1985, at
205-06.
847. DWYER & TULLY, supra note 844, at 9. "If, in leaving a violent mate, she lacks
adequate financial resources and must live in an unsafe dwelling in a crime-ridden commu-
nity, a survivor may have changed only the type of danger to be braved and may have
added the risk of assaults by strangers to the risk of her partner's reprisals." Browne, supra
note 10, at 1080-81. Further, many battered women do not perceive shelters as a viable op-
tion since it means leaving one's home and family unit. JUDY GROSSMAN, NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INCARCERATED WOMEN:
SURVEY RESULTS 8. This is particularly true for battered immigrant and refugee women, who
often turn instead to friends and relatives for shelter.
848. 297 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. CL App. 1982).
849. Id. at 136.
850. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.050 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-208 (Michie 1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-104 (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(9)
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp.
1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-7 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6309 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-7 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.11 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(5) (Supp. 1992); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.755 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2135(c) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.9 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-928 (Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8 (1990); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7(B)(4) (Michie 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 503-4 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-04 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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quire the police to accompany a domestic violence victim to retrieve
her personal property."' 2 When the order to vacate is issued, courts
should follow through with these additional safeguards to better insure
the victim's safety. An ideal order would require respondent to vacate
immediately, and would order the police to accompany the petitioner
to the residence, serve the respondent with a copy of the vacate or-
der, stand by while the respondent removes personal belongings,""
obtain all keys to the home from the respondent, test the keys, and
turn them over to the petitioner.
Courts faced with constitutional challenges to vacate orders have
consistently found them not to violate due process rights. 5 State
courts rely on the line of decisions handed down by the United States
Supreme Court on ex parte relief,' and apply the Matthews v.
Eldridge'" test which recognizes that uninterrupted possession of
one's home is a significant private interest, but can be outweighed by
the governmental interest in preventing domestic violence.'
§ 3113.31(F)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.718(l)(c) (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 15-15-5 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-90(c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.15 (West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 1108 (1989); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26-50-080 (West 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(6)(a) (West Supp.
1993).
851. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(g) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(7.5)(a) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(5) (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS
60/304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(8) (Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(c) (West Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-25-13(b) (West Supp.
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7(B)(3) (Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a) (1989);
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 107.718(c), 107.719 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-100 (Law. Co-op.
1985); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 3.10 (1992).
852. Removal of belongings is generally limited to clothing and personal affects. It is
important to assure that respondent takes with him sufficient clothing so that he will not
have any excuse to return to petitioner's residence prior to the next court hearing or, in the
case of a full (not temporary) civil protection order, all his clothes so that he need not return
at any time in the future.
853. Cote v. Cote, 599 A.2d 869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that protection
order which requires respondent to vacate and bars him from the marital home does not con-
stitute a taking because respondent was not deprived of all beneficial use of the property);
State ex reL Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of
ex parre temporary protection order which evicted respondent from family home); Boyle v.
Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1979) (holding that an ex parte eviction
of a batterer is not a due process violation where any deprivation of the use of property is
temporary, title to real estate is not affected, exclusion is the last resort, and all exclusion
orders are modifiable).
854. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
855. 424 U.S. at 319.
856. The Mathews court developed a test that ex parte relief is constitutional when the
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7. Property
a. Rights to Use of Personal Property
If rights to personal property are not specifically established as
part of the civil protection order, these items of property can present
an arena for continuing conflict. 57 Twenty-six state statutes specifi-
cally state that the issuance of a civil protection order does not affect
title to personal property,85 a notion upheld in case law. 59 Seven-
teen state statutes stipulate that the court can grant exclusive posses-
sion of personal property in the protection order, ° and eighteen
states and the District of Columbia provide that the order can deter-
mine who has the right to use certain property. 6' Some statutes
delineate clearly that checkbooks, 2 keys and personal effects.'
household furniture,8" and cars' are among the items of personal
respondent's private interest is outweighed by the governmental interest, taking into consider-
ation the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest through procedures used and the
probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Id.
857. ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 87; Browne, supra note 10, at 1080-81.
858. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(9)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(1) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29b(9) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(D) (Michie Supp. 1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1A (Michie Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(d) (1988).
859. See, e.g., Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fam. Ct. 1984); Boyle v. Boyle,
12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1979).
860. CAL FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(4) (Supp.
1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 601214(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(9) (Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2135(A)(2), (4) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(l)(D) (West Supp.
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.3(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4I(b)(1) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29(b)(9) (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5OB-3(a)(8) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02.4.f (Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson Supp.
1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§71.11(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
861. CAL FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1989), ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1) (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)
(West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:4I(a)(5) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29b (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5OB-3(a) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02.4f (Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11(d) (West Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§§ 305, 306.
862. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993).
863. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993).
864. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.1.D (West Supp. 1992); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(1)(b)(1) (1990).
865. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(8) (restraining a defendant from entering
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property which can be disposed of in the order. Case law consistently
supports this approach.' The court in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald'7
ruled that the petitioner may obtain personal property from respon-
dent, even if a divorce decree has already addressed property is-
sues.' The majority of jurisdictions have realized that enabling the
courts to resolve questions about usage of personal property in a civil
protection order removes arenas of potential conflict by preventing the
parties from having to contact each other in order to retrieve their
belongings, or to discuss an unresolved and controversial property
matter. Reduction in contact between the parties combined with reso-
lution of issues that could become controversial can help prevent
future violence.
b. Restraining Respondent From Taking, Converting,
Selling, Damaging, Or Destroying Property
Seventeen states and Puerto Rico statutorily recognize that a civil
protection order may order that certain property of parties in a do-
mestic abuse proceeding be protected.' 9 These provisions have de-
plaintiff's car or propelled vehicle); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(2) (West 1982); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(9) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.3(6) (Vernon
Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(t)(b)(I) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(b)(9) (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.f (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson Supp. 1992); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§§ 305, 306.
866. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing that trial court in the domestic abuse proceeding was not precluded from addressing the
request for the return of wife's belongings, even if the divorce decree had granted relief);
Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (involving protection order
which divided personal property between the parties); Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d
681, 682 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (holding that court could order the removal of family dog where
the dog was trained to attack the wife); Smart v. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that temporary protection order can give wife exclusive use of marital home
and order husband to remove his personal effects from the home and turn over his key to
the police); Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (involving divorce action
where lower court entered an order in adult abuse proceeding which divided property). But
see Cooley v. Cooley, Ohio App. LEXIS 4996 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993) (stating that
permanent property division is not allowed in a protection order).
867. 406 N.W.2d at 52.
868. Id. at 54.
869. CAL FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (Supp.
1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5
(West Supp. 1993); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(4) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(l)(D)
(West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-13(2)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050.3(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT.
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veloped due to the realization that batterers are often destructive, not
only of their victims, but of things associated with their victims,
including pets." Destroying a victim's possessions is another meth-
od of gaining and maintaining control over her." Some states spec-
ify that the order can stipulate no disposing,"' no taking,"' no
transferring,874  no encumbering," no concealing, 6  and no
damaging or destroying real877 or personal property. 8  Some stat-
CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:41(a)(5)
(1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 2.1(g) (1992); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(4),(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.11(a)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(v) (1988).
870. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4; FAMILY ABUSE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 139-48
(Gerald T. Hotaling et al. eds., 1988); LENORE E. WALKER, ELIMINATING SEXISM TO END
BATrERiNG RELATIONSHIPS 2 (1984).
871. Fifty-nine percent of batterers destroyed or damaged sentimental and personal effects
of their victims. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 113.
872. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(9) (Supp.
1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(c)
(Michie/Bobbs Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(4) (West 1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(2)(d)
(Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.3(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-121(2)(a) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1993); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 8, § 2.1(g) (1992); TEx. PAM. CODE ANN. §71.11(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993); WYo.
STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(v) (1988).
873. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:41(a)(5) (1990).
874. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(9) (Supp.
1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
j 46:2135(A)(4) (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(2)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.3(7) (Vernon Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2)(a) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie
Supp. 1993); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-
21-105(a)(v) (1988).
875. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(9) (Supp.
1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2135(A)(4) (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(2)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.3(7) (Vernon Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2)(a) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie
Supp. 1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-
21-105(a)(v) (1988).
876. CAL FAM. CODE § 2035(a) (West 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(7) (West Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-121(2)(a) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(4) (Michie Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT.
§ 35-21-105(a)(v) (1988).
877. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(3),(7) (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5 (West Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.750(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(a)(5)
(1990).
878. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2045 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); 750
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utes make an exception to these rules where tampering with property
is in the ordinary course of business, 9 for expenses of a minor
child,880 or for necessities of life."' The trend in case law parallels
the statutes, and has acknowledged the ability of civil protection or-
ders to restrain respondents from removing, damaging, or converting
items from the family home. 82
c. Exchange of Personal Property
The trend in state statutes and case law provides for the ex-
change of personal property between the parties in a civil protection
order. 83 Resolving contentious property issues in the civil protection
order helps avoid future conflict over these items. The safest way to
accomplish such an exchange is to establish a specific time, date, and
list of the exact items to be exchanged in the civil protection order.
During the exchange, a police officer should be present to ensure the
victim's safety.'" In cases where the parties should have no contact
ILCS 60/214 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
879. CAL FAM. CODE § 2045 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(4) (West
1982); MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01.6 (1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(2)(d) (1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-12(2)(a) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie 1993); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(1)(B) (West 1993); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (1990).
880. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(4) (West 1982).
881. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2045 (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(4) (West
1982); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01.6 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2)(a) (1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie 1993).
882. See, e.g., Rayan v. Dykeman, 274 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the
court had authority to enter and enforce the order in light of the nonexclusive remedies pro-
vision of the domestic violence act and the stipulation that the plaintiff would permanently
transfer jointly owned real estate property to defendant); Thomas v. Thomas, 477 A.2d 728
(D.C. 1984) (refusing to dissolve a civil protection order which precluded son from removing
any items from father's home); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the civil order of protection which restricted respondent from transferring or
encumbering the parties' property was properly issued).
883. See, e.g., State v. Wiltse, 386 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. App. 1986) (reviewing a convic-
tion for violation of a civil protection order which restrained respondent from entering
petitioner's home and required petitioner to turn over defendant's belongings still in her pos-
session); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
884. Eleven states and Puerto Rico require the police to accompany a domestic violence
victim to retrieve her personal property. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701 (West 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(7.5)(a) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(5) (1993); 750
ILCS 60/304 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(8) (1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46: 2135(C) (West 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(k) (West 1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-7B(3) (Michie 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5 (1992); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 107.718(c) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 3.10 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-100
(Law. co-op. 1991). The District of Columbia and Illinois have provided specifically in their
statutes that the police or other adult third party may accompany defendant to retrieve his
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or the petitioner lives at an undisclosed address, the order should
provide that the petitioner deliver the specified items to a neutral
third party. The court in Smart v. Smart" dismissed the appeal of
an order which required a safe exchange where the husband had to
remove his belongings from the home and then turn his keys over to
the police. 86
8. Orders Concerning Weapons
Each year, over 1.7 million Americans face a spouse wielding a
knife or a gun."' Forty percent of the domestic violence calls re-
ceived by the San Francisco Police Department each year involve the
use of weapons.88 Weapons are used in twenty-six percent of vio-
lence crimes committed by spouses. 89 Although over thirty-three
percent of assaults by intimates involved the use of guns, bludgeons,
or other weapons," in only fory-one percent of these cases is the
batterer arrested.89" ' Even where the batterer is arrested, these cases
are prosecuted as misdemeanors rather than felonies."
personal belongings. D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (1981); 750 ILCS 60/214(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993);
see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia require the police to assist a petitioner
to remove the respondent and gain possession of her residence. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.050
(1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-208 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(h) (West
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-103 (West 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-7 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6309 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12 (West
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(5) (1992); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.785(3)(a)
(Michie 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928
(Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:43 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28 (West
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7B(4) (Michie 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (1992);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-04 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31F(3) (Anderson
1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.718(c) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5 (1992); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.150 (West 1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.080 (West 1992);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(6)(a) (West 1992).
885. 297 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
886. Id. at 137-38; see also State v. Lewis, 508 N.W.2d 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (up-
holding order requiring defendant to stay away from plaintiff's residence subject to the condi-
tion that he could retrieve personal property if accompanied by a police officer).
887. GOOLKASIAN, supra note 780, at 2.
888. In 1991 and 1992, 59% of female homicide victims were killed by a husband, boy-
friend or family member. Family Violence Leads Cause of San Francisco Women's Death,
CALIF. PHYsICiAN, Dec. 1993, at 23.
889. KLAUS & RAND, supra note 3, at 4.
890. Id. Weapons used include chains, clubs, chairs, lamps, wrenches, hammers, gold
clubs, knives, razors, broken bottles, belts, and buckles. EWING, supra note 180, at 8-9.
891. Id.
892. Barbara Smith, Non-Stranger Violence: The Criminal Courts Response, in 7 RE-
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In light of the severe danger weapons pose in an abusive rela-
tionship, judicial authorities recommend that law enforcement officers
be given authority to seize weapons when they make arrests in do-
mestic violence cases, and that batterers be precluded from the use
and possession of firearms and other specified weapons.' 9 Further,
when the respondent keeps a licensed or unlicensed gun in a com-
monly held area of the parties' residence, the petitioner can request
that the court order the police to search the residence for that weapon
and confiscate it." A judge can order the police to perform this
search in the temporary or civil protection order. 5 The court issu-
ing a civil protection order may also prohibit the respondent's posses-
sion of weapons," order the revocation of respondent's weapons li-
cense, 97 or order the respondent to turn over or surrender all weap-
ons, 899 or prohibit the respondent from purchasing or receiving addi-
tional firearms for the duration of the order.' 9 California prohibits a
respondent who has a protection order issued against him from pur-
chasing, receiving, or attempting to purchase a firearm.' New
Hampshire and New Jersey additionally provide that after an arrest
for a civil protection order violation, the police may seize defendant's
weapons." North Dakota authorizes the court to order a surrender
of weapons following an arrest for domestic violence if it appears
likely the respondent will use them.' This relief is available to vic-
tims in all states either by specific statute, or through the catch-all
provisions in the states' civil protection order statute.
SPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, 2 (1983).
893. MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 207, 306.
894. See infra notes 1333-43 & 2186-202 and accompanying text.
895. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8(I)(b) (1990).
896. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 1994).
897. NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:25-21(d) (West 1994).
898. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:10(g) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(d) (West 1994); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(7) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-24 (1992).
899. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993).
900. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5516 (west 1992).
901. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8(I)(b) (1990) ("Subsequent to an arrest, the peace
officer shall seize any deadly weapons in the control, ownership or possession of the defen-
dant which may have been used or threatened to be used, during the violation of the protec-
tion order."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(d) (west 1994) ("[A] law enforcement officer who
has probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed may: (a)
question persons present to determine whether there are weapons on the premises; and (b)
upon observing or learning that a weapon is present on the premises, seize any weapon that
the officer reasonably believe would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury.").
902. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-13(2) (1991).
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Case law expands upon these statutory provisions. The court in
Hoffman v. Union County Prosecutor"3 held that the police properly
took possession of the husband's rifles, shotguns, and a Japanese
saber after a domestic incident at the wife's request, in order to pro-
tect her from further abuse.' 4 The court explained that continuation
of the husband's firearms purchaser ID card would not be in the
interest of the public health, safety, or welfare, based on his habitual
drinking and his pattern of domestic and other violence.'
Both criminal and civil courts should routinely inquire whether
perpetrators in domestic violence cases own weapons, and should
order their confiscation by police in the protection order. Domestic
violence advocates and attorneys representing battered women should
request this relief whenever the victim raises concerns about weapons.
Research data on batterers who ultimately kill their victims highlight
the importance of retrieving weapons.' The National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence reports that forty-one percent of all female
homicide victims are murdered by their own mates, and most serious
injuries and deaths occur when the battered woman attempts to
flee. 7 A Pennsylvania study reveals that a woman or child is mur-
dered every three days by husbands or male partners in that state."
In light of this research, the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges recommends that civil protection orders specifically
903. 572 A.2d 1200 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
904, Id. at 1204.
905. Id. at 1205; see also State v. Solomon, 621 A.2d 559 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1993) (hold-
ing that where a defendant's weapons were seized pursuant to the domestic violence statute,
these weapons would not be returned until the domestic violence complaint was dismissed
and the threat had passed, not simply when the criminal prosecution was dismissed because
any other interpretation of the statute would undermine its purpose to release the seized
weapons when the violent situation no longer existed). In a 1988 study, researchers empirical-
ly derived three types of men who batter. The most violent men were those who were se-
verely abused or witnessed abuse in childhood, who abuse alcohol and other drugs, and who
are violent outside as well as inside the home. Daniel G. Sanders & Angela Browne, Domes-
tic Homicide, in CASE STUDIES IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 379 (Robert Ammerman & Michel
Hersen eds., 1991). Given this study, the great importance of removing the weapons in the
Hoffman case is evident where the defendant was a severe abuser, used alcohol regularly, and
was violent outside as well as inside the home. Hoffnan, 572 A.2d at 1200.
906. Sanders & Browne, supra note 905, at 381.
907. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATrERED WOMEN. STATISTICS
PACKET 11 (1990).
908. Behind Closed Doors: Family Violence in the Home: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Children. Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1991) (statement of Barbara Hart).
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address weapons in the home or in the possession of the abuser.'
9. Treatment and Counseling
a. Authority to Order Treatment for Domestic Violence
Perpetrators
10
The National Institute of Justice's civil protection order study
found that mandatory counseling that is specifically designed to treat
domestic violence can teach some batterers non-abusive ways of relat-
ing to their partners.9 ' Thirty-three jurisdictions statutorily authorize
the court to order counseling and treatment for domestic violence
perpetrators in protection orders.9" Progressive jurisdictions order
the defendant into a certified batterers program.93 California, Illi-
nois, and Massachusetts explicitly provide for the inclusion of sub-
stance abuse treatment in the treatment order,914 and courts in other
states order substance abuse treatment under the catch-all provisions
of their statute. Wyoming is the only state which requires that the
909. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJEcT, supra note 687, at 21.
910. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 102.
911. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 44.
912. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b)(7) (1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5754 (West 1992);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.30(7)(a) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(11) (Michie 1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-5.5 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214 (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(6) (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.1 (West 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(9) (Vernon 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(g)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136(A)(4) (West 1982); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(10) (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21.15(0 (1992);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(3)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:4(b)(5) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-
6(F) (Michie 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4d (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E)(1)(f) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 1992); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 602 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5 (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-279.1(A)(5) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(d) (West 1992);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (1992); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(vii) (1993).
913. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 5754 (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(0
(1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 450.050(3)(8) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(1)(b)(5)
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(5) (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5 (1993);
see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 508 (requiring the appropriate state agency to "pro-
mulgate rules or regulations for programs of intervention for perpetrators of domestic or fami-
ly violence").
914. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5754 (West 1992); 750 ILCS 60/214 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1993). However, domestic violence experts have
recommended separate treatment of domestic violence and substance abuse because they are
separate problems that must be treated independently. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 154.
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treatment not exceed ninety days.915 Case law reflects a trend toward
courts ordering batterers into treatment. Courts have held batterers for
psychiatric examinations, 916 risk assessment,917 and domestic abuse
counseling. 98 Where domestic violence is an issue, the batterer hus-
band can be ordered to undergo psychiatric examination in a custody
case.
919
It is important to be aware that little is really known about the
effectiveness of various treatment programs in preventing future do-
mestic violence. In ordering or requesting counseling, courts and
attorneys should be mindful that experts argue that spousal battering
represents a complex, long-term behavior pattern that is not readily
changed. 92°
Generally, counseling programs for abusers have a thirty-three to
fifty percent dropout rate."' At least half of the men who complete
court ordered treatment programs are nonviolent during the following
year.9' Even these limited results must be evaluated in light of re-
915. Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(vii) (1993). There is a growing consensus among do-
mestic violence experts that a minimum of one year is required for treatment to be effective.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES. supra note 23, at 154.
916. See, e.g., Agnew v. Campbell, No. C3-90-1130. 1990 WL 188723 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 4. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's action against the judge who assessed
attorney's fees and had the plaintiff held for psychiatric examination after the plaintiff violat-
ed a civil protection order).
917. Cosine v. Figueroa, 609 A.2d 523. 525 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (holding
that a requested risk assessment should be ordered unless defendant can show that the request
is arbitrary and capricious).
918. See, e.g., id. at 523 (ordering defendant to undergo domestic violence counseling).
919. Katz v. Katz, 467 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (ordering abusive hus-
band to undergo psychiatric examination in custody case).
920. A.R. KLEIN, PROBATION/PAROLE SUPERVISION PROTOCOL FOR SPOUSAL ABUSERS 86
(1989). The National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women has reported that
clinicians claim that the majority of the few abusive men who receive treatment continue the
abuse with new partners. Lenore E. Walker & Angela Browne, Gender and Victimization by
Intimates. 53 J. PERSONALITY 179, 192 (1988). Dr. Anne Ganley has also found that the
batterers she treats often go on to batter another woman in their next relationship. TERRIFY-
ING LOVE, supra note 4, at 72.
921. Edward Gondolf, Evaluating Programs for Men Who Batter: Problems and Pros-
pects, 2 J. FAm. VIOLENCE 95, 98 (1987). The drop out rate has reached 75% in some pro-
grams. Id. Men who drop out of treatment are significantly more likely to continue violence
than those who complete treatment. WILLIAM A. STACEY & ANSON SHUPE, UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS AT ARLINGTON, AN EVALUATION OF THREE PROGRAMs FOR ABUSIVE MEN IN TEXAS
68 (Monograph No. 29, 1984); Jeffrey L. Edleson & Roger J. Grusznski, Treating Men Who
Batter: Four Years of Outcome Data From the Domestic Abuse Project, 12 J. SOC. SERV.
RFS. 3. 4 (1988); L. Kevin Hamberger & James. E. Hastings, Characteristics of Spouse
Abuse: Predictors of Treatment Acceptance, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 363-73 (1986);
HARRELL, supra note 599, at 32.
922. Carann S. Feazell et al., Services for Men Who Batter: Implications for Programs
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search which demonstrates a decline in violence following court inter-
vention even when treatment is not sought or ordered.9" Studies of
court intervention based on victim interviews have found that sixty
percent of batterers who experienced court intervention remained non-
violent for six months.924 Although treated offenders were more like-
ly to commit less serious acts of physical violence against their vic-
tims, it appears that overall, treated batterers reduced their psycho-
logical abuse more than untreated offenders under court supervi-
sion.9' Therefore, leading researchers have concluded that court in-
tervention is the best deterrent to continued domestic abuse.'
Many batterers attempt to excuse their violence against family
members by blaming it on their alcohol or drug use.9" Research
indicates, however, that substance use or abuse does not cause domes-
tic violence." There are many substance abusers who do not batter
their partners.' There are abusers who batter when they are under
and Policies, 33 FAM. REL. 217-23 (1984). Studies on the percentage remaining non-violent
varies dramatically, with lower rates of non-violence reported in studies that relied on victim
interviews for data rather than on police reports. Id; Richard M. Tolman & Larry W.
Bennett, A Review of Quantative Research on Men Who Batter, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIO-
LENCE 87, 104 (1990); Gondolf, supra note 921, at 98.
923. Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE 377, 413-14 (L. Ohlin and M. Tonry eds., 1989); Peter Jaffee et al.. The Impact
of Police Laying Charges in Cases of Wife Assault, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 37-50 (1986);
HARRELL, supra note 599, at 32.
924. PATRICK A. LANGAN & CHRISTOPHER A. INNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVENT-
ING DoMEsTtc VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1 (1986). This percentage of non-violent batterers
is 82% if police reports are relied on as the test of recidivism. Lawrence W. Sherman &
Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault. 49 AM. SOc.
REv. 261, 267 (1984). Other studies have found that at least half of the small percentage of
abusive men who receive treatment continue their violent behavior with new partners. H.M.
HUGHES, IMPACT OF SPOUSE ABUSE ON CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN IN VIOLENCE UP-
DATE 1-11 (1992). Ninety-five percent of men who sought treatment for battering behavior
have admitted to battering more than one woman. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 4, at 72.
This abusive behavior stems from the male batterer himself, not from any particular relation-
ship. Id.
925. Forty-three percent of treated batterers reduced their psychological abuse compared to
12% of non-treated batterers. ADELE HARRELL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF
COURT ORDERED TREATMENT FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS 62 (1991).
926. Jeffrey L. Edleson & Maryann Syers, The Relative Long-term Effects of Group
Treatments for Men Who Batter, in MINNEAPOLIS: THE DOMESTIC ABUSE PROjECT (1990);
Jeffrey L. Edleson & Maryann Syers, The Relative Effectiveness of Group Treatments for Men
Who Batter, 26 SOC. WORK 10, 16-17 (1990); HARRELL, supra note 599, at 32.
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the influence and batter when they are sober.9' The fact that a
batterer was using substances at the time of a particular incident of
abuse does not alter the fact that the abuse took place. Instead, sub-
stance use or abuse increases lethality in domestic violence cases and
should be a factor considered by courts when assessing a victim's
need for protection and the safety of the children during visita-
tion.93' When a batterer also abuses substances, any treatment plan
must include treatment of the substance abuse problem prior to treat-
ment for domestic violence. 2
Courts and counsel should be careful to consider the particulari-
ties of each batterer when ordering batterers to undergo treatment for
domestic violence and/or substance abuse. Experienced domestic vio-
lence counselors recommend that counseling should only be ordered
when specific criteria are met." The court should:
1) Assess the respondent's suitability for domestic violence
treatment.9M Factors to consider in determining the respondent's
suitability include: respondent's dangerous propensities, his motiva-
tion for change and the safety needs of the victim, other family
members and children.933
2) Ensure that the victim's safety is addressed by developing a
safety plan, including issuance of civil protection orders when the
batterer is ordered into treatment.9-
3) Determine whether an appropriate batterer's treatment program
exists in the community, i.e. one that will specifically address the
violent behavior.937
4) Ensure that there will be adequate monitoring of defendant's
progress in the counseling program by court probation.93
5) Assure that criminal contempt proceedings are promptly instituted
if the court learns that a new incident of domestic abuse has been





933. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 151-52.
934. Id.
935. Anne L. Ganley, Perpetrators of Domestic Violence: An Overview of Counseling the
Court Mandated Client, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 173-93 (D. Sonkin ed., 1986).
936. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 151.
937. Id.
938. Id. at 152.
939. Id. at 151; Ganley, supra note 935, at 173-93.
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State v. Sutley" ° is an example of a case in which the court
struck down the substance abuse treatment ordered as a condition of
bail, because the court believed that it was only "remotely related" to
the domestic violence crime with which the defendant was charged
and therefore would not be effective in the rehabilitation of the defen-
dant. Courts should carefully assess the respondent's need to have
domestic violence counseling and only order batterers into programs
that meet appropriate criteria. The National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges recommends that standards for batterers' treat-
ment and education programs be established in each jurisdiction and
that court referrals be limited to those providers who meet the stan-
dards.94' The Council further states: "[iut is paramount that these
programs ensure the ongoing safety of the victim and other family
members."' 2
b. Treatment for the Abused Party 3
Victims of domestic violence should never be ordered into treat-
ment programs against their wishes. The National Institute of Justice
civil protection order study states:
Requiring the victim to enter counseling may put her in increased
jeopardy by suggesting to the batterer that he is not responsible for
his violence and thereby giving him an excuse to continue his
abuse. Couples' counseling improperly conducted may have the
same effect; furthermore, it may create a setting in which the victim
is at an inherent disadvantage given her fear of the batterer."
Ordering victims into counseling programs confirms the batterer's
belief that the victim, rather than he, caused, and is responsible for,
the violence."45 Alaska provides for family counseling if it will not
result in more domestic violence.' The D.C. Gender Bias Task
Force Civil Protection Order Survey revealed a civil protection order
contempt rate that was twice as high when the parties were ordered
into family counseling as opposed to individual counseling for the
940. No. 90-A-1495, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1990).
941. FAMiLY VIOLENCE PROJECt, supra note 687, at 50.
942. Id.
943. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 102.
944. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 44.
945. ORLOFF & KLE N, supra note 26, at 105.
946. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b)(7) (1993).
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batterer." 7
Case law supports the position that the court can appropriately
refuse to order a mental examination of the petitioner who received
the protection order.4 The best type of treatment program must fo-
cus only on the batterer and not on the victim or the relationship.
The victim can be encouraged to seek treatment and support if this is
done outside of the courtroom and away from the batterer. Several
state statutes authorize court orders that allow or assist petitioners in
obtaining counseling or treatment through a civil protection order.49
Treatment in these cases is not mandatory for the petitioner; instead,
the civil protection order provides a mechanism that assists the victim
in accessing free or low-cost counselling programs.'
10. Custody and Visitation Issues
Custody questions arise in a variety of domestic violence con-
texts and court cases. An overview of policy concerns, research find-
ings, and court cases which link custody and domestic violence is
relevant in all domestic violence cases whether questions arise in a
civil protection order, divorce, custody, or criminal case. Case law
decided in the divorce context regarding domestic violence and custo-
dy can be useful in a civil protection order proceeding. Similarly,
court decisions in civil protection order and custody cases can be
instructive to criminal court judges fashioning pre-trial release orders.
The D.C. Gender Bias Task Force found that dramatic change is
needed in the way judges view custody, visitation, and support issues
in domestic violence and civil protection order cases:
Issues of custody, visitation and support are not viewed as
947. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, app. H at 20.
948. See, e.g., Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (refusing to order
mental examination of civil protection order petitioner).
949. See, e.g.. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5754 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 949(a)(10) (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.1 (West 1985 & Supp.
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(9) (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.750(l)(g) (Michie Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136.A(4) (West 1982);
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(10) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01.6(6) (West
1990 & Supp. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(l)(f) (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4(b)(5) (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4d (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(f) (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 60.4(E) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1.A.5 (Michie 1992).
950. Judicial authorities recommend that communications between shelter workers, domes-
tic violence counselors, victim advocates, and battered women be afforded privilege. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 216.
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peripheral to resolving domestic violence. Their resolution may be
as important as traditional "stay away" orders, since disputes over
custody and visitation can trigger violence, and lack of financial
resources may lead a victim of violence to return to the batterer.
Therefore, the Task Force recommends that the Superior Court
evaluate its practices to address this apparent failure of the system
to utilize regularly critical provisions in the Intrafamily Act.9 '
Congress demonstrated widespread bi-partisan support for court
recognition of the strong link between spouse abuse and child abuse
in making child custody determinations when both houses unanimous-
ly passed House Concurrent Resolution 172 in October of 1990.952
This concurrent resolution calls on all jurisdictions to require that
judges take testimony about violence in the home in all custody cas-
es, and to adopt a presumption against awarding custody of minor
children to batterers.953 This bill incorporates the sense of Congress
that batterers should not be rewarded for their behavior by awarding
them custody of their children, and recognizes the interrelated nature
of domestic violence and child custody.9' The bill's sponsor, Con-
gresswoman Constance Morella from Maryland, who has taken the
lead on many issues affecting battered women, explained:
Battering is socially learned behavior. Witnessing domestic violence,
as a child, has been identified as the most common risk factor for
becoming a batterer in adulthood .... But, this cycle can only be
broken when there is a recognized consequence for these ac-
tions. 5'
The text of House Concurrent Resolution 172 includes the fol-
lowing recommendations:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the
Senate concurring) it is the sense of the Congress that, for purposes
of determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of
a spouse should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental
to the child to be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.9'
951. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 143.
952. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 5183 (1990).
953. Id.
954. Id.
955. 135 CONG. REC. H4030 (daily ed. July 20, 1990) (statement of Rep. Morella).
956. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 5183 (1990). The remainder
of the text summarizes conclusions about domestic violence and custody:
Whereas State courts have often failed to recognize the detrimental effects of hav-
ing as a custodial parent an individual who physically abuses his or her spouse,
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The findings and recommendations of the National Council of Juve-
nile and Family Court Judges also emphasize the need for judges
hearing custody and visitation cases to take evidence of domestic
violence in custody cases and weigh that evidence in favor of the
non-abusive parent:
[F]amily violence is a factor the court must consider in all legal
decisions relating to the family and especially custody and visita-
tion.957
If victims of family violence have children in common with
their batterers, courts often must adjudicate the matter of custody
and visitation when issuing protection orders and dissolutions.
Courts have sometimes failed to evaluate and provide for children
who have lived in abusive homes, and such failure can have tragic
insofar as the courts do not hear or weigh evidence of domestic violence in child
custody litigation;
Whereas there is an alarming bias against battered spouses in contemporary child
custody trends such as joint custody and mandatory mediation;
Whereas joint custody guarantees the batterer continued access and control over the
battered spouse's life through their children;
Whereas joint custody forced upon hostile parents can create a dangerous psycho-
logical environment for a child;
Whereas a batterer's violence toward an estranged spouse often escalates during or
after a divorce, placing both the abused spouse and children at risk through shared
custody arrangements and unsupervised visitation;
Whereas physical abuse of a spouse is relevant to child abuse in child custody dis-
putes;
Whereas the effects of physical abuse of a spouse on children include actual and
potential emotional and physical harm, the negative effects of exposure to an inap-
propriate role model, and the potential for future harm where contact with the
batterer continues;
Whereas children are emotionally traumatized by witnessing physical abuse of a
parent;
Whereas children often become targets of physical abuse themselves or are injured
when they attempt to intervene on behalf of a parent;
Whereas even children who do not directly witness spousal abuse are affected by
the climate of violence in their homes and experience shock, fear, guilt, longlasting
impairment of self-esteem, and impairment of developmental and socialization skills;
Whereas research into the intergenerational aspects of domestic violence reveals that
violent tendencies may be passed on from one generation to the next;
Whereas witnessing an aggressive parent as a role model may communicate to
children that violence is an acceptable tool for resolving marital conflict; and
Whereas few States have recognized the interrelated nature of child custody and
battering and have enacted legislation that allows or requires courts to consider
evidence of physical abuse of a spouse in child custody cases.
Id.; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 401.
957. FAMILY VIOLENCE PRIojECr, supra note 687, at 9.
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consequences for those children. If they have not been, state statutes
should be amended to require that spouse abuse be a significant
factor in consideration of custody awards. Where joint custody or
unsupervised visitation is sought and there is evidence of family
violence, the statute should require investigation of the violence and
forensic custody evaluations by professionals specially skilled in
such assessments. State legislators and judges must understand the
propensity for continued violence and the impact of the violence on
the children. If there is a recent history of violence, offenders
should be ordered to successfully complete treatment specifically for
the violence, and for substance abuse if necessary, before custody or
unsupervised visitation is awarded.9'
• . . Civil protective orders should remove the offender from
the home and allow the victim and children to remain with appro-
priate protection, safety plans, and support.959
It is extremely important that children not be removed from
their home .... Judges should ensure that necessary services are
provided, and that adequate safety plans are in place for both the
victimized spouse and the children . ... '
.. When the issue of family violence is found to exist in
the context of a dissolution of marriage, domestic relations case of
any kind, or in a juvenile case:
a) The violent conduct should be weighed and considered in
making custody and visitation orders;
b) Judges should be aware that there may be an unequal bal-
ance of power or bargaining capability between the parties which
calls for a more careful review of the custody and financial agreem
[sic] before they are approved by the court;
c) Judges should not presume that joint custody is in the
best interest of the children."'
Family violence is a significant factor which must be consid-
ered when deciding custody and visitation matters. Without treat-
ment, the propensity for continued violence remains after the di-
vorce or separation and frequently recurs during unsupervised visita-
tion or joint custody. Court orders which force victims to share
custody with their abusers place both victims and children in dan-
ger. Further, there is near unanimity that violence in the home has a
powerful negative effect on children. Continued aggression and
violence between divorced spouses with joint custody has the most
958. Id. (citations omitted).
959. Id. at 24.
960. Id.
961. Id. at 26.
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adverse consequences for children of any custody option. The long-
term effect is intergenerational transmission of abuse, with such
children becoming either victims of abuse or abusers as adults. In
the shorter term, emotional and physical problems will frequently
lead to poor school performance, running away and juvenile delin-
quency.'
... Recent studies have found a 60-70% correlation between
spouse and child abuse. 3 Growing up in a home where family
violence is occurring is in itself a form of child abuse. Children in
these homes suffer from low self-esteem, poor school attendance,
poor social skills, delinquency, hyperactivity, nightmares, bed-wet-
ting, violent behaviors and drug/alcohol abuse. They are far more
likely to have serious emotional and psychological problems and to
become abusers and victims of violence as adults.'
Supervised visitation programs, which can ensure the safety of
victims of spousal abuse and their children, should be available to
all persons, regardless of their income.' If, after a thorough in-
vestigation and forensic custody evaluation, the court does order...
unsupervised visitation, then there is an obligation to ensure mea-
sures are taken to protect those at risk.'
Determination of custody and visitation of children are ways in
which batterers frequently continue their harassment and other abuse.
Because of his control and her fear, the battered spouse may agree
to custody provisions which are not really desirable for herself or
the children. Alternatively, the battered spouse may trade financial
support or equitable distribution of assets for more protective custo-
dy or visitation. Judges should be sensitive to these dynamics and
carefully review custody agreements when there is evidence of
family violence.'
962. Id. "Known family violence should also receive significant consideration in delin-
quency hearings." Id. at 53 n.47. Children from abusive homes are at a higher risk to be-
come adjudicated as delinquent. Lenore E. Walker, Eliminating Sexism to End Battering Rela-
tionships. Paper Presented at the American Psychological Association 2-3 (1984).
963. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
964. Id.
965. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJET supra note 687. at 26. "The Creative Visitation Pro-
gram designed by the YWCA of San Diego is a successful example of such a program." Id.
at 53 n.48.





i. Statutory Trend Towards Creating a Presumption
Against Awarding Custody to Batterers
Forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico au-
thorize an award of temporary custody of the children in a civil pro-
tection order.' Social science research clearly supports a presump-
tion against awarding custody to batterers. Studies consistently reveal
that there is a high coincidence of spousal and child abuse.' The
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee found that the most serious child
abuse cases which result in emergency room treatment are merely
* extensions of assaults directed against the child's mother."O Another
968. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(4) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25:35.010(b)(5) (1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(3) (Michie 1993); CAL. FAm. CODE § 5650(b) (West 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(2)(d) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b)
(West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(5) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1005(c)(6) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-13-4(a)(4) (1991 & Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5 (1985 & Supp. 1993);
IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(a) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(d) (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(4) (Supp.
1993); Ky. REV. STAT ANN. § 403.750(1) (Michie Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2136(A)(3) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(l)(E) (West 1981 &
Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 209A, § 3(d) (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950(1)(c) (West
1986); MINN. STAT ANN. § 518B:.01.6(a)(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-15(1)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455-050.3(1) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.030.1(d) (Michie 1986); N.H. RE'. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(b)(2) (1990); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(1 1) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5A(2) (Michie 1989
& Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. 50B-3(a)(4) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.C
(1981 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(d) (Anderson 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107-716(2)(a) (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(4) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 8, § 621(a) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1)(c) (1988 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. §36-3-606(4) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a)(3)
(1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(c) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-6 (1992 & Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105(b)(1) (1988); see also MODEL CODE,
supra note 15, § 306(2)(g) (authorizing a court to "[girant temporary custody of any minor
children to the petitioner" without notice and a hearing in a protection order). But see Polin
v. Cosio, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the court has no jurisdiction
under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to award temporary custody where the parties to
the protection order are two sisters and where the minor is not the child of both parties to
the protection order).
969. Studies have found that wife beaters abused children in 70% of abusive homes
where children are present. NATIONAL WOMAN ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT, UNDERSTANDING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FACT SHEETS 3 (1989); Bowker et al., supra note 800, at 162; Walker
et al., supra note 800, at 1.
970. Women and Violence. supra note 789, at 142.
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study by the Boston Children's Hospital Child abuse program reveals
that seventy percent of severely abused children in their program also
had mothers who are battered."7 Several other national studies
found that in seventy percent of families where the woman is bat-
tered, children are battered as well.972 Where there is child abuse
concurrent with spouse abuse, seventy percent of the child abuse is
committed by men.973 Many batterers use abuse of children as a
weapon to control battered women.974 "Children in homes where do-
mestic violence occurs are physically abused or seriously neglected at
a rate of 1500% higher that the national average in the general popu-
lation. 975 Batterers, in addition to being more likely to purposefully
injure their children, also frequently inadvertently injure children
while throwing furniture or other household objects at the battered
spouse.976 Children of abused women are also often injured acci-
dentally when they intervene to try to protect their mothers.9'
971. WILLIAM M. HOLMES, POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT
FOR BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 16 (1988).
972. See FAMILY VIOLENCE COALITION, BROKEN BODIES AND BROKEN SPIRITS: FAMILY
VIOLENCE IN MARYLAND AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 2 (1991); NATIONAL WOMAN
ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT, supra note 969, at 3. Boston City Hospital found a 60% corre-
lation between abused children and battered women. Linda McKibben, et al., Victimization of
Mothers of Abused Children: A Controlled Study, 84 PEDIATRICS 531 (1989); see also
FREDERIC J. COWAN, AT'rORNEY GENERAL, ADULT ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION: A
MEDICAL PROTOCOL FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND COMMUNrY AGENCIES 39 (1991)
(stating that between 45-60% of all spouse abuse cases eventually involve physical and/or
sexual abuse to children as well); Barbara Hart, Remarks from the Task Force on Child
Abuse and Neglect (1992).
973. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 27-28 (based on data from the National
Center for Child Abuse and Neglect). "The most serious cases of child abuse resulting in
emergency room treatment are merely extensions of battering rampages launched against the
child's mother, with 70% of the serious injuries to children and 80% of fatal injuries are
inflicted by men." Women and Violence, supra note 789, at 142.
974. Physical assaults on the children may be one of the weapons used by the batterer
against the victim (e.g., child physically injured when thrown in the vehicle, child abused as
a way to coerce the victim to do certain things). Thirty-three percent of battered women in a
Seattle shelter cite physical attacks against the children as the reason for fleeing to the shel-
ter. Sometimes the children are injured accidentally when the batterer is assaulting the victim
(e.g., infant injured when mother was thrown while holding the child, small child injured
when attempting to stop the batterer's attack on the victim). FINAL REPORT OF THE WASH-
INGTON STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE 7 (1991); see also Ganley, supra note 21,
at 48-50.
975. NATIONAL WOMEN ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT, supra note 969, at 1 (1987); Ford,
supra note 800. at 3.
976. ROY, supra note 800, at 89-90.
977. Ganley, supra note 21, at 49; see, e.g., State v. Sallet, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS
787 (Minn. CL App. Aug. 3, 1993).
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Social science research strongly confirms that spousal abuse has
profoundly negative affects on a child's mental and physical well-
being.97 Children who witness violence between parents often suffer
emotional trauma,979 which results in behavioral and emotional prob-
lems ranging from depression and withdrawal to violence toward
others and suicide." Studies also reveal that children from abusive
homes repeat patterns of abuse.98' One study showed that eighty-one
percent of abusive husbands and thirty-three percent of abused wives
came from violent families." Another study reveals that "sons of
the most violent parents have a rate of wife-beating 1,000% greater
than that of sons from non-violent parents.""9 3 Moreover, the devas-
tating effect of family abuse on young persons' lives is clearly re-
vealed in a study which found that sixty-three percent of young men
between the ages of eleven and twenty serving time in prison for
homicide in this country are doing so for killing their mother's
batterer.M
Consequently, state civil protection order statutes and custody
statutes have been moving toward supporting a presumption against
awarding custody to a batterer where there is evidence of abuse.
Illinois, Missouri, and New Jersey's civil protection order statutes,
adopting a view preferred by Congress9 and the National Council
of Juvenile and Family Court Judges," create a presumption of
awarding custody to the non-abusive parent.' Pennsylvania's civil
978. MURRAY A. STRAUSS E AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 112-14 (1980) [hereinafter BEHIND CLOSED DOORS]; see also MODEL CODE, supra
note 15, § 402.
979. Id. at 102.
980. JAFFE ET AL., supra note 800, at 49; Goodman & Rosenberg, The Child Witness to
Family Violence: Clinical and Legal Considerations, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 100, 102 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed.,
1987); Alan Rosenbaum & K. Daniel O'Leary, Children: The Unintended Victims of Marital
Violence, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 692, 693 (1981).
981. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 978. at 112-14.
982. Rosenbaum & O'Leary, supra note 980, at 693.
983. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 978, at 101.
984. Battered Women and Child Custody Litigation: Hearings on H.R. 89 Before the
House Judiciary Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 164 (1992) (testimony of Judge Rosalyn Bell, Maryland Court of Special Appeals).
985. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 5183 (1990).
986. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687. at 8 (suggesting that state statutes
should be amended to require that family violence be a factor in consideration of custody
awards).
987. 750 ILCS 5/602(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.050(5)
(Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(11) (West 1992).
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protection order statute specifically provides that the respondent may
not receive custody if he abused the children.98 A Pennsylvania
court may also impose conditions on a custody award necessary to
assure the safety of the petitioner and child.99 In Minnesota and
New Mexico, the civil protection order statute gives primary consider-
ation to the victim and the children's safety in the placement deci-
sion.'
State custody statutes, independent of domestic violence codes,
also address abuse issues.991 Nine state custody codes articulate a
rebuttable presumption against joint or sole custody to, or unsuper-
vised visitation with, an abusive parent. 2
The newly enacted Louisiana statute?" is particularly specific
and innovative. The statute not only creates a rebuttable presumption
against joint or sole custody to a batterer, it also awards only super-
vised visitation, and then only on the condition that the abusive par-
ent participates in a treatment program specifically designed for do-
mestic violence offenders.' Other state custody statutes make do-
mestic violence a factor that must be considered as a factor in the
best interest of the child determination when courts make custody
awards. 9 5
988. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(4) (1991).
989. Id.
990. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993) ("[A]ward temporary cus-
tody or establish temporary visitation with regard to minor children of the parties on a basis
which gives primary consideration to the safety of the victim and the children."); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-5A(2) (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1993) ('[A]ward temporary custody of any chil-
dren involved when appropriate and provide for visitation rights . . . on a basis that gives
primary consideration to the safety of the victim and the children.").
991. See Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and
Recommendations, 43 Jtv. & FAM. Cr. J. 17 (1992).
992. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(m) (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A), (C) (West Supp.
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-05-22.3 (1992). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West Supp. 1994); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 14.021(h) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(2)
& (3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b) (West 1993); WYO.
STAT. § 20-2-113(b) (1977); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 401.
993. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 9:364(A), (C).
994. Id.
995. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332-B (1991
& Supp. 1993); CAL. Ctv. CODE § 4608(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(m) (West 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(9) (1986 & Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 5/602(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214.5K-1 (West Supp. 1992); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025(a)(12)
(West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.5 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
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As the study undertaken by the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges concludes: "collectively the codes appear to
create a new legal principle; to wit, the existence of domestic vio-
lence in a family militates against an award of joint legal or physical
custody and against an award of sole custody or unsupervised visita-
tion to the abusive parent."'
These statutes recognize that domestic abuse poses a danger for
children, and attempt to counter an alarming trend-fifty-nine percent
of abusive men and fathers who use violence to gain custody are
successful in court.' Gender bias reports from states across the
country are consistently finding that judges routinely ignore the issue
of domestic violence in custody disputes, or dismiss as insubstantial
the impact of parental violence on children in the household."' This
is partially due to the lack of judicial education about domestic issues
that would allow judges to better recognize power and control tactics
and the cycles of violence.' In some cases, these results are also
due to bad lawyering by attorneys who are not schooled in the dy-
namics of domestic violence and who encourage clients to trade pro-
212()(f) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480.4(c) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:17(II)(c) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-06.2(1)6) (1991 & Supp. 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303(a) (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(g) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1993);
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)(i) (West 1993).
996. Hart, supra note 991, at 31; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 401, 403.
997. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45 (1991); Gender Bias in Court-Determined Custody,
MICH. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE NEWSL (Mich. Coalition Against Domestic
Violence), Feb. 1989, at 4.
998. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 247, 255-57. The Maryland Gender Bias Report found
that only 50% of judicial officers are willing to take into account domestic violence when
making custody determinations. MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 33 (1989). The Gender Bias Task Force in the
District of Columbia found that less than half of all judges take into account violence by the
father against the mother when making custody determinations. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note
213, at 183.
999. Persons who are not trained to recognize the dynamics of domestic violence may be
easily lulled by men who batter their wives who often do not come across to those outside
the family as abusive individuals. Often, the abusive man maintains a public image as a
friendly, caring person who is a devoted "family man." David Adams, Identifying the Assaul-
tive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge, 33 BOSTON BJ. 23, 23 (1989). Many batterers
effectively use this suave exterior to maintain continued control over their victims and chil-
dren by successful manipulation of the court process. As a result, batterers' rates of success
in obtaining custody of their children at a contested custody trial may be somewhat higher
than non-batterers, whose success rates ranges from 38%-63%. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Child
Custody Decisions: Exploring the Myth That Mothers Always Win, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
235, 236-37 (1982).
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tection for money or accept settlements that include some protection
if the battered woman agrees not to present testimony about the vio-
lence in the divorce proceeding.'Ot
North Dakota case law addresses the issue of what evidence is
sufficient to overcome a statutory presumption against awarding custo-
dy to a batterer. In Schestler v. Schestler,rol the court ruled that
the statutory presumption against custody to an abusive parent was
rebutted and awarded custody to the father, who had physically
abused the mother during the marriage." 2 The court found that an
adverse relationship existed between the children and their step sib-
lings, and therefore questioned the children's safety in the mother's
home. °3 Additionally, the court found that the father never direct-
ed violence toward the children, the father had a more stable home
environment, the children felt more affection toward the father than
toward the mother, and the father's relatives would assist in child
care.'W
ii. Importance of Addressing Custody in Civil Protection
Order Cases
The D.C. Gender Bias Task Force studied judicial behavior, bias,
and outcome in all civil protection order cases in the District of Co-
lumbia in 1989."°° The findings were shocking. Specifically, in cas-
es where the parties had a child in common, custody was ordered in
less than half (47.9%) the cases," 6 and child support was ordered
in only 4.9% of the cases with a custody order." 7 In the most se-
verely violent cases, when a civil protection order was issued, the
1000. Such agreements effectively bar the presentation of evidence about violence on the
issue of custody and the best interests of the child. To avoid these problems, it is very im-
portant that battered women secure representation by counsel that is familiar with and has
handled domestic violence cases. This domestic violence counsel may be retained in addition
to traditional family law counsel that may have more expertise in handling monetary and
property issues. One way to locate experienced domestic violence counsel is to call the local
battered women's shelter or crisis line and ask for the names of attorneys who provide pro
bono assistance to women at low-income levels. These attorneys usually have extensive do-
mestic violence experience.
1001. 486 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1992).
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 512.
1004. Id. at 512.
1005. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213.
1006. Id. at 147.
1007. Id. at 148.
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likelihood that judges would order custody was even less." Cus-
tody was not determined in 70.8% of the assault cases, 73.7% of
cases of assault with a deadly weapon, nor was it determined in
81.8% of the cases involving rape or a sexual offense. t"9 In addi-
tion, judges were most likely to order reasonable rights of visitation,
which requires unsupervised communication between the abuser and
his victim, where the underlying offense was assault with a deadly
weapon."10 The report also reveals that there is a high correlation
between ineffective custody and visitation provisions and contempt of
the court order.' Even in cases where custody is awarded, con-
tempt of court orders involving visitation provisions which allow
contact between the parties invariably occur at a higher rate than any
other form of contempt violation.' 2 In most cases where the abus-
er was found in contempt, the court amended reasonable visitation
provisions to provide for structured or supervised visitation."' 3
Appellate courts consistently uphold awards of temporary custody
to a petitioner in protection order proceedings.0 4 The reason for
1008. Id. at 11 app. H.
1009. Id. at 10-11 app. H.
1010. Id. at II app. H.
1011. Id.
1012. Id.
1013. Id. at 153; Battered Women and Child Custody Litigation: Hearings on H.R. 89
Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1992) (testimony of Leslye E. Orloff).
1014. Kavolkowski v. Capps, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2681 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 13,
1993) (granting plaintiff mother ex parte restraining order and temporary child custody order
against defendant father in proceeding where mother alleged father had physically abused her
and her children); Crippen v. Crippen, 610 So. 2d 686 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (granting wife
temporary sole custody of children in domestic violence injunction where temporary injunction
was later extended with custody provision in place); in re Marriage of Rodriguez, 545 N.E.2d
731 (111. 1989); In re Marriage of Alexander, 623 N.E.2d 921 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (awarding
petitioner temporary custody of couple's minor child in ex parte protection order issued when
the petitioner filed for divorce); Rigwald v. Rigwald. 423 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(awarding temporary custody to petitioner in a temporary protection order where judicial
authorities assured the court that an adjudication of child custody in another proceeding was
imminent); Sweep v. Sweep, 358 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding custody of
the child to the parents of the deceased natural mother in the stepmother's domestic abuse
proceeding against the father where the maternal grandparents were likely to prevail in a
subsequent custody action); Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (awarding
custody to petitioner in a renewed civil protection order); Smart v. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 135
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding temporary custody for petitioner in temporary protection
order). But see Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 504 A.2d 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (reversing a
permanent custody and visitation order against respondent because the court stated that the
Protection from Abuse Act was not meant to establish procedures for awarding permanent
custody, but rather only temporary custody and visitation rights).
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this approach was articulated in Campbell v. Campbell,"1 5 a visita-
tion case where the court noted the harmful impact spousal abuse has
on the children. 16 The Campbell court concluded that the children
"like their mother, had reasonable cause to believe that they were
about to become the victims of an act of domestic violence. Surely,
fear that a custodial parent will be assaulted or battered by a non-
custodial parent constitutes an act of domestic violence as to their
child.'
1017
Case law also confirms that custody does not revert to the prior
abusive custodian when the civil protection order expires, but rather
should remain with the petitioner unless and until the court issues a
new order modifying the original civil protection order custody award.
In Sparks v. Sparks,.1 . the court held that custody awarded to the
husband petitioner in a civil protection order, issued after his wife
attempted to kill him, did not automatically revert back to the wife
under the prior custody provisions contained in the parties' divorce
decree.0 9 The court based its decision on the fact that the wife
never alleged her fitness or her husband's unfitness to have custody,
even though the civil protection order had expired. 20
iii. Domestic Violence as a Factor in Custody Decisions
A number of state custody statutes make domestic violence a
factor in the best interest of the child determination for the purpose
of making custody awards.' In the vast majority of reported deci-
sions, courts consider domestic violence to be a significant factor in
1015. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. App. 1991).
1016. Id. at 126.
1017. Id. at 126-27 (citation omitted).
1018. 747 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
1019. Jd. at 193.
1020. Id.
1021. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332-B (1991
& Supp. 1993); CAL. Cirv. CODE § 4608(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(m) (West 1989); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(9) (1986 & Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 5/602(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214.5K-I (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025(a)(12)
(West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.5 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
212(1)(f) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480.4(c) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:17(El)(c) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-06.2(11j) (1991 & Supp. 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303(a) (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(g) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1993);




custody determinations. Courts have held that spousal abuse is very
relevant to the best interests of the child determination," 2 and that
domestic violence is a factor in determining parental fitness."
1022. Kim v. Kim, 256 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it determined that child's best interests were served by award-
ing custody to mother where father admitted to physically and sexually abusing child, and
shot mother three times and left her paralyzed); Williams v. Williams, 432 N.E.2d 375 (Ill.
App. 1982) (awarding custody to mother where the father's brutal beating of mother was
relevant to the best interest of the child determination, regardless of the child's knowledge of
the violence, and holding that violence or the threat of violence directed against the child or
another is a factor in the best interests of the child determination, even if the child did not
witness the violence); Bruscato v. Bruscato, 593 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing
award of sole custody to a batterer where the trial court failed to consider domestic violence
in its best interest of the child determination); In re Marriage of Houtchens, 760 P.2d 71
(Mont. 1988) (awarding sole custody to the mother based on evidence that the father had
physically abused the mother because evidence of abuse of a parent is relevant when deter-
mining the best interests of the child); Malcolm v. Malcolm, 640 P.2d 450 (Mont. 1982)
(upholding determination that it would not be in children's best interests for the father to
have custody, even though the father was found a fit and loving parent, where the children
were afraid of the father after witnessing his abuse of the mother); Reynolds v. Green, 439
N.W.2d 486 (Neb. 1989) (affirming trial court's order of custody to mother because the best
interest of the child would not be served if custody was awarded to the father where the
father battered the mother and used marijuana); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (reversing and remanding custody award to husband in part because the trial
court impermissibly attempted to justify the husband's rape and battery of wife which left her
unconscious, and where the appellate court held that all of these findings of fact were rele-
vant to the best interests of the child); Venable v. Venable, 342 S.E.2d 646 (Va. Ct. App.
1986) (upholding trial court's order awarding custody to the mother because the best interest
of the child would not be served by awarding custody to the father where the father was
violent toward the mother); Bertram v. Kilian, 394 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (hold-
ing that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded custody to the father after refus-
ing to hear evidence of the father's violence towards his wife, because evidence of domestic
violence affects the best interests of the child).
1023. Odom v. Odom, 606 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding sole custody to the
mother and finding the father an unfit parent in light of his long history of domestic abuse
against his former wife); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 802 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (uphold-
ing an award of custody to mother, noting that the father's physical abuse of the mother was
one factor which reflected negatively on his ability to serve as a custodial parent); Sparks v.
Sparks, 747 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (awarding custody of children to husband in
civil protection order where wife attempted to murder husband); Campbell v. Campbell, 685
S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding trial court's finding that the father was an unfit
parent where he had adulterous relationship of which the child was aware, had an uncontrol-
lable temper, and admitted to physically abusing the mother); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 379
S.E.2d 93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing custody from natural father to natural mother
based on changed circumstances, where the father's second wife testified that the father was
violent toward her and the child); Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(considering father's six physical assaults on the mother in finding him unfit, and awarding
custody to the mother); Kenneth B. v. Elmer Jimmy S., 399 S.E.2d 192 (W. Va. 1990) (ter-
minating the parental rights of a father who beat and then murdered the mother because
spousal abuse is a factor in determining parental fitness); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W.,
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Higher courts have reversed custody awards to batterers where
the trial court refused to hear or made light of evidence of spousal
abuse."24 In Bertram v. Kilian,"0 z the appeals court held that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody to the father
when it refused to hear evidence of the father's abuse of the mother.
The court concluded that the state custody statute:
[R]equires the trial court to consider evidence tending to show that
a spouse seeking custody has a violent character or has abused the
other, whether or not it has been shown that their children have
been affected. Parental violence and abuse affect "the interaction
and interrelationship of the child" with the parent and may affect
the mental and physical health of the children. The violent and
abusive spouse may have the same potential as a parent. Weighing
the risk of actual future violence or abuse may be difficult but it is
necessary to the custody determination. Because the trial court failed
to consider evidence bearing on [the interaction and interrelationship
between parent and child] it abused its discretion.'0
26
In Marchant i Marchant,'" the appeals court reversed a cus-
tody award to a batterer where the trial court tried to justify the
husband's rape and battery of his wife."'2 The court held that such
violent acts were clearly relevant to a best interests of the child deter-
mination. 29 The court noted that evidence that the defendant beat
the plaintiff to unconsciousness and forced her to have sex shortly
after she had surgery supported a finding of the defendant's cruel-
ty."'O° The court concluded that, "[w]hile the findings attempt to ex-
cuse or justify defendant's assault on plaintiff, neither this Court nor
any other court can excuse or justify or approve intrafamily violence
or spouse abuse. An assault is equally serious and equally criminal
whether committed between family members or between strang-
356 S.E.2d 464 (WV. Va. 1987) (holding that batterer's murder of wife renders him an unfit
parent because spousal abuse is a recognized factor in determining parental fitness). But see
In re Welfare of P.L.C., 384 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing custody award to
maternal grandparents, and according a presumption of parental fitness to father in child cus-
tody dispute against grandparents, even though trial court established that the father physically
abused children's mother).
1024. See, e.g., Moore v. Trevino, 612 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1025. 394 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
1026. Id. at 774.
1027. 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
1028. Id. at 203-04.
1029. Id.
1030. Id. at 203.
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ers."' The court further noted that the "most serious aspect of
this problem is the proven tendency of family violence to be passed
down to successive generations. While children may not be immediate
victims, they certainly are the victims and perpetrators of such vio-
lence in the future."'
0 32
Courts should also consider evidence of spousal abuse even
where abuse was not directed against the children. 33 In the case of
In re Marriage of Wiley, 3" the court held that the trial court may
consider the husband's verbal and physical abuse of the mother in its
custody determination even though there was no evidence that he
abused the children.' 35  In Williams v. Williams,"°  the court
ruled that even where a child was too young to comprehend the
father's brutal attack on the mother, the trial court properly consid-
ered the violence in its custody decision.' 37 Finally, in A.F. v.
A.F.,'°a the court specifically held that domestic violence, when it
occurs in the presence of the child, directly relates to the parties'
parenting and custodial abilities.' 39
Domestic violence may also be a factor in permitting a battered
woman to move out of the jurisdiction with her children." In
Gruber v. Gruber, 4' the court held that a battered woman could
move away from the state to escape her isolation and poor standard
of living to be with her family in Illinois.
A few cases have granted custody to a batterer, but these deci-
sions fly in the face of the analysis in the majority of cases. For
example, in Lutgen v. Lutgen," 2 the court refused to reverse, as an
abuse of discretion, the trial court's award of custody to a batterer
who choked his wife to death while their children were present in the
house.11 3 This decision, however, is contrary to a line of cases in
1031. Id. at 203-04.
1032. Id. at 204.
1033. Zuccaro v. Zuccaro. 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1750 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 16.
1993) (awarding abused spouse sole custody with supervised visitation where batterer's vio-
lence led to break-up of the marriage).
1034. 556 N.E.2d 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
1035. Id. at 813-14.
1036. 432 N.E.2d 375 (111. App. Ct. 1982).
1037. Id. at 377.
1038. 549 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
1039. Id. at 514.
1040. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 402.
1041. 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
1042. 532 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
1043. Id. at 986. But see Dschaak v. Dschaak. 479 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1992) (awarding
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
other jurisdictions which have terminated parental rights where one
parent murdered the child's other parent.1t 4
iv. Domestic Violence Victims Are not Unfit Parents
Case law rejects the notion that formerly battered spouses are
unfit parents. Indeed, in Lewelling v. Lewelling,t°45 the court held
that "evidence that a parent is a victim of spousal abuse, by itself, is
no evidence that awarding custody to that parent would significantly
impair the child."'" The court concluded that a contrary holding
"could only deter battered spouses from reporting their suffering lest
they lose their children."'" 7 The court further noted that its ruling
was consistent with the state's recently enacted custody code provi-
sion, which creates a custody preference for the non-abusive
parent. ' The court emphasized that in a custody dispute:
[E]vidence of spousal abuse [is] to be considered only as a factor
that weighs heavily against the abusive parent; such evidence does
not weigh against the abused. As the abuser cannot take advantage
of his acts of abuse in a custody battle with the abused, so the
abuser's parents also may not benefit from that abuse. While ex-
pressing continued concern for the best interest of the child, the
Legislature has also determined that removing a child from a parent
simply because she has suffered physical abuse at the hands of her
spouse is not in the best interest of our state.""'9
The court in Rapp v. Dimino,' where the battered woman's
child was put in the custody of the batterer father amidst a relief
custody to the father after minimizing the abuse against the mother, which the court de-
scribed as only controlling and verbally abusive).
1044. T.V.N. v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 586 So. 2d 227 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)
(terminating parental rights where child firmly believed his father murdered his mother and
testified as such, even though the father was acquitted); In re Sean H., 586 A.2d 1171
(Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (terminating parental rights where batterer stabbed mother to death in
front of the children); Kenneth B. v. Elmer James S., 399 S.E.2d 192 (W. Va. 1990) (up-
holding termination of parental rights of father who murdered the children's mother); Nancy
Viola R. v. Randolph W., 356 S.E.2d 464 (WV. Va. 1987) (terminating parental rights where
batterer plead guilty to murdering mother). For further discussion, see infra notes 2295-301
and accompanying text.
1045. 796 S.W.2d 164 (rex. 1990).
1046. Id. at 167.
1047. Id.
1048. Id. at 168.
1049. Ud
1050. 19 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1459-60 (Vt. July 2, 1993).
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from abuse hearing, held that the trial court had overreached its au-
thority. The court also stated that a non-abusive spouse should not
have to risk losing custody to seek relief under the act, and that
holding otherwise would deter victims from seeking the court's pro-
tection."'e
v. Dangers of Joint Custody Where Domestic Violence
Exists
Judicial authorities strongly urge against the award of joint custo-
dy in custody disputes where domestic violence is an issue. A Joint
Resolution unanimously passed by the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate noted that "joint custody guarantees the
batterer continued access and control over the battered spouse's life
through their children . . . .""' The National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges further points out that continued access is
the batterer's opportunity to harass and otherwise abuse the other
parent,' ° 3 and warns that "[c]ourt orders which force victims to
share custody with their abusers place both victims and children in
danger.", "'
Consequently, in order to protect the abused party, a number of
courts have refused to award joint custody to batterers in both civil
protection order and custody cases. In Ellibee v. Ellibee, °E3 the
court awarded sole custody in a protection order to the petitioner
mother after the father severely spanked his son, leaving visible bruis-
es, even though the father previously had joint custody °5 A series
of custody cases also reflect the courts' growing realization that joint
custody is inappropriate in domestic violence cases. In In re Marriage
of Houtchens,"'57 the Supreme Court of Montana awarded sole cus-
tody to the mother based on evidence that the father had physically
1051. Id. The court relied upon the expedited nature of the relief from abuse hearings and
the lack of procedural safeguards that made such hearings unsuitable places for custody deter-
minations. As previously demonstrated, however, when abuse of a parent becomes apparent in
an abuse hearing, the great likelihood is that the children are in danger of abuse. Placing the
children in the custody of the non-abusive parent during such hearings is therefore advisable.
1052. H. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
1053. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECr, supra note 687, at 25; see also MODEL CODE, supra
note 15, § 401.
1054. Id.
1055. 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1991).
1056. Id. at 467-68.
1057. 760 P.2d 71 (Mont. 1988).
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abused her.I"'s The court held that evidence that a child's parent is
abused is relevant to the best interests of that child. 59 Therefore,
the court would consider such evidence in awarding sole custody in a
divorce proceeding. t" The court further found that the mother's
fear of the father, which in turn interfered with her ability to commu-
nicate with him was sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor
of joint custody." 1 In several custody cases, courts have ruled
against joint custody in light of significant antagonism between the
parties which included allegations of physical abuse."° 2
1058. Id. at 72-73.
1059. Id.
1060. Id.
1061. Id.; see also Jon N. v. Fred N., 224 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (placing
child with social services due to violence between parents, and later placing child in the
home of mother in a different county from father, since social services believed that in-
creased distance was in the child and parent's best interests).
1062. Ouellette v. Ouellette, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2339 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 9,
1993) (holding that joint custody is not a viable solution in divorce agreement where the
marriage had a history of violence, restraining orders, calls to the police, and loud argu-
ments); In re Marriage of Heilmann, 771 P.2d 948 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the father's request for joint custody
and awarded custody to the mother where there was a history of violence by the father and
threats to take the mother's life); Rolde v. Rolde, 425 N.E.2d 388, 405 (Mass. App. Ct.
1981) (upholding the trial court's award of sole custody of children to the mother even
though the father requested joint custody because "joint custody or shared responsibility is an
invitation to continued warfare and conflict"); In re Marriage of Goostree, 790 S.W.2d 266
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying joint
custody where joint custody requires that parents "agree to agree" and evidence that parents
are prepared to deal with each other as equal partners, and where there was evidence of
disagreements, strained relations, and different attitudes about child rearing); Brisco v. Brisco,
713 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (considering mother's claims of physical abuse by her
husband as one of many factors weighing against an award of joint custody); Blake v. Blake,
483 N.Y.S.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding joint custody inappropriate given history of
antagonism between the parties, which included mother taking refuge in a battered woman's
shelter); Bolick v. Bolick, 376 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that given the par-
ties attitudes towards each other and the mother's claim of physical abuse, joint custody is
clearly inappropriate). But see Dempster v. Dempster, 809 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding joint custody despite evidence of domestic violence by the father where the chil-
dren expressed considerable preference for the father, and the court found that the parties
could agree on several major decisions about the children); Garner v. Garner, 773 S.W.2d
245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding trial court's award of joint custody even though both
parties alleged cruel and inhuman treatment).
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vi. Remarrying Abuser and Battered Women Who Are
Substance Abusers
Case law reveals that when a domestic violence victim returns to
or becomes newly involved with a batterer, she risks losing custody
of her children. Her relationship with the batterer may constitute a
change of circumstances which is sufficient for the court to reverse a
custody award. In Kimmel v. Kimmel,"° 3 the court awarded a child
protective services agency custody of a battered woman's son for
ultimate placement with the child's natural father where the mother
ignored a civil protection order, allowed the batterer back into her
house, and left her son alone in his care, thereby placing the child's
health in jeopardy." In Wenzel v. Wenzel," the court reversed
a divorce custody award to the mother, based on changed circum-
stances where the child had a very real and understandable fear of his
mother's boyfriend, who had severely beaten the mother." Addi-
tionally, in Giesler v. Giesler,"° 7 the court upheld a custody award
to a paternal aunt and uncle, where the mother demonstrated an in-
ability to cope with the demands of parenthood, and where she mar-
ried a physically abusive boyfriend who the court described as de-
structive, hostile, and morally unfit to be a step-parent."° The
court noted that the boyfriend's visitation with his children from prior
relationships was subject to supervised visitation."
While an abuse victim may lose custody of her child because of
1063. 392 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
1064. 14 at 906-07.
1065. 469 N.W.2d 156 (N.D. 1991).
1066. I at 157; see also Grigley v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 625
So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (awarding custody to child services instead of the
battered woman because of domestic violence); Bier v. Sherrard, 623 P.2d 550 (Mont. 1981)
(reversing custody from the mother to the father where the mother moved in with her ex-
brother-in-law, who beat her, and where trial court found that father was a better parent and
provided a more stable environment); J.M. v. D.M., 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 371 (Neb. CL
App. Sept. 7, 1993) (terminating battered woman's parental rights because she would not
leave her batterer and would not protect her children). But see Burdette v. Adkins, 406
S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1991) (reversing trial court's decision to award custody to father where
mother moved back in with her abusive second husband because the court had found that the
child was well adjusted, happy, and bonded to her mother).
1067. 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
1068. Id. at 61; see also In re J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (terminating
mother's parental rights where she was involved in domestic violence and where evidence
showed that counseling was ineffective in helping her avoid domestic violence). See infra
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her involvement with a batterer, courts will often return custody once
she terminates the relationship. For example, in Wanamaker v.
Scott,0 70 the court returned custody of the parties' daughter to the
mother, who had initially lost custody because of her second marriage
to a batterer, after she divorced her abusive second husband.t'
It is difficult for battered women who are also substance abusers
to secure custody of their children in domestic violence proceedings.
Many women who abuse substances suffer abuse at the hands of their
intimate partners."~ This group of women need protection from do-
mestic abuse as much as any other battered women. However, for this
group of women, it may be advisable to first seek non-legal assis-
tance, including shelter and benefits."t° 3 At the same time, she
should be immediately referred to a substance abuse treatment pro-
gram.
If battered women who are substance abusers go to court to seek
protection before they have begun to address their problem of sub-
stance abuse, they are at grave risk of losing custody of their children
in civil protection order, custody, or divorce proceedings. Courts have
been reticent to award custody to battered women who are also sub-
stance abusers. 74
1070. 788 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1990).
1071. Id. at 713; see also Dillard v. Dillard, 859 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (return-
ing custody to mother when she married a non-abusive spouse and left boyfriend who abused
son).
1072. Thirty-two percent of women who abuse substances also have a history of abusive
or violent relationships. Surveys of substance abuse programs reveal that two-thirds of sub-
stance abuse programs also offer counseling for domestic violence and sexual abuse. Howev-
er, in many programs these services are not helpful to women because they are delivered in
groups where men are present. SHELLY GEHSHAN, A STEP TOWARD RECOVERY: IMPROVING
ACCESS TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING WOMEN 2, 13,
16 (1993).
1073. It is important for attorneys and domestic violence advocates to incorporate questions
about substance abuse into intake interviews so as to identify clients who need special help
with substance abuse issues. Advocates should explain the reasons why this information is
being asked to all persons interviewed, to encourage clients to be honest about these prob-
lems.
1074. See M.B.P. v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 586 So. 2d 24 (Ala. Civ. App.
1991) (terminating parental rights of mother who had a history of abusive relationships and
substance abuse); Jennifer R. v. Shannon M., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(awarding custody of children to father rather than battered woman with substance abuse
problem); In re J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (terminating parental rights of
mother who had a history of abusive relationships and substance abuse); DJ.S. v. Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 563 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (terminating
parental rights of father who had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse); In re
J.W.D., 458 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (terminating both parents' rights where father
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vii. Custody and Visitation Requests from Domestic
Violence Perpetrator's Parents, Other Relatives, and
Abusive Step Parents
Courts sensitive to the intricacies of domestic violence have not
allowed the batterer's parents or other relatives to seek custody or
visitation of the children against the wishes of the abused party.
There are different rationales behind disallowing relatives of the
batterer custody visitation. In Lewelling v. Lewelling,"'t s the court
held that evidence that the mother was a victim of spousal abuse did
not justify awarding custody to paternal grandparents.""m 6 Men who
abuse their wives were often abused or witnessed domestic violence
as children.)" In Hughes v. Hughes,' the court denied visita-
tion to a paternal grandmother where the court found that the
grandmother's visitation request did not arise from a "bona fide inter-
est in maintaining a beneficial relationship with the child but rather
from an effort to disrupt the mother's relationship with the
child."1 'm9 Finally, arrangements which encourage frequent contact
with the batterer's family members, who may be closely connected to
the batterer, could subject the victim to continued physical or mental
abuse. This contact cannot only lead to contact with the abuser him-
had a substance abuse problem and the couple had a history of separation and reunification);
C.D.C. v. J.R.C., 455 N.W.2d 801 (Neb. 1990) (terminating parental rights of both parents
where father abused substances and mother stayed in relationship with him); West Virginia
Dep't of Human Serv. v. Tammy B., 376 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1988) (terminating parental
rights of mother who had a history of abusive relationships and abusing substances). Mentally
ill women who are battered by their husbands run the same risk of losing custody as those
who abuse substances, and their cases should be treated similarly. See, e.g., McCarty v.
McCarty, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 282 (Neb. Ct. App. June 15, 1993).
1075. 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990).
1076. Id. at 167.
1077. Since violence is a learned behavior, witnessing violence in the home as a child can
have profound effects on the child's adult life. In one study, battering was reported to have
been present in 67% of battered women's childhood homes, 81% of batterers', and only 24%
of non-batterers' homes. This finding supports the conclusion that violence is learned behav-
ior. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 4, at 19 (stating that child and adult victims of abuse are
more likely to commit violent acts outside the family that those not abused); Gerald T.
Hotaling et al., Intrafamily Violence and Crime and Violence Outside the Family, in FAMILY
VIoLENCE 315-76 (Lloyd Ohlin and Michael Tonry eds., 1989). Abused children are arrested
by the police four times as often than non-abused children. R. GELLES & M.A. STRAUS,
IN'IMATE VIOLENCE (1988).
1078. 463 A.2d 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
1079. Id. at 480; see also Cavanaugh v. McCourt, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 106 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1993) (denying visitation to maternal grandmother and aunt because visita-
tion was not in the child's best interests, based on evidence of a family history which in-
cluded substance abuse and domestic violence).
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self, but can be a traumatizing and constant reminder of the abuser.
Courts have also denied visitation to a non-parent batterer in a
civil protection order case. In Cooper v. Merkel," the court denied
an appeal of a protection order which failed to grant visitation to a
batterer who had lived with the mother for seven years, but who had
never adopted her child."' The court held that at common law, a
non-parent has no right to visitation with a minor child, and therefore,
absent statutory authorization, the court lacked authority to order a
non-parent visitation." 2
viii. U.C.C.J.A./P.K.P.A. and Interstate Flight to Avoid
Continued Abuse
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (the "U.C.C.J.A.")
provides a set of rules regarding jurisdiction over custody matters that
has been adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.' 3
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (the "P.K.P.A.") was estab-
lished by Congress to address the problem of parental kidnapping,
and provides, most importantly, that a parent who has lost custody or
who has snatched the children and fled out of state cannot obtain a
conflicting custody order based on the child's presence in the new
state." 4 The purpose of both acts is to limit forum-shopping in
child custody cases, and to encourage states to respect, defer to, and
enforce custody orders issued by other states.' In determining
whether and when a certain state may exercise jurisdiction in custody
cases, the U.C.C.J.A. looks at the child's home state, the child's con-
nections with a state, whether the child is in an emergency situation,
and whether the state for some reason is the only forum
available." 6 In passing the P.K.P.A., Congress determined that
home state jurisdiction must take precedence over all other jurisdic-
tional bases set out in the U.C.C.J.A., including significant connection
with the jurisdiction."6 7 Thus, given that the P.K.P.A. is a federal
1080. 470 N.W.2d 253 (S.D. 1991).
1081. Id. at 254.
1082. Id.
1083. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 123-331 (1988).
1084. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).
1085. See Brenda v. Brenda, 565 A.2d 1121, 1123 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
1086. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 3, 9 U.L.A. 266 (1988).
1087. Specifically, one problem which arises in domestic violence cases involving interstate
custody issues is the U.C.CJ.A.'s pleading requirements, which require disclosure of the
parties' addresses. This requirement may expose victims of abuse to further violence. To
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statute and the U.C.C.J.A. is a state statute, home state custody de-
crees are supreme over other decrees issued under the authority of
other jurisdictions.
The emergency provisions of the P.K.P.A. and the U.C.C.J.A. are
especially important in custody cases in which domestic violence is
an issue. Child abduction occurs at alarming rates. More than forty
children are abducted every hour in the United States."1 8 Fully for-
ty-one percent of all abductions by family members occur between
the parents' separation and divorce." Another forty-one percent
occur when the parents have been separated or divorced for longer
than two years." ° Authorities often fail to recognize the strong
connection between domestic violence and child abduction. One study
found that when a child was abducted, over 50% of the underlying
relationships had a history of domestic violence."8 ' Over seventy
percent of all child kidnappers are fathers or their agents." Re-
search further reveals that over half of abductions occur in the con-
text of domestic violence,"'~3 and seventy-seven percent of the ab-
ductors snatched the children out of a desire to hurt the other par-
ent."1 It is important for courts to be made aware of the connec-
tion between spousal abuse and child abduction so that court orders
in civil protection order, divorce, child custody, and criminal cases
can help deter the ongoing risk of child snatching in families with a
history of domestic violence.
The level of child abduction among batterers also requires that
courts carefully scrutinize compliance with the U.C.C.J.A. notice
address this concern, trial courts often allow domestic violence victims to plead generally the
county or general area of residence. This provides sufficient information so that the court
may determine whether jurisdiction is proper under the U.C.CJ.A. An exact address is not
necessary or required. When the court requires disclosure of the exact address, petitioners are
allowed to provide the court with such information under seal. In such cases, the information
is available only to the judge, and is not available to the opposing party or the opposing
party's attorney.
1088. See Stephanie Mann & M.C. Blakeman, Protect Your Child From Abduction,
CONSUMERS' RESEARCH MAGAZINE, Feb. 1994, at 33.
1089. DAVID FNKELEOR Er AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY,
AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA: FIRST REPORT: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS:
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDIES 104-05 (1990).
1090. Id.
1091. Child Abduction Studied; Domestic Violence Implicated in Child Abductions. THE
WOMEN'S ADVOCATE, May 1992, at 3.
1092. FINKELHOR ET AL, supra note 1089, at 103.
1093. Barbara Hart, Remarks from The Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect (1992).
1094. Child Abduction Studied; Domestic Violence Implicated in Child Abductions. supra
note 1091, at 3.
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requirements in all cases where custody determinations are requested
without the presence of both parents. When batterers come to court
seeking custody and the victim is not present at the hearing, courts
should not routinely award custody to the batterer. Instead, the courts
should make efforts to locate the absent abused party, notify her of
the proceedings, and determine her interest in the action. This protec-
tion is important because it helps prevent children from being used by
batterers to control their victims, a practice that often occurs when
other avenues of control are closed off."° 5 This approach will help
prevent abducting batterers from obtaining legal custody orders
against victims who have escaped to a shelter in order to flee the
violence.
1095. Battering men use custodial access to children as a tool to terrorize battered women
or to retaliate for separation. 54% of child abductions in the United States related to short
term manipulations around custody orders. 46% involve concealing the whereabouts of the
child or taking the child out of state. Hart, supra note 1093.
Dr. Anne Ganley describes how batterers will use children to continue control over
battered women. Perpetrators will sometimes physically or sexually abuse children in addition
to abusing their intimate partners. They will often intentionally or unintentionally physically
injure children during their attacks on the adult victim. They will assault the abused adult in
front of the children. Others will use children to coercively control the adult victim. Other
tactics include:
a. Isolating the child along with the abused parent . . .
b. Engaging the children in the abuse of the other parent (making the child
participate in the physical or emotional assaults against the adult).
C. Threats of violence against children, pets or other loved objects . . .
d. Interrogating the children about the mother's activities; forcing the abused
parent to always be accompanied by a child or children; taking the child away
after each violent episode to ensure that the abused party will not flee the abuser;,
etc.
e. Forcing children to watch the abuse against the victim.
Some perpetrators use the children as pawns to control the abused party after the
abused party and the perpetrator are separated.
a. . . . the intent is to continue the abuse of the victims, with little regard for
the damage of this controlling behavior to the children . . .
b. Using lengthy custody battles as a way to continue abusing the other par-
ent.
C. Holding children hostage or abducting the children in efforts to punish the
abused party or to gain the abused party's compliance.
d. Some visitation periods become nightmares for the children either because
of physical abuse by the perpetrator or because of the psychological abuse that
results from the abuser interrogating the children about the activities of the vic-
tim ...
e. Insisting that the children take care of all perpetrators' emotional needs or
expecting unlimited visitation or access by telephone in order to avoid being alone.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 48-50.
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In addition, there may be situations in which a battered woman
must flee her home state because she feels that she and/or her child
are in danger of being severely harmed. By fleeing with the child,
she may violate her home state's custody order which gives the
batterer visitation rights with respect to the child." Fleeing the
state where the violence continues to occur may be the only way in
which a victim of abuse can survive the violence to which she is
being subjected in her home. Flight, which often occurs when all
other attempts at stopping the abuse have failed, should not be pun-
ished in these circumstances. Courts should be sensitive to the reasons
for the flight and should not punish the victim by denying her custo-
dy. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges rec-
ommends that "[i]f a parent is absent or relocates because of an act
of domestic or family violence by the other parent, the absence or
relocation is not a factor that weighs against the parent in determining
custody or visitation."'"
Some courts have refused to modify prior custody awards to an
abused party when that party flees from domestic abuse while taking
the children in violation of a pre-existing court order. In Desmond v.
Desmond,'98 the court held that the father was not entitled to cus-
tody of the children based on the mother's flight from the state with
the children where he had repeatedly and severely beaten her, and
where her out of state home was the only place which provided her
with a strong familial support system.'099 In A.F. v. N.F.,I the
court denied an award of sole custody to a batterer after the mother
interfered with the father's visitation when she moved from New
York to Massachusetts.""0 The court held that a party's interference
with visitation does not always mean that party is an unfit custodial
parent where, as here, the mother moved shortly after the father broke
into her residence and assaulted her, and where she had obtained a
protection order, and where the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services substantiated the child's allegations of sexual abuse against
1096. In order to avoid being criminally charged under state law for parental kidnapping,
a battered woman should follow required procedures when fleeing with her children. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1993). Many states specify situations in which action that
would otherwise be prohibited will not be subject to parental kidnappping charges. See. e.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1023(a) (Supp. 1988).
1097. MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 402(3).
1098. 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fain. Ct. 1986).
1099. Id. at 982-83.
1100. 549 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
1101. Id. at 512.
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her father." 2 Moreover, where a battered spouse flees in violation
of an existing court custody order, the flight state may exercise emer-
gency jurisdiction and award temporary custody to an abused spouse
pending a permanent order."' 3
In cases where battered women flee prior to the entry of any
custody determination, courts routinely reverse custody awards made
to their batterers in the battered woman's absence. In Odom v.
Odom," '  a case in which a battered woman fled from her home
with her children, the court invalidated an ex parte custody order to
the batterer when there was no notice to the battered woman, who
had fled to a shelter."' 5 In Desmond v. Desmond,"1°6 the court
held that the mother's one out-of-state move with the children did not
by itself entitle the father to custody of the children, where the moth-
er had been repeatedly and severely abused by the father, and where
her selection of an out-of-state city as a new home for her and her
children was the only site which provided her with a strong, familial
support network to assist her in creating a new and tranquil environ-
ment for the children and herself."0 7 The court concluded that the
mother
was completely justified in escaping from the marital home with the
children to protect their respective safety and best interests, that [the
1102, Id. at 514-15.
1103. Hanke v. Hanke, 615 A.2d 1205, 1209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). The court re-
versed the trial court's transfer of custody from the mother to the father, apparently to punish
the mother for moving to Kentucky after which no visitation took place, finding that:
Where the evidence is such that a parent is justified in believing that the other
parent is sexually abusing the child, it is inconceivable that the parent will surren-
der the child to the abusing parent without stringent safeguards. The fact that the
judge does not agree with the parent's fear is immaterial. This is not a case in
which there is no basis for the mother's belief. Past behavior is the best predictor
of future behavior.
Id.; Garza v. Hamey, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the trial court
properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction over the daughter where mother fled from
Mexico to Texas with her children in violation of a Mexican court custody order because her
husband abused her and her daughter, but not over the son since no abuse against him was
alleged); In re Custody of Thorensen, 730 P.2d 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the
trial court properly refused to enforce the out-of-state order where the mother did not receive
notice and thus was denied the opportunity to be heard, and that the trial court properly
maintained jurisdiction where the child had lived in the state for the past two years and
where the mother fled the father's home state out of fear for her safety).
1104. 606 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
1105. Id. at 869.
1106. 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
1107. Id. at 982-83.
1993]
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mother] had more than reasonable cause to be frightened by taking
up residence locally after the proven history of [the husband's]
abuse; and that [the father's] abusive acts substantially worsened the
strife to which the children-to their detriment-were repeatedly ex-
posed ... ..0
The court further stated that its holding is intended "to signal the ac-
ceptance by this court of the view that severely and/or repeatedly
abused parents ought not to be penalized, in the context of a custody-
visitation case, for seeking refuge out of the easy reach of their op-
pressors.""' In Bruscato v. Avant,'"' a case in which a battered
woman fled to a shelter with her child and lost custody to her
batterer because she could not be located to be informed about the
hearing, the court reversed and remanded the custody case, noting
that escaping domestic violence may mitigate the flight by the abused
parent.I'I
Pursuant to the emergency provisions of the U.C.C.J.A., courts in
the state to which a domestic violence victim flees may exercise
emergency jurisdiction over a child custody matter." 2 These states
1108. Id. at 982.
1109. Id. at 982-83.
1110. 593 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
1111. Id. at 838; see also Farrell v. Farrell, 351 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that the U.C.CJ.A. is extended to the international sphere, and that the trial court
properly assumed jurisdiction based on the best interests of the child where the mother fled
with the children from Ireland to Michigan away from her abusive husband because the
U.C.CJ.A. does not require the court to respect the Ireland court's award of custody to the
batterer where the Irish court did not provide the mother with reasonable notice and opportu-
nity to be heard). But see Er parte Lee. 445 So. 2d 287 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
where mother fled with children from Texas to Alabama to escape abuse, the P.K.P.A. re-
quires the Alabama court to respect the Texas court's custody award to the batterer where
that suit was filed first and the abuse victim was given reasonable notice and opportunity to
be heard); People v. Griffith, 620 N.E.2d 1130 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the domes-
tic violence was too remote in time to serve as a defense to criminal child abduction charg-
es).
1112. See, e.g., Kimmel v. Kimmel, 392 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in acting quickly to protect the child when faced
with an emergency situation which placed the child's health, safety, and welfare in jeopardy
even though the court might not have strictly adhered to statutory procedure); Curtis v.
Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990) (holding that Mississippi has no power under the Protec-
tion from Abuse Act to issue a custody order that is inconsistent with the U.C.C.J.A. and the
P.K.P.A., and that the chancery court could exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction only as
long as an emergency lasted where petitioner father kidnapped his children and brought them
to Mississippi from Utah and sought permanent custody, alleging that his wife substantially
abused and neglected them); Benda v. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (stating that where prior custody litigation was pending in another jurisdiction, the state
to which the custodial mother fled could assume emergency jurisdiction under the U.C.CJ.A.
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can be asked to temporarily amend existing custody orders which
give the batterer visitation rights, so that the victim can remain in the
state of refuge with her children until she is out of danger." 3
In Cole v. Superior Court, "" the court reversed the trial
court's denial of emergency jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. where
the mother fled with the couple's children and her daughter from
Arizona to California, alleging that the father physically and emotion-
ally abused her and the older step-daughter." 5 The appeals court
specifically held that where a father's violence against the mother and
his step-child forces the mother to flee with all the couple's children,
an emergency exists as to all the couple's children, sufficient to trig-
ger the U.C.C.J.A. emergency jurisdiction."16 The court noted that
when the mother of two young children is forced from the family
home because the husband abuses her and her daughter of another
marriage, the situation may also have great potential for the abuse
and serious traumatization of her younger children by him. Not only
are they deprived, by his conduct, of their mother's care and love,
but they are left in the care of one demonstrably capable of abusive
to issue temporary custody under a civil protection order to preserve the status quo; but if
after conferring with the judge in the original state the courts determined that permanent
litigation should occur there, permanent custody could not be awarded in the domestic vio-
lence action); Zappitello v. Moses, 458 N.W.2d 784 (S.D. 1990) (holding that in cases in-
volving allegations of domestic abuse in interstate custody disputes, the U.C.CJ.A. jurisdic-
tional requirements must be satisfied before South Dakota courts may exercise jurisdiction
over the custody issues including visitation rights); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.
CL App. 1987) (holding that the trial court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdic-
tion over the daughter where mother fled from Mexico to Texas with her children in viola-
tion of a Mexican court's custody order because her husband abused her and her daughter,
but jurisdiction was not proper over the son since no abuse was alleged against him). But
see Ex parte Lee, 445 So. 2d 287 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that, where battered woman
fled with her children from Texas to Alabama, under the P.K.P.A. the Alabama court must
respect the Texas court's custody award to the batterer since that suit was filed first and the
abuse victim was given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard); Archambault v.
Arehambault, 555 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1990) (determining that when a child is in one state
and is danger of sexual abuse in another, if the state where the danger exists has jurisdiction
under the P.K.P.A., the other state may not assume jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. but may
communicate its concerns to the state that has jurisdiction); Danna v. Danna, 364 S.E.2d 694
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the lower court correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to the U.C.C.J.A., as there was insufficient evidence of an emergency where the
wife fled from Florida to North Carolina with children to escape domestic violence, and suit
was brought regarding a visitation dispute and attempted modification of the custody decree).
1113. See, e.g., Kimmel, 392 N.W.2d at 908; Benda, 565 A.2d at 1124.
1114. 218 Cal. Rptr. 905 (Ct. App. 1985).
1115. Id.
1116. Id. at 908.
19931
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behavior in some familial situations." 7
The court concluded that "the situation ... is tantamount to an emer-
gency respecting the younger children also, possibly justifying [the
mother's] removal of them and certainly negating any finding that she
has 'unclean hands' because she took them away..''... In Coleman
v. Coleman," 9 the court held that Nebraska, the state to which a
battered woman fled to be in a "safe haven" with her family, could
exercise emergency jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A., even though
Minnesota was the children's home state."20
Permanent modifications of the custody order, however, must
occur in the original state, unless after the state courts confer, the
original state declines jurisdiction, passing it to the flight state."
2t
However, where the home state's decision awarding a batterer custody
does not comport with the U.C.C.J.A.'s requirement of a best interest
of the child analysis, the flight state need not recognize, defer to, or
enforce the home state's order."2
These courts have recognized that domestic abuse can leave a
victim with no other choice but to flee the home with the children
and take up residency alone or with family members or friends in
another state."' They have realized that an order which gives a
batterer custody and visitation rights must not be used to keep the
victim in the vicinity of the batterer and subject to continuing danger.
In evaluating a batterer's objections to a petitioner's move, it is im-
1117. Id.
1118. Id.; see also Crippen v. Crippen, 610 So. 2d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating
that the U.C.C.J.A. permits courts to decide custody matters when necessary to protect the
child, and here, since the wife alleged domestic violence, the court was able to decide the
issue).
1119. 493 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
1120. Id.
1121. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cline, 433 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Curtis v.
Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990); Benda v. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989); Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
1122. See, e.g., Bull v. Bull, 311 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the
trial court was not required to recognize and enforce a Georgia custody award to batterer
where the Georgia court's award was based solely on mother's denial of father's visitation
rights, and gave no consideration of the best interests of the child as required under the
U.C.C.J.A.). But see Hernandez v. Collura, 493 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1985) (refusing to
exercise emergency jurisdiction over the mother who had moved to New York from Connect-
icut, and finding that she gained actual custody through deception and made only vague and
insufficient allegations of abuse where she called father and asked him to bring the child for
a visit and then initiated a temporary protection order against father on behalf of herself and
child in the New York court).
1123. See, e.g., Benda, 565 A.2d at 1124.
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portant that courts attempt to discern whether the respondent may be
objecting to the move because he wants continued access to his vic-
tim. 4 The U.C.C.J.A. and the P.K.P.A. must be interpreted by
courts in a manner that will protect abused women and their children
by allowing emergency jurisdiction in the flight state. To determine
the most appropriate forum to enter the permanent custody order,
competing courts should confer with each other and determine which
court should make the final custody award based on the facts of each
particular case. Such a conference should include a discussion of
which state will provide the safest jurisdiction for the child.
b. Custody Orders and Child Abduction
i. In the United States
Child abduction is not an uncommon action that batterer's may
take in retaliation when their victim turns to the court for protec-
tion."' In In re Marriage of D'Attomo,12 6  a non-custodial
batterer attempted to punish his victim for separating from him and
going to court to obtain a protection order, by abducting their
child. 1 7  The husband violated an order of protection-which
barred him from removing the parties' child from the jurisdiction of
the court or from concealing him-by absconding with his son during
the course of divorce proceedings and concealing the child for more
than two years."2 1 The husband was found in indirect criminal con-
tempt of court by the circuit court.1129 This case illustrates the criti-
cal need for custody orders, within and separate from protection or-
ders, to address the issue of child abduction.
Some state statutes respond to this need and specifically autho-
rize courts to add provisions to their ex parte custody orders aimed at
preventing the type of child abduction that occurred in the D'Attomo
case."" Including custody provisions in all temporary and civil pro-
1124. ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 43.
1125. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 43, 50.
1126. 570 N.E.2d 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
1127. Id. at 798.
1128. Id. at 797.
1129. The appellate court held that removing and concealing a child in violation of a
custody order constitutes the same offense as child abduction for which the father had been
prosecuted; thus, holding the father in criminal contempt constituted double jeopardy. Id. at
800-02.
1130. CAL. FAm. CODE § 2030 (West 1992) (providing that a court can order parties not
to remove children from the jurisdiction); IDAHO CODE § 39-360-8(l)(c) (1993) (same); 750
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tection orders can help deter child abduction. It also triggers a more
effective police response to child snatching. When a child is snatched
in violation of a court order, the abducting parent can be more easily
prosecuted under state parental kidnapping statutes. Such provisions
also serve to hold violating parties accountable for their criminal
actions.
ii. International Child Abduction
There is no clear established policy regarding jurisdiction when a
victim of domestic violence flees with her children to the United
States in order to escape the abuse in another country.".' American
courts have held that where a victim of abuse flees from a foreign
country to a jurisdiction in the United States, the U.C.C.J.A. provi-
sions apply." 2 In international child abduction cases, courts will
employ the same analysis used in interstate custody cases."33 They
will generally assume emergency jurisdiction and will then determine
the validity of the original court order from the foreign country to see
if it meets U.C.C.J.A. notice and hearing requirements."' The court
with the temporary jurisdiction should assume the burden of protect-
ing the family until danger in the state or country from which they
have fled has ended."3 If the court order issued in the country
from which the victim fled does not meet U.C.C.J.A. standards, the
U.S. court need not recognize and enforce it and may proceed if it
has U.C.C.J.A. jurisdiction to issue its own permanent custody or-
der.' 36 This approach ensures that the victim not be penalized for
ILCS 60/214(b)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (preventing concealment of the child); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2)(d) (1993) (providing that a court can order parties not to remove
children from the jurisdiction); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(1)(c) (West Supp. 1993)
(same).
1131. See, e.g., Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (stating that emergen-
cy jurisdiction is alleged but not found under Hague Convention standards).
1132. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 351 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Garza v.
Hamey, 726 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
1133. See, e.g., Farrell, 351 N.W.2d at 219 (assuming jurisdiction under the U.C.CJ.A.
where mother left abusive father in Ireland and brought the children to Michigan); Garza,
726 S.W.2d at 198 (holding that, in cases of domestic abuse and child abuse, Texas is bound
by U.C.CJ.A. to uphold Mexico decree, but can grant short term emergency relief until steps
can be taken to protect the child).
1134. See, e.g., Garza, 726 S.W.2d at 200-01.
1135. See, e.g., id. at 200-02.
1136. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 351 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
the U.C.CJ.A. is extended to the international sphere, and that the trial court properly as-
sumed jurisdiction based on the best interests of the child where the mother fled with the
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the step she may have been forced to take to protect herself and her
children.
Domestic violence cases also lead to international child abduction
and removal of children of battered women from the United States.
Among children abducted in the United States, 31.8% are known or
believed to have been taken outside of the United States, most fre-
quently to Germany, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
3 7
Civil protection orders can be used to help prevent this. Under the
catch all provisions in state civil protection order statutes, courts can
order batterers to sign a statement, which is also signed by the victim
and the judge, that asks the embassies in relevant countries not to
issue a visa to the parties' U.S. citizen children absent a court or-
der.'
38
On July 1, 1988, the United States became a member country of
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction which acts as a weapon against problems of international
child abductions. The Federal International Child Abduction Remedy
Act 39 sets forth the requirements for bringing a convention case in
the United States. It addresses questions of jurisdiction, burden of
proof, costs, fees, admissibility of documents, and locating and assist-
ing an abducted child in the United States. Judges and advocates
must be familiar with the convention and its procedures which take
precedence in cases where they are applicable. In these instances, the
convention's procedures do not preclude use of the U.C.C.J.A. and
the P.K.P.A., both of which may provide additional or complimentary
remedies."'
children from Ireland to Michigan away from her abusive husband, because the U.C.CJ.A.
does not require the court to respect the Ireland court's award of custody to the batterer
where the Irish court did not provide the mother with reasonable notice and an opportunity
to be heard).
1137. Child Abduction Studied; Domestic Violence Implicated in Child Abductions, supra
note 1091, at 3.
1138. For discussion, a sample letter, and court order, see ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note
26, at 8.
1139. 42 U.S.C. § 11601.
1140. For a detailed discussion, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTIONS: A GUIDE TO APPLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION. FAMILY LAW SECTION 1-2





Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia authorize courts
to include temporary visitation provisions in a civil protection or-
der."4' Many state civil protection order statutes and the courts
have sought to address the risks posed to abuse victims and their
children by unsupervised visitation in domestic violence cases."42
Consequently, ten state civil protection order statutes authorize a court
to order supervised or otherwise restricted visitation if more liberal
visitation poses a danger to the petitioner or the children."43 Six
states and the District of Columbia mandate that courts must give
primary consideration to the safety of the victim and children when
awarding visitation in a protection order."' The District of Colum-
1141. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(4) (1989); ARK. STAT. CODE § 9-15-205(3) (Michie 1993);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 5513 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(2)(d)(I)
(West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(7) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(7)(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-5.5 (Supp. 1992); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.5.2.d (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(4) (Supp. 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136(A)(3) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19, § 766.1.E
(Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(7) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209C, § 15 (West 1987); MINN. STAT ANN. § 518B:01(6)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(3)(1) (Supp.
1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(2)(a) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:4()(b)(3) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-5A(2) (Supp. 1993); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1056.1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 50B-3(a)(4) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(c) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(d) (Anderson Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 107-718(1)(a)
(1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(4) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(1)
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(3) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-606(a)(4) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(3) (West 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-6-6(2)(g)(ii) (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 1103(d) (1989); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105(b)(i) (1988); see also MODEL
CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1142. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 405, 406 (requiring the creation of
visitation centers "to allow court ordered visitation in a manner that protects the safety of all
family members," and setting out what they must provide).
1143. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5513 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(5)
(Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2.d
(West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(7) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.2(a) (Michie
1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1103(d) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra
note 15, §§ 306, 402.
1144. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(7) (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2.d (West Supp.
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bia statute states that a court may "provide for visitation rights with
appropriate restrictions to protect the safety of the complainant.""' 4
Six state civil protection order statutes allow visitation in accordance
with the best interests of the child."' Illinois mandates a rebuttable
presumption of supervised visitation when the court finds abuse." 7
The Iowa civil protection order statute states that a court may affir-
matively investigate the need to modify an existing custody or visita-
tion order."48
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
strongly urges that in cases where domestic violence exists, the court
should weigh and consider the violent conduct when entering both
custody and visitation orders."49 The Council found "the propensity
for continued violence remains after the divorce or separation and
frequently recurs during unsupervised visitation or joint custody."
' 150
Similarly, the National Institute of Justice study concluded that "no-
where is the potential for renewed violence greater than during visita-
tion."',t
5 1
Judicial authorities strongly support supervised visitation as the
preferred method of visitation in domestic violence cases, to reduce
the risk of further violence between the parties. 52 The National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommend that unsu-
pervised visitation should not be allowed where there is evidence of
family violence until after professionals have fully completed a foren-
sic custody evaluation, and the batterer has successfully completed a
domestic violence treatment program and, if warranted, a substance
1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(7) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01.6(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(b)(3) (1990); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(2) (Michie
Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 402.
1145. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(7) (1989).
1146. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5513 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(2)(d)(III) (West Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.1.E (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT.' ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.050(3)(1) (Supp. 1993).
1147. 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) ("If a court finds, after a hearing,
that respondent has committed abuse of a minor child . . . there shall be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that awarding physical care to respondent would not be in the child's best inter-
est.").
1148. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2.d (West Supp. 1993).
1149. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECt, supra note 687, at 25.
1150. Id.
1151. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 43.
1152. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 19-20; see also MODEL CODE, supra




The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
strongly urges the establishment of supervised visitation programs in
every jurisdiction to ensure the safety of the domestic violence victim
and her children, which would be available to persons regardless of
income."' The Minnesota Legislature has approved state funding
for children's safety centers to offer visitation with a batterer at a
neutral site.""5
Despite these recommendations, many trial courts are still unwill-
ing to enter orders providing for supervised visitation in civil protec-
tion order cases." 5 6 Some courts have, however, appropriately re-
stricted visitation."57 In Campbell v. Campbell,"' the court in a
civil protection order case awarded a protection order to a wife who
petitioned to stay her husband's visitation rights with the children be-
cause of her fear of domestic violence based on the husband's prior
violent behavior and arrest for sexual battery of the parties' three year
old daughter." 9 The court concluded that "[s]urely, fear that a cus-
todial parent will be assaulted or battered by a noncustodial parent
constitutes an act of domestic violence as to their child." ''  In
Desmond v. Desmond,' in considering emergency jurisdiction un-
der the U.C.C.J.A., the court similarly concluded "[i]t can hardly be
convincingly argued that repeated acts of physical terror and forced
sex over a number of years, commingled with emotional abuse (much
of which was seen or heard by the children) are to be disregarded
when contemplating the degree and quality of [the abuser's] future
access to his children.""' 62
1153. Id.; ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 51; see also NI CPO STUDY, supra note
19, at 43-44.
1154. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 19-20.
1155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256F.09(1) (West 1992); cf. H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,
title XL (1993).
1156. For example, in Minnesota, less than half of all judges report that they are willing
to order supervised visitation of children in civil protection order cases. MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, GENDER FAIRNESS REPORT,
reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 825, 879 (1989); see also Czapanskiy, supra note
23, at 256.
1157. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McCoy, 625 N.E.2d 883 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (finding
that abuse of custodial parent provides sufficient basis to restrict visitation with children).
1158. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1159. Id.
1160. Id. at 127.
1161. 509 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (Farn. Ct. 1986).
1162. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Klister, 777 P.2d 272 (Kan. 1989) (allowing the
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Courts that have a clear understanding of the danger posed by
unsupervised visitation when domestic violence is an issue award
supervised visitation in both civil protection order and custody cases.
Courts will impose supervised visitation as part of a protection or-
der.""b3 The court in Hall v. Hall held that a court may suspend
visitation in a protection order even where the petitioner does not
allege abuse directed toward the children."" In that case, the court
suspended visitation where the husband made verbal threats in the
context of past abuse, and where a social worker recommended super-
vised visitation in light of the respondent's volatile behavior and
chemical dependency." 5 The court reasoned that the petitioner's
fear of imminent physical harm or assault was sufficient to warrant
supervised visitation to avoid the risk of further violence."' In
Cosme v. Figueroa,167 the court ordered that a father have super-
vised visitation as part of a temporary protection order pending the
outcome of a risk assessment."' The court concluded that the
defendant's admission to the assault on the petitioner and "the pres-
ence of their child in the middle of this dispute, warrants the order of
a risk assessment.""' 69 In Eichenberg v. Eichenberg,"7 the court
upheld the trial court's suspension of the respondent's visitation rights
until a guardian ad litem had an opportunity to investigate and make
mother to present evidence of the father's alleged alcohol abuse, violent temper, sexual abuse
of another daughter, and physical abuse of second wife where father sought unsupervised,
overnight visitation with daughters).
1163. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
1164. Id. at 629.
1165. Id.
1166. Id. at 628-29; see also In re M.D.. 602 A.2d 109. However, some courts have been
unwilling to totally suspend visitation rights. In Katz v. Katz, 467 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div.
1983), the court held that denial of visitation rights to a natural parent is a drastic remedy
which courts should only order for compelling reasons and with substantial evidence that such
visitation is "inimical to the welfare of the children." Id. at 224.
1167. 609 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
1168. Id. at 528.
1169. Id. at 527. But see Tung v. Oshima, No. C2-90-387, 1990 WL 146595 (Minn. CL
App. Oct. 9. 1990) (refusing to overturn as a clear abuse of discretion the trial court's deci-
sion to issue a civil protection order without the petitioner's requested supervised visitation);
Comas v. Comas, 608 A.2d 1005 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (holding that respondent
may have visitation with his child in his home because the petitioner failed to meet her
burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that such visitation was not in the
child's best interests. where she only claimed that the defendant's new wife hated the child,
but provided no evidence to support her claim).
1170. No. 93AP-840, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5282 (Ohio CL App. 1993).
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a recommendation as to appropriate visitation."'" In Hopkins v.
Hopkins,""2 the court upheld the entry of a restraining order pre-
venting the respondent from interfering with the petitioner's posses-
sion of the child and awarding the respondent only limited access and
possession of children in light of his physical abuse of the mother
and oldest child.
' 73
Courts will also impose supervised visitation in custody cases
where domestic violence exists. In Katz v. Katz,"74 the court, while
refusing to entirely suspend the defendant's visitation rights, ordered
limited and supervised visitation under carefully controlled circum-
stances, where the defendant had abused his wife in the presence of
the child." 5 In Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 76 the court limited a
father's visitation with his son to take place outside the mother's
home and presence where the court found that the strained meetings
between the parties, which in the past included the father slapping the
mother, were inappropriate for the child to witness.
Courts have responded with resolve to violations of visitation
restrictions in protection orders. Courts have conditioned further visi-
tation on the respondent providing a bond where the respondent has
failed to comply with visitation rules in the past. In In Re Marriage
of Rodriguez,"' the court held that the lower court rightly condi-
tioned limited visitation in a protection order on the respondent post-
ing a $10,000 bond where the respondent father had violated the
visitation provision in the past."" The court further held that the
mother had standing to execute the bond when the father failed to
1171. Id. at *9-*10.
1172. 853 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
1173. Id. at 138.
1174. 467 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
1175. Id.; see also Zuccaro v. Zuccaro. 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1750 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 16, 1993) (ordering supervised visitation in dissolution action where there was a history
of violence against the custodial parent); Carter v. Carter, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 672
(Minn. Ct. App. July 13, 1993) (restricting father's visitation where he was suspected of
abusing children); In re Brandon "UU," 597 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div. 1993) (ordering super-
vised visitation); Lufft v. Lufft, 424 S.E.2d 266, 270 (W. Va. 1992) (remanding case so that
father's violent tendencies could be evaluated, and amending visitation order to extend super-
vised visitation until father could demonstrate that he is no longer violent). But see In re
Whaley, 620 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding no abuse of discretion when trial
court granted father unsupervised visitation with child where there was evidence of violence
against two girlfriends, but no evidence that it occurred in the child's presence and allega-
tions of child abuse were unsubstantiated).
1176. 213 A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
1177. 545 N.E.2d 731 (I11. 1989).
1178. Id. at 734-35.
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return the child in accordance with the order. 79 In Leonetti v.
Riehl,"' the court held respondent in contempt and sentenced him
to fifteen days in jail for violating a civil protection order which
ordered him to stay away from the petitioner's residence except on
designated visitation days where he went to the mother's house on a
non-visitation day, engaged in disruptive behavior, and kicked over
garbage cans. t
Courts have also considered expert opinions on the issue of
visitation. In Hall v. Hall,1 82 the court relied, in part, on a social
worker's recommendation of supervised visitation to support its or-
der." 3 In In re Penny R.,"' the court held that in order to
vacate sua sponte a preexisting order permitting visitation, based on
an unsolicited letter from the director of a mental health center stating
that such visitation is adverse to the child's best interests, the court
must subsequently hold a review hearing to determine the correctness
of the order within the time the court would have to hold a hearing
following the issuance of a temporary protection order."" 5 In Vogt
v. Vogt,"' the court reversed the temporary visiting arrangements
established in a protection order when the court found that the court
services representative went beyond consulting the parties and instead
overrode the misgivings of the petitioner and exacted a signed written
agreement from the parties in violation of state statutory law."'
The Vogt court held that only when there is no probable cause of do-
mestic violence may the court order or refer parties to media-
tion.1
88
1179. Id. at 734.
1180. 546 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1989).
1181. Id.
1182. 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
1183. But see In re M.D., 602 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1992) (reversing a denial of visitation in a
civil protection order where the trial judge failed to read relevant psychiatric evaluations and
underlying findings before making his decision).
1184. 509 A.2d 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
1185. Id. at 340.
1186. 455 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1990).




ii. Visitation Suspended Altogether Due to Domestic
Violence
State statutes and case law both recognize that under some cir-
cumstances, the court may entirely suspend a batterer's visitation
rights. Several states empower courts to suspend visitation to protect
the safety of the victim and her children."89 For example, the Min-
nesota statute states that courts will entirely suspend visitation "as
needed to guard the safety of the victim and the children."''
Courts have specifically held that denial of visitation rights in an ex
parte temporary protection order does not violate due process where
deprivation is only for a limited period of time until a full hear-
ing.
191
Appellate courts who have reached this question"' have been
generally willing to suspend or limit visitation in protection order
cases to protect the petitioner or her children from abuse." In
Campbell v. Campbell,"' the court granted a stay of respondent's
visitation rights because of petitioner's fear of domestic violence and
the husband's prior arrest for sexual battery of their three year old
daughter."95 The court found that the children "like their mother,
1189. 750 ILCS 601214(b)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2.d
(West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(7) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1190. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
1191. See, e.g., Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
an ex parte order which effectively denied batterer's visitation for 10 days did not violate
due process).
1192. Reviewing gender bias reports from across the country, it becomes clear that trial
level courts are issuing many more decisions unfavorable to civil protection order petitioners
than we see when we review appellate court cases. To understand this phenomenon, we need
only return to the dynamics at work in domestic violence relationships. When battered women
turn to the courts seeking protection and they lose custody of their children, they receive
orders that are unworkable, or protection is denied, many victims do not appeal the court's
decision, even when their chances of winning on appeal are high. They instead return to their
batterers, having learned that the justice system will not offer them effective relief. This rein-
forces their batterers' control over their lives. As attorneys representing hundreds of battered
women, we have observed that only a small fraction of battered women who have valid
grounds for appeal actually appeal their cases.
1193. Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1992) (entering a 90 day order giving re-
spondent only supervised visitation rights and telephone contact with his children based on
evidence that he had administered a severe spanking to his son which left several visible
bruises); People v. Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) (determining that a
protection order may prohibit visitation where the court finds that visitation would seriously
endanger the physical, mental, or emotional health of a minor child).
1194. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1195. Id. at 126.
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had reasonable cause to believe that they were about to become the
victims of an act of domestic violence."'  Surely, fear that a custo-
dial parent will be assaulted or battered by a non-custodial parent
constitutes an act of domestic violence as to their child.""' 97
In Pendleton v. Minichino,"8 the court issued an ex parte
temporary protection order suspending visitation where petitioner al-
leged present and immediate danger in an affidavit under oath.""
The court concluded that the respondent's statements to the petitioner
"that he was depressed and, 'this time I'm not going alone. You
better watch your back,' are at the least menacing and disturbing and
it was not unreasonable to find that the words constituted an immedi-
ate and present physical danger to the applicant and/or the chil-
dren."" The court further noted that concern as to the children
was especially appropriate since the respondent "had 'sole' custody of
the children in his own home at the times of his visitation.''
In Hughes v. Hughes," the court found the father's history of
violence toward the mother, which included holding the mother and
child hostage for eight hours while threatening to kill the mother and
himself, and later breaking into the mother's home and shooting her
while she held the child, was so egregious that the court entirely sus-
pended visitation, finding contact with the father to be against the
child's best interests.2 3 The court held that, while parents should
seldom lose visitation, in this case the father's reckless endangerment
of the child and abuse of the mother confirms a moral deficiency
which threatens the child.'2 4
Courts have also suspended visitation in custody and divorce pro-
ceedings due to domestic violence. In Goldring v. Goldring,0 the
court upheld an order in a divorce settlement which suspended the
husband's visitation rights with the children until he underwent a
psychiatric evaluation based on evidence that he had continually ha-
rassed his former wife, and physically abused her on two occa-
1196. Id.
1197. Id. at 127; see also Daniel R. v. Noel R., 600 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1993)
(denying father visitation rights where he sexually abused his child).
1198. 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 915 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
1199. Id. at *20.
1200. Id.
1201. Id.
1202. 463 A.2d 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
1203. Id. at 478-79.
1204. Id. at 479.
1205. 424 N.Y.S.2d 270 (App. Div. 1980).
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sions.12 t The respondent ex-husband "torment[ed] his ex-wife three
or four times a day, from early morning to late evening, by standing
outside her apartment and screaming curses at her.""'1' The court
further noted that the defendant had physically abused his wife on
two occasions since the divorce, and "the children fear their father,
often hid when he comes to take them for a visit, and are literally
dragged down the street by him when they do not want to go."' 2°
11. Monetary Relief, Including Child and Spousal Support
a. Availability of Broad Economic Relief
Aside from fear, economic dependence is possibly the single
most common reason why abuse victims remain with or return to a
batterer."'2 Unless courts order financial assistance for the victim
1206. Id.
1207. Id. at 273.
1208. Id.; see also Bender v. Kramer, 1992 WL 435693 (Del. Faro. Ct. Nov. 12, 1992)
(declining to enter visitation order based on allegations of acts of physical and/or sexual
abuse by petitioner).
1209. Victims of abuse often stay with their batters because they lack viable employment
opportunities, secure financial assistance, or safe affordable housing where they can live with
their children. Ganley, supra note 21, at 44.
One of the major findings of the D.C. Gender Bias Task Force Report was that D.C.
judges routinely issue civil protection order orders without resolving questions of custody,
visitation, and child support:
Issues of custody, visitation and support are not viewed as peripheral to resolving
domestic violence. Their resolution may be as important as traditional "stay away"
orders, since disputes over custody and visitation can trigger violence, and lack of
financial resources may lead a victim of violence to return to the batterer. There-
fore, the Task Force recommends that the Superior Court evaluate its practices to
address this apparent failure of the system to utilize regularly critical provisions in
the Intrafamily Act.
D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 143, 147-50, 158-59.
Like other victims of interpersonal violence, women assaulted by male intimates
learn to weigh all alternatives against their perception of the assailant's ability to
control or to harm . . . . For women whose assailant is their husband or other
intimate partner predictable effects of attack are further compounded by the fact
that the assailant is someone . . . on whom they may depend for shelter and other
components of survival . . . women at risk from male partners may become even
more frightened by the lack of viable alternatives for safety and well-being. Espe-
cially for women who are married to their assailants, decisions about their relation-
ships are complicated by legal and financial ties . . . . Living in hiding is incom-
patible with maintaining faithful employment, raising and educating children, and
other components of normal life. Economic circumstances also play a major role in
the choices facing a woman who is experiencing violence at home. If, in leaving a
violent mate, she lacks adequate financial resources and must live in an unsafe
dwelling in a crime-ridden community, a survivor may have changed only the type
of danger to be braved and may have added the risk of assaults by strangers to
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and her family, she cannot be entirely protected from abuse.1 2 °
Battered women are often financially isolated.2  Social science
studies reveal the severe financial stress on abused women which so
often forces them to return to a batterer. 12 When a battered wom-
an leaves her abuser, there is a fifty percent chance that her standard
of living will drop below the poverty line." Domestic violence is
a leading contributor of homelessness for women and children in this
country.2 4 A Senate Judiciary Report reveals that over fifty percent
the risk of her partner's reprisals.
Browne, supra note 10, at 1077, 1080-81.
For battered women to be successful in their attempts to leave, courts must
provide for economic and other necessities related to the adequate care of children.
Orders that contain economic resources such as property possession (e.g. house,
car, and household items), child support, and assistance with medical or other
necessary expenses can make the difference between a woman's remaining separat-
ed from an abusive partner and returning to him to avoid impoverishing her fami-
ly. Such orders need to be accompanied by mechanisms for enforcing child support
and other economic payments.
Id. at 1084.
1210. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 22 ("Judges may be uncomfortable
issuing ex parte orders which . . . require the payment of child or spousal support . . .
Without such provisions however, the victim cannot be protected. Economic dependence is
frequently the reason the victim returns to the offender. Such ex parte relief is strongly sup-
ported by both case law and statute."); see also Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (citing NEw JERSEY ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN IN NEW JERSEY 26 (1981)).
1211. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 113. Thirty-four percent of battered women
had no access to checking accounts, 51% had no access to charge accounts, and 21% had no
access to cash. Even battered women who are employed outside the home are often denied
access to financial resources by their batterers. EWING, supra note 180, at 10.
1212. DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES 232 (1977) (stating that battered women who re-
turned were married longer, had less work experience, and were mostly unskilled); Lewis
Okun. Termination or Resumption of Cohabitation in Woman Battering Relationships: A Sta-
tistical Study, in COPING WITH FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 107,
116 (Gerald Hotaling et al. eds., 1988) (finding that couples in which the battered woman
was unquestionably the main income producer were twice as likely to breakup immediately);
Ganley, supra note 21, at 44 (stating that the reasons for staying with or returning to a
batterer often include: 1) lack of real alternatives for employment or financial assistance when
the batterer controls the finances; 2) lack of financial resources to pay for an attorney; and
3) lack of safe and affordable housing for the abused party and her children); Daniel G.
Saunders & Patricia B. Size, Attitudes About Woman Abuse Among Police Officers, Victims,
and Victim Advocates, I JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 25, 35 (1986) (stating that
48% of victims report that having "no place to go" forced them to return to batterers).
1213. Women and Violence, supra note 789, at 95.
1214. See, e.g., Ellen L. Bassuk, Homeless Families, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Dec. 1991, at
66 (Eighty-nine percent of homeless mothers have been physically or sexually abused. Thirty-
four percent of the nation's homeless are families with children-disproportionately single-
mother families-and are the single fastest growing segment of America's homeless popula-
tion). In 1987 the New York State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence found that
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of homeless women are fleeing domestic abuse."" The power of
this economic stress is evident. A study of battered women in New
York City shelters discovered that thirty-one percent of the victims
returned to their batterers, citing an inability to obtain long-term sepa-
rate housing.2 6 Financial assistance and support for abuse victims
as part of a protection order is clearly needed to alleviate the finan-
cial stress on victims which often forces them to return to their abu-
sive partners and to further violence.
217
To address abuse victims' financial vulnerability, judicial experts,
courts, and the majority of state statutes urge the inclusion of mone-
tary relief as part of a civil protection order. The National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges enunciated the position that:
Civil restraining order should be available to all, and issued ex
parte on request when family violence has occurred or is threatened.
Such orders should be clear and specific and should address ...
[flinancial support and maintenance for the victim and family mem-
bers ... Judges may be uncomfortable issuing ex parte orders
which evict the offender from the family home, require the payment
of spousal or child support or award custody of the children to the
petitioner. Without such provisions, however, the victim cannot be
protected. Economic dependence is frequently the reason the victim
returns to the offender. Such ex parte relief is strongly supported by
both case law and statute.
2 1
However, reports on gender bias in the courts consistently find that,
despite the courts' authority to offer financial relief when issuing
protection orders, and judicial experts' recommendations that courts
adopt this practice, judges across the country routinely deny requests
for financial relief in civil protection order proceedings.
219
a full 40% of individuals in the state's homeless shelters were battered women and their
children. DWYER & TULLY, supra note 844, at 7. Domestic violence was the main reason for
homelessness in Oregon in 1988. KAY STOHL, HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN OREGON
6 (Oregon Shelter Network ed., 1988).
1215. Women and Violence, supra note 789. at 95; Kay Morgan. Reassessing the Battery
of Women: A Social and Economic Perspective, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (1992).
1216. DWYER & TULLY, supra note 844, at 9.
1217. See, e.g., Elis v. North Carolina Crime Victim's Compensation Comm'n, 432 S.E.2d
160 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that victim's refusal to prosecute batterer does not dis-
qualify victim from right to receive victim's compensation and that refusal to prosecute is
distinct from failure to cooperate with prosecution).
1218. FAMILY VIOLENCE PRoJEcr, supra note 687, at 22.
1219. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 247, 253; GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA DY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1991), reprinted in 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 539, 588 (1992); Ricki Lewis
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Forty-one states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico au-
thorize some form of economic relief in a protection order."" The
protection order statutes of thirty-eight jurisdictions contain catch-all
provisions under which a court may award financial relief to a vic-
tim.' Twenty states specifically authorize the payment of general
Tannen, Report of the Florida Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 867
(1990); Lynn Hecht Schafran, The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task
Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129, 150 (1986).
1220. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(5) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25:35.010(b)(4) (1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5752 (West Supp. 1993) (includes
putative father); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1005(c) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4)(g) (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4
(1991 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1993): IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.5.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(6) (Supp. 1993); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(f) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2136 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West Supp.
1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(1) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050 (Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2) (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.2(b)(2) (Michie 1986 &
Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(a) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)
(West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(2) (1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 842
(McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a) (Michie 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
02A.e (Supp. 1993); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(e) (Anderson Supp. 1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60A(E) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.716(2) (1991); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(8) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 664 (Supp. 1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFiED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(a) (1991); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060
(West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a) (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12
(West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(b) (1988); see also MODEL CODE, supra note
15, § 306.
1221. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(d) (1991); ARtz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(D)(4) (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(6) (1993); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2035 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993);
DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 945(4), 948(b), 949(a)(11) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1005(c)(10)(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4)(b)(g) (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-
5(b) (1987 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(e) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(17)
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2) (1985 & Supp. 1993); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(h) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46-2136 (West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1)(K) (West 1981
& Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A. § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(a)(11) (West 1990
& Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 33.030(1)(e) (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4(I) (1990); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(5) (Michie 1989 &
Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02.4 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.312(E)(1)(h) (Anderson
1993]
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monetary relief in a protection order. -
The New Jersey statute enumerates the most comprehensive
protection for abuse victims. In addition to offering financial support
for petitioner and her children, which is typically available in civil
protection order proceedings, it specifically authorizes the payment of
punitive damages and compensation for pain and suffering." In
Sielski v. Sielski, 4 the court awarded $6000 in punitive damages
to the petitioner, after the court found that the respondent acted vi-
ciously and sadistically when he yanked petitioner out of bed by her
hair, slapped her about the face and neck, attempted to push her face
in the toilet, and yanked at her pubic hair.' 225 Innovative state stat-
utes also authorize payment for economic losses stemming from abuse
including medical costs,1 "6  lost earnings,"e repair and replace-
1989 & Supp. 1992)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4C., D. (West 1992); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 6108(a) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(6) (1984);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(1)
(1989 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.].A(6) (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(e) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-6(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(vi) (1988); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
8, § 621 (Supp. 1990).
1222. ALASKA STAT. 25.35.010(b)(4) (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5753 (West Supp. 1993);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(6), (7) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (Supp. 1993);
725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West
Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-15 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.030.2 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I) (1990); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y.
FAM. Cr. ACr § 842 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a) (1989); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1991);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993);
WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(b) (1988).
1223. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4); see also Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (noting that the New Jersey statute authorizes the payment of
punitive damages and compensation for pain and suffering in addition to compensatory dam-
ages and awarding petitioner monetary relief of $120).
1224. 604 A.2d 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
1225. Id. at 207; see also Reeves v. Reeves, 625 A.2d 589 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (holding that a trial court may decide whether to assess punative damages in domestic
violence cases).
1226. ALASKA STAT. § 25.25.010(b)(6) (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5753(a) (West Supp.
1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112-14(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(l)(f) (Supp. 1993); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B4:(I)(a)(6) (1990); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 842(h) (McKinney 1983);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(8) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6; Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(b)(iii) (1992); see also MODEL CODE,
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ment of damaged property," alternative housing COSTS
229
meals," out of pocket expenses for injuries,"' relocation and
travel expenses," replacement costs for locks,' 3 and counseling
costs." - Domestic violence victims may also file civil damage suits
against their batterers under a variety of legal theories including torts,
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'235
supra note 15. § 306.
1227. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5753(a) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949
(Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 766(1)(e) (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp.
1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(f) (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B4:(I)(a)(6) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4) (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6108(a)(8) (1991).
1228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 112A-14(b)(2) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1) (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4) (West
1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621(i) (Supp. 1990); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§ 306.
1229. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5753(a) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(3)
(Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.5.2.b (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2136(A)(2) (West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp.
1993); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(c) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(5)
(Supp. 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:10(h) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29B(2)
(West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-
3(a)(3) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a) (1991); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621(i) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(3) (1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16:1-279.1(A)(4) (Michie Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(i) (1988); see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1230. 725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993).
1231. CAL. FAm. CODE § 5753(a) (West Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(I) (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(f) (Supp.
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4()(a)(6) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4)
(West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(8) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8,
§ 621(i) (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(b)(iii) (1988).
1232. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-14(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.1 (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(f) (Supp.
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(1)(a)(6) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29b(4)
(West 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(8) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8.
§ 621(i) (1992).
1233. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993).
1234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. 93-21-15(1)(f)
(Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:25-29b(4) (West 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(a)(8) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8. § 621(i) (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
36-5 (Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1235. For a full discussion, see DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES, supra note
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Courts have specifically recognized the vital role that monetary
relief plays in alleviating financial pressures on an abuse victim,
which too often force her to return to her batterer. In light of the leg-
islative intent of civil protection order statutes to prevent continued
violence, courts have interpreted statutes to extend economic relief to
battered women. In Powell v. Powell,'z6 the court held that the
catch-all remedy provision of the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act' 7
authorizes courts to order monetary relief as part of a civil protection
order if the court determines such relief would appropriately resolve
the domestic abuse crisis often exacerbated by the victim's economic
dependence." 8 The court concluded that the court has broad judi-
cial discretion to fashion effective remedies to end domestic
violence." 9 The court found that the clear legislative intent of the
domestic violence statute was to provide an effective tool and power-
ful remedies to bring an end to domestic violence, justifying an ex-
pansive reading of the Act even where the statute does not specifical-
ly authorize monetary relief. 2 ' In Mugan v. Mugan,24' the court
also construed that state's domestic violence act broadly to advance
the legislative purpose of ending violence. 242 The court awarded
the petitioner monetary relief, based on the legislative intent to protect
abuse victims from the threat of financial distress caused by the re-
moval of the respondent from the home. 243
Courts award a broad variety of economic relief in civil protec-
tion orders including palimony, rent and mortgage payments, utilities,
and medical bills. A primary form of economic relief awarded in civil
protection order cases is spousal and child support, which the follow-
21. at 293-327, see also Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (holding that wife
may sue for damages under husband's homeowner's policy where husband was convicted of
crimes against spouse, including attempted murder, and suit was not barred by the doctrine of
interspousal immunity).
1236. 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988).
1237. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(10) (1981).
1238. Powell, 547 A.2d at 974-75.
1239. Id. at 975.
1240. Id.
1241. 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super Ct. App. Div. 1989).
1242. Id.
1243. Id. at 3; see also Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(ordering batterer to pay certain bills, as well as attorney's fees and costs, as part of a civil
protection order). But see Maksuta v. Higson, 577 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(ordering the male respondent to pay $1000 per month for the female petitioner's separate
housing and maintenance after she was ordered to vacate their home, upon a finding that
both parties had committed acts of domestic violence against the other).
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ing sections of this Article address.
b. Support for Petitioner
Spousal support is often needed to relieve the financial stress
placed on abuse victims and their families when they escape their
batterers. Consequently, thirty-five states authorize the payment of
spousal support as part of a civil protection order. 2" Case law sup-
ports this positive trend of awarding maintenance in protection or-
ders,"' even in jurisdictions where the catch-all provisions are used
in the absence of a specific statutory authorization for support. t2
The parties, moreover, do not necessarily need to be married for
courts to award the petitioner temporary maintenance in a civil pro-
tection order. In Maksuta v. Higson,247 the court awarded tempo-
rary maintenance to the woman pending resolution of a palimony
claim, even though the parties where unmarried but had cohabitated
for twenty-eight years." In Brookhart v. Brookhart,"249 the court
also acted affirmatively to protect a domestic violence victim when it
1244. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(5) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25:35.010(b)(4) (1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. 9-15-205(a)(5) (Michie Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(6) (Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(7) (Supp.
1993); 735 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(3)(d)
(West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2(e) (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3107(a)(6) (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(f) (Michie Supp. 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136.A(2) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West
Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d) (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(e) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050 (Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.2(b)(2) (Michie Supp.
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 178-B:41(b)(4) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5.A(2) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-
3(a)(7) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4.e (Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E)(1)(e) (Anderson Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(3) (1991);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-
5(4) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(5) (1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(2)(c)
(West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(I)(b) (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-
6(a)(5) (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(b)(ii) (1988); see also MODEL CODE, supra
note 15, § 306.
1245. See, e.g., Mugan v. Mugan, 55 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (ordering
respondent to pay petitioner $120 per week in maintenance as part of a civil protection or-
der); Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. Ct. App. 1986) (ordering interim child
and spousal support of $1,200 per month).
1246. E!g., Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988).
1247. 577 A.2d 185 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
1248. i
1249. 17 D. & C.3d 795 (Pa. 1991).
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granted temporary support to the petitioner at an evidentiary hearing
without requiring the petitioner to specifically request it in her civil
protection order petition.' The court found that the support order
was temporary, respondent and counsel were present, and the award
was warranted under the circumstances.' l In awarding spousal sup-
port in civil protection order cases, courts require petitioners to prove
their entitlement to spousal support under the spousal support laws of
the jurisdiction. If necessary under state law, petitioners have been
required to show that they lack sufficient property or other means to
provide for their reasonable needs." 2
c. Support for Children
Like spousal support, child support payments in a protection
order are often vital to the financial, mental, and physical well being
of an abuse victim and her family. Both state legislatures and judicial
authorities overwhelmingly encourage the inclusion of child support as
a civil protection order remedy. The National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges strongly urges ex parte monetary relief in the
form of child and spousal support to address the economic depen-
dence which frequently forces abuse victims to return to their
batterers.' Thirty-seven jurisdictions authorize the payment of
child support as part of civil protection order remedies.' 4 The
1250. Id. at 796.
1251. Id.
1252. Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding it improper to grant
continued maintenance to petitioner in renewed civil protection order without evidence that
she lacked sufficient means to provide for her reasonable needs); Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 673 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (denying spousal support in civil pro-
tection order where petitioner did not show that she lacked sufficient property to provide for
her reasonable needs).
1253. FAMLY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 21-22.
1254. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(5) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(4) (Michie Supp.
1993); ALASKA STAT. § 25:35.010(b)(4) (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5752 (West Supp. 1993)
(includes putative father); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(6) (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.30(4) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(6) (Supp. 1993); 725
ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a)(3)(C) (West
Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5.2(e) (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(6)
(Supp. 1993); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(4) (Michie Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2136.A(2) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West Supp. 1992);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(8) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§ 3(f) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(4) (West Supp. 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(e) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050(2) (Supp. 1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.2(b)(2) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178-B:4(I)(b)(4)
(1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(10) (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(2)
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courts also demonstrate considerable willingness to award child sup-
port as a civil protection order remedy. "'
The institution of child support guidelines in practically every
jurisdiction resulted from the federal requirements under 42 U.S.C.
§ 666, 116 which makes determination of child support awards in
civil protection order cases a relatively simple process. It provides the
courts and litigants with an objective standard upon which to calcu-
late an equitable child support award." 7 Child support guidelines
protect petitioners from bargaining away child support in exchange for
protection from abuse."' 8 Battered women who come to court seek-
ing civil protection orders are extremely vulnerable and frightened.
They are often seeing their abusers for the first time since the most
recent beating, and are often unable to adequately advocate for their
own needs and those of their children. Judges and advocates should
ensure that a child support award is entered in every civil protection
order case where the parties are separated and petitioner is awarded
custody.
Courts should employ child support guidelines in civil protection
order cases to ensure that support awards adequately provide for
children's needs. An example of how the use of guidelines in civil
protection order cases can better protect domestic violence petitioners
is illustrated in the problem that might have been avoided in Casey v.
Shy. 12 9 In Casey, the court reversed a modification of a civil pro-
tection order to increase the weekly child support award from twenty
to fifty dollars despite the mother's claims that the expenses were
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(6) (Michie 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-02.4(e) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(10)(e) (Anderson Supp.
1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(5) (1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1)(d) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(2) (Law.
Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(4) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
606(5) (1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(4) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-6(1)(b) (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-
21-105(b)(ii) (1988); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15. § 306.
1255. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988) (court overruled trial court
determination that it lacked authority to award child support and other monetary relief under
the Intrafamily Offenses Act); Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (court
ordered continued child support in a renewed civil protection order).
1256. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(1) (1988).
1257. Id.
1258. Child support guidelines are beneficial to abused parties because they reduce oppor-
tunities for abusers and their lawyers to negotiate unfairly from a position of unwarranted
strength. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 273.
1259. 712 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. App. 1986).
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greater than she anticipated and the child's needs were
neglected.2 ' The court ruled that since the mother had agreed to
the support award six weeks earlier in a consent agreement and the
respondent's income had not changed, she had not established the
sufficient "change of circumstances" to warrant a modification."'
Child support guidelines in that case would have identified the
parent's respective financial abilities, rather than resting the support
award on the mother's initial erroneous estimate of the child's needs
and expenses. The guidelines would have avoided the need to show
"change of circumstances" to modify a support award that was insuf-
ficient to begin with.
Finally, state legislatures should follow the lead of Illinois, Min-
nesota, and Missouri which authorize wage withholding to enforce
child support awards.'262 Beginning in January 1994, under Federal
law, all child support awards are required to be paid through wage
withholding.263 Child support awards in civil protection order cases
should be handled in the same manner as other child support actions.
Wage withholding is the safest form of child support enforcement in
domestic violence cases, because it reduces contact between the
batterer and the abuse victim. Since the employer automatically col-
lects the support payment, the batterer's ability to coerce the abuse
victim, control the victim's life through late payments, or create pre-
tenses for contact are significantly undermined. Further, enforcement
through wage withholding reduces the need for civil contempt hear-
ings to collect child support, at which both petitioner and respondent
would be present.
d. Rent, Mortgage, and Housing Costs
Economic dependence is a common reason that abuse victims
return to an abusive partner. A victim cannot be entirely protected
from abuse unless courts order financial support and maintenance for
the victim and her family. 2 ' The court in Mugan v. Mugan,"
1260. Id. at 463.
1261. Id. We should note that the respondent, not the petitioner, was represented in the
earlier consent agreement. The power imbalance may have been significant in her earlier
agreement to accept an insufficient child support award. See id.
1262. 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6
(West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.526 (Supp. 1993).
1263. 42 U.S.C. § 666.
1264. FAMILY VIOLENcE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 22.
1265. 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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specifically recognized the direct relationship between economic de-
pendence and domestic violence. 2' The court concluded that "the
Legislature did not intend victims of domestic violence to be discour-
aged by a threat of financial distress," and quoted the legislative
history for the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, which stated
"[o]ther than fear, economic dependence may be the single most
important reason why women stay in battering situations. Thus finan-
cial assistance must be readily available if an abused woman is to
have the option of leaving her husband.""26 7
Five state statutes authorize the payment of mortgage or rent
costs as part of a civil protection order.'26 Case law in New Jersey,
Ohio, and the District of Columbia authorizes rent and mortgage pay-
ments as part of a civil protection order.'269 Other courts have spo-
ken on related issues. In Nuss v. Nuss, 27' the court held that a trial
court could not order the petitioner to pay rent to the respondent to
occupy their community property after a civil protection order ordered
respondent to vacate the marital residence. 27 Similarly, in Rigwald
v. Rigwad,"272 the court held that a vacate order against the batterer
did not mandate a decision in the same proceedings concerning mort-
gage payments where the batterer sought to shift mortgage payment
responsibility to the victim spouse. 3
e. Utilities
Only the Massachusetts statute explicitly authorizes utility pay-
ments as part of civil protection order remedies."v However, using
1266. Id.
1267. Id. at 2-3.
1268. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2035 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 949(a)(6)
(Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(4) (Supp. 1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.030.2(b)(2) (Michie 1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4) (West 1993); see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 15. § 306.
1269. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988) (holding that in a civil pro-
tection order proceeding, a court may order respondent to pay child support, rent, and mort-
gage costs, as well as other monetary payments which will help end the violence); Ruedele
v. Kiefer, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (awarding mortgage payments
to petitioner for property jointly owned by unmarried couple); Mugan, 555 A.2d 2 (upholding
order requiring husband to pay wife $120 per week in maintenance and other household,
medical, dental, mortgage, and utility expenses).
1270. 828 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
1271. Id.
1272. 423 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. App. 1988).
1273. Id.
1274. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993) ("Compensatory loss-
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their power to order any constitutionally defensible remedy, courts in
other jurisdictions have ordered respondents to pay utilities as part of
a civil protection order.' 5  In Mugan v. Mugan,"276  the court
awarded monetary relief which included utility payments, reasoning
that "the Legislature did not intend victims of domestic violence to be
discouraged by a threat of financial distress .... .""' Court orders
which require the respondent to make utility payments serve to insu-
late the victim of abuse from financial pressures which may make her
vulnerable to continued contact with the batterer, or hesitant to seek
the batterer's removal from the residence in the first place.
f. Medical, Dental, and Counseling Bills
Eleven states and Puerto Rico specifically authorize medical
payments as part of civil protection order remedies.'278 While the
New Jersey statute does not explicitly authorize payment of medical
costs as part of a civil protection order, New Jersey case law has
ordered a respondent to pay medical and dental bills as part of the
es shall include, but not limited to, loss of earnings or support. costs for restoring utilities,
out-of-pocket expenses for injuries sustained, replacement of locks or personal property re-
moved or destroyed, medical and moving expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees.").
1275. See, e.g., Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Drake v.
Drake, No. CA-9114, 1984 WL 7861, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 1985) (ordering de-
fendant to pay utilities).
1276. 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
1277. Id. at 3.
1278. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b)(6) (1991) (medical expenses incurred as a result of
domestic violence); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5753(c) (West Supp. 1993) (expenses for medical
care incurred as a direct result of the abuse or any actual physical injuries which were sus-
tained due to abuse); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993) (medical, dental and
counseling expenses); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993) (medical ex-
penses which are the direct result of the abuse); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § (3)(f)
(West Supp. 1993) (medical expenses and out of pocket losses for injuries sustained); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(l)(f) (Supp. 1993) (medical expenses resulting from abuse and out-of-
pocket losses for injuries sustained); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4.I.(b)(6) (1990) (losses
suffered as a direct result of abuse including medical and dental expenses and out-of-pocket
losses for injuries sustained); N.Y. FAm. Cr. AcT § 842(h) (McKinney 1983) (respondent
provides by means of medical and health insurance for expenses incurred for medical care
and treatment arising form the incident or incidents forming the basis or the issuance of the
protection order); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a)(8) (1991) (defendant pays reasonable
losses suffered as a result of abuse including medical and dental costs and other out-of-pock-
et losses or injuries sustained); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(2)(g)(ii) (Supp. 1993) (payment of
medical expenses other damages suffered as a result of the abuse); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-
105(b)(iii) (1988) (medical costs incurred as a result of the abuse); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8,
§ 621 (Supp. 1990) (medical, psychiatric, and psychological expenses); see also MODEL
CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
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civil protection order remedies. '279 Five states and Puerto Rico au-
thorize protection orders which require respondent to pay petitioner's
counseling costs.' Courts may also order these and other forms of
assistance to abuse victims under the "catch all" provisions of the
state domestic violence statutes.12"
A recent amendment of the Minnesota protection order statute
authorizes a court to "order the continuance of all currently available
insurance coverage without change in coverage or beneficiary
designation."' 2 Ordering payment of medical bills and continued
coverage on health insurance policies is absolutely critical in light of
the high numbers of persons who lack health insurance coverage and
the numbers of women whose only access to insurance is dependant
on their batterers. Among married couples, 22.2% are uninsured and
5.9% receive medicald."23 When females head households by them-
1279. Bryant v. Burnett, 624 A.2d 584 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (ordering respon-
dent to pay emergency room expenses); Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989) (upholding order requiring husband to pay wife $120 per week in maintenance as
well as other household, medical, dental, mortgage and utility expenses).
1280. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7) (Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-
15(1)(f) (Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4) (West Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 6108(a)(8) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5(2) (1990 & Supp. 1993); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990).
1281. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(d) (1991); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(D)(4) (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(6) (1993); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2035 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West Supp. 1993);
DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 945(4), 948(b), 949(a)(11) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1005(c)(10)(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4)(b)(g) (West 1986); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-
5(b) (1987 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(e) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(17)
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2) (1985 & Supp. 1993); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(h) (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46-2136 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1)(K) (West 1981
& Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A. § 3 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(a)(11) (West 1990
& Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 33.030(l)(e) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4() (1990); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(5) (Michie 1989 &
Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02.4 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.312(E)(1)(h) (Anderson
1989 & Supp. 1992)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60.4C, 60.4D (West 1992); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(6)
(1984); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-6(1) (1989 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1.A(6) (Michie 1988 & Supp.
1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(e) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-6(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(vi) (1988); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990).
1282. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.6(a)(10) (West Supp. 1993).
1283. 1991 DEP'T OF HEALTH STATS., CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, DEP'T OF HEALTH
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selves without assistance of a spouse, the picture changes dramatical-
ly: 19.8% are uninsured and 34.5% receive insurance through medic-
aid. "'2 Of those with private insurance, 70% of married women and
64% of females heading households without a spouse have medical
insurance coverage through a spouse or relative. 85 When separation
from a batterer may result in loss of medical insurance, soaring medi-
cal costs, and lack or loss of insurance can drive battered women to
return to their batterers.'t2
g. Ordering Attorney's Fees and Litigation Costs to be
Paid by Respondent
Twenty-five states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
authorize the payment of attorney fees in a civil protection
order.2 7 Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia include
court costs as a civil protection order remedy. 28 Case law also
AND HUMAN SERVS. TBL. 24.
1284. Id.
1285. Id.
1286. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 504-507 (discussing recommended provisions
for public health settings, health care facilities, and health care workers).
1287. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(5) (Michie 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3602(M) (1989); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5755 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 949(a)(7) (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(8) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-
4(a)(10) (1991 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(f) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13)
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(7) (1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.7(1)(J) (West 1981 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 3(f) (West Supp. 1993); MisS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(f) (Supp. 1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.2(b)(3) (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 178-B:4(l)(B)(6),
:10(H)(h) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4) (West 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 842(f) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(10) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-02.4.(e) (1991 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §60.4.D(7) (West 1992); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.716(2)(c) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a)(8) (1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(d) (1991); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(f), (g) (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1.D (Michie
1988 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(f) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993);
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1288. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5755 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(a)(7)
(Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §16-1005(c)(8) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(10)
(1991 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(f) (1993); 750 ILCS 601214(b)(13) (Smith-
Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(7) (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 766(1)(J) (1981 & Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(11) (Supp.
1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-13(1)(f) (Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(3)10 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 33.030(2)(b)(3) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 178-B:4(I)(b)(6),
:10(I)(h) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(4) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr
§ 842(f) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(10) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BAT7ERED WOMEN
supports the award of attorney fees in protection orders.s 9 Howev-
er, to receive an attorney's fee award, a civil protection order peti-
tioner must give evidence of the nature and extent of the legal servic-
es provided.2 In Schmidt v. Schmidt,291 the court held that be-
cause under New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic Violence Act"2
reasonable attorney's fees are compensatory damages, the fees are not
subject to the traditional needs analysis. A petitioner may receive
attorney's fees even though she was able to pay them.293
Even if the court does not initially order attorney's fees the
respondent's subsequent misconduct may warrant such an award. In
Agnew v. Campbell," the court awarded attorney's fees against a
respondent who violated an existing civil protection order when he
filed a frivolous legal action against the civil protection order peti-
tioner to prevent her from remarrying.'295 In addition to ordering re-
imbursement of petitioner's attorney's fees paid to private counsel,
courts also award attorney's fees to legal services organizations which
successfully argue for a temporary protection order. 2 Courts have,
07.1-02.4(e) (1991 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 22, §60.4.D(7) (West 1992); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.716(2)(c) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6107(d) (1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(d) (1991); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(f), (g) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(4)(b) (Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1.D (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(f) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §
306.
1289. See Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (awarding
attorney's fees in civil protection order); Rogers v. Rogers, 556 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (App.
Div. 1990) (upholding award of attorney's fees to petitioner seeking protection order). But see
Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1992) (denying petitioner's request for attorney's fees
on appeal by respondent since the appeal was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foun-
dation); Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing the trial
court's award of attorney's fees to the civil protection order petitioner as an abuse of discre-
tion despite the relevant factor of the respondent's misconduct, in light of the fact that the
petitioner's monthly income was more than twice that of the respondent's and exceeded her
expenses).
1290. Todd v. Todd, 772 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to award attorney
fees to petitioner when she submitted no evidence as to the nature and extent of legal fees
requested); Rogers, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (upholding award of attorney fees to petitioner seek-
ing protection order but holding that Family court erred in relying on affirmation of counsel
alone to determine the amount of fees; reasonable fees and the nature of the services must
be established at an adversarial hearing).
1291. 620 A.2d 1388 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
1292. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 b(4) (West 1990).
1293. Schmidt, 620 A.2d at 1389-90.
1294. No. C3-90-1130. 1990 WL 188723 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1990).
1295. Id. at *1-*2.
1296. Spoto v. McCarroll, 593 A.2d 375, 379 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding
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however, placed reasonable limits on attorneys fees awards in civil
protection order actions. In Kass v. Kass,"27 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that absent clear evidence of the civil protection order
petitioner's bad faith or intent to assert a frivolous claim, the court
will not award attorney's fees against the petitioner when a civil
protection order is denied.""9
Finally, a petitioner may also receive attorney's fees for prosecut-
ing a violation of a protection order. In Linda D. v. Peter D.,"2
the court awarded $2500 in attorney's fees to a petitioner who sought
to prosecute a petition for a violation of a protection order even
though she eventually withdrew the underlying violation petition after
the respondent consented to a modified and expanded protection or-
der. 3
00
12. Ordering Police Assistance
The police can and should play a vital role in fighting domestic
violence. Law enforcement acts as a critical informational link be-
tween the abuse victim and the legal and social service systems.
Battered women often first hear about the legal rights and the servic-
es available to them from police officers responding to their calls for
help."'e1 The National Institute of Justice reports that ninety percent
of domestic abuse victims who appear before the Philadelphia Family
Court for protection orders say that they learned about protection
orders from police officers. 3 '2 Police officers are a major resource
for abuse victims, in that they are often the people who refer the
victims to protection orders and social services. 3  Therefore, state
that the trial court had authority to award attorney's fees to a publicly funded legal services
organization after the court issued a temporary protection order).
1297. 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
1298. Id. In that case the petitioner saw a man on the street she believed to be her for-
mer husband whom she had left three years before to escape abuse. Id. She had moved 124
miles away from him because she feared for her safety. Id. She became alarmed when she
believed she saw him while she drove in a car. Id. The court denied her civil protection
order petition for insufficient evidence of present harm or intent to harm, but failed to order
attorney's fees against her. Id
1299. 577 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Fam. Ct. 1991)
1300. Id.
1301. Hart, supra note 991, at 70-71. For this reason, it is essential that police officers
participate in continuing education programs on domestic violence. See MODEL CODE, supra
note 15, § 509.
1302. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 15, at 60.
1303. Hart, supra note 991, at 70-71.
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statutes should clearly articulate that it is properly the police officer's
function to provide information and assistance to a victim of domestic
abuse.' 4 This practice promotes a consistent and thorough delivery
of vital protective services to needy victims.
35
State statutes now require that police provide domestic violence
victims a broad variety of assistance. Thirty-three states and Puerto
Rico require the police to notify a domestic violence victim of her
rights and the services available to her. 3' Eighteen states and Puer-
1304, See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 204, 223.
1305 Hart, supra note 991, at 70-71.
1306. ALA. CODE § 30-6-9 (1989) ("Where facilities are available, any law enforcement
officer who investigates an alleged incident of domestic violence may advise the person sub-
ject to th, abuse of the availability of a facility from which he or she may receive servic-
es."). ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.520(a) (1991) ("During the course of responding to an offense
involving domestic violence, a peace officer shall orally and in writing inform the victim of
serxi eA, available to the victim and of the rights of the victim. ); ARMa. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601D (1989) ("When a peace officer responds to a call alleging that domestic
violence has been or may be committed, the officer shall inform in writing any alleged or
potential victim of the procedures and resources available for the protection of such vic-
tim ... . : CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(i) (West 1992) ("Furnishing a written notice to
victirnms at the scene ...."); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-104(2)(a) (West 1993) ("[I]t is
the duty of the officer to inform the party protected by the emergency protection order or
rstraming order that the aggrieved party has the right to initiate contempt proceedings against
the alleged violator in the court which issued the original order."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 461B-38b(d)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993) ("Notifying the victim of the right to file an affidavit
or wanrant for arrest ... informing the victim of services available and referring the victim
to the commission on victim services."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.29(l), 415.606 (West 1986
& Supp. 1993) ("Any law enforcement officer who investigates an alleged incident of domes-
tic violence shall advise the victim of such violence that there is a domestic violence center
from which the victim may receive services. The law enforcement officer shall give the vic-
tim immediate notice of the legal rights and remedies available . . . using simple English as
well as Spanish and shall distribute [noticel. ); IDAHO CODE § 39-6316(2) (1993)
("When a peace officer responds to a domestic violence call, the officer shall give a written
statement to victims which alert the victim to the availability of a shelter or other resources
in the community, and give the victim a written notice provided by the department of law
enforcement."); 750 ILCS 601304(4) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.12(l)lc) (West 1985) ("Providing an abused person with immediate and adequate notice
of the person's rights. The notice shall consist of handing the person a copy of the following
statement written in English and Spanish, asking the person to read the card and whether the
person understands the rights."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.785(3)(c) (Michie 1984 &
Supp. 1992) ("When a law enforcement officer has reason to suspect that a family member,
member of an unmarried couple, or household member has been the victim of domestic vio-
lence and abuse, the officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, includ-
ing ... advising the victim immediately of the rights available to them . . . ."); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(4) (West Supp. 1993) ("Notifying the abused person of his right to
initiate criminal or civil proceedings; the availability of the protection order . . . and the
axailability of community assistance for domestic violence victims."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 770(6)(c) (1981) ("Giving that person immediate and adequate written notice of his
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rights, which shall include information summarizing the procedures and relief available to
victims of the family or household abuse . .."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 209A, § 6(4)
(West Supp. 1993) ("Whenever any law officer has reason to believe that a family or house-
hold member has been abused, ... such officer shall ... give such person immediate and
adequate notice of his or her rights. Such notice shall consist of handing said person a copy
of the statement which follows below and reading the same to said person."); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 764.15(c) (West Supp. 1993) ("After intervening in a domestic dispute ...a
peace officer shall advise the victim of the availability of a shelter programs or other services
in the community and give the victim the statutory notice . . . . The notice shall include fur-
nishing the victim with a listing of the phone numbers of area shelter program services and
a copy of the following statement ...."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341(3) (West Supp.
1993) ('The peace officer shall tell the victim whether a shelter or other services are avail-
able in the community and give the victim immediate notice of the legal rights and remedies
available. The notice must include furnishing the victim a copy of the . . . statement."); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 455-080(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("The officer at the scene of an alleged inci-
dent of abuse shall inform the abused party of available judicial remedies for relief from
adult abuse and of available shelters for victims of domestic violence."); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-6-602 (1993) ("Whenever a peace officer arrests a person for domestic abuse ...if the
victim is present, the officer shall advise the victim of the availability of a shelter or other
services in the community and give the victim immediate notice of any legal rights and
remedies available. The notice must include furnishing the victim with a copy of the ...
statement ...."); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171-1225(l)(a)-(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) ("When
investigating an act of domestic violence, a peace officer shall ...make a good faith effort
to explain the provisions of [this act] pertaining to domestic violence and advise victims of
all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including advising each person of the availabil-
ity of a shelter or other services in the community ...[And] provide a person suspected of
being the victim of an act of domestic violence with a written copy of the . . . statement.");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:10(I) (1990) ("[A]II peace officers shall give victims of abuse
immediate and adequate notice of their right to go to . . .court . . . to file a petition asking
for protection orders against the abusive person and to sign a criminal complaint at the po-
lice station."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C-25-23 (West Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer
shall disseminate and explain to the victim the following notice, which shall be written in
both English and Spanish."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7.B(l) (Michie 1989) ("[Aldvising the
victim of the remedies available under the Family Violence Protection Act ... the right to
file a written statement or request for an arrest warrant and the availability of domestic vio-
lence shelters, medical care, counseling and other services"); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 812(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1994) ("Every police officer, peace officer or district attorney investigating
a family offense under this article shall advise the victim of the availability of a shelter or
other services in the community, and shall immediately give the victim written notice of the
legal rights and remedies available to a victim of a family offense ...."); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B-5(a) (1989) ("The local law enforcement officer responding to the request for assis-
tance . .. is authorized to advise the complainant of sources of shelter, medical care, coun-
seling and other services."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(l) (Anderson 1989 & Supp.
1992) ("Any law enforcement agency that investigates a domestic dispute shall provide infor-
mation to the family or household members involved regarding the relief available under this
section [and the criminal domestic violence statute]."), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.2
(West 1992 & Supp. 1993) ("It shall be the duty of the first peace officer who interviews
the victim of the domestic abuse to inform the victim of the twenty-four hour statewide tele-
phone communication service ... and to give notice to the victim of certain rights. The
notice shall consist of handing such victim the following statement ...."); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2711(d) (Supp. 1993) ("Upon responding to a domestic violence case, the police
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to Rico require written notice of rights and services."37 Information
officer shall, orally or in writing, notify the victim of the availability of a shelter, including
its telephone number, or other services in the community. Said notice shall include the fol-
lowing statement: 'If you are the victim of domestic violence, you have the right to go to
court and file a petition requesting an order for protection from domestic abuse."'); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-15-5(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993) ("Notice by the police officer to the victim shall
be by handing the victim a copy of the ... statement ... "'); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-
103(7)(B), (C) (1990 & Supp. 1993) ("[W]hen a law enforcement officer responds to a do-
mestic violence call and the alleged assailant is no longer present, such officer shall: ...
advise the victim of the availability of a shelter or other services in the community and give
the victim immediate notice of the legal rights and remedies available by furnishing the vic-
tim a copy of the ... statement ... ."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1993)
("When any peace officer has reason to believe a [family member] is being abused, or that
there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, although no protection order
has been issued, that officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent the abuse, includ-
ing ... explaining to the victim his or her rights in these matters."); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 10-99-030(4) (West 1990) ("When a peace officer responds to a domestic violence
call, the officer shall advise victims of all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, includ-
ing advising each person of the availability of a shelter or other services in the community,
and giving each person immediate notice of the legal rights and remedies available. The no-
tice shall include handing each person a copy of the following statement ...."); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-9(b) (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 7- 20-104 (1987) ("At the time of ar-
rest ...or as soon thereafter . . . the peace officer shall advise the victim of the availabili-
ty of a program that provides services to victims of battering in the community and give the
victim notice of the legal rights and remedies available. The notice shall include furnishing
the victim a copy of the ... statement.'); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8. § 621 (Supp. 1990).
1307. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.520(s) (1991) ("During the course of responding to an of-
fense involving domestic violence, a peace officer shall orally and in writing inform the
victim of services available to the victim and of the rights of the victim. ... ); CAL PE-
NAL CODE § 13701 (West 1993) ("Furnishing a written notice to victims at the
scene. ... ); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(1) (1986 & Supp. 1993) ("Any law enforcement
officer who investigates an alleged incident of domestic violence shall advise the victim of
such violence that there is a domestic violence center from which the victim may receive
services. The law enforcement officer shall give the victim immediate notice of the legal
rights and remedies available ... using simple English as well as Spanish and shall distrib-
ute [notice]. ... ); IDAHO CODE § 39-6316(2) (1993) ("When a peace officer responds to a
domestic violence call, the officer shall give a written statement to victims which alert the
victim to the availability of a shelter or other resources in the community, and give the
victim a written notice provided by the department of law enforcement."); 750 ILCS
60/304(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12.1(c) (West 1985)
("Providing an abused person with immediate and adequate notice of the person's rights. The
notice shall consist of handing the person a copy of the following statement written in Eng-
lish and Spanish, asking the person to read the card and whether the person understands the
rights."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(6) (1981) ("Giving that person immediate and
adequate written notice of his rights, which shall include information summarizing the proce-
dures and relief available to victims of the family or household abuse ...."); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch 209A, § 6(4) (West Supp. 1993) ("Whenever any law officer has reason to
believe that a family or household member has been abused, such officer shall ... give
such person immediate and adequate notice of his or her rights. Such notice shall consist of
handing said person a copy of the statement which follows below and reading the same to
said person."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15C (West Supp. 1993) ("After intervening in
19931
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which the police must provide includes shelter referral," the right
to initiate contempt proceedings after a violation of a protection or-
der," the right to file a criminal complaint,"1 0 the right to file
a domestic dispute . . .a peace officer shall advise the victim of the availability of a shelter
programs or other services in the community and give the victim the statutory notice ....
The notice shall include furnishing the victim with a listing of the phone numbers of area
shelter program services and a copy of the following statement . . . "); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 629.341(3) (West Supp. 1993) ("The peace officer shall tell the victim whether a shelter or
other services are available in the community and give the victim immediate notice of the
legal rights and remedies available. The notice must include furnishing the victim a copy of
the ... statement."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-602 (1993) ("Whenever a peace officer ar-
rests a person for domestic abuse ... if the victim is present, the officer shall advise the
victim of the availability of a shelter or other services in the community and give the victim
immediate notice of any legal rights and remedies available. The notice must include furnish-
ing the victim with a copy of the ... statement ...."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-23
(West Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer shall disseminate and explain to the victim
the following notice, which shall be written in both English and Spanish ...."); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 812(5) (McKinney 1994) ("Every police officer, peace officer or district attorney
investigating a family offense under this article shall advise the victim of the availability of a
shelter or other services in the community, and shall immediately give the victim written
notice of the legal rights and remedies available to a victim of a family offense ....");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (it shall be the duty of the
first peace officer who interviews the victim of the domestic abuse to inform the victim of
the twenty-four hour statewide telephone communication service ... and to give notice to
the victim of certain rights. The notice shall consist of handing such victim the following
statement .... "); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993) ("Notice by the po-
lice officer to the victim shall be by handing the victim a copy of the . . . state-
ment. ... ); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7)(B), (C) (1990 & Supp. 1993) ("When a law
enforcement officer responds to a domestic violence call and the alleged assailant is no lon-
ger present, such officer shall ...advise the victim of the availability of a shelter or other
services in the community and give the victim immediate notice of the legal rights and reme-
dies available by furnishing the victim a copy of the ... statement."); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.99.030(4) (West 1990) ("When a peace officer responds to a domestic violence
call, the officer shall advise victims of all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, includ-
ing advising each person of the availability of a shelter or other services in the community,
and giving each person immediate notice of the legal rights and remedies available. The no-
tice shall include handing each person a copy of the following statement . . . ."); WYo.
STAT. § 7-20-104 (1987) ("At the time of arrest ... or as soon thereafter . . . the peace
officer shall advise the victim of the availability of a program that provides services to vic-
tims of battering in the community and give the victim notice of the legal rights and reme-
dies available. The notice shall include furnishing the victim a copy of the . . . state-
ment .... "); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (1992).
1308. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(d)(3) (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 415.606 (West 1993); 750 ILCS 60/304 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(3) (West Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-04 (1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7)(c) (1990 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2)(c)
(Supp. 1993).
1309. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-104(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993).
1310. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/112A-30(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-23 (West Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-100(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH
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an affidavit and obtain a warrant for the batterer's arrest,"" the
batterer's eligibility for parole and possible release, 12 and the im-
portance of preserving physical evidence. 3 3
Four states require the notice be available in Spanish and
English," 4 and Alaska and Massachusetts require a reasonable ef-
fort to give notice in the victim's language. 5 Rhode Island, more-
over, recognizes that domestic violence occurs in all of its communi-
ties and, therefore, provides notice in six different languages.3 6
More civil protection order statutes should follow the lead of these
states and of the Illinois protection order statute, which requires writ-
ten notice of rights and services in the language appropriate for the
victim, even if it is braille or sign language.
3 7
In addition to notification of rights and services, the better state
statutes require the police to assist victims in obtaining these same
rights and services. Fourteen states and Puerto Rico require the police
to assist the victim with transportation.""31 In particular, twelve
states require the police to transport the victim to shelter if request-
ed. 3' In eighteen states and Puerto Rico, the police must assist the
CODE ANN. § 77-36-2(3)(b) (1990 & Supp 1993).
1311. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(d)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
1312. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A § 6(6) (West Supp. 1993).
1313. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 60/304(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-7.B.(6) (Michie 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-100(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2(3)(b) (1990 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.030(3)(a) (West 1990).
1314. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236,12(1)(c) (1985). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-23 (West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-15-5(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
1315. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.520(b) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(4)
(West Supp. 1993).
1316, R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-15-5(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (Written notice is available in
Cambodian, Hmong. Spanish, English, Laotian. Vietnamese. French, and Portuguese).
1317. 750 ILCS 60/304(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-30(a)(4)
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993).
1318. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 60/304(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.12(I)(b) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.785(3)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(3) (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(6)(B) (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(2) (West
1987 & Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.080(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13.7B(2) (Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a) (1989) (authorized); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 204-100(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7)(B)(i), (ii) (1990 &
Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2(4) (1990 & Supp. 1993): WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.030(5) (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-9(c) (Supp. 1993); P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
8. § 621 (1992).
1319. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(g) (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 709.9061)(1987 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 69-6316(3)(1993); 750 ILCS 60/304(a)(7)
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victim in obtaining medical care.' Thirty states and the District of
Columbia require the police to assist a petitioner in removing the re-
spondent and gaining possession of the parties' residence. 21 Eleven
states and Puerto Rico require the police to accompany a domestic
violence victim to retrieve her personal property.' Case law sup-
ports this police involvement. In FitzGerald v. FitzGerald32 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not
ruling on appellant's request for the return of her property, and if she
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(3) (West Supp.
1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.080(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7B(2)
(Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a) (1989) (authorized); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-
100(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7)(B)(ii) (1990 & Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030(5) (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-9(c)(Supp.
1993).
1320. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(g) (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
38b(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 709-906(1) (1987 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO
CODE § 39-6316(3) (1993); 750 ILCS 601304(a)(7); 725 ILCS 5/112A-22(c): IOWA CODE
§ 236.12(1)(a) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.785(3)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 &
Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(3) (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 770(6)B (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(2) (West Supp. 1993);
MINN. STAT. § 629.342(3)(1) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.080(5) (Vernon
Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7B(2) (Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a)
(1989) (authorized); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5(A)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-100(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1993);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10-99-030(5) (West 1990); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (1993).
1321. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.050(b)(2) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-208 (Michie
1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(3)(b) (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
103(3)(b) (West 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(C)(4)(9) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(6)(a)(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(2) (1991 &
Supp. 1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 586-7 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 39-6309 (1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.12(1)(c)(1) (West 1985); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(5) (Supp. 1993); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.785(3)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01.9 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-925, 928 (Supp.
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:4(I(a)(2), :6(1) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(2), (6) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7B.4 (Michie 1989); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-04 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(3) (Anderson 1989 & Supp.
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(1)(f) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5(c) (1988 & Supp.
1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.15(i)(3) (West Supp 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1108(a)(2) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.080 (West 1986); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813-12(6)(a) (West Supp. 1993).
1322. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(g) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
102(7.5)(a) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(5) (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS
60/304(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(8) (Supp.
1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(C) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C-25-29(b)(12) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7B(3) (Michie 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a) (1989) (authorized); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(1)(c), .719 (1991);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-100(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (1993);
see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1323. 406 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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could obtain the property, the order may include the assistance of the
sheriff.324 Some innovative states also require the police to assist a
petitioner in obtaining her children from the batterer, 3 ' obtaining
an arrest warrant, 6  obtaining an after hours order from a
judge,' and in serving process on the respondent.ta'
Some jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, authorize
the court to order the police "to take such action as the Family Divi-
sion deems necessary to enforce its orders ....,,9 Courts have
held that the police are obligated to enforce a civil protection or-
der. 3' Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia require
the police to take a report of a domestic violence incident. 33' Flori-
1324. Id. at 54.
1325. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(a)(3) (1989) ("Enforcement may include, but is not
limited to: ... assisting the recipient of an order granting sole custody of children to obtain
sole custody of the children if the defendant refuses to release them.").
1326. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7)(B)(i) (1990 & Supp. 1993).
1327. 750 ILCS 60/304(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 209A. § 6(5) (West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1106(b) (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-253A(B) (Michie Supp. 1993).
1328. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.040(a) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-208
(Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 5606(a), 5802(a) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-4-102(10) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(a) (Supp. 1993);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 586.7 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6310(2) (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-22(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1993); MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B:01.9 (West Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.060(2) (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6.A (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 153-b (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-04 (1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4F (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4.1(A) (1988 &
Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-609 (1991 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.090(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(6)(a) (West Supp.
1993).
1329. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(9) (1989); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01.6(a)(10) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-.5A(5) (Michie
1989 & Supp. 1993).
1330. Baker v. City of New York, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (hold-
ing law enforcement officers have a duty to enforce civil protection orders); Sorichetti v. City
of New York, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219, 228 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding police have an obligation and
authority to act when violation of a protection order is reported); Tammy S. v. Albert S.,
408 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (Fam. Ct. 1978) (finding military police, on request, must enforce
order of protection issued to military wife who lives on the military base); Nearing v. Weav-
er, 670 P.2d 137, 138-39 (1983) (holding that a police officer has a duty to arrest a batterer
without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the batterer had been
served with a protection order and has violated it).
1331. ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701 (West 1992);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38d (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1032 (1989
& Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 709-906 (1985 & Supp. 1992); 750 ILCS 60/303 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.785 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2141 (West
1993]
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da, Massachusetts, and Utah provide that the police report shall be
available to the domestic violence victim free of charge.
332
Two states, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, demonstrate consider-
able statutory initiative and foresight by authorizing the police to
seize a batterer's weapons when investigating a domestic violence
call. 333 New Jersey's statute permits discretionary seizure of weap-
ons on the premises if the police officer believes the weapon exposes
the victim to risk of serious bodily injury."' The Pennsylvania
statute requires seizure of weapons used in a domestic violence of-
fense. 335 The New Hampshire civil protection order statute also re-
quires the police to seize any deadly weapons used or threatened with
use during a violation of an existing civil protection order. 3'
Courts also authorize the police to seize weapons during a domestic
violence call. 337 In Johnson v. State,338 an officer acted within
his authority when, during a domestic violence call after the officer
had probable cause to arrest the defendant for violation of a domestic
violence injunction, the officer seized the defendant's gun which was
in plain view. 339 In People v. Johnson,' the police were justi-
fied in conducting a limited warrantless search for a gun when re-
sponding to a domestic violence complaint because upon arriving at
Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 28.257 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1993); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-601 (1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.137 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-8 (West 1982); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-12 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.32 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 40.6 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-5 (1988 & Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-21 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103 (1990 &
Supp. 1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.18 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-2 (1990 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030 (West 1990 & Supp.
1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-9 (1992 &
Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 7-20-107 (1987).
1332. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A.
§ 6 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2 (Supp. 1993).
1333. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(3)(d) (West 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. § 6113(b) (1991).
For a full discussion of warrantless searches, see infra notes 2186-202 and accompanying
text.
1334. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(3)(d) (West 1992).
1335. PA. STAT. ANN. § 6113(b) (1991).
1336. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173B:8(I)(b) (1990).
1337. See Johnson v. State, 567 So.2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Johnson,
585 N.Y.S.2d 851 (App. Div. 1992).
1338. 567 So.2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1339. Id. at 33.
1340. 585 N.Y.S.2d 851 (App. Div. 1992).
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the scene they heard a woman scream not to shoot.'" More state
statutes need to order active police assistance to domestic violence
victims and increase law enforcement's frontline role as an informa-
tion provider. In State v. Nakachi, 3 2 the court held that the police
are authorized to order a couple to leave their vehicle and conduct a
search where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the respon-
dent is armed and where the police suspect recent physical abuse
between the parties."343
13. Police Liability For Inaction
As stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court:
As "on the scene" enforcers of domestic-violence laws, police and
law enforcement officials play a principal role in protecting battered
women. Ineffective police response is a chief reason for continuing
high rates of domestic violence. Police are under increasing pressure
to take a more active role in preventing domestic violence, and a
failure to do so has prompted calls for increased police liability for
failure to respond to such incidents. Clearly, incidents or the likeli-
hood of incidents of domestic violence are a valid concern of police
and they should take steps to try to prevent their occurrence."
The following discussion provides a review of court cases in which
domestic violence victims have sued police departments. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind, however, that lawsuits may not be the only way
to improve police practices in domestic violence cases. Advocates in
some jurisdictions have been effective in changing police tactics
through consistently filing complaints and commendations with local
police officials, drawing attention to officers who are incorrectly and
correctly handling cases. Advocates have also improved police practic-
es through legislative advocacy, and by becoming involved in police
training on domestic violence.
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Deshaney v. Winnebago City Social Services Department,'345 which
addressed the issue of the state's duty to protect citizen's from private
violence. In that case, a minor boy sued the Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
1341. Id. at 852.
1342. 742 P.2d 388 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987).
1343. Id. at 388.
1344. City of Grafton v. Swanson, 497 N.W.2d 421, 423 (N.D. 1993) (citations omitted).
1345. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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county deprived him of substantive due process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment when the department failed to protect the petition-
er from his father's violence, despite notice that he was at risk of
abuse.'346 The Court held that the county did not violate the
plaintiff's substantive due process rights, finding that Social Service's
notice of the danger and expressions of willingness to protect the boy
did not establish a "special relationship" giving rise to an affirmative
constitutional duty to protect him.347 While the Deshaney Court
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not
impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from
danger which the state itself did not create or from which the state
did not limit the individual's ability to protect herself, the Court
affirmed that the state violates the Equal Protection Clause when it
selectively denies its protective services to certain disfavored minori-
ties.
134 8
The Court's decision in Deshaney did affect battered women's
ability to hold the police and local municipalities liable for failure to
respond to abuse victims' calls for protection. Prior to the Deshaney
decision, courts in a number of jurisdictions had recognized causes of
actions against the police for failure to protect domestic violence
victims. Courts held police who failed to assist domestic violence
victims liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of substantive
due process rights based on a special relationship between the victim
and the police created by a protection order,'349 under the Four-
1346. Id. at 193.
1347. Id. at 197.
1348. Id.
1349. See, e.g., Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding spe-
cial relationship between municipality and battered woman where she was shot after police
had been informed of threats against her and had lead her to believe that action would be
taken on her behalf); Dudosh v. City of Allentown. 629 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (rec-
ognizing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of due process rights
against the individual police officers and police department); Ashby, 841 S.W.2d 184 (finding
no special relationship where battered was beaten to death following issuance of protection
order); Baker v. City of New York, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1966) (holding that while
municipality may not be held liable for failure to provide general police protection, there may
be liability where a special duty exists to protect a person or class of persons, in this case
recipients of civil protection orders); Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983) (holding
that police officers are potentially liable to any intended beneficiaries of a protection order if
they knowingly fall to enforce it and that state law which mandates arrest when protection
orders are violated creates a special relationship between the police and the recipient of the
protection order).
Note that some battered women have brought suits against parties other than police
officers claiming the acts or omissions of these parties were the proximate cause of their
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teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause,35" and under negli-
gence theories of liability.
135
Post-DeShaney cases reveal that a battered woman may continue
being battered. See, e.g., Koepke v. Lao, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
special relationship creating duty to warn domestic violence victim of potential assault can be
a relationship between actor and batterer or between actor and victim of abuse; here the third
party who became involved in couple's domestic dispute did not have such a duty to warn).
1350. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dept., 864 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(holding that to survive summary judgment on an equal protection claim the plaintiff must
offer sufficient evidence that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protec-
tion to victims of domestic violence than to other victims of violence, that discrimination
against women was the motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the policy or
custom); Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (denying
summary judgment to the city police officers based on claims that the police violated equal
protection by failing to provide the same protection to domestic violence victims as it does
to victims of other crimes); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (holding an individual police officer liable for discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause but failed to find a pattern, practice or policy needed to
hold the city liable); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984)
(holding that the wife assaulted by husband after police received numerous requests for pro-
tection stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause where the police had a practice or
pattern of consistently affording less protection to battered women than to other assault vic-
tims); Bruno v. Codd, 419 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief against the police department to compel the officers to perform a duty
imposed upon them by law, to exercise their discretion in a reasonable and nonbiased manner
to protect battered wives from their offending partners, just as they would protect other
citizen's injured by assault, presented a justiciable question). But see Turner v. City of North
Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1987) (denying equal protection claim and holding that
despite a permanent restraining order, the Protection From Domestic Abuse Act does not
require that the police provide affirmative protection to victims of domestic violence but is
only addressed to follow up procedures, and therefore, since the police did not create the
danger, no special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the city creating the affirma-
tive duty on the part of the police to protect the plaintiff); Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841
S.W.2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting equal protection claim against city where battered
woman was beaten to death following issuance of civil protection injunction).
1351. See, e.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986) (holding that
municipal liability does not attach simply because injury occurs because of a violation of a
protection order;, however, when the police have notice of a possible violation they are obli-
gated to respond). But see Ashby, 841 S.W.2d 184 (holding city immune from liability for
negligence based on discretionary exercise of judgment where battered woman was beaten to
death following issuance of protection order); Hamilton v. City of Omaha, 498 N.W.2d 555,
562 (Neb. 1993) (rejecting victim's negligence cause of action against police officer and city
based on "bare legal conclusions" that the officer was negligent in not protecting her after
assuring her that he would provide protection, where she failed to allege specific acts or
omissions of the officer which would prove the existence of a duty, breach thereof and prox-
imate cause); Braswell v. Braswell, 390 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no liability
based on negligence against a police sheriff for his police deputy's murder of police deputy's
wife even though the wife sought help from the sheriff, since the sheriff was off duty at the




to bring suits against police departments for violation of the Equal
Protection Clause where the plaintiff shows that the department has a
pattern or practice of discriminating against domestic violence vic-
tims. 3 2 In some cases, state domestic violence statutes may create
"special relationships" enforceable as a property interest under the
Due Process Clause. Therefore, courts may continue to find liability
based on a special relationship created by a protection order where
the police have not provided "reasonable protection." In Coffinan v.
Wilson Police Department,'353 the court held that under the Pennsyl-
vania Protection From Abuse Act, a protection order creates a special
relationship between the police and the victim. 3 The victim's
right is not a substantive due process right rejected under DeShaney,
but rather a property right to reasonable police response.355 The
court also held that the police department's failure to adequately train
its officers may also state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 56 Police officers may al-
1352. Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that police inaction
to protect a domestic violence victim may be an equal protection violation under the
DeShaney decision which held that the equal protection claim must be specific and prove that
the state selectively denied its protective services to certain disfavored minorities. Plaintiff's
were permitted to amend their claim in accordance with DeShaney); Balistreri v. Pacifica
Police Dep't.. 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding no special relationship between the
police and the victim based on the police department's notice of victim's plight, but holding
that the plaintiff did state an equal protection claim based on animus against women); Howell
v. City of Catoosa, 729 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (holding that plaintiff's equal
protection suit failed because she did not show that the city had a policy or custom of giv-
ing less protection to domestic violence victims); Roy v. City of Everett, 823 P.2d 1084
(Wash. 1992) (holding that immunity granted to police officers in the Domestic Violence Act
only applied to actions at the scene and not to a failure to act; therefore the police were not
immune where plaintiff alleged year long pattern of non-enforcement). But see Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3rd Cir. 1990) (granting police qualified immunity to equal
protection claim based on alleged discrimination against domestic violence victims; the court
also held that the police did not violate the victim's due process right to access to the courts
where the police failed to inform the victim of her right to a restraining order as required
under the domestic violence statute).
1353. 739 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
1354. Id.; see also Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a deputy who accompanied domestic violence victim to her home to retrieve her
belongings and in whose presence the victim was murdered by her husband is not entitled to
immunity on the negligence claim since his obligation to protect the victim was no longer
discretionary once he assumed duty to accompany her to her home).
1355. 739 F. Supp. at 265.
1356. Id. at 266. But see Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1106 (1992) (find-
ing that no liability existed where protection order was issued but was never entered in po-
lice tracking system and where the statute did not create an on-going duty to investigate);
Siddle v. City of Cambridge, Ohio, 761 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (granting summary
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so be successful in suits against police departments when they are
injured on a domestic violence call due to the department's failure to
provide a back-up officer on the call.
1357
14. Working with Immigrant Battered Women
As our society becomes more open about the problem of domes-
tic violence, greater numbers of immigrant, refugee, and non-English
speaking battered women and children are turning to our courts for
protection. They learn about the relief offered by our courts from
shelters and social services systems, employers, clergy, police, school
counselors, and social workers. In addition, they profit from the edu-
cational efforts of bilingual, multicultural programs that work with
battered immigrant women. 3 ' Although domestic violence affects
all communities in the United States and cuts across race, ethnic, reli-
gious, and economic lines, undocumented battered women face greater
obstacles to escaping violence, because immigration status is a factor
that exacerbates the level of violence in abusive relationships when
batterers use the threat of deportation as a tool to hold undocumented
battered women in violent relationships.
359
judgment to police holding that police gave "reasonable protection" to the recipient of a civil
protection order and denying the equal protection claim finding no policy of discrimination).
1357. See Eyssi v. City of Lawrence, 618 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1993).
1358. Several programs which have years of experience representing and assisting battered
immigrant women have recently banded together to form The National Network for Battered
Immigrant Women. These agencies include: Ayuda, Inc. (Washington, D.C.); Asian Law Cau-
cus (San Francisco, CA); Family Violence Prevention Fund (San Francisco, CA); Main Street
Legal Services/CUNY Law School (Flushing, NY); National Immigration Project of the Na-
tional Lawyer's Guild (San Francisco. CA and Boston, MA); San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation (San Francisco, CA); The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
of the San Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco, CA); NOW Legal Defense Fund (New York,
NY); Asian Women's Shelter (San Francisco. CA); Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee
Rights and Services/Immigrant Women's Task Force (San Francisco, CA); and SAKHI for
South Asian Women (New York, NY).
1359. WILLIAM R. TAMAYO AND LESLYE E. ORLOFF, SELF-PETITIONING RIGHTS AND
PROTECTIONS FOR BATTERED ALIEN SPOUSES AND CHILDREN SEEKING LAWFUL RESIDENT
STATUS; AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1993, H.R. 1133. TITLE
II, SUBSECTION C-SAFE HOMES FOR IMMIGRANT WOMEN 3 (1993) (submitted at the request
of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate).
The legislative history of the Violence Against Women Act H.R. 1133 reiterates the
following: "[m]any immigrant women live trapped and isolated in violent homes, afraid to
turn to anyone for help. They fear both continued abuse if they stay with their batterers and
deportation if they attempt to leave." COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 1133, H.R. Rep. No. 395, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 26-7 (1993).
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Offering battered immigrant women effective assistance through
the legal system requires that advocates, attorneys, police, and courts
are willing to develop an understanding of immigrant women's life
experience. This entails being able to listen carefully to battered im-
migrant women, and craft creative legal solutions that are respectful
of each individual's cultural experience and responsive to her individ-
ual needs. Adopting an approach that focuses on each victim's needs
and life experiences focuses attention on creative use of the catch-all
remedy provisions in state domestic violence statutes, rather than
solely on an enumerated list of remedies. This approach also results
in stronger civil protection orders that directly address those aspects
of the abusive relationship which, if left unaddressed, can serve as
continuing arenas for conflict.
Battered immigrant women who seek help from the legal system
to stop domestic abuse must overcome significant barriers to receive
help. Those barriers include distrustful expectations about the legal
system, language and cultural barriers, and fear of deportation. To
overcome these barriers to the legal system it is important for advo-
cates and attorneys to build bridges with social service providers,
workers in immigrant rights organizations, and church workers who
work with immigrants and refugees. Shelter workers, domestic vio-
lence advocates, attorneys, and courts should strive to create relation-
ships with and exchange information with persons who are bilingual
and bicultural so that these groups can work together to assist bat-
tered immigrant women who need assistance from the court sys-
tem.1
36
The reticence of many immigrants and refugees to turn to the
legal system for help grows out of their experience with legal systems
Preliminary results from a survey being conducted by Ayuda in Washington, D.C.
have found that the rate of battering among undocumented Latino women married to U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents is 77%. In 69% of these cases citizen or resident
batterers had failed to file immigration petitions on behalf of their undocumented spouses.
AYuDA, UNTOLD STORIES: CASES DOCUMENTING ABUSE BY U.S. CITIZENS AND LAWFUL
RESIDENTS ON IMMIGRANT SPOUSES (1993).
1360. Most communities have at least one organization that assists battered women. Simi-
larly, most communities with non-English speaking populations have organizations, churches
or other programs which serve the needs of the immigrant or refugee population. Both groups
should work to establish ties now, so that battered women will be able to receive effective
assistance in the future. An excellent resource for attorneys, social workers and advocates
seeking to learn how to advocate for the rights of battered immigrant women is DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF BATTERED
WOMEN (Deeana Jang et al. eds., 1991).
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in their home countries. Many immigrants come from countries whose
legal system works very differently than ours. In countries which use
a civil law system, the primary form of evidence accepted in court is
signed, notarized, and sealed affidavits. 311 Immigrant litigants in the
United States often have great difficulty understanding our common
law system where oral testimony is not only valid evidence, but the
primary form of evidence presented.'362
Further, many immigrants come from countries where the judicia-
ry is an arm of a repressive government and does not function inde-
pendently. They expect that persons who will prevail in court are
persons with the most money or the strongest ties to the gov-
ernment.M In domestic violence cases, batterers will often manipu-
late these beliefs to get battered immigrant women to drop charges,
or dismiss protection order petitions by convincing them that since
the batterer is a citizen or has more money, or is a man and therefore
his word is more inherently credible, he will win in court and her life
will become even more difficult.'36
When battered immigrant women do approach the legal system
for help, few court systems ensure that they will be provided with the
assistance of a certified interpreter. 365 Few police departments have
implemented policies which ensure that domestic violence victims
who do not speak English can communicate their complaints effec-
tively, and can learn about their rights as family violence vic-
tims. " Further, non-English speaking battered women have limited
1361. UNrrED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN




1365. One of the first jurisdictions to guarantee access to court certified interpreters for all
litigants was the District of Columbia. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 31-2701 (1989); see also Unit-
ed States v. Mosquera. 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. N.Y. 1993) (recognizing the importance of
access to interpreters as a due process right).
Some state statutes have taken limited steps to improve access to the civil protection
order system for non-English speaking persons. A number of other jurisdictions have forms
available in Spanish to assist petitioners in civil protection order cases. Hart, supra note 991,
at 8-9. See also CAL. Civ. PROC. STAT ANN. § 6112 (West 1992) (requiring that the notice
contained in emergency protection orders advising parties of the durations of the order and
the availability of a more permanent order be printed in English and Spanish); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 6106(g)(1) (providing that forms and clerical assistance must be available to
unrepresented applicants in both English and Spanish).
1366. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-24-5(C)(7) (Michie 1990) (mandating that law en-
forcement agencies, prosecutors and judges must make all reasonable efforts to afford victims
the right to an interpreter or translator so that they can be informed of their legal rights);
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access to shelter. When non-English speaking women seek shelter,
their requests are often denied by shelter workers who prefer to offer
limited numbers of slots to women who can theoretically make better
use of all shelter services. Few shelter programs nationally have taken
steps to provide bilingual access. The Senate Violence Against Wom-
en Act' 67 addresses this problem by amending the Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act' to ensure that states distributing
funds to domestic violence programs under this federal program certi-
fy that they have developed a plan to address the needs of under-
served populations, including populations under-served because of eth-
nic, race, cultural, or language diversity.
Threats and fears of deportation are the single largest concern for
all immigrant, refugee, or non-English speaking battered women who
seek help fleeing violence. Fear of deportation may hinder battered
women from seeking legal assistance whether or not they have al-
ready obtained legal immigration status. This is largely due to incor-
rect information provided to battered women by their batterers. For
undocumented women, fear of deportation is the primary reason that
few seek any help unless the violence against them has reached crisis
proportions.
Many immigrant battered women are undocumented, despite the
fact that they are in valid marriages to U.S. citizens or lawful perma-
nent residents through whom they could legally obtain permanent
residency. Current U.S. immigration laws place control over the im-
migration petitioning process exclusively in the hands of the citizen
or lawful permanent resident spouse. The Immigration and Nationality
Act"' contains the last vestiges of coverture in American
Law.""70 Abusive citizens and legal residents use this control to pre-
R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-8.15(B) (1988) (mandating that law enforcement officers provide domes-
tic violence victims with oral and written notice of their rights; such notice must be available
in English, Portuguese, Spanish, Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese and French). Three
other jurisdictions, Alaska. Iowa. and New Jersey, require police to provide domestic violence
victims with written notice in languages other than English. Hart, supra note 991, at 66.
1367. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2265 (1993).
1368. 42 U.S.C. § 303(a)(2)(C) (1984); 42 U.S.C. § 10402(a)(2)(C) (1984).
1369. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
1370. At common law, the concept of coverture deemed husband and wife during a mar-
riage one legal entity. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 16 (1964). Wives were subordi-
nate to husbands and lived under the husbands control. Id. This concept was incorporated
early into American immigration law, and the concept of spousal domination in immigration
law was strengthened by Marriage Fraud Amendments in 1986. Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1186 (1988)). For complete discussions of the history of immigration law and its
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vent their battered undocumented spouses from seeking protection
orders, cooperating with police, or leaving a violent home.
Subtitle D of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993 (the
"Protection for Immigrant Women"), which was passed unanimously
by the House of Representatives on November 20, 1993,3 amends
the Immigration and Nationality Act in an effort to prevent immi-
gration law from being used by citizen and resident batterers to hold
their undocumented wives and children in violent relationships."'
The legislative history of the Violence Against Women Act H.R.
1133 summarizes why these changes were needed:
Domestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in mar-
riages where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizen's legal
status depends on his or her marriage to the abuser. Current law
fosters domestic violence in such situations by placing full and
complete control of the alien spouse's ability to gain permanent
legal status in the hands of the citizen or lawful permanent resident
spouse. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident can, but is not required to, file a rela-
tive visa petition requesting that his of her spouse be granted legal
status based on a valid marriage. Also, the citizen or lawful perma-
nent resident can revoke such a petition at any time prior to the
issuance of permanent or conditional residency to the spouse. Con-
sequently, a battered spouse may be deterred from taking action to
protect himself or herself, such as filing for a civil protection order,
filing criminal charges or calling the police because of the threat or
affect on battered women, see JANET M. CALVO, SPOUSE BASED IMMIGRATION LAWS: THE
LEGACIES OF COVERTURE, (1991); William R. Tamayo, The Evolution of United States Immi-
gration Policy, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERT-
ING THE RIGHTS OF BATrERED WOMEN ch. 4 (Deeana Jang et al. eds, 1991).
1371. The Violence Against Women Act will go to conference committee as part of the
Crime Bill during the spring of 1994. We expect that the provisions contained in Subtitle D
which received bi-partisan support in the House Judiciary Committee will be accepted by the
Senate in the final version of the Crime Bill.
1372. The citizen and resident spouse's control over the immigration process and conse-
quently control over the deportation of their abused spouse in a very real sense immunizes
citizen and resident spouses who batter their wives or children from criminal prosecution for
their crimes. If the spouse or child complains to police, cooperates with prosecutors or seeks
a protection order, the batterer could turn her in to the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice and have her deported. Unless the Violence Against Women Act passes, including the
Protection of Immigrant Women, Subtitle D. there will continue to be nothing any prosecutor,
judge or advocate can do to protect her against deportation. Furthermore, none of the provi-
sions of the Violence Against Women Act aimed at preventing domestic violence and increas-
ing protection to domestic violence victims will be of any help to battered immigrant women
unless Subtitle D is included in the final version of the Act.
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fear of deportation. 3
To address this problem, the Protection of Immigrant Women
Subtitle of the Violence Against Women Act will authorize battered
spouses and parents of abused children to file their own immigration
petitions (self-petitions).' 4 They will also be eligible as abused
spouses, children, and parents of abused children for suspension of
deportation.'375 This will offer petitioners protection against their
batterers' efforts to have them deported, will make them eligible to
receive work authorization,' and will enable them to obtain law-
ful permanent residency without having to leave the United
States.'377 Undocumented spouses who are validly married to, and
have been living in the United States for more than three years with
citizens or resident spouses who have failed to file immediate relative
petitions, may file a self-petition.'378 The purpose of this provision
is to remove the control citizens and residents have over the immigra-
tion process in some families without requiring that victims suffer the
first beating.
Until the Violence Against Women Act becomes law, undocu-
mented battered women must weigh their options carefully. If they
are married to U.S. citizens, the time lapse from the date that the citi-
zen spouse files the immigration petition until the battered spouse
receives her conditional green card could be up to six months. Under
the Marriage Fraud Act,379 conditional residency is awarded to any
one who has not been married for two years on the date they receive
their residency.' 1To obtain permanent residency status, the condi-
tional resident spouse must prove two years later that she is still mar-
ried to the citizen spouse.' At the end of her two year condition-
al residency, she must file a joint petition with her spouse."
This joint filing requirement served to hold battered women in
violent relationships for two years before they could obtain permanent
1373. COMMrITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 1133, H.R. Rep. No. 395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-7 (1993).
1374. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. subtit. D § 241(a) (1993).
1375. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subtit. D § 243 (1993).
1376. Id.
1377. Id.
1378. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subtit. D § 241(a) (1993).
1379. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
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legal residency. The grave danger this posed to battered immigrant
women led Congresswoman Louise Slaughter to introduce and secure
passage of a Battered Spouse Waiver 3 1 to the joint petitioning re-
quirement. The Battered Spouse Waiver was passed as part of the
1990 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Its passage
was the first formal recognition that the structure of U.S. immigration
laws posed a danger to battered immigrant women. The Battered
Spouse Waiver allowed a conditional resident who was battered or
subject to extreme cruelty by a citizen or resident spouse to apply for
a waiver of the requirement that a joint petition be filed at the end of
the two year conditional residence. This amendment to the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, however, failed to protect battered immi-
grant women married to citizens and lawful permanent residents prior
to the filing of a petition for residency or, during the time that the
petition is pending, before the immigrant spouse receives her condi-
tional residency.""
Thus, for many battered immigrant women, all "domestic vio-
lence options" will have to be weighed against the probabilities that
acting to stop the violence may lead to deportation. When the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1993 becomes law and battered women
will be allowed to self-petition and file for suspension of deportation,
the dangers associated with obtaining immigration status in this fash-
ion will be greatly reduced." 5
Legal immigration status, or lack thereof, is not a fact that legal-
ly precludes battered immigrant and refugee women from obtaining
civil protection orders, from filing criminal charges against their
batterers, or from cooperating with criminal prosecutors. No existing
law limits court protection or the ability of the criminal courts to
1383. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
§ 216(c)(4), 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1186(c)(4) 1251 (1988)).
1384. For undocumented battered women married to lawful permanent residents, the time
lapse before she can receive her green card is over 26 months. During the time prior to the
filing of the immigration petition and throughout the waiting period until conditional or per-
manent residency is granted, a battered immigrant woman's ability to receive immigration
papers is totally controlled by the citizen or resident spouse who is in many cases the abus-
er. For further discussion of these issues, see JANET M. CALVO, SPOUSE BASED IMMIGRATION
LAW: THE LEGACIES OF COVERTURE (1991); Michelle J. Anderson, A License to Abuse: The
Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401 (1993).
1385. Until the Violence Against Women Act is signed into law, it is important to note
that the only persons who will benefit from the Act will be battered women who are married




prosecute based on the victim's or the perpetrator's immigration sta-
tus. However, the risks associated with taking action to stop the vio-
lence must be assessed in light of each battered woman's immigration
status. Therefore, it is important for advocates and attorneys who may
come in contact with battered immigrant women to be aware of the
various means available for an undocumented person to attain legal
immigration status. The most likely options for battered immigrant
women might include: 1) applying for lawful permanent residence
based on marriage to a U.S. citizen"' or lawful permanent resi-
dent; '3 2) battered women who have resided continuously in the
United States for more than seven years may be eligible for suspen-
sion of deportation;... 3) battered women who have a well founded
fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion if they are forced to re-
turn to their home country may be eligible for political asylum; 3"'
or 4) battered women who have lived continuously in the United
States since 1972 may quality for registry.3 '
Attorneys and advocates representing battered immigrant women
seeking protection orders need to be aware that the remedies immi-
grant and refugee battered women may need from the court as part of
their civil protection order may be affected by their immigrant experi-
ence and immigration status. The catch all provisions of state domes-
tic violence statutes have been used creatively to obtain relief peculiar
to the needs of battered immigrant women. The following are only a
few examples. Courts have issued civil protection orders precluding
citizen and resident spouses from withdrawing applications for perma-
nent residence filed on behalf of their abused wives. 39 Courts have
1386. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 201(b).
1387. Id. at § 203(a).
1388. Id. at § 244(a).
1389. Id. at § 208(a).
1390. Id. at § 249. Other actions that a battered woman may opt for include: 1) applying
for the Deferred Action Program, pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Operating Instructions § 242.1(a)(22); 2) obtaining a labor certification pursuant to
§ 212(a)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which are available for battered wom-
en who are skilled workers with at least two years experience, making it a rather limited
option; and 3) voluntary departure, as a last resort. The government may grant a limited
additional stay in the United States, provided the woman is of good moral character and has
the finances to enable her to depart the United States at the end of her stay. Delaying volun-
tary departure can lead to a more permanent remedy, however, if the woman can be kept
legally in the United States long enough to receive an immigrant visa through another pro-
gram, such as a family petition.
1391. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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also ordered batterers to sign statements, which are forwarded to the
embassy or consulate of the batterer's home country, informing the
consul that they are not authorized to issue visitor's visas or any
other visa to the U.S. citizen children of the parties absent court order
authorizing travel.392
In order to determine exactly what remedies battered immigrant
women may need, it is important to carefully interview the immigrant
battered woman with the assistance of a bilingual, bicultural interpret-
er or case worker. The goal of the interview should be to identify her
fears of the batterer and the factors that will complicate her ability to
leave him. Once these problems are identified, creative remedies
should be requested from the court that will address each of these
issues. Many of her concerns, including financial support, can be
addressed using the remedies specifically enumerated in civil protec-
tion order statutes.
Several difficult questions must be explored when battered immi-
grant women contemplate applying for public benefits. First, one must
determine what public benefits might be available to assist battered
immigrant women and their children. Second, before applications are
made, battered immigrant women must consider what effect applying
for public benefits may have on pending immigration petitions or on
applications that they may be eligible to file in the future.393
All persons who apply for legal immigration status must prove to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") that they will not
become a public charge. 3 ' For most immigrants,395  INS
1392. ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 8.
1393. If a battered woman has a pending immigration petition, an application for public
benefits is generally not advisable. If, on the other hand, a battered immigrant woman will
not be applying for legal immigration status immediately or in the near future, short term
reliance on public benefits may not preclude her from attaining future immigration benefits. It
is essential that advocates and attorneys assisting battered immigrant women consult with an
immigration attorney who will review the specifics of each individual's case to assess what
danger application for public benefits might pose to her immigration status. Two resources
contain an excellent chart which provides an overview of an applicant's immigration status
and the types of benefit programs for which the applicant may apply. Charles Wheeler, Pub-
lic Benefits for Immigrants and Refugees, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT AND REFU-
GEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF BATrERED WOMEN IX-1 (Deeana Jang et al.
eds., 1991) [hereinafter IMMIGRANT WOMEN]; NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, GUIDE
TO ALIEN ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1992).
1394. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (Supp. IV. 1992). They must also prove that they are not
otherwise excludable from the United States. Other grounds for exclusion include: prostitution,
criminal behavior, drug use, drug trafficking, positive tests for tuberculosis or HIV infection,
membership in the communist party and homosexuality. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Supp. 1992).
1395. Except those whose status as alien is adjusted to that as an alien lawfully admitted
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analyzes the totality of the immigrant's circumstances to evaluate
whether the immigrant will become a public charge in the fu-
ture. 3 Factors include the immigrant's age, health, past and cur-
rent income, education, and job skills.397 The government looks
closely at federal poverty guidelines and counts the spouse and all
children in determining whether the applicant falls below the poverty
line.398  Battered immigrant women who are single heads of
household will have to show an ability to provide for all family
members and dependents. 3" Past receipt of public benefits is an
important but not controlling factor in predicting whether INS will
determine that the petitioner is likely to become a public charge. 4'
It is important for battered women's attorneys, advocates, and
shelter workers to know that immigrant battered women are not cate-
gorically excluded from all public benefits programs. 4' All immi-
grants and refugees, including undocumented immigrants and persons
who received Temporary Protected Status,"4  may apply for and re-
ceive emergency medical services,"" services from the Women In-
fants Children ("WIC") program,""° school lunches, and break-
for temporary residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1) (Supp. IV. 1992).
1396. Matter of Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (1974).
1397. Matter of A. 19 I. & N. Dec. 867, 869 (1988).
1398. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 440,
441 (1993).
1399. Id.
1400. Wheeler, supra note 1393; NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, supra note 1393.
1401. Wheeler, supra note 1393; NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, supra note 1393.
Often case workers and shelter workers trying to assist battered women presume that applying
for services will always bar her ability to obtain legal immigration status. Participation in
some public benefit programs for a significant period of time may jeopardize a battered
woman's ability to obtain legal immigration status. However, temporary reliance on govern-
ment assistance programs which assist a battered women in leaving a batterer, absent longer
term dependance on the program will not generally preclude her from attaining immigration
status at some future time.
1402. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (Supp. 1992).
1403. This includes emergency medical care under Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3)
(Supp. 1991). Emergency care is defined as treatment of medical conditions that place the
patient's health in serious jeopardy, could result in serious impairment to bodily functions or
could cause serious dysfunction of any bodily part or organ. Id. Coverage includes emergency
labor and delivery, but not prenatal care. Id. See also Wheeler, supra note 1393, at IX-14;
National Health Law Program, Undocumented Aliens and Emergency Care, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 619 (1988). Free medical care is also available to undocumented per-
sons under the Hill-Burton Act. 42 U.S.C. 291c(e) (1988). Hospitals who received federal
low-interest loans are required to provide a fixed percentage of their medical services free to
indigent persons and at low cost to persons whose income is not more than twice federal
poverty guidelines. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503 (1993).
1404. The statutory mandate of the Special Supplemental Food Program for WIC is to
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fasts," enrollment in Headstart,'" public education from kinder-
garten through twelfth grade,'" 7 federal housing, 4 'a and services
available through social service block grants.'"
Lawful permanent residents, refugees, receivers of asylum, and
some amnesty applicants may apply for Aid to Families with Depen-
dant Children ("AFDC"),t4 0 Food Stamps,14 Supplemental Secu-
rity Income ("ssr'),'4 2  Unemployment Compensation Insur-
ance,' 41 3  Medicaid,' 4 4  and Job Training Partnership Act pro-
prevent poor birth outcomes and to improve the nutritional status and health of pregnant
women and infants. 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988). Because of the profound effect this program
has on citizen children, all immigrants regardless of legal immigration status are eligible to
apply for WIC benefits. Cf. id. (immigrant status is not mentioned as a bar to eligibility).
1405. Undocumented children and children of undocumented parents are eligible to partici-
pate in federal programs that provide free or reduced-price meals to eligible children at
schools, child care centers and in summer school programs such as the School Lunch Pro-
grams, 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988); the Child and Adult Care Food Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1766
(Supp. IV 1991); and the Summer Food Service Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1991). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(4) (Supp. 1992).
1406. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, supra note 1393, at xi.
1407. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (holding that states cannot impose restric-
tions that prevent children from attending public schools (K-12) due to their immigration
status).
1408. Undocumented immigrants are only eligible for public housing if they are part of
"mixed families" which contain citizens and ineligible immigrants. 42 U.S.C. § 1436a(c)(1)
(Supp. IV 1991). However, most undocumented immigrants are discouraged from applying for
federal housing programs by verification procedures. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development is required to obtain a declaration of citizenship or proof of immigration status
for all applicants and all current participants in federal housing programs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1436a(d) (Supp. IV 1991). Additionally, in many large cities the waiting lists for public
housing are so long that new arrivals may not come to the top of the list for many years.
1409. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, supra note 1393, at xi.
1410. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1993). Lawful permanent residents, refugees, receivers of asylum,
conditional entrants and parolees are eligible to apply for AFDC benefits. Id. Amnesty appli-
cants may not apply until five years after they received legalization. 45 C.F.R. § 233.50
(1993); see also Wheeler, supra note 1393, at IX-9. app. XIII-1.
1411. Only limited categories of immigrants may apply for food stamps: lawful permanent
residents, registry applicants, refugees, asylees, immigrants granted withholding of deportation,
parolees, conditional entrants, and legalized aliens who qualify for SSI. 7 C.F.R. § 273A(a)
(1993).
1412. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (Supp. IV 1991) allows lawful permanent residents, refugees,
asylees, immigrants with temporary resident status, conditional entrants, parolees, immigrants
residing in the U.S. pursuant to a stay of deportation, and immigrants granted deferred action
status, suspension or withholding of deportation to apply for SSI benefits. See also Wheeler,
supra note 1393, at IX-11 to IX-12.
1413. Immigrants who are lawful permanent residents, refugees, receivers of asylum, immi-
grants permanently residing in the United States under color of law, and other persons law-
fully working in the United States are eligible to apply for Unemployment Compensation In-
surance. 51 Fed. Reg. 29.713 (1985); see also Wheeler. supra note 1393, at IX-16. Amnesty
applicants and persons who received Temporary Protected Status are also eligible to apply. Id.
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grams." s Undocumented parents may also apply for AFDC, Food
Stamps, SSI, and Medicaid on behalf of their U.S. citizen chil-
dren. "' However, the amount of funds the family receives will be
less than that paid to families where the applicant parent is a
citizen.4 7 The grant to families headed by an undocumented parent
will only include the children's portion of the funds that other eligible
families receive.
1 418
Aside from public benefits, undocumented battered women may
receive assistance from a broad variety of non-governmental social
service programs. Often assistance with rent money, food, clothing
and emergency shelter can be obtained from local churches, homeless
programs, community groups, organizations that assist immigrants,
shelters, the Red Cross, and city or state government programs that
are not subject to federal restrictions. In addition, battered immigrant
women may have a wealth of resources available to them through
networks of friends or family members. Through years of representing
hundreds of battered immigrant women, Ayuda has learned that immi-
grant battered women are very willing to assist one another in secur-
ing temporary housing, food, clothing, and other forms of emergency
assistance.4 9 Often, clients will develop friendships with other bat-
tered women whose cases were scheduled for court on the same day.
It is important for advocates working with battered immigrant women
to think creatively about all resources available to help battered immi-
grant women in the legal system, through public or private social
service agencies and through community networks.
at app. XIII-1.
1414. Medicaid is available to lawful permanent residents, refugees, receivers of asylum.
and limited categories of persons permanently residing in the U.S. under color of law. 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (Supp. IV 1991). Amnesty applicants may only qualify for Medicaid for
emergency services during the 5 years following legalization, unless they are 65 or older,
disabled or a child under 18. 55 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1990); see also Wheeler, supra note
1393, at IX-13 to IX-14.
1415. Participants in this program must be eligible to work under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act's employer sanctions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12
(1993).
1416. See Wheeler, supra note 1393.
1417. Id.
1418. Id. at IX-10-11.
1419. See Debbie Lee et al., Community Organizing, in IMMIGRANT WOMEN, supra note
1393, at X-9 to X-10.
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H. Temporary Protection Orders
1. Remedies Available as Part of a Temporary Protection Order
Twenty-seven jurisdictions authorize the same remedies for both
civil and temporary protection orders. 42 The remaining jurisdictions
and the courts also award a wide range of relief in temporary protec-
tion orders. Remedies generally include ordering the respondent to
vacate a shared residence, " 2  to stay away from petitioner's
1420. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(c) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(C) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-206(b) (Michie 1993);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 144-102(2) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1004(d) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6308(l) (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (West 1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3105 (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 4 (West Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:25-28 (West 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-4 (Michie 1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 828.1 (McKinney Supp.
1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.718 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6107(b) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4
(1988 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5
(Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-104 (1988); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 621 (Supp. 1990).
1421. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(2) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 5552 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(b) (West Supp. 1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(6)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 39-6308(1)(b) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3106(b) (Supp. 1992); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(d) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135.A(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.4.C (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); MD.CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§4-505(a)(2)(i) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(c) (West Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.7(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(2)(b) (Supp.
1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.045(2) (Vernon 1986); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-924(2) (Supp.
1992); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.1(b) (Michie 1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:-25-
28(West 1992); N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-03.2(b) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3.A.6 (West Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 6108(a)(2) (1991); S.D. CODITIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-(2) (1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.15(g) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(1) (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1104(a)(2) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4.B(3) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(I)(b) (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(3)(a)
(West Supp. 1993); see also Anders v. Anders, 618 So.2d 452 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (granting
vacate order ex pane); Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319, 320 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
(awarding ex parte temporary protection order to petitioner that included exclusive possession
of the residence where the parties lived together but never married even though lease was in
respondent's name since landlord had told them the place was "theirs" as opposed to "his");
People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (ordering respondent to
vacate parties' residence in an ex part temporary protection order); Smart v. Smart, 297
S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (awarding wife exclusive use of the marital home and
ordering respondent husband to remove his personal effects from the home and turn over his
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home, 4 ' to stay away from petitioner's place of employment,""
and may also include an order to pay attorneys fees to a legal servic-
es organization representing the petitioner.14 14 Temporary protection
orders also frequently require no communication or contact with the
petitioner,1 5  no assaulting of the petitioner," an award of
keys to the police); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1979)
(holding ex parte eviction is not a due process violation where the deprivation is temporary,
is a remedy of last resort and does not affect title to property); MODEL CODE, supra note
15, §§ 305, 306.
1422. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(a)
(West Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6308(I)(f)
(1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3106(b) (Supp.
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135.A(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 4-505(a)(2) (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp.
1993); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.14(2)(A) (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
121(2)(c) (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac"
§ 842 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(2) (1989); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6107(1992). See
also Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319, 320 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (upholding the
granting to petitioner of an ex parte temporary protection order forbidding defendant from re-
turning to the parties' residence); People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Suffolk County Ct.
1981) (denying husband access to his home and possessions under an ex parte temporary
protection order pending a prompt hearing); MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
1423. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.7(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE,
supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
1424. Spoto v. McCarroll, 593 A.2d 375, 379 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding
that a trial court has the authority to award attorney fees to a publicly funded legal services
agency following issuance of a temporary protection order).
1425. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5505 (West 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-103(3)(a) (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4(a) (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6308(1)(e) (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-2(b)(3)(B) (West
Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); MASs.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(b) (West Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.030.2)b)(1) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29(b)(7) (West 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 842(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-03.2(a) (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3.A.2 (West Supp.
1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a)(6) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(a)(2) (Law.
Co-op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(a) (West Supp. 1993); see also Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 (Mass.
1989) (granting Court granted emergency ex parte order restraining ex-husband from commu-
nicating with his ex-wife prior to hearing on order); Cosine v. Figueroa, 609 A.2d 523 (N.J.
Super. CL Ch. Div. 1992) (prohibiting contact with the petitioner); Comas v. Comas. 608
A.2d 1005, 1006 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (prohibiting contact with former spouse);
Grant, 536 A.2d at 320 (prohibiting respondent from contacting petitioner); Selland v.
Selland, 494 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1992) (upholding temporary protection order which prohibited
respondent from coming within one hundred yards of petitioner and from telephoning her);
Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting respondent from
contacting wife); MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
1426. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(I) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(a) (1991); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 5505 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-103(3) (West Supp. 1993); FLA.
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temporary custody of the parties' children to the petitioner, 1427 no
visitation with the parties' children,4 2' no weapons possession,429
and when needed, temporary child support'43" and spousal
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(6)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993): HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-4(a)(1) (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6308(1)(a) (1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(1) (1992); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-5.1(b)(3) (A) (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3106(b) (Supp. 1992); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(b) (MichielBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2135.A(1) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.4.B (West Supp. 1992);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A. § 3(a) (West Supp. 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2950(1)(b) (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.7(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993);
MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13(2)(a) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.045(1) (Vernon
1986); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.1(a) (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842(c) (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14.07.1-03.2(a) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(l)(a) (Anderson Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3.A.2 (West Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 6108(a)(1) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-10-6(1) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(1) (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a)(1) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1.A(1) (Michie Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(1)(a) (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.125(3) (West Supp. 1993); see also Smart v. Smart. 297 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982) (restraining husband from assaulting his wife); MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305,
306.
1427. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(4) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 5513 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-103(3)(c) (West 1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(6)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6308 (1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3106(b) (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135.A(5) (West 1982);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.4 (West 1981 & Supp 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 4-505(a)(2)(iii) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(d) (West Supp. 1993);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.045(3) (Vernon 1986); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.030.1(d) (Michie
1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 828 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § SOB-3(a)(4) (1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-03.2(c) (1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(E)(1)(d) (Ander-
son Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a)(4) (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1103(c)(3) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A)(5) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(1)(c) (West Supp. 1993); see also In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 545
N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ill. 1989) (granting wife temporary custody of the couple's minor child);
Smart v. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (temporary protection order grant-
ed wife immediate custody of the children); MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306.
1428. See, e.g., Cosine, 609 A.2d at 524 (suspending visitation rights); Comas, 608 A.2d
at 1006 (denying visitation rights); Marquette, 686 P.2d at 992 (holding emergency ex parte
order which effectively denied ex-husband visitation with parties' child did not violate his
procedural due process rights because the deprivation was only for 10 days and was out-
weighed by state's interest in securing immediate protection for abused persons); In re Penny
R., 509 A.2d 338, 339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (suspending father's visitation with child after
court received unsolicited letter from the director of a mental health center stating that visita-
tion with the father is contrary to the child's best interests).
1429. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6.VII (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j)
(West 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1430. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(5) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2136.A(2) (West 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(c) (Ander-




The case law also reveals that courts generally suspend entirely
the respondent's visitation rights with the parties' children for the
duration of a temporary protection order.'432 This is true even when
suspension of visitation is the indirect consequence of an ex parte
order prohibiting contact with the custodial parent. In Marquette v.
Marquette,433 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that an ex parte
protection order which restrained the ex-husband respondent from
communicating with his ex-wife prior to the hearing, and which effec-
tively denied him visitation with his child for 10 days prior to the
hearing did not violate his procedural due process rights in light of
the state's interest in protecting abuse victims and the short period of
the suspended visitation. 
4
1
Both social science research and judicial authorities support the
suspension of visitation rights in temporary protection orders. The
National Institute of Justice (the "NIJ") civil protection order study
found agreement among judges and victims that the potential for
renewed violence is greatest during visitation." The National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (the "NCJFCJ") also
notes that since visitation provides the batterer with continued access
to the abuse victim through the children, violence against the peti-
tioner often continues.'436 A batterer may seek visitation with the
children in an effort to maintain contact with and control over the
abuse victim. 1437 Visitation remains a catalyst for continued intimi-
dation and abuse.' 438 Therefore, it is essential that visitation be ex-
plicitly suspended during the short life of the temporary protection
order, until the parties can come to court for a hearing on the full
hearing.
1431. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(5) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3106 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135.A(2) (West 1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(e) (West Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(E)(1)(c) (Anderson Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a)(3) (1991).
1432. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 306.
1433. 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
1434. Id. at 995-96; see also In re Marriage of Bolt, 854 P.2d 322 (Mont. 1993) (uphold-
ing ex parte protection order granting temporary custody to petitioner).
1435. NIl CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 43.
1436. FAMILY VIOLENCE PRoJECT, supra note 687, at 26.
1437. JUDGE BEN GADDIS, DOMESTIC ABUSE PROTECTION ORDER CONCEPTS 8 (1992).
1438. See D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 141, 151.
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2. Legal Standard for Issuing Ex Parte Orders
State domestic violence statutes generally issue temporary protec-
tion orders based on a showing of "good cause.""439 Statutes define
"good cause" to include an emergency,'"
0  immediate danger,144
immediate and present danger of abuse,'" 2 imminent and present
danger of bodily injury,'6 an occurrence of abuse," a substan-
tial likelihood of imminent danger of abuse, 44' 5 clear and convinc-
ing evidence of imminent danger of abuse,'" 6 and imminent and
present danger to a child." 7 A few states issue temporary protec-
tion orders based on probable cause of imminent and present
danger,"' or on probable cause of irreparable injury.'" 9  A
temporary protection order may also issue based on the court's rea-
sonable grounds to believe abuse occurred'" or that an emergency
1439. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(c) (1991); CAL FAM.
CODE § 5650 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(4) (West Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.4.2 (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3105 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2135.A (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.2 (West Supp.
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11(2) (Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(i) (West
Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 828(1) (MeKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.310) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3(A) (West Supp.
1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6110(a) (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4(A)(2)
(Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 204-50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
605(a) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(2) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A)
(Michie Supp. 1993).
1440. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3105(a) (Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-08
(1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6110(a) (Supp. 1993).
1441. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(d) (1989).
1442. CAL- FAM. CODE § 5650 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(4)
(West Supp. 1993); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 765.2 (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B:01.7 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-11(2) (Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6110 (Supp. 1993); TFNN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-605(a) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2A-5(a) (Supp. 1993).
1443. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(4) (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-50
(Law. Co-op. 1985).
1444. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(2)
(Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(a) (Supp. 1993).
1445. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020 (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 4 (West
Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(2) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A)
(Michie Supp. 1993).
1446. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(a) (Supp. 1993).
1447. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (Vernon
1986).
1448. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(b) (1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 586-4 (Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE § 34-4-5.1.2 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-4A (Supp. 1993).
1449. IDAHO CODE § 39-6308 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODii:ED LAws ANN. § 25-10-6 (1984);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).




Case law confirms that the petitioner must show that she is at
risk of imminent harm,'452 and she must show this by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.' 3 In most, if not all jurisdictions, evidence
of recent physical violence, which may include visible injuries to the
petitioner, is sufficient proof of imminent harm. 45" However, visible
evidence of physical harm is by no means required for a temporary
protection order to be issued.4  The case law illustrates the broad
variety of acts, threats, or situations which are sufficient to constitute
imminent harm including: petitioner's fear that the respondent would
kidnap their children; 's the respondent's visitation violations;
45 7
physical abuse following the parties divorce; 4 the respondent
screaming "bitch" at the petitioner and driving off while she still had
her hands on the car frame, resulting in her being thrown against a
tree;' 5 9 an anonymous tip to the police that the batterer was trying
to kill the petitioner; 4" ° the respondent's harassment of petition-
er;"'6' the respondent's verbal threats against petitioner; the re-
Supp. 1993).
1451. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4 (Michie Supp. 1993).
1452. Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (reversing issuance of ex
parte protection order where petitioner did not show she was at risk of imminent harm when
she alleged that the respondent assaulted her two weeks before but never alleged fear of an
attack in the future); Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. CL App. 1986) (stating that
court should renew protection order, absent evidence of new abuse, if temporary protection
order's lapsing would place petitioner in an immediate and present danger of abuse); Steckler
v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992) (upholding the granting of a temporary protection
order where wife petitioner met her burden of proving actual or imminent domestic violence
by a preponderance of the evidence); Master v. Eisenbart, Wis. Ct. App. LEXIS 1270, at *9
(Sept. 18, 1991) (upholding finding of risk of immediate harm sufficient to issue a TRO
where the police received a tip through a community "crimestoppers" information service that
the respondent was trying to kill the petitioner).
1453. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 550; Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76 (1992). Marquette v.
Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 993 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting appellant's argument that the
trial court erred when it failed to impose on petitioner the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard).
1454. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3 (1991); Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 613
N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1992).
1455. See, e.g., Steckler, 492 N.W.2d at 81.
1456. See Sanders v. Shepard, 541 N.E.2d 1150 (1. App. Ct. 1989).
1457. See Stecler, 492 N.W.2d at 78 (finding imminent danger based on the husband's
visitation violations, and allegations of physical and verbal abuse following the divorce).
1458. Id.
1459. Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
1460. Master v. Eisenbart, Wis. Ct. App. LEXIS 1270, AT *9 (Sept. 18, 1991).
1461. Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 991-92 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding the
granting of an ex pane order based on petitioner's allegation in the petition that respondent
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spondent throwing the children at the petitioner; and holding a
gun to petitioner's head.'"
3. Need for Hearing Prior to Issuance of Temporary Protection
Order
The importance of ex parte orders in the domestic violence con-
text was strongly emphasized by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Matter of Baker.'"5 In that case, the court held that the procedures
of the Domestic Abuse Act do not have to satisfy the notice require-
ments of the marriage dissolution statute.1" The court concluded
that an ex parte order is "central to the substantive relief provided for
under the act."'" 7 The court noted that notice or extensive justifi-
cation for lack of notice would impede a victim's ability to obtain the
immediate remedy and extraordinary relief the statute contem-
plates.'" Furthermore, the court even pointed out that such notice
could in fact precipitate further domestic violence.'" 9 The court
concluded that in determining temporary custody, application of the
best interest of the child standard is inappropriate in protection order
cases, as it obviates the statutory direction to focus instead on the
safety of the victim and the child.470
Forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico au-
thorize courts to issue temporary protection orders ex parte based on
a petitioner's affidavit or testimony.'47' The case law embraces this
assaulted her, continued to her harass her, made verbal threats against her, and threw the
children and the children's toys at her).
1462. Id.; see also Steckler, 492 N.W.2d at 76.
1463. Marquette, 686 P.2d at 991.
1464. Koepke v. Loo, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding granting of
temporary restraining order against ex-boyfriend after he held a gun to petitioner's head as
she exited her apartment).
1465. 494 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
1466. Id. at 286-87.
1467. Id. at 286.
1468. Id. at 286-87.
1469. Id. at 286.
1470. Id. at 290.
1471. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020(b) (1991); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp. 1993); CAL FAM. CODE §§ 5530, 5756 (West 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(3) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-15
(West Supp. 1993); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 947 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §16-1004
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Supp.
1992); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-15
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1 (West Supp. 1993); IOwA CODE ANN.
§ 236.5 (1985 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
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approach as well. Courts have issued ex parte protection orders based
on the sworn affidavit or testimony of the petitioner. 1472 Courts will
issue a temporary protection order prior to a full evidentiary hearing
if an opportunity for a hearing is promptly given to the respondent
after the entry of the order.473 In Oregon, a court will conduct an
ex parte hearing by telephone or in person within one judicial day
after the petition is filed.474 In many jurisdictions the courts will
issue emergency protection orders twenty-four hours a day. 47
While a court has the authority to issue an ex parte order, it does not
have the discretion under the domestic violence statute to deny an ex
parte hearing to determine whether immediate and present danger of
ANN. § 403.740 (Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (West
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-505 (1991); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B-01.4 (West Supp. 1993); MESS. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-9 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-020 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B-6 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-28 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson Supp. 1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (1991); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-10-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (1991); Ta. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.15 (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15,
§ 1104 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.070 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (1992); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.125 (West Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105 (Supp. 1993); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8
§ 621 (1992); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 305, 306. But see In re Baker, 481
N.W.2d 871 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an ex parte temporary restraing order
should not have been issued when no attempt to contact the husband was made).
1472. Pendleton v. Minichino, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 915 (April 2, 1992) (requir-
ing affidavit under oath and judicial involvement for ex parte order to reduce risk of errone-
ous deprivation); Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 613 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
1473. People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (holding that temporary
protection order can issue without an evidentiary hearing if defendant is accorded his right to
a hearing promptly after the order's issuance).
1474. Marshall v. Hargreaves, 725 P.2d 923 (Or. 1986) (conducting an ex parte hearing in
person or by telephone within one judicial day after petitioner files for her temporary protec-
tion order); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 305.
1475. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-103(a) (West Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (Supp.
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3105 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2135 (West Supp. 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3
(West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050
(Vernon Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr
§ 828 (McKinney Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. it. 23, § 6110 (Supp. 1993) (emergency
relief available where by filing petition before hearing officer); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4
(Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-70 (Law. Co-op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4
(Michie Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 305.
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abuse exists. In Marshall v. Hargreaves,'476 the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that a circuit judge did not have the discretion to deny a
hearing to determine the existence of immediate or present abuse for
purposes of issuing an ex parte temporary protection order even
though the petitioner has twice before requested, received, and then
dismissed such orders based on essentially the same allegations.' 4"
The statute requires, not just permits, an ex parte hearing to deter-
mine the merits of the petition before a request for a temporary pro-
tection order may be denied.'478
4. Authority to Issue Temporary Protection Orders Ex Parte
Temporary protection orders may issue in both civil and criminal
cases. In State v. Naegele,'4" a criminal case, the Ohio Court of
Appeals held that an ex parte temporary protection order issued as a
nonmonetary condition of pretrial release does not violate the
defendant's right to bail where the state has a strong interest in pro-
tecting the defendant's family members.1
480
5. Constitutionality of Temporary Protection Orders
To date, courts have rejected challenges to ex parte relief granted
in protection orders. 4"' This reflects the overriding judicial accep-
tance of the need for immediate protection of abuse victims and their
families without prior notice and hearing for the respondent. Reported
case law consistently upholds the constitutionality of ex parte tempo-
rary protection orders provided that the respondent is promptly afford-
1476. 725 P.2d 923 (Or. 1986).
1477. Id. at 925.
1478. Id.
1479. No. 920 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1980).
1480. Id.; see also State v. Dawson, No. 79AP-565 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1979) (pre-
venting the defendant from entering his own home upon motion of the state according to
statute which permits the judge to issue a temporary protection order as a pre-trial condition
of release); People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 1981) (stating that orders of
protection may be made a condition of release on bail).
1481. Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that ex parte orders
do not violate due process generally but in this case was wrongly issued because no immi-
nent harm was shown); People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (holding
temporary protection order may issue without evidentiary hearing so long as one is held
promptly after issuing the order); In re Penny RL, 509 A.2d 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (hold-
ing that due process required a hearing review within 10 days of ex parte temporary protec-
tion order which discontinued visitation rights); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (Ct.
C.P. 1979) (holding ex parte eviction of batterer does not violate due process where the
deprivation is temporary, of last resort and does not change the title of property).
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ed a hearing.482 Courts have routinely held that balanced against
the important state interest in protecting domestic violence victims
from further abuse, ex parte temporary protection orders which tem-
porarily deprive the respondent of property, visitation, or other rights
subject to a subsequent prompt hearing survive procedural due process
challenges. 4 3 Courts have held constitutional the denial of visita-
tion rights for ten days,4 " the suspension of visitation for fourteen
days,14 and the eviction from home and suspension of visitation
for fifteen days."' Some courts emphasize that the procedural safe-
guards, including sworn affidavits and mandated judicial involvement,
protect against erroneous deprivation of property or rights and there-
fore insulate ex parte temporary protection order's from due process
attacks.149
6. Extension of Temporary Protection Orders
Case law splits regarding whether temporary protection orders are
extendable. Some courts have refused to extend ex parte temporary
protection orders without a hearing beyond fourteen days, 148  and
1482. Id.
1483. Pendleton v. Minchino, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 915, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
April 2, 1992) (holding ex parte order which suspended visitation for 14 days until hearing
did not violate due process); Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (holding ex
parte order excluding respondent from home and prohibiting contact with children for 15
days prior to hearing did not violate due process); People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Suf-
folk County Ct. 1981) (respondent must be granted prompt hearing after ex parte temporary
protection order denied him access to his home and personal belongings); Marquette v.
Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding ex pare order which restrained
respondent from communicating with his wife and effectively denied visitation with his chil-
dren for 10 days prior to the hearing did not violate procedural due process).
1484. Deacon v. Landers, 587 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding ex parte order
which restrained respondent from communicating with his wife and effectively denied visita-
tion with his children for 10 days prior to the hearing did not violate procedural due pro-
cess); Marquette, 686 P.2d 990.
1485. Pendleton, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 915, at *34 (holding ex parte order which
suspended visitation for 14 days until hearing did not violate due process).
1486. Williams, 626 S.W.2d at 232 (holding ex parte order excluding respondent from
home and prohibiting contact with children for 15 days prior to hearing did not violate due
process).
1487. Sanders v. Shepard, 541 N.E.2d 1150 (11. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that an ex parte
emergency order supported by affidavits which demonstrate exigent circumstances, in this case
fear of concealment of a child, does not violate procedural due process); Pendleton, 1992
Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 915 at *34 (holding was in part because procedures requiring an
affidavit under oath and judicial involvement in issuing such protected against erroneous de-
privation of rights).
1488. Nohner v. Anderson, 446 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing the trial
court's continuance of an ex parte order until an evidentiary hearing two months later, hold-
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beyond five days."4 9 Case law has also limited temporary spousal
support to two weeks, 4 'o and capped extensions and duration of
temporary protection orders to thirty days, even if the respondent
previously consented to a continuance but now asserts the temporary
protection order has expired. 49'
However, courts in Ohio and New York have extended tempo-
rary protection orders. In Eichenberger v. Eichenberger492 the Ohio
Court of Appeals held that in light of the trial court's heavy docket
the court did not error when, after continuing a temporary protection
order hearing twice, it failed to rule on the temporary protection order
within seven days.'493 The court concluded that the limited delay
did not jeopardize the integrity or constitutionality of the
process. 4" In People v. Forman,"495 the court found sufficient
evidence to continue a temporary protection order excluding respon-
dent from the residence for an additional two weeks based on evi-
dence that he punched his wife in the mouth and knocked out one of
her two front teeth.
496
The New Hampshire domestic abuse statute illustrates an innova-
tive statutory authorization for temporary protection orders. 497 The
New Hampshire code does not limit the duration of the temporary
protection order remedies, but rather states that "[i]f temporary orders
are made ex parte, the party against whom such relief is issued may
file a written request with the clerk of the court and request a hearing
thereon."' 491 If the respondent does not challenge the order ,or re-
ing that an ex parte temporary protection order may not be extended for more than 14 days
without a full hearing and findings of domestic abuse).
1489. Zerhusen v. Zerhusen, 543 A.2d 686 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (holding courts
have no authority to enter an ex parte protection order that lasts for more than five days and
courts may not extend such order beyond the statutory five day period).
1490. Brookhart v. Brookhart, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 795 (1981) (awarding temporary support
at evidentiary hearing would become void after two weeks unless the petitioner filed for
support under the Civil Procedural Support Act during that time).
1491. Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So. 2d 1083 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the limiting
of the duration of a temporary restraining order on behalf of minor child whose custodial
parent allegedly engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior to 30 days holding that the respon-
dent did not waive his right to assert that the temporary protection order expired even though
he had earlier consented to its continuance).
1492. 613 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
1493. Id. at 682-83.
1494. Id.
1495. 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989).
1496. Id. at 759-60.
1497. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:6 (1990).
1498. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(6)(b) (1991); MODEL CODE, supra note 15.
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quest a hearing, the temporary protection order remedies are left un-
disturbed.14' Under this procedural framework, civil protection
order hearings are only scheduled at the request of either party and
hearings are held expeditiously within the constitutional time
frame. 
15
7. Appeal of Temporary Protection Orders
Courts differ regarding whether a temporary protection order is
appealable. Most jurisdictions which have addressed the issue, howev-
er, permit the respondent to appeal the temporary protection order
where the respondent challenged, on procedural due process grounds,
the ex parte nature of the order. In this context, courts have permitted
appeals of temporary protection orders entered regarding temporary
custody,"'et temporary visitation,"se2 and no contact with the peti-
tioner." Temporary protection orders entered as a condition of
pretrial release have also been found to be appealable." °
Courts in North Carolina and Ohio, however, have held that
temporary protection orders are not appealable." In State v.
Dawson, the Ohio Appeals Court held that a temporary protection
order ordering the respondent to stay away from the petitioner's home
was not appealable." In Smart v. Smart, the North Carolina Court
§ 308 (authorizing either party to request a hearing to contest or expand relief).
1499. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173B:6 (1990).
1500. Id.
1501. Sanders v. Shepard, 541 N.E.2d 1150 (III. App. Ct. 1989) (denying father's appeal
of temporary protection order ordering him to produce the parties' minor child since he did
not raise a due process objection at the hearing where the ex pare emergency protection
order did not violate notice due process requirements); Matter of Baker, 481 N.W.2d 871
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a temporary custody award in an ex parte temporary pro-
tection order due to the absence of particularized findings stating reasons for proceeding ex
parte based on best interest of the child factors and deficient notice procedures).
1502. Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So.2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding non-
final order suspending respondent's visitation rights).
1503. Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 613 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting
respondent's appeal of an initial temporary protection order finding that allegations in the
petitioner's affidavit were sufficient to support the order); Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d
501 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing wife's action challenging husband's temporary protec-
tion order against her on constitutional due process grounds).
1504. See People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Suffolk County Ct. 1981) (allowing respon-
dent to appeal a temporary protection order ordering respondent to vacate his home without a
prior hearing or prompt post order hearing).
1505. See Smart v. Smart 297 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Dawson, No.
79AP-565 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1979).
1506. Dawson, No. 79AP-565.
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of Appeals held that a temporary protection order granting temporary
custody to the petitioner and ordering the respondent to vacate the
residence and turn over the keys to the police was not appeal-
able." °7 In both cases, the courts emphasized the non-final nature
of temporary protection orders, and concluded that such orders are not
appealable since they are not the ultimate disposition of the contro-
versy. " A petitioner may also not appeal a denial of interlocutory
injunctive relief where no underlying claim for permanent injunction
relief is before the court 09
. Standards of Proof
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia, either by statute
or case law, provide that petitioners for civil protection orders must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence"1 that the court should
issue a protection order against respondent. A minority of six states
provide that the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the
1507. Smart, 297 S.E.2d at 137.
1508. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 137-38; Dawson, No. 79AP-565.
1509. Spearman v. Dupree, 342 N.W.2d 755 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (court denied appeal of
interlocutory injunctive relief where the petitioner had no claim for permanent injunctive relief
against abuse and the interlocutory relief, issued only during the pendency of litigation for
short term protection to prevent irreparable injury until the court makes a final order, is not
an action and cannot stand alone).
1510. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(a) (1989); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 948 (Supp.
1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(c) (1991); 750
ILCS 60/205 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(a) (Bums 1992); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236-4.1 (1995 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(B) (West
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-11(l) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.516.1 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4(I) (1990); N.Y. FAM.
CT. Act § 832 (McKinney Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(a) (1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(6) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(4) (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. § 15, § 1104(b) (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(b) (1992); Cruz-Fos-
ter v. Foster, 547 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991) (granting renewal of protection order on showing of
preponderance of the evidence); Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(same); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201, 1206 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding prepon-
derance of the evidence standard is proper in that it best serves the purposes of the act since
there are seldom eyewitnesses to domestic violence leading to enhanced credibility problems).
In states where the statute leaves the question open, courts have rejected imposing
higher burdens of proof than a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Hagaman, 462 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding higher standard of proof required
for divorce not required to obtain civil protection order); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d
990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is not re-




evidence that she is facing a clear and present danger or an imminent
danger."" Oregon goes into further detail and recognizes that the
imminent danger can exist when there has been either actual abuse or
the recent threat of bodily harm. 2 Four state statutes use a "rea-
sonable grounds to believe" or "reasonable cause to believe" standard
and require that abuse occurred, 3 that there is an emergency, 4
or that the petitioner is in "immediate and present" danger. 5
The standard of proof can usually be met by showing that the
respondent has subjected petitioner to recent abuse.516 Many juris-
dictions have acknowledged that past abuse is a factor to consider in
determining whether the standard of proof has been met. 5" These
1511. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102(4) (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30(6)(a) (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1) (1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.718(1) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.15(a) (West 1986); Coughlin v. Lancione,
1992 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 874, at *2 (Feb. 25, 1992) (holding that the evidence must be
unequivocal that a person was in fear of imminent harm. Here, the record was found to be
devoid of statements attributed to the defendant that "could reasonably lead one to be in fear
of imminent serious physical harm"; the trial court, therefore, abused its discretion in issuing
the protection order).
1512. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(2) (1991).
1513. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(D) (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(3)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
1514. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4(A)-(B) (Michie Supp. 1993).
1515. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5650 (West 1993).
1516. Cf., Harriman v. Harriman, No. 97826, 1990 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1200 (Sept.
25, 1990) (denying application for relief and dismissing all temporary orders previously grant-
ed where father failed to prove that her or his child had been subjected to abuse as defined
under the statute, "despite evidence that the [mother's] boyfriend may have spanked the child
on one occasion").
1517. See Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (finding suffi-
cient evidence of past abuse to show present intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm,
bodily injury or assault); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634, 635-36 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (issuing protection order when last incident of abuse, which occurred two months prior
to the civil protection order petition, was accompanied by present fear of violence by respon-
dent husband); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding that
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence were properly admitted into evidence pursuant to
the domestic violence act); Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (upholding the issuance of an emergency restraining order under the domestic violence
act based upon a finding of past harassment at the civil protection order hearing absent a
finding that the plaintiff was in present danger of domestic violence); Strollo v. Strollo. 628
P.2d 532, 534-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (admitting evidence of past abuse coupled with pres-
ent fear of future abuse where defendant threatened to kill petitioner if she divorced him and
he had beaten her for eight and a half years, most recently seven months before).
Minnesota makes it most difficult for a petitioner to obtain a protection order by
holding that evidence of past abuse is insufficient to show present danger to the petitioner.
See Andrasko v. Andrasko, 443 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a
domestic abuse protection order was improperly issued because, although specific incidents of
past abuse were alleged, there was no evidence of any intent to do present harm or a show-
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states have recognized the cycle of abuse characteristic of domestic
violence as one in which there is a tension building phase, a violent
outburst, and a calm period..... One incident of abuse, no matter
how remote in time, can be indicative of future and more severe vio-
lence.' 9 Past abuse, therefore, can create present fear in the peti-
tioner, and can signify the present intention of the batterer to do her
harm.1
52
Courts enforcing protection orders have held that a petitioner can
meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof required to
prove a civil protection order violation based upon petitioner's testi-
mony alone. 52 The court in People v. Blackwood found that uncor-
roborated testimony of the plaintiff regarding threats was sufficient to
meet the higher standard of proof necessary to prove criminal con-
tempt of a civil protection order despite the lack of other witness-
es."' Just as uncorroborated testimony of abuse was sufficient to
meet a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof for contempt in
Blackwood, it should also be sufficient to meet the lower standard of
proof required for the issuance of the initial civil protection order.
hig of present harm as required by the Minnesota act); Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d
604, 605-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that the evidence, including the husband's admis-
sion that he had abused his wife in 1984, and the wife's unsubstantiated allegation that her
husband had abused their children near the end of 1985, was insufficient to establish the
husband's present intention to do harm or inflict fear of harm and thus did not warrant a
protection order); Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335. 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the issuance of an order for protection pursuant to
the Minnesota Domestic Violence act because the only incidents of abuse were several years
before and there was no present harm or intention to do harm).
1518. BROWNF, supra note 171, at 68. While batterers are often remorseful following a
battering incident, the percentage that show remorse declines over time as violence continues.
While over 87% showed sorrow and remorse after the first incident, this figure declines to
73% after the second incident and only 58% after the third or one of the worst incidents. Id.
1519. See DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 17-46
("Domestic violence is not an isolated, individual event. One battering episode builds on past
episodes and sets the stage for future episodes. All incidents of the pattern interact with each
other and have a profound effect on the victim. There is a wide range of consequences,
some physically injurious and some not; all psychologically damaging.").
1520. Follingstad et al., supra note 317, at 115. In a study of psychological abuse in
abusive relationships, 54% of battered women use escalating levels of emotional abuse to pre-
dict physical abuse.
1521. People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742, 743 (11. App. Ct. 1985) (affirming
defendant's conviction of contempt of civil protection order where ex-wife testified to an
encounter where defendant called her a "fucking whore," "a dead bitch," and told her that
"he had a plot waiting for her." Defendant denied making such remarks, and no other wit-
nesses testified. The court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to meet the standard of




One court, when faced with the issue of accepting petitioner's unsup-
ported testimony, noted that the petitioner's failure to call the police
was not a basis for challenging the petitioner's credibility. 5' The
court in Blackwood recognized that the credibility of the petitioner
must be assessed in light of the dynamics of domestic violence and
the effect of the power and control relationship on the parties." 4
Her ability to meet the standard of proof necessary to obtain a civil
protection order must be determined while keeping these issues in
mind.1525
Three jurisdictions explicitly provide by statute that a petitioner
can extend her protection order for good cause. 526 The judge pre-
siding over the civil protection order hearing uses his or her discre-
tion to determine whether good cause for extension exists.527 Case
law suggests that in order to show good cause, the petitioner must
meet the same general standards of proof she met upon her initial
request for the civil protection order.5  She must usually show by
a preponderance of the evidence that she is still in fear of harm by
1523. Betts v. Floyd, No. CX-91-2155, 1992 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 257, at *2 (Mar. 12,
1992) (where petitioner presented testimony and other evidence supporting her allegations of
abuse and respondent argued that she could not be believed because she did not complain to
the police when the police were called, the fact finder's issuance of a civil protection order
based on a determination of petitioner's credibility will not be overturned; case was reversed
on other grounds).
1524. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d at 745.
1525. Battered women, especially those who have been victimized over a long period, tend
to underestimate both the frequency and the severity of the violence they experience when
their reports are compared to witnesses' reports, hospital recordes, etc. See BROWNE, supra
note 171, at 10; see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at
38-39. Some of the victim's behaviors within the court system can be understood in light of
the control the batterer has managed to enforce by isolating the victim. Through incremental
isolation of the victim, some batterers can increase their psychological control of the victim
to the point that they literally determine reality for the victim. The psychological control
tactics used by batterers are similar to those used in brainwashing prisoners of war and hos-
tages. The more successful the batterer has been at isolating the victim, the more he controls
what she believes and does.
1526. See D.C. CODE ANN. 16-1005(d) (1989) (granting extensions of protection orders for
good cause); 725 ILCS 5/l12A-20(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (extensions only for good
cause shown); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(B) (Michie Supp. 1993) (allowing extensions of
protection orders for up to six months upon a showing of good cause); Maldonado v.
Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1993) (noting that a civil protection order can be extend-
ed for good cause); Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. 1991) (noting that a
protection order may be modified, extended or rescinded upon a showing of good cause). For
a full discussion of civil protection order extensions, see infra notes 1749-64 and accompany-
ing text.
1527. Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 42.
1528. See Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930 & n.3.
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the respondent. 5"
Fear of harm may be assessed, as in cases of civil protection
order issuance, in light of past abuse and prior protection orders. 5"
In fact, the judge issuing a civil protection order can be found to
abuse his or her discretion in determining whether good cause for
extension exists if he or she fails to consider the history of abuse be-
tween the parties or the provisions of any prior protection
orders." As the court held in Cruz-Foster v. Foster, the effect of
the stay-away order on the question of whether the civil protection
order should be extended must be considered.532 The court further
held that in deciding whether to extend a protection order issued
pursuant to the District's Intrafamily Offenses Act 3 beyond one
year, the "entire mosaic" should be considered, including all episodes
of violence during the parties' marriage.' Therefore, the court
may not simply rely on a lack of recent episodes of physical abuse to
deny extension of the protection order.
Extension of a civil protection order should not be denied solely
because the respondent is incarcerated.535 As the court held in Mal-
donado v. Maldonado, incarceration does not preclude a showing of
good cause. 5 The court based its holding upon several factors in-
cluding the effect termination of the civil protection order would have
on child support payments, and the possibility that respondent would
be released before anticipated, would escape, or would gain access to
a telephone or a third party through whom he could harass petition-
er." The court stated that:
[A]ithough a [civil protection order] does not guarantee that such
conduct will not occur, it nonetheless serves as some deterrent.
1529. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 784 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
sufficient evidence to support the decision to extend the order since the wife would be
placed in a position of immediate and present danger of abuse if the order were not extend-
ed).
1530. See, e.g., Boniek, 443 N.W.2d at 198.
1531. Cf. Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 42-3.
1532. Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930-31 (remanding case to trial judge to consider the
effect of a stay-away order on the question of whether a civil protection order should be
extended).
1533. D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (1989).
1534. Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930-31.
1535. Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 42 (holding that the trial court judge abused his discretion
in finding that good cause for extension of civil protection order did not exist when respon-
dent was "locked up").
1536. Id.
1537. Id. at 43-44.
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Thus, we conclude that even if the husband remained incarcerated,
that circumstance would not prevent him from engaging in conduct,
either alone, through others, or both, that would be barred by the
[civil protection order] if it had been extended.'538
Modification of civil protection orders can occur upon a showing of
good cause""' or a substantial change in circumstances." °
J. Efforts to Improve Accessibility to the Courts for Battered
Women Appearing Pro Se
1. The Need to Make Courts Accessible to Domestic Violence
Victims...
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges rec-
ommends that court facilities be specifically designed to provide pro-
tection and security for victims and their witnesses. The Council
states that "[v]ictims and witnesses awaiting hearings in family vio-
lence cases are frequently intimidated by defendants in the same room
or waiting area .... Courts must provide secure, separate waiting
areas for victims in family violence cases because of the likelihood of
threat, intimidation, harassment or recurring violence." '' 2
The vast majority of domestic violence victims in every jurisdic-
tion come to court seeking civil protection orders without the assis-
tance of counsel.s Appearing pro se is difficult for the terrified
victim of abuse, often encountering the court system for the first
1538. Id. at 43.
1539. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(d) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. Act § 844
(McKinney 1983).
1540. MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.528(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. § 15,
§ 1103(b) (1989). For a full discussion of civil protection order modifications, see infra notes
1743-48 and accompanying text.
1541. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 313.
1542. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 39; see also Bozer v. Higgins, 596
N.Y.S.2d 634, 637-38 (Sup. Ct. 1992). In Bozer, the court upheld a security policy which re-
quired all persons entering the court to pass through a magnetometer and have their brief-
cases searched on the grounds that, like airport searches, it was consensual and protection to
those in court outweighed the intrusiveness of the search. Id. The court gained support for its
holding from a federal case which noted that "the need to protect Family Courts from the
very real potential for violent incidents more than justifies the use of magnetometers. the
emotional stresses of divorce proceedings ... [and] domestic violence are fertile grounds for
violent incidents in Family Court." Legal Aid Society of Orange County v. Crosson, 784 F.
Supp. 1127, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
1543. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 143. Based on research conducted by a spe-
cial task force, it is estimated conservatively that in most jurisdictions at least 66% of do-
mestic violence victims appear at civil protection order courts pro se.
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time. Petitioners must not be dissuaded from seeking protection from
the courts due to their fear and lack of knowledge about courtroom
procedures. Jurisdictions have responded to the needs of these peti-
tioners applying for protection pro se in several ways.'5"
Both state statutes and case law encourage and require court
employees to assist petitioners in filing for civil protection or-
ders.' 5 Twenty-one states permit designated court employees to as-
sist with preparation and filing of petitions for protection orders."
1544. DOMESTIC vIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASEs, supra note 23, at 39. The author of
this section of the book suggests the following court procedures: ensuring that a safe place is
available in the court house for abused parties to wait until their case is called; requiring that
the parties sit on opposite sides of the court room; calling domestic violence cases as early
as possible on the court calendar or having a calendar that is solely for domestic violence
cases; ensuring that any statements made from the bench indicating that the court takes evi-
dence of domestic violence seriously in the cases before it; using court policy to assure the
safety of the abused party by ordering the alleged abuser to remain in the courtroom until
the abused party has left the building; ordering the bailiff to accompany the abused party to
transportation; having multiple actions with the same parties remain under the jurisdiction of
one judge. Id.
1545. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 302, 510 (including training for court person-
nel).
1546. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-203(a) (Michie 1993) (the clerks of the court shall provide
simplified forms and clerical assistance to help petitioners with the writing and filing of a
petition if the petitioner is not represented by counsel); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 946(d)
(Supp. 1993) (court provides forms and instructions in simple understandable English; court
staff shall assist in filing all necessary papers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(3)(c)(l)-(2) (West
Supp. 1993) (clerk assists petitioners in obtaining injunctions and provides simplified forms
with instructions); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(d) (1991) ("Family violence shelter or social
service agency staff members designated by the court may explain to all victims not repre-
sented by counsel the procedures for filling out and filing all forms and pleadings necessary
for the presentation of their petition to the court. The clerk of the court may provide forms
for petitions and pleadings to victims of family violence or to any other person designated by
the superior court ... authorized to advise victims on filling out and filing such petitions
and pleadings. The clerk shall not be required to provide assistance to persons in completing
such forms or in presenting their case to the court. Any assistance provided . . . shall be
performed without cost to the petitioners. The performance of such assistance shall not consti-
tute the practice of law ...."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3(d) (1985) (family court desig-
nates employee or nonjudicial agency to provide forms and assist the person completing the
application); 750 ILCS 60/205(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (domestic abuse advocates to
assist victims in preparing petitions); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.730(2) (Michie/Bobbs
Merrill Supp. 1992) (provide accept and file forms requesting protection order); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2138 (West Supp. 1993) (make applications available, provide clerical assis-
tance to the petitioner, advise indigent applicants of the availability of filing in forma paupe-
ris, and provide notary services); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 764 (2) (West Supp. 1992)
(provide forms and clerical assistance in completing and filing complaint and other necessary
documents; assistance may not include legal advice; clerk provides written notice of resources
where plaintiff may receive legal and social service assistance); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(4)(d)-(f) (West Supp. 1993) (court provides simple forms and clerical assistance to
help write and file petitions; court shall advise petitioner of right to file a motion and affida-
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A Minnesota court upheld provisions of the Domestic Abuse Act that
require the court to provide forms and clerical assistance to help with
the writing and filing of petitions, to advise the petitioners of their
rights to file a motion and affidavit and to sue in forma pauperis, and
to assist with the writing and filing of motions and affidavits. 47
The offering of these services by Court employees did not constitute
an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Oklahoma has upheld the right of the courts to issue preprinted court
forms which the petitioner can fill out and file as a request for a civil
protection order against a due process challenge.
154
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia do not require
filing fees from civil protection order petitioners.' Of those states
vit and to sue in forma pauperis and shall assist in writing and filing the motion and affi-
davit; court shall assist in serving respondent by published notice); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 455.508 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (explain to unrepresented petitioners the procedures for filing
all forms and pleadings; advise petitioner of right to file a motion and affidavit to sue in
forma pauperis; notice of available clerk assistance will be conspicuously posted; assistance is
provided without cost to petitioners); NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.050(3) (1986) (clerk of court
shall assist any party in completing and filing the application, affidavit, and any other paper
or pleading necessary to initiate or respond to petition; assistance does not constitute the
practice of law); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(c) (1992) (clerk or other designated employee
assists petitioner in completing necessary forms for filing summons, complaint or other plead-
ing); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 823(a)(i) (McKinney 1983) (rules of court authorize probation
service to confer with potential petitioner's about filing petition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.2(D) (Supp. 1992) (at request of plaintiff, the clerk of the court shall prepare or assist
the plaintiff in preparing the petition); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.718(3) (1991) (clerk provides
forms and instruction brochure explaining rights under the statute); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 6106(g) (1991) (courts and hearing officers shall provide simplified forms and clerical
assistance in English and Spanish to help with the writing and filing of the petition for pro-
tection by an unrepresented petitioner, advise petitioner of tight to file an affidavit in forma
pauperis, and assist with the writing and filing of affidavit); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4(1)-
(2) (Supp. 1993) (provide forms and assistance and inform unrepresented plaintiffs of possibil-
ity of filing in forma pauperis and of means available for the service of process); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.030(3) (West Supp. 1993) (all clerks offices provide forms, instruc-
tions, and informational brochures, and names and telephone numbers for community resourc-
es; assistance provided by clerks is not the practice of law); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-4(e)
(Supp. 1993) (magistrate courts are to provide assistance to certain petitioners); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-21-103(e) (Supp. 1993) (provide standard forms with instructions for completion).
1547. State v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681, 682-83 (Minn. 1981).
1548. Cf. Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 994-96 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
civil protection order and temporary protection order, which were obtained using pre-printed
court forms, on the ground that there were procedural safeguards sufficient to satisfy
defendant's due process rights, given the interest of the state in protecting victims of domes-
tic violence).
1549. ALA. CODE § 30-5-1 to -11 (1989); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5512(a) (West 1993);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (1989);
Ga. Code Ann. § 15-6-77(a) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO
CODE § 39-6305 (1993); 750 ILCS 60.202(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); KAN. CIv. PROC.
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that do require filing fees, twenty-one states expressly authorize the
court to waive the filing fee for indigent petitioners. 5 ' Four of the
states with waiver provisions add that the income from the abuser
cannot be considered in determining whether a waiver of fees is
appropriate."" Maryland, Nebraska, and West Virginia allow filing
fees to be deferred until the completion of a full hearing. 552 Indi-
gent victims in need of the court's protection are more likely to ap-
proach the courts when no fees are required or when waiver provi-
sions are in place and are readily accessible. However, since filing for
a waiver adds another level of paperwork for pro se petitioners who
may already find the court process daunting, state statutes should
explicitly require that no filing fees be charged in civil protection
order cases. No fees should be charged for filing, service, or for se-
curing the appearance of witnesses. 553
For pro se litigants, courts have been willing to avoid strict
CODE § 60-3014(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.730(3) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 764(3) (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West
Supp. 1993); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(3)(a) (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-9 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:3(I) (1990); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 821
(MeKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
j 3113.31(J) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2(c) (West Supp.
1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.710 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-2 (1988); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(c) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1 (Michie Supp. 1992).
1550. ALAsKA STAT. § 25.35.040 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(c) (Supp.
1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-259b (West 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West
Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3
(West Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2138 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 4-504(c) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-508 (Vernon Supp. 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-122 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924.01 (Supp. 1992); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.050(2) (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3(G) (Michie Supp.
1993); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6106(c) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(e) (Law. Co-op.
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-10-3(4) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(a)
(1993); TIx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(t) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4(3)
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.040(2) (West 1986); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-
103(d) (Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 312.
1551. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-924.01 (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3(G) (Michie
Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.040(2) (West 1986); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-
103(d) (Supp. 1993).
1552. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504(c) (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
924.01 (Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-4(f) (Supp. 1993).
1553. In order to encourage states to move swiftly to change their laws and procedures to
ensure that domestic violence victims will not be required to pay fees in connection with
civil protection order proceedings, both the House and Senate versions of the Violence
Against Women Act condition funding awards to states upon each state certifying that no
such fees are charged. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., Ist Sess., title I, subtitle A, § 113 (1993);
see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 312.
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interpretations of court rules that could be used to bar access to the
courts, and frustrate the intent of the civil protection order statute of
offering victims swift and immediate protection. In Campbell v.
Campbell,55 while holding that a family court rule should not be
used to file a domestic violence claim, the court concluded that the
wife's petition substantially followed the form outlined in the civil
protection order statute, noting that she had reasonable cause to fear
domestic violence, and should be considered a petition filed under
such statute.55 In Capps v. Capps,' 6  petitioner filed a motion
to modify an order of protection when she intended to file a motion
to renew the order for 180 days. 557 The court, however, treated her
motion as a motion to renew and granted her the appropriate
protection."5
Courts have also ruled against application of court procedural
rules that are antithetical to the goal of domestic violence statutes to
offer swift protection to victims.5 59 A Pennsylvania court deter-
mined that the requirement that preliminary objections be filed was
prohibited in a protection order action so as not to frustrate the act's
purpose of creating an efficient, simple, and rapid vehicle for resolu-
tion of domestic disputes." These relaxed procedures to avoid de-
lay in issuance or implementation of the order are essential in cases
of domestic violence, where the victim's emergency needs predomi-
nate.
561
1554. 584 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1555. Id. at 126.
1556. 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
1557. Id. at 549.
1558. Id. at 552-53.
1559. See generally Mahorsky v. Mahorsky, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 210 (Ct. Comm. Pleas
1982).
1560. Id. at 213.
1561. Cf. Traiforos v. Mahoney, No. C3-92-340, 1992 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 633 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 7, 1992) (petitioner filed for both an ex parte temporary protection order and a
civil protection order against respondent; temporary protection order was issued, but at the
civil protection order hearing the trial court found the abuse did not occur. The order was
then converted to one for harassment and prohibited future contact between the parties. Re-
spondent argued that the trial court erred in issuing a harassment order under the Domestic
Abuse Act. Appellate court held that the trial court's error was harmless and the order
stood); Lucia v. Lucia, 465 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (where husband failed to file
exceptions to the trial court's order excluding him from the marital home pursuant to the
Protection From Abuse Act, he waived the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on appeal);
Knisely v. Knisely, 441 A.2d 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (where husband failed to file excep-
tions as to whether his actions constituted abuse at the hearing where he was ordered to
refrain from abusing his wife and to keep the peace, he waived the issue on appeal).
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2. Developing and Funding Domestic Violence Coordinating
Councils and Other Services for Battered Women
Forty-five state statutes provide for and fund crisis intervention,
counseling, shelter, and advocacy services for abused women and
their children."52 States should follow the lead of Connecticut
which recently enacted a law creating family violence and interven-
tion units in the Connecticut judicial system.1"3 The intervention
units accept referrals of domestic violence cases from judges and
provide judges with an oral or written report and recommendation in
each case. 5' The intervention units must identify victim service
needs, and contract with victim and offender services to provide these
programs. 5' The intervention unit will also create a pretrial family
violence education programs for persons charged with domestic vio-
lence." 6
The Connecticut statute highlights the crucial need for judicial
1562. ALA. CODE § 30-6-2 to 8(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.010 (1991); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-284(C), 25-311.01(E), 36-3002 (1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.4 (West
1992); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-7.5-105, 39-22-801 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-580 (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.01(2) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-20 to 22 (1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 587-1 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-
5212 (1993); 20 ILCS 2210/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-17-14-2, 33-19-5-
l(a), 33-19-6-13 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.15A (West Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-108(a) (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46: 2126 (West Supp. 1993);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8501 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-404(b)
(Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 17, § 16 (West Supp. 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 400.1505 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 357.021 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-5-93(o), 25-7-13(2), 93-21-115, 93-21-117 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 451.151(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-10-601(4)(g), 52-6-101
(1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-904 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT.ANN. § 122.060(4) (Michie
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173B:13 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:14-11, 37:1-12.1
(West Supp. 1993); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 62(5)(f), 459-b to -c, 481-f (McKinney 1992);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-9 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03-22, 27-01-10 (Supp.
1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.34 (Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 3-
314.1 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.045, 108.660 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 611.13 (1990); RPI. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-6.1 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 25-1-10, 25-10-16 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-411(b) (Supp. 1993); TEX.
HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 51.001 (West 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63a-6 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 18 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-318 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.123.090 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-1-24, 48-2C-6 (1992); Wise.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46.95, 973.055 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 9-2-102 (1991).
1563. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(a) (West Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE,
supra note 15, §§ 501, 502 (creation of state and local advisory councils on domestic vio-
lence).
1564. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(c).
1565. Id.
1566. Id. § 46b-38c(g).
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training in the dynamics of domestic violence. The Connecticut Judi-
cial Department must, therefore, establish an ongoing training program
for judges, bail commissioners, court clerks, and family division per-
sonnel to inform them of the law on domestic violence, the function
of the family violence intervention units, and the use of protection or-
ders." 7
3. Discovery
Civil protection order discovery provisions should be formulated
in light of the summary nature of civil protection order proceedings
and the need to avoid delays in the issuance of a protection order.
Courts, attorneys, and advocates must guard against the use of discov-
ery by respondents as a means of intimidating petitioners or locating
them. Discovery which requires any direct contact between the parties
should not be used or enforced. 5 Minimizing contact between the
parties in domestic violence cases reduces friction between the parties,
and reduces the danger to the petitioner posed by each renewed con-
tact.
Most states do not have special discovery rules applicable to
civil protection order cases, but limit the discovery to that which is
"appropriate to the proceedings involved or preclude discovery where
necessary to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment,
disadvantage, or [any] prejudice to any person or the court."'" In
domestic violence cases, these standards must be interpreted in order
to best protect the victim."sT Discovery is inappropriate, for exam-
ple, when it delays the issuance of a protection order or when the
batterer uses discovery to gain access to details concerning the
victim's current life, especially information concerning her
whereabouts.'571 The District of Columbia's Intrafamily Rules ac-
commodate the need to assure victim safety, and define the scope of
discovery as "limited to matters directly relating to the incident or
incidents of abuse alleged in the petition or answer, and to medical
treatment obtained as a result of those incidents"; expansion of the
scope of discovery is allowed only by court order.'572
1567. Id. § 46b-38c(i) (West Supp. 1993).
1568. See, e.g., D.C. CT. R. ANN., SUPER. CT.-INTRAFAMILY PROC., R. 8(d) (Michie
1993).
1569. Orloff, supra note 768, at 141.
1570. See id at 143.
1571. Id. at 143.
1572. D.C. Cr. R. ANN., SUPER. CT.-INTRAFAMILY PROC., R. 8(b) (Michie 1993).
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Case law on the scope of discovery in domestic violence cases
illuminates the need to safeguard the victim from intrusive discovery
procedures which threaten her freedom. In a New York case, 3 the
respondent in a family offense proceeding sought an examination of
the petitioner before trial."574 The court denied the request because
of the "tensions," the "risk of violence," and the "need for permanent
protection" which characterize family offense cases. 575 It explained
that delay caused by an examination would only aggravate these
conditions.'576 The court implied that an examination before trial
can be inherently intimidating, especially for an unrepresented peti-
tioner."r The court set forth that:
In most cases, petitioners who bring family offense petitions come
to the Family Court for immediate protection for themselves and
their children. They are seldom represented by attorneys. They come
to the court tense, desperate, fearful and confused. To subject them
to an examination before trial would be totally inappropriate and
would discourage future petitioners from bringing petitions.' 8
Batterers have attempted to use discovery rules to gain access to
a battered woman's diary. In a New Jersey case,' 9 the court found
that the wife's diary about specific events occurring between herself
and her husband, which she kept at her lawyer's direction, was a
work-product properly not produced to her husband.' These
courts have clearly acknowledged in their holdings restricting discov-
ery and strictly adhering to the work-product immunity rule, that the
dangers inherent in the examination and discovery procedures out-
weigh the importance of the respondent's right to acquire certain
information.
4. Concerns Regarding the Danger Continuances Pose to
Battered Women
Continuances should generally be avoided in civil protection
order cases and, if granted, should be conditioned upon the issuance
1573. Kunz v. Kunz. 462 N.Y.S.2d 559 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983).
1574. Id. at 559.




1579. Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
1580. Id. at 1209.
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of a temporary protection order."" Continuances of the hearing
date at which the civil protection order can issue pose a danger to
petitioners." 2 The longer the delay, the more time the batterer will
have to gain access to his victim and attempt to convince her to
withdraw the petition.' In other cases where the petition is filed
as violence is escalating, the delays caused by continuances leave the
battered woman subject to threats and intimidation. 5" Repeated
continuance of civil protection order cases undermines battered
women's confidence that the legal system can help them, makes them
reluctant to follow through, and reinforces their batterer's claims that
the courts will ultimately side with him.'
A number of state statutes have provided restrictions on the use
of continuances in civil protection order cases that reflect an under-
standing of these concerns."' When a continuance is granted, a
1581. Ganley, supra note 21, at 43-44.
1582. Id. Batterers in domestic violence cases "may have terrorized the abused party over
the period of time between the assault and the time of the court proceeding in order to
coerce the [battered woman] into compliance. The more time that passes between the event
and the court hearing at which the civil protection order is ultimately issued, the more likely
that the batterer may increase the violence and threats of violence, or may bargain effectively
with the battered woman promising that if she drops the charges or changes her testimony in
court the violence will stop or the batterer will give her custody of the children." Id.
1583. Id. at 45; see also Clark v. State, 629 A.2d 1322, 1328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
(ruling that the court "cannot allow witnesses to be threatened or improperly coerced into
dropping charges. At a minimum, we must protect those who appropriately seek the protec-
tion of the courts.').
1584. HARLOW, supra note 3, at 3. Battered women call the police and seek help in 51%
of the cases in order to keep an abusive incident from happening again; 47% of battered
woman call the police to stop an ongoing incident from happening. Id.
When battered women do seek help it is essential that they be able to receive a swift
response offering protection without delay. If continuances are allowed, women are open to
threats from abusers. Research on successful completers of batterer treatment programs pro-
vides insight on just how pervasive the use of threats is for batterers. Among the 2/3 of
batterers who remained non-violent 18 months after the completion of treatment, researchers
found that the overwhelming majority of batterers continued their use of threats. See Jeffery
L. Edelson & Maryann Syers, Relative Effectiveness of Group Treatments for Men who Bat-
ter, 26 Soc. WORK REs. & ABSTRACTS 10, 10-17 (1990).
1585. Ganley, supra note 21, at 45.
1586. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(c) (1989) (a temporary protection order may be issued if a
continuance is granted); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West 1992) (if continuance
granted ex parte orders are not continued except by consent or good cause shown); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(6)(c) (West 1986) (continuances should be granted only for good
cause); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586.5 (Supp. 1992) (continuance granted for a maximum of
ninety days if no service); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1) (1993) (if one party is represented by
counsel, a continuance shall be granted only for good cause, should be kept to a minimum
reasonable duration and may be limited to certain requested remedies); 750 ILCS 60/213(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (continuances should be granted only for good cause, should be kept at a
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temporary protection order should issue to protect the petitioner dur-
ing the intervening period. 5'
Courts have adopted varying approaches to the amount of time a
case may be continued when a temporary protection order is in effect.
In Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that
the trial court did not err in twice continuing a civil protection order
hearing date, thereby failing to hold the hearing within seven days of
issuance."" The court's rationale was that the limited delay was
reasonable in light of the trial judges' heavy docket responsibilities,
and neither the integrity nor the constitutionality of the proceedings
were jeopardized."89  However, in Nohner v. Anderson,1590 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not contin-
ue an ex parte order for more than 14 days without a full hearing
and findings of domestic abuse. 59 Additionally, in Keneker v.
Keneker,'592 the court placed limits on continuances, holding that
despite the respondent's consent to a continuance of a temporary
protection order based on alleged inappropriate sexual behavior with
his minor child, he did not waive his right to assert the expiration of
the temporary protection order since under no circumstances could a
temporary protection order remain in effect for longer than 30
minimum reasonable duration and may be limited to certain requested remedies); IowA CODE
ANN. §§ 236.4.5, 236A.3 (1985) (continuance granted to secure counsel); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. I 46:2135(E) (West 1982) (continuance shall not exceed 10 days); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. fit. 19. § 765(6) (West Supp. 1992) (may extend temporary protection order); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-11 (Supp. 1992) (maximum of 20 days); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Act §§ 826(a),
828.3 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) (continuance to allow for three days following service
and temporary protection order may be extended); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6107(c) (1991)
(may extend temporary protection order); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (if
served late, the respondent is entitled to a continuance to have five full days notice); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.09(b), (c) (West Supp. 1993) (maximum continuance of 14 days after
date of hearing if served less than 48 hours before hearing but if no service, maximum con-
tinuance is 14 days from date of request for rescheduling); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.050 (West Supp. 1992) (if served late, the respondent is entitled to a continuance to
receive five full days notice); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(d) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (upon con-
tinuance, temporary orders may be extended).
1587. N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr §§ 826(a) & 828.3 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) (continu-
ance proper to allow for three days following service and temporary protection order may be
extended); PA. STAT. ANN. § 6107(c) (1991); see also D.C. Cr. R. ANN., SUPER.
Cr.-INTRAFAMILY PROC., R. 4(d) (Michie 1993).
1588. 613 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
1589. Id. at 682.
1590. 446 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
1591. Id. at 203.





Courts may, however, limit the respondent's ability to frustrate
the rapid progress of a protection order case. In Mahorsky v.
Mahorsky,"5  the court held that the respondent may not file pre-
liminary objections in a protection order action because these objec-
tions will frustrate the purpose of the Protection from Abuse Act to
create an efficient, simple, and rapid vehicle for resolution of a do-
mestic violence dispute."595
The preferred procedure that offers protection to the rights of
both victims and respondents would be to allow extension or reissu-
ance of a temporary protection order in any case where service has
not been achieved. In cases where respondent has been served, courts
should condition granting respondent's request for a continuance on
entering, extending, or reissuing a temporary protection order. In
cases where petitioner requests a continuance, the court should seek
respondent's consent to the temporary issuance of a protection order
or hold a brief hearing to determine whether a temporary protection
order should issue or re-issue pending a hearing on the petition for a
civil protection order. All temporary protection order statutes should
set the length of the temporary protection order at 30 days so as to
improve the possibility of holding a full hearing within a statutory
time frame that preserves respondent's due process rights to a hear-
ing.
5. Representation of Petitioner in Civil Protection Order Cases
A grave need exists to greatly increase legal representation of
petitioners in civil protection order proceedings. 59 Several state
statutes specifically provide for the petitioner's legal representation in
a proceeding to issue"' and to enforce a civil protection
order."598 The protection order statutes of Illinois and Texas provide
1593. Id. at 1085.
1594. 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 210 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1962).
1595. Id. at 212-13.
1596. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 19.
1597. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6 (1989) (petitioner has right to counsel); IDAHO CODE § 39-
6306(1) (1993) (if either party has counsel the court may enter an order to appoint council
for the opposing side); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-103(e) (1988) (court may appoint an attorney to
assist and advise petitioner); see also 750 ILCS 60/213.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (court will ap-
point independent counsel for high risk adult petitioner with disabilities).
1598. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5805 (West 1993) (court may appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner to enforce a restraining order); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-907(4) (1988) (requires the
Department of Public Welfare to provide "emergency legal counseling and referral"); WASH.
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that prosecutors may assist petitioners in obtaining protection orders
where a criminal prosecution is also filed. 5' Case law raises other
issues connected to the representation of the petitioner in a civil pro-
tection order proceeding. Roe v. Roe"t° illustrates how an attorney's
representation can protect a domestic violence victim. In that case, the
court held that a diary kept by the petitioner on the advice of her
attorney was not subject to discovery as work product of the
attorney.' Some progressive courts are, however, unwilling to
penalize a domestic violence victim in need of protection when her
lawyer is not well-trained in domestic abuse dynamics and litigation.
In Kobey v. Morton,'" the court reversed a mutual restraining
order against the petitioner and held that her attorney's comment
during her temporary protection order hearing that the court might, on
its own motion, issue mutual restraining orders was not an implied
consent to the order where the attorney expressly objected at the
hearing.'6 3
Significant evidence indicates that a pro se system which allows
battered women to seek a civil protection order without the assistance
of an attorney is necessary to ensure access to protection. It is, how-
ever, far from ideal. In the vast majority of cases, the court hearing
for a civil protection order is the first time a battered woman sees her
batterer following the violent incident which led to the petition. The
victim is terrified, unclear of her legal rights, and highly susceptible
to the batterer's influence and control. The National Institute of
Justice's study of civil protection orders found a grave need for legal
representation of battered women in civil protection order proceedings.
Most judges they interviewed believed strongly that:
[v]ictims who are not represented by counsel are less likely to get
protection orders and, if an order is issued, it is less likely to con-
tain all appropriate provisions regarding exclusion from the resi-
dence, temporary custody of children, child support, and protective
limitations on visitation rights ....
Further, difficulties for victims in advocating effectively for
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.120 (West 1986) (if probable cause of violation of order the dis-
trict attorney must assist a petitioner who cannot afford an attorney).
1599. 750 ILCS 60/202 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.04 (West Supp.
1993).
1600. 601 A.2d 1201 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
1601. Id. at 1209.
1602. 278 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1991).
1603. Id. at 532.
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their own rights may also stem from the climate of emotional crisis
or fear that usually precipitates seeking a protection order. Since
most victims are not schooled either in the applicable law or in
legal advocacy, skilled legal assistance may be crucial in obtaining
adequate protection orders.
An attorney for the petitioner is especially important when the
respondent appears with counsel .... In cases in which the peti-
tioner is without legal representation ... it is often more difficult
for the court to adequately assess the need of the victims and any
children for protection."0
One solution to the lack of legal representation for battered
women is to increase the role of lay advocates. This solution requires
cooperation between lawyers and nonlawyer advocates who are autho-
rized to represent battered women who go to court seeking civil pro-
tection orders. Lay battered women's advocates for many years have
been assisting battered women who seek civil protection orders. They
help them prepare court papers and talk with them in the halls of the
court house about their rights. Judges have found battered women's
advocates to be of assistance to the court and have come to rely in
many instances on their expertise."605 The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota recognized the importance of non-lawyer domestic violence advo-
cates for the representation of battered women by entering an order
that permits domestic violence advocates to attend court, sit at the
counsel table, confer with the victim, and address the court in protec-
tion order proceedings and in the sentencing phase of criminal prose-
cutions.'"
Courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions have moved slowly in
adopting this enlightened approach. Lay advocates are still typically
not permitted to speak for the petitioner during the civil protection
order proceeding. This restriction on nonlawyer practice severely
limits the effectiveness of advocates, and must be changed.'" Five
innovative state statutes, those of California, New York, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin, are exceptions and specifically autho-
rize lay persons to accompany the petitioner at her civil protection
order hearing." However, even in these states, some limits are
1604. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 19.
1605. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 247.
1606. In re Domestic Abuse Advocates, No. C2-87-1089. 1991 Minn. LEXIS 34, at *1
(Minn. Feb. 5, 1991); see also Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 258.
1607. Leslye Orloff, Address at the American Bar Assoc. Commission on Nonlawyer Prac-
tice (June 25, 1993).
1608. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5519(d) (West 1993) (lay person may not give legal advice);
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placed on the lay person's role. The California statute provides that a
nonlegal support person may accompany the petitioner at the hearing
or a mediation session.'6
A sound system would make trained lay advocates associated
with battered women's programs, legal services, or law school clinics
the first line in service provision or of referral for battered women.
The lay advocates would handle cases that were fairly straight for-
ward and routine, but they would refer more complicated cases to
trained domestic violence attorneys for representation. Cases in which




In recognizing the benefits of the pro se process, it is necessary
to point out the problems. While we need a process that guarantees
access to all needy abused persons, battered women who can obtain
legal assistance from trained counsel are much more likely to receive
civil protection orders which contain complete and effective re-
lief. '63  The country needs more attorneys able and willing to act as
battered women's advocates.6 12 Few legal services programs across
the country, however, presently allocate staff time and resources to
assisting battered women. Some, like the legal services programs in
the District of Columbia, most often only offer legal representation in
domestic violence cases to batterers.
The National Institute of Justice recommends that more attorneys
undertake representation of battered women in civil protection order
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 838 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) (petitioner entitled to presence of
a counselor, non-witness friend, social worker or relative; however, lay person may not par-
ticipate unless called as a witness at the court's discretion); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6111
(1991) (specifically includes advocate and counselor); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-4 (1992 &
Supp. 1993) (specifically includes person of petitioner's choice); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.73
(West Supp. 1993) (petitioner may be accompanied in court by a service representative).
1609. CAL. FAm. CODE § 5519(d) (West 1993).
1610. Orloff, supra note 1607.
1611. NiJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 19.
1612. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 146, 161. Civil protection orders are more
likely to be awarded after trial if petitioner is represented by counsel and fewer cases are
returned to files without court action. The report concluded that counsel should be appointed
to represent petitioners in civil protection order contempt actions for enforcement and that
representation of petitioners by members of the private bar should be encouraged. Funding
should be sought to compensate attorneys for services rendered. Id.
As violence continues, greater numbers of battered women turned to informal sources
(friends) and professionals for help. "Between the first and last violent incident, the use of
lawyers rises from 6% to 50%. while that of social service agencies increases from 8% to
43%." SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATrERED WOMEN's MOVEMENT 232 (1982).
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proceedings.16 " To help accomplish this goal, local legal services
organizations should change their program priorities to place a high
priority on serving victims of domestic violence petitioning for pro-
tection orders. Setting a priority of representation of battered women
is a preventative step that may ultimately reduce the need for other
legal services. Since there is a direct causal relationship between
domestic violence, homelessness, and the need for public benefits, as-
sisting battered women may help prevent some of these other serious
problems.
One suggestion is for one-third of the funding allocated to the
programs to be spent in each of the following areas: family, housing,
and benefits. The Governing Board of the Legal Services Corporation
(the "LSC") has clear statutory authority under the Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1974 and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der 614 to distribute its funds to various legal services organizations
throughout the country in this way."" The LSC must place priority
on those populations most in need of legal services. 6 6
Family violence is a major issue in the United States and is the
root cause of many family legal problems. Thirty percent of divorced
adults cite physical abuse as the reason for their divorce.'6 7 An ad-
vocate for Brooklyn Legal Services reports that thirty percent of
divorces involve violence as a factor.' 6"s Domestic violence is thus
the root of many family legal problems. When allocating resources to
legal services programs in the family law area, the LSC should make
1613. NU CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 22.
1614. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 1609 (1992).
1615. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (1993) ("With respect to grants or contracts in con-
nection with the provision of legal assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the
Corporation shall . . . insure that (i) recipients, consistent with goals established by the Cor-
poration, adopt procedures for determining and implementing priorities for the provision of
such assistance, taking into account the relative needs of eligible clients for such assis-
tance . . . including particularly the needs for service on the part of significant segments of
the population of eligible clients with special difficulties of access to legal services or special
legal problems . . . ; and (ii) appropriate training and support services are provided in order
to provide such assistance to such significant segments of the population of eligible cli-
ents . . . ").
An alternative approach to the Legal Services Corporation setting the priorities with
funding would be to require that all programs applying for LSC funding describe whether
they provide family law assistance, the type of assistance, and whether they place a priority
on representing battered women. Programs which do not place any priority on representing
battered women should have to explain why they do not.
1616. 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2 (1992).
1617. NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MEDIA CAMPAIGN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1993).
1618. DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIES 164 (1976).
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certain that a significant portion of resources are being used to repre-
sent battered women. Investing in representation of family violence
victims is sound public policy, because ending violence in the home
has a preventative effect on so many other societal problems, includ-
ing homelessness, juvenile delinquency, and teenage suicide.
Rather than handling domestic violence cases, some legal servic-
es programs have instead placed a priority on representing indigent
persons in uncontested divorce cases. This approach allows the agency
to handle matters for a large numbers of clients with limited invest-
ment of attorney time. Allocating legal services program resources to
simple divorces when there is an overwhelming need for legal rep-
resentation in domestic violence and custody cases raises serious
questions about the commitment these programs have to offering
family law representation. Uncontested divorce cases should not be
deemed "most needy of representation." It is incumbent upon the LSC
to develop a mechanism for investigating what resources are being
devoted to family law representation, and how those resources are
being allocated. The focus of the inquiry must move beyond counting
persons served and instead place priority on the type of services
offered. Emphasizing too heavily the number of clients served drives
programs to offer less critical services, because they are the ones that
can be offered in the highest quantities. This emphasis leaves battered
women who fear for their lives and who are most needy of represen-
tation so that they may obtain full and adequate court protection
without any means of obtaining needed counsel.
A few states explicitly address the issue of the availability of
counsel for the petitioner. For example, the Nebraska statute requires
the state to provide "emergency legal counseling and referral." 
619
The Wyoming statute authorizes the court to appoint an attorney to
assist the petitioner in seeking a civil protection order."620 In Chica-
go, free legal counsel is provided by the prosecutors office to battered
women who are seeking both a civil protection order and pursuing a
current criminal prosecution,' while in Ithaca, New York, private
attorneys are paid a reduced fee by the county to represent indigent
1619. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-907(4) (1988).
1620. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103(e) (West 1993); see also IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)
(1993) (providing that where one side has counsel, counsel will be provided for other party);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §26.50.120 (West 1986) (providing that district attorney will repre-
sent victim in contested cases).




In some jurisdictions, local bar associations and other profession-
al organizations are actively involved in organizing lawyers to repre-
sent victims on a pro bono basis. For example, each year the District
of Columbia Bar offers an intensive training to local lawyers who are
willing to represent battered women. Several large Washington, D.C.
law firms, such as Crowell & Moring, also operate extensive pro
bono programs serving domestic violence victims.
6. Representation of Respondent in Civil Protection Order
Hearing
Courts across the country consistently hold that while the respon-
dent has a right to counsel in a contempt proceeding for violation of
a protection order,'6 he does not have a right to counsel during
the initial issuance of the civil protection order. 6 4 This is so even
though the respondent may be imprisoned for contempt if he later
violates the protection order.'6
Courts have further found that a legal representative's advice
does not relieve the respondent of his obligation to respect court
orders. In Nickler v. Nickler,'6 the court held the respondent in
contempt and the respondent's attorney in violation of disciplinary
rules when the attorney advised the respondent to ignore an allegedly
improperly issued civil protection order rather than take needed steps
to vacate the order.627 The court firmly concluded that
regardless of whether or not the subject order is illegal ... defen-
1622. Id.
1623. Thompson v. Thompson, 559 A.2d 311, 314 (D.C. 1989) (permitting continuance for
the respondent to secure counsel prior to hearing on criminal contempt); Sanders v. Shepard,
541 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that indigent respondent was entitled to
appointed counsel at the hearing for indirect civil contempt where he faced imprisonment);
see also N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 846(a) (McKinney 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6114(b)
(1991).
1624. Cloutterbuck v. Cloutterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082, 1087 (D.C. 1989) (denying respondent
husband appointment of counsel at initial civil protection order hearing even though he could
be imprisoned for contempt if he later violated the order), People ex rel. Williams v. Rhodes,
540 N.E.2d 1114, 1115 (11. App. Ct. 1989) (denying indigent respondent husband right to
counsel in proceeding to issue civil protection order based on his abuse of his wife). But see
ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(b) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-
6306(c) (1992); IowA CODE ANN. § 236.4(5) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3106(a) (Supp.
1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6107(a) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(c) (1985).
1625. Cloutterbuck, 556 A.2d at 1087.
1626. 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 49 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1985).
1627. Id. at 55.
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dant and his lawyer were in error when they unilaterally elected to
violate the order. Defendant, through his counsel, never approached
the court prior to the instant proceeding alleging illegality ... nor
was any other acceptable effort made to change or vacate said or-
der . 1628
The court held that "[i]f a court has competent jurisdiction to issue
an order, such an order must be obeyed until properly vacated."'629
Here the defendant transferred property in violation of an existing
protection order, and the "fact that defendant's counsel advised him to
ignore the court's order does not provide defendant with a shield
against a contempt proceeding."'
630
Further, even in the context of a criminal prosecution, the
batterer respondent may not easily prevail on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. In State v. Harper,'63t the Utah Court of Appeals
held that the defendant could not prevail on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim when he failed to show "reasonable probability" that
proper representation by his attorney would have prevented his con-
viction where the testimony of the defendant, victim, and victim's
physician overwhelmingly supported the conviction.' 632
K. Failure to Appear at Hearing
The National Institute of Justice study of civil protection order
cases found that there are several reasons why a petitioner may not
appear at her hearing for a civil protection order, including: 1) the
victim is physically unable to appear for the hearing due to injuries;
2) the victim is intimidated by threats of greater violence from the re-
spondent as a result of pursuing court action; and 3) the victim does
not understand that a second hearing is required.
633
Dr. Anne Ganley confirms in a State Justice Institute funded
curriculum for civil court judges on domestic violence that battered
women may not appear at the civil protect order hearing because their
batterers prevent them from attending. 6 In other cases, victims




1631. 761 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
1632. Id. at 572.
1633. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 29.
1634. Ganley, supra note 21, at 46.
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stopped.635 In many of these cases, Dr. Ganley reports that the
batterer has merely changed tactics.63 He begins using good be-
havior to bring an end to the court proceedings.'637 Other victims
fail to show up for hearings because their batterers have intercepted
court notices.63
The likelihood that one of these situations exists makes dismissal
of a civil protection order petition based solely on petitioner's failure
to appear without further inquiry a dangerous proposition. When a
petitioner fails to appear for a civil protection order hearing, courts
and attorneys should not agree to immediately dismiss the case. In-
stead, the matter should be continued to a new court date in the near
future. The court and counsel should make efforts to communicate
with the petitioner, and the petitioner should be sent notice of the
court date with an explanation of the importance of appearing for the
civil protection order hearing. Any court dismissal for petitioner's
failure to appear should be without prejudice.'639 When the court is
uncertain of the reason for petitioner's failure to appear and the re-
spondent asks for dismissal, courts should be especially wary and take
steps to ascertain petitioner's desires."
When the respondent fails to appear at the hearing, the court
should issue the civil protection order by default based on evidence
presented by the petitioner. "' Four states specifically authorize the
court to issue a default civil protection order when the respondent





1639. See, e.g., D.C. CT. R. ANN., SUPER. CT.-INTRAFAMILY PROC., R. 5.
1640. Orloff, supra note 768, at 154. Where the respondent requests dismissal and the
court is uncertain as to the reason for the petitioner's failure to appear, the court may want
to continue the case, notify the petitioner of the continuation date, and inform the respondent
that the case will not be dismissed unless the petitioner comes to court to request it in per-
son. Id. But see Eaches v. Steigerwalt, 569 A.2d 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that
while costs could be assessed against complainants who initiated a protection from abuse
proceeding but then failed to appear at the subsequent hearing, it was error to award these
costs to the defendant). The Eaches case runs counter to the position presently being adopted
by Congress discouraging requirements that domestic violence victims pay fees. See supra
notes 1549-53 and accompanying text.
1641. Orloff, supra note 768, at 154-55. When the respondent has been served with notice
of the hearing and fails to appear, the court, unless prohibited by statute, should issue a
protection order. Id.
1642. 750 ILCS 60/219(3) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (if the defendant is served); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 765 (West Supp. 1992) (interim relief can be issued ex parte in defendant's
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Some jurisdictions authorize the issuance of a bench warrant for
the respondent who has failed to appear to ensure that the respondent
is brought before the court."63 The petitioner should be notified of
the bench warrant issuance and the date of the continued hearing. If a
bond is set, it should be set in light of the facts pertinent to the
safety of the petitioner and the respondent's criminal record. Bench
warrants are particularly useful in jurisdictions where default protec-
tion orders must be served on the respondent before they can be
enforced. Temporary Protection Orders must always be issued simulta-
neously with a bench warrant, as this provides the victim with protec-
tion that will become immediately effective once the respondent is
detained on the bench warrant and served.
Default civil protection orders served upon the respondent are
valid orders to be taken as seriously by the courts and law enforce-
ment officials as those issued at a hearing where respondent is pres-
ent. t" If the respondent desires a new trial after being served with
the default order, the respondent must file a timely post-verdict mo-
tion." 5 Where defendant has a history of failing to appear in court,
the court may require an appearance bond to ensure his future appear-
ance.'W
absence); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 4 (Supp. 1993) (if defendant does not appear, order
continues as a matter of law); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(3) (Supp. 1993) (if the defendant
is served).
1643. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.18.050(3) (West 1993).
1644. See, e.g., People v. Zarebski, 542 N.E.2d 445 (ll. App. Ct. 1989) (affrming jury
verdict that defendant violated default protection order by harassing petitioner and entering her
residence, since jury could find that defendant's conduct constituted harassment of wife and
that he knowingly violated the protection order since the officer who served defendant with
the order advised him that he would be in violation of the order should he go into the
house).
1645. See. e.g., Melvin v. Melvin, 580 A.2d 811, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that
where a default protection order is issued when respondent fails to appear at a civil protec-
tion order hearing, the rule to show cause is not the proper vehicle by which to pursue
husband's request for a new trial on equitable grounds, as relief could have been requested in
a timely post-verdict motion).
1646. See, e.g., State v. Weller, 563 A.2d 1318, 1319 (Vt. 1989) (holding that the trial
court reasonably concluded that the defendant's failure to report to his probation officer in-
creased the risk that he would not appear in court. The defendant was convicted of domestic
violence against wife was placed on probation, and the district court required an appearance
bond to ensure that the defendant would appear).
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L. Dismissals and Withdrawal of Orders"7
Attorneys and courts should consider requests for dismissals of
civil protection orders carefully.' 48 When a petitioner asks that the
court dismiss or withdraw an order, the court should question the
petitioner outside the presence of the respondent to ascertain fully
whether the respondent is coercing the petitioner."' In cases where
the petitioner wishes to return to her batterer who has promised not
to continue the violence, the petitioner should be informed by the
court and by counsel that a civil protection order may issue even if
the parties remain together.se The provisions of the protection or-
der would prohibit further abuse.' If the court doubts whether the
petitioner's request to dismiss is voluntary, the court should continue
the matter rather than dismiss the protection order.6 2
A number of state civil protection order statutes reflect this cau-
tious approach to withdrawals and dismissals of civil protection or-
ders. New Jersey permits the court to dismiss a civil protection order
upon motion only if the court has a full record in front of it. 6 3
The Idaho statute allows for court modification of a civil protection
order if the petitioner, voluntarily and without duress, consents to the
waiver of any part of the order." Maine, Minnesota, and Nevada
require notice to the petitioner and a hearing before the respondent
may dismiss a protection order.'655 Missouri will permit the parties
1647. For the position of judicial authorities on dismissals of criminal domestic violence
actions, see MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 212. 213.
1648. Ganley, supra note 21, at 47 ("[Wle often ignore the multiple barriers to domestic
violence victims and blame them for 'their ambivalence' rather than eliminating the barri-
ers."). Id.
1649. D.C. CT. R. ANN., SUPER. CT.-INTRAFAMILY PROc., R. 10 ("In allowing dismissal,
the Court may wish to inquire carefully about the voluntariness of the petitioner's actions and
advise the petitioner of the right to refile the petition if all other statutory requirements are
met.").
1650. Ganley, supra note 21, at 46. Sometimes battered women stop the court process
because the violence has temporarily stopped and they do not feel that the order is necessary.
Abused parties may be unaware that the batterer has merely switched tactics of control-they
are using good behavior to manipulate an end to the court proceedings. Id.
1651. This type of order ensures that if the batterer re-abuses the petitioner, she will be
able to enforce her order through contempt. This order will be useful for victims willing to
attempt to reunite with their batterers. "Ninety-three percent of battered women are willing to
forgive and forget the first beating that they suffered from their partners." GILLESPIE, supra
note 124, at 147.
1652. Orloff, supra note 768, at 176-77; NU CPO STUDY, supra note 19. at 28.
1653. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(d) (West Supp. 1993).
1654. IDAHO CODE § 39-6311(4) (1993).
1655. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.5 (1981) (respondent may move to dismiss a
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
to dismiss a civil protection order by mutual consent.6 6
Case law reflects courts' struggles with the conflicting concerns
involved in the dismissal of protection orders. Courts vacillate be-
tween respecting the petitioner's request to dismiss an order and
protecting the petitioner from continued coercion and abuse. In Irene
D. v. Anthony D.,1 7 the court refused to dismiss a protection order
on the petitioner's request, finding that since the parties' 10 year old
child was struck in the course of the respondent's assault on the
petitioner, a discontinuance of the wife's individual claim would be
inimical to the child's best interest. 65  In Marshall v.
Hargreaves,"' the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a circuit
judge did not have the discretion to deny a hearing to determine the
existence of immediate or present abuse for purposes of issuing an ex
parte temporary protection order even though the petitioner had twice
before requested, received, and then dismissed such orders based on
essentially the same allegations."
Courts have also addressed dismissal of domestic violence crimi-
nal complaints. In Lakewood v. Pfeifer," ' the court refused to dis-
miss a domestic violence prosecution based on the prosecutor's
conclusory statement that insufficient evidence and supporting factual
statements existed." In Commonwealth v. Haofeld,' 3  the court,
while deciding to dismiss a domestic violence criminal prosecution
after the victim refused to testify, concluded that given the increasing
numbers of battered spouses who refuse to testify, the court should
exercise its judicial discretion based on a detailed record of the
temporary protection order only on two days notice to the petitioner of a hearing); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993) (dismissal of civil protection order only after
motion and notice); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.080.2 (1986) (respondent may move to dis-
miss temporary protection order only after two days notice to the petitioner).
1656. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.060.5 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
1657. 449 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Fain. Ct. 1982).
1658. Id. at 586; see also In re J.E.P., 432 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (ordering
dismissal of mother's civil protection order filed on child's behalf where no guardian ad
litem was appointed to represent the child); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 673 S.W.2d 478
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (vacating wage assignment provision of civil protection order where
petitioner failed to provide evidence to support maintenance request).
1659. 725 P.2d 923 (Or. 1986).
1660. Id.; see also NIJ CPO STuDy, supra note 19, at 28-29. ("While repeat petitioners
can be frustrating . . . there usually are good reasons for the victim's return ... "). For a
full discussion of the problems related to court sua sponte dismissals of civil protection order
petitions, see ORLOFF & KLEiN, supra note 26, at 60-66.
1661. 583 N.E.2d 1133 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1991).
1662. Id. at 1136.
1663. 593 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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parties' history of abuse."
While considering dismissals carefully, courts should dismiss a
protection order where a batterer has sought it in an effort to intimi-
date his partner. In Chieco v. Chieco,'" the court reversed a pro-
tection order issued to a husband, finding that the petitioner did not
fear injury or need protection but rather sought to intimidate his wife
who had commenced a divorce action based on cruel and inhuman
treatment."
M. Jury Trial
In no jurisdiction is there a right to jury trial in civil protection
order cases for the issuance, modification, or extension of a civil
protection order. Protection orders are civil in nature and the possibil-
ity of a criminal penalty upon violation does not create a right to a
jury trial." 7 This policy favorably recognizes the fact that the exi-
gent circumstances of domestic violence require speedy determinations
of whether a protection order will be issued, continued, or changed.
There is also no right to a jury trial in a contempt proceed-
ing." This policy emerges in part from the fact that contempt is
not an offense which demands the right to a jury trial." It is only
in the context of prosecutions for multiple contempt charges that the
defendant may have a right to a jury trial in some jurisdictions. 67°
1664. Id. at 1277.
1665. 566 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1991).
1666. Id.
1667. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 60/206 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (providing that there is no right to
jury trial for modifications, extension, vacation or issuance of civil protection order); Cooke
v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 376, 377 (Me. 1990) (explaining that Domestic Protection from Abuse
Act is civil in nature and even though there is the possibility of criminal sanctions for the
violation of the orders under the Act, it does not violate the constitutional right to trial by
jury in criminal cases).
1668. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6114(b) (1991) (providing that there is no right to jury
trial in an action to enforce a civil protection order).
1669. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hathaway v. Hart, 690 P.2d 514, 516 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that the defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding for violating an order has no
statutory or constitutional entitlement to a jury trial); Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d
918, 920 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (rejecting claim that contempt was a serious offense giving
rise to a jury trial since the maximum sentence authorized was six months imprisonment plus
$1,000 fine, especially in light of the emergency conditions in which such contempt cases
must be adjudged; and explaining that the Domestic Violence Act, which provides for a sen-
tence for contempt and does not give the defendant a right to jury trial on such a charge,
enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality because it does not clearly and palpably vio-
late constitutional provisions for jury trial).
1670. See infra notes 1902-16 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of
[Vol. 21:801
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
N. Court Orders in Civil Protection Order Cases
1. Findings
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges urge
states to amend civil protection order statutes to require courts to
issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law when courts
deny a civil protection order, fail to order batterers into treatment or
allow unsupervised visitation or custody to a domestic violence perpe-
trator. 67'
Both state statutes and case law require courts to make findings
of fact when issuing a protection order. Seven states mandate courts
to make either oral or written findings of fact. 672 A number of
states also require a statement of legal findings.'673 The statutes of
Illinois, Kentucky, and Maine require the court to state its reasons for
a denial or reservation of a remedy.674 Case law requires courts to
make findings of fact as to what abuse occurred."673 New York case
law further encourages courts, in an effort to aid prosecutions for
contempt, to specifically mention in findings of fact that the defen-
dant was informed of the existence and purpose of the civil protection
order.'676 In In re Marriage of Hagaman,'6" the Illinois Appeals
this issue.
1671. See FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECr, supra note 687, at 4-5.
1672. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(7)(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (mutual civil protection order
required written findings of fact and law to clarify for the police); 750 ILCS 60/214(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.1 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 1993) (mutual civil protection order requires written find-
ings of fact); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 842(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.10(a) (West 1986) (court must state findings of abuse); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4A
(Michie 1988).
1673. IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (Supp. 1992); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.735 (Baldwin 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (West 1982);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-
506(c)(2) (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6
(1993).
1674. 750 ILCS 60/221(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.735(4)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765.3A (West Supp. 1992).
1675. See Thomas v. Thomas, 477 A.2d 728, 729 (D.C. 1984) (ordering trial judge to
make findings of fact as to what specific intrafamily offenses occurred and why the court
issued a protection order); Andrasko v. Andrasko, 443 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (reversing trial court because it issued a civil protection order without issuing findings
of fact as to what abuse occurred); see also People v. Thompson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 516. 519
(Ct. App. 1984) (holding that domestic violence falls within the continuous course of conduct
exception which arises when acts are so closely connected that they form part of one and the
same transaction. Consequently, the prosecutor seeking a domestic violence conviction does
not need to elect and the jury does not need to agree unanimously on which specific act the
guilty verdict rests).
1676. See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 506 N.Y.S.2d 995 (City Ct. 1986) (noting that findings
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Court, sustaining the trial court's award of exclusive possession of the
marital residence to the petitioner, held that the trial court need not
make specific findings on all factors referenced in the statute to issue
a civil protection order, provided the record reflects that the court
considered relevant factors to determine the specific remedies.'678
While courts may not need to address every factor enumerated in the
civil protection order statute, courts should read the relevant psycho-
logical reports and prior civil protection order findings on which it
relies in determining whether to issue a protection order.679 Howev-
er, in Delisser v. Hardy," the court held that before a court may
impose enhanced penalties for contempt of a protection order, the
court must make findings of fact describing the defendant's contemp-
tuous conduct which defeated or prejudiced the plaintiff's reme-
dy. 1681
2. Advisory Opinions
A judge cannot dismiss a civil protection order sua sponte prior
to respondent having been served and joined in the action. In Sabio
v. Russell,"6 the trial court was found to be without authority to
issue an advisory opinion which found the statute providing protection
from abuse unconstitutional and dismissed the petition where the
defendant was never served with process, was not before the trial
court, and was not before the district court."63
3. Consent Orders
Eighteen state statutes authorize the issuance of consent civil
protection orders." 4 Case law also supports the issuance of protec-
should include mention that the defendant was informed of the civil protection order as these
findings will eliminate later question about the defendant's knowledge at a contempt trial).
1677. 462 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
1678. Id. at 1280.
1679. See, e.g., Matter of M.D., 602 A.2d 109. 115 (D.C. 1992) (reversing civil protection
order finding an abuse of discretion where trial court continued a prior civil protection order
suspending visitation for one year without having read either the psychiatric evaluation which
challenged the recommendation against visitation or the findings underlying the civil protec-
tion order on which the court relied).
1680. 749 P.2d 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
1681. Id. at 1209; see also Baker v. Florida, 622 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(remanding contempt conviction where court failed to make sufficient oral findings to sustain
charge); Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96 (Il. App. Ct. 1993) (failing to reverse lower
court's failure to state jurisdictional findings on record).
1682. 472 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1683. Id.
1684. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (1989) (court may approve consent agreement); DEL. CODE
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tion orders by consent of the parties." Courts will fully enforce a
civil protection order signed and agreed to by the parties. 6' In
Maldonado v. Maldonado," 7 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals concluded that encouraging consent agreements serves the pur-
pose of the Intrafamily Offense Act,' and therefore, "if the con-
sent is voluntary a trial judge ordinarily should issue the civil protec-
tion order when requested."'" 9 However, "[i]f the trial court de-
clines to issue a civil protection order freely consented to by a re-
spondent, we believe that a strong statement of reasons for not doing
so should be set forth."'" Judge Schwelb, in his concurrence, flatly
concluded that since "there was no basis whatever for any finding
that the decree was unlawful, unreasonable or inequitable, and the
judge made no such finding ... I perceive no basis for the judge's
refusal to sign the consent order."' 9
In State v. Stahl,t " the court held that a protection order ex-
tended by consent of the respondent without a finding of abuse could
ANN. tit. 10, § 948(b) (Supp. 1993) (court shall grant appropriate relief if respondent consents
to entry of a protection order); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (1991) (court may approve con-
sent agreement); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-6 (West Supp. 1993); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 236.5.2 (West Supp. 1993) (court may approve consent agreement); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3107(a) (1992) (court may approve consent agreement); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2136A (West 1982) (court may approve consent agreement); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 766.1 (West Supp. 1992) (court may approve consent agreement and may enter consent
civil protection order without finding of abuse); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-13.2 (1992) (court
may approve consent agreement); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 824 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (court
may approve consent agreement); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5OB-3(a) (1993) (court may approve
consent agreement); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31E(l) (Anderson 1992) (court may ap-
prove consent agreement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (West Supp. 1994) (court may
approve consent agreement); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.716(3) (1991) (court may approve con-
sent agreement); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(a) (1991) (court may approve consent agree-
ment); S.D. CODuIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-3 (1985) (court may approve consent agreement);
Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.12(c) (West Supp. 1993) (court may approve consent agreement);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(e) (1992) (court may approve consent agreement).
1685. See Vogt v. Vogt, 455 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. 1990) (entering consent agreement);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 552 A.2d 292, 293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that double
jeopardy did not bar criminal prosecution and consent agreement based on the same incident).
1686. See. e.g., Rayan v. Dykeman, 274 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
fully enforceable a consent agreement which required a transfer of property to respondent
despite the bankruptcy of the petitioner); Lee v. State, 799 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990).
1687. 631 A.2d 40 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993).
1688. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001, 16-1026 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
1689. 631 A.2d at 44.
1690. Id.
1691. Id.
1692. 416 N.W.2d 269 (S.D. 1987).
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form the basis for a criminal contempt charge for a violation of that
order."63 The court held that the respondent cannot attack or appeal
a civil decree entered with his consent, absent such grounds as mis-
take or fraud." Courts, relying on a sworn petition, also issue
consent civil protection orders between the parties without a finding
of abuse." 5 However, a consent mutual civil protection order will
not be issued against a petitioner where there has been no petition
filed against or finding of abuse by the petitioner."6 The civil pro-
tection order must be consented to by the parties, not by coun-
sel."u
4. Mutual Civil Protection Orders
Mutual protection orders undermine the purpose and strength of
domestic violence statutes, which seek to end violence and hold
batterers accountable. Therefore, such orders should not be permitted
absent a petition, notice, hearing, and findings of violence against
each party. Gender bias reports from many states note that judges
frequently enter mutual orders even when there was no complaint
filed and no evidence of any violent conduct by the victim."" Both
researchers and judicial authorities strongly recommend against the
1693. Id at 270.
1694. Id.
1695. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.1 (West Supp. 1992) (court may approve
consent agreement and may enter consent civil protection order without finding of abuse);
Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 40 (explaining that court should issue a consent civil protection
order if voluntarily entered into by both parties); Betts v. Floyd, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS
257 (Ct. App. March 12, 1992) (stating that civil protection order may be issued upon agree-
ment of the parties without a finding of abuse).
1696. See Deacon v. Landers, 587 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (reversing mutu-
al civil protection order since their was no finding of domestic violence by the petitioner and
noting in dicta that the statute may require that even in uncontested consent agreements the
plaintiff must present evidence to sustain the issuance of the consent civil protection order).
Under the Violence Against Women Act, H.R. 1133, S. 11, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. § 2265
(1993), which will become law in early 1994, mutual protection orders entered without a
petition, notice, hearing and specific findings against each party will not be afforded full faith
and credit by sister states.
1697. See Erhart v. Erhart, 776 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing a protec-
tion order when no evidence was offered to support it even though both parties' counsel
stipulated to the continuation of the protection order).
1698. Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 247, 253; see also Gender and Justice in the Courts:
A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judi-
cial System, reprinted in 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 586-7 (1992); Minnesota Supreme Court
Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts: Final Report, reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 829, 878 (1989); NEVADA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAs TASK FORCE, JUSTICE POR
WOMEN, 62-63 (1988).
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issuance of mutual protection orders." Four out of five victims of
intimate offenders resist assaults.tt' They passively resist by trying
to get help, threatening, or arguing or using evasive action twice as
often as victims resort to violence or aggression in self-defense and in
response to an abusive relationship.""0 The legal system's focus in
these cases should be upon identifying, restraining, and punishing the
primary aggressor in the relationship, not victims who are attempting
to protect themselves.7 " Battered women who receive help and
support when they reach out for assistance are significantly less likely
to turn to violence as the only means of protecting themselves against
their batterer's continued violence.7 3
Judicial authorities also recognize that all violence between par-
ties should not be perceived or treated equally. The recommendations
of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges are
clear and unequivocal: "Judges should not issue mutual protective or
restraining orders," citing serious issues of due process, enforcement,
and gender bias.7°' Judge Ben Gaddis, a family court judge in
Hilo, Hawaii, specifically points out the importance of identifying the
primary aggressor in a violent relationship. He explains:
One way to determine the identity of the primary aggressor is to
make an assessment as to which party is afraid of being seriously
hurt. Usually only one party is afraid of the other. The primary
1699. See FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 19.
1700. HARLOw, supra note 3, at 6.
1701. Id.
1702. "Abusive" acts reported by batterers are often acts of resistance by their victims.
Careful fact finding by the court and presentation of evidence by counsel will often reveal
that one party is the primary aggressor and the other was acting in self-defense. Ganley,
supra note 21, at 24.
Studies indicate that even when women are physically violent against their batterers
who are the primary aggressors in the relationship, women suffer more injuries during as-
saults, are attacked much more frequently, with more aggressive actions during a single attack
and each attack is more severe than when women use force against their male batterers.
Assertions that men and women are equally violent fail to account for these factors and fail
access the impact that forcible sexual assault, perpetrated solely by men, has on intimate rela-
tionships. Browne, supra note 10, at 1078.
1703. Research indicates that there is a correlation between an increase in legal protection
and services for battered women and a decrease in the number of homicides committed by
women against male partners. From 1979 to 1984, this type of homicide decreased by more
than 25%. Angela Browne & I.R. Williams, Resource Availability for Women at Risk: Its
Relationship to Rates of Female-Perpetrated Homicide, paper presented at the American Soci-
ety of Criminology Annual Meeting (Nov. 11-14, 1987, Montreal, Canada).
1704. See FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 24; see also NU CPO STUDY,
supra note 19. at 47. ("There are . . . compelling reasons to use this remedy sparingly.").
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aggressor usually is not concerned about being hurt but uses vio-
lence by the other party as a justification or explanation for his own
actions.l"
Courts should look carefully at abusive relationships to determine
who is the primary aggressor and who is using self-defense. Issuing
mutual protection orders may place a battered woman at greater risk.
Mutual orders confuse the police as to the truly dangerous party, and
increase the batterer's sense of legitimacy in his violence.7 '6 Fur-
thermore, case law reveals that batterers may seek protection orders to
intimidate their partners. In Chieco v. Chieco,7 °' the court reversed
a protection order issued to a husband finding that the petitioner did
not fear injury or need protection, but rather sought to intimidate his
wife who had commenced a divorce action based on cruel and inhu-
man treatment. 7" This case demonstrates the usefulness of the
court determining who is the aggressor in the relationship.
A number of states have recognized the dubious nature of mutual
protection orders, and have placed significant limits on their issuance.
Eight state statutes refuse to issue mutual protection orders without
requiring each party to file a petition. 7" North Dakota will issue a
mutual restraining order only if the court specifically finds that nei-
ther party acted in self defense.'7 ° Florida, Massachusetts, and
North Dakota, require a court to enter written findings of fact when
issuing a mutual civil protection order, which clearly states who did
what and who is restrained.'7 ' California and West Virginia will
only issue mutual protection orders if both parties appear in court and
each present evidence of abuse by the other."" Alaska will only
1705. Judge Ben Gaddis, Domestic Abuse Protective Order Concepts, at 5-6 (Sept. 22,
1992) (Unpublished Paper).
1706. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 24.
1707. 566 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1991).
1708. Id.
1709. ARtZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3602G (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.302(h)(1) (West
Supp. 1992); 750 ILCS 60/215 (Smith-Hurd 1991); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.735(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (no mutual protection order unless separate petition by the re-
spondent); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 761-A.5, 766.7 (West Supp. 1993) (not available
because undermines the purpose of the act); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.2 (Vernon 1993);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 841 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.6 (1992); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.121 (West Supp. 1992); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§ 310.
1710. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.5 (Supp. 1993).
1711. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (7)(d)(l) (West Supp. 1993) (court must set out specific
findings of law and fact to clarify for the police); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3
(West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.5 (Supp. 1993).
1712. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5514 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (1993); see also
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issue such an order if there is good cause based on the extraordinary
circumstances of the case.1
713
The Violence Against Women Act of 1993, which passed the
House and Senate in November of 1993, when enacted, will offer
interstate enforcement of civil protection orders.7 14 However, under
this federal legislation, mutual protection orders will not be awarded
interstate enforcement unless each party has filed a petition, has been
served, has had an opportunity for a hearing, and specific findings
have been entered against that party.'
75
Courts across the country have recognized the danger of mutual
orders and have severely restricted their use.7 6 Courts require a
cross petition, notice to the petitioner, and evidence of actual or
threatened domestic violence before the court will issue a mutual
protection order.71 7 In Deacon v. Landers,17  the court reversed a
Maksuta v. Higson, 577 A.2d 185, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (issuing a mutual
protection order absent a cross petition but did so only upon a finding that both parties com-
mitted domestic violence, and awarding temporary support to the respondent woman ordered
to vacate the parties' residence based on her violent acts, even though the respondent filed
no counterclaim); Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (ordering respon-
dent to vacate home but also issuing protection order on behalf of the children directing the
petitioner not to consume alcoholic beverages in the home or be intoxicated in the presence
of the children).
1713. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(e) (1993) (mutual protection orders are only mutual as
to petitioner not to communicate to respondent and only issued after finding that the petition-
er committed domestic violence against the respondent).
1714. H.R. 1133, S. 11, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. § 2265(A) (1993).
1715. Id. at § 2265(C).
1716. See, e.g., Kobey v. Morton, 278 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1991) (setting forth that
the court cannot grant a mutual protection order where no petition or cross-complaint was
filed or where the party never received notice or the opportunity to be heard); Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing mutual protection order
where there was no evidence that petitioner wife abused respondent husband); Maksuta, 577
A.2d at 185 (noting that a mutual protection order will only be granted upon a finding that
both parties committed acts of domestic violence).
1717. See Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 236 (N.D. 1980) (refusing to exclude
respondent's oldest daughter from the family residence where she was never brought in as a
party); Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that it was error
for trial court to sua sponte issue a mutual protection order to husband when only wife had
petitioned the court for relief; to receive relief a petitioner "must" file a petition and a hear-
ing must be held thereon for the court to have power to issue an order); Commonwealth v.
Allen, No. 3458, 1988 Pa. C.P. LEXIS 13 (March 7, 1988) (considering cross petition for
civil protection order-, awarding civil protection order to initial petitioner but rejected mutual
civil protection order finding insufficient evidence); see also Linville v. Lillard, No. 01-90-
00367-CV, 1991 WL 19840 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1991) (upholding denial of civil protec-
tion order and reversing issuance of permanent mutual injunction against harassment between
divorced parties since the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction after divorce
was finalized); Baldwin v. Moses, 386 S.E.2d 487, 489 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that a magis-
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mutual civil protection order as a denial of the petitioner's due pro-
cess rights where the petitioner was not given notice or a hearing to
rebut the respondent's charges, and the respondent presented insuffi-
cient evidence of actual or threatened domestic violence. 19 In Fitz-
gerald v. Fitzgerald,' the court reversed a mutual civil protection
order when only the petitioner requested protection and there was no
evidence that the petitioner wife abused the respondent husband.""
Therefore, the mutual protection order may not issue without a peti-
tion and evidence of abuse by each party.'... In Kobey v.
Morton,"' the appellate court concluded that the trial court has no
inherent power to grant a mutual protection order against the petition-
er where the respondent never filed a petition or cross complaint, and
where petitioner never received notice or the opportunity to respond
to the allegations." 4 Specifically, the court held that the statute
"calls for the formality of a cross-complaint before the court imposes
on the plaintiff 'what approximates a permanent injunction."" 7
The court's inherent power does not extend so far as to encompass an
order without a petition to serve as a vehicle for that order.
0. Mediation
Like mutual protection orders, the mediation process undermines
the goal of domestic violence statutes to protect abuse victims and
delegitimize the batterer's violence. Judicial authorities have severely
criticized the use of any mediation in both protection order proceed-
ings and in divorce, custody, and visitation cases which involve do-
mestic abuse. The NCJFCJ concluded:
Judges should not mandate mediation in cases where family violence
has occurred .... Mediation is a process by which the parties
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Vio-
lence, however, is not a subject for compromise. Thus, when the
trate court has jurisdiction to grant civil protection order relief to former wife against former
husband even though the final divorce decree enjoined each party from molesting or annoying
the other).
1718. 587 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
1719. Id. at 398.
1720. 406 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
1721. Id at 54.
1722. Id.
1723. 278 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1991).
1724. Id. at 530.
1725. Id. at 532.
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issue before the court is a request for an order of protection or a
criminal family violence charge, mediation should not be mandated.
The victim receives no protection from the court with a medi-
ated "agreement not to batter." And a process which involves both
parties mediating the issue of violence implies, and allows the
batterer to believe, that the victim is somehow at fault."
The NIJ challenged the appropriateness of mediation in child custody
cases where there is a history of spousal abuse. 7  The NIJ con-
cluded that the "balance of power in victim/abuser relationships is so
weighted that the possibility of victim coercion during mediation is
virtually unavoidable .... This imbalance of power would continue
after the mediation session as well, since the parties' relationship
would not be altered."'' " The NCJFCJ calls for judges to scrutinize
closely mediated agreements involving victims of domestic violence,
and recommends that judges urge victims to have questionable agree-
ments reviewed by counsel.729
The positions adopted by judicial authorities are well grounded in
sound research on power and control in abusive relationships and the
effect that the power dynamic has on a domestic violence victim's
ability to bargain equally. Research has found that the tools of the
legal system (rules of evidence, open court hearings, court reporters)
are better suited to counter the power imbalance in abusive relation-
ships of parties entering the court system.'7 Abused women who
have suffered prior violence are intimidated by their batterers during
mediation and are fearful that asserting their interests or those of their
children will incite continued harm at the hands of their batterer.'73'
1726. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 28.
1727. GOOLKASLAN, supra note 780, at 62.
1728. Id.
1729. FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 28; see also Czapanskiy, supra note
23, at 273. ("[Wle need to use extreme caution when we consider taking family law issues
outside the realm of courts and into private dispute resolution systems. Given our general
social conditioning, the professionals who staff such systems are likely to be just as baised as
judges. Because they do not operate in the open, however, holding them accountable is much
more difficult."). Id.
1730. See generally JESSICA PEARSON, MEDIATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE AND RESEARCH (1989).
1731. Mediation in domestic violence cases is improper because men have greater bargain-
ing power given their position of power in the economic and social structure. Women have
more to lose given their lower economic and social status and their role as primary caretaker
of the children in many families. Even the most skillful mediators cannot reduce or eliminate
differences in power embedded in the relationship. See H. Cohen, Mediation in Divorce:
Boon or Bane? 5 WOMEN's ADvoc. 1-2 (1983); Charlotte Germane et al., Mandatory Custo-
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Policymakers in states with the most experience in mediating
custody disputes have begun to conclude that mediation of custody
must not occur in families where there has been spouse or child
abuse,732 and several innovative states now preclude mandatory me-
diation or restrict mediation in their civil protection order stat-
utes." '3 The Supreme Court of Minnesota clarifies the definition of
mediation. In Vogt v. Vogt,""M the court held that only when there
is no probable cause of domestic violence may the court order or
refer parties to mediation." s The court reversed the temporary vis-
iting arrangements established in a protection order when it found that
the Court Services representative went beyond consulting the parties,
and instead overrode the misgivings of the petitioner and exacted a
signed written agreement from the parties in violation of state statuto-
ry law prohibiting mediation in domestic violence cases.7
P. Peace Bonds and Penal Bonds
A few state civil protection order statutes authorize courts to
require the respondent to provide a bond to prevent further violations
dy Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Danger for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 1 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 175 (1985); Barbara L Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The
Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION
Q. 317-30 (1990) [hereinafter Gentle Jeopardy]; Barbara J. Hart, Effects of Domestic Violence
on Children and Their Consequences for Custody and Visitation Agreements, 7 MEDIATION Q.
347-63 (1990); J. Schulman & Laurie Woods, Legal Advocacy v. Mediation in Family Law, 6
WOMEN'S ADVOC. 3-4 (1983); Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress
on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 431 (1985). 32% of battered women are
fearful during negotiations for child custody, and about 22% stated that they were fearful of
retaliatory violence during negotiations for child support and 27.7% were fearful during nego-
tiations for property. 13% of the women in the study stated that they gave up legal rights
because of their fear of retaliatory violence. D. Kurz and K. Coughey, The Effects of Marital
Violence on the Divorce Process, Paper Presented at the American Sociological Association
Meeting (Aug. 1989).
1732. Gentle Jeopardy, supra note 1731, at 317-30.
1733. IowA CODE ANN. § 236.13 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768.5 (1993);
MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11 (West
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3(D) (Michie 1993); see also Hart, supra note 991. State
statutes which exempt or partially exempt custody and visitation cases from mediation when
domestic violence exists include: CAL. CIvIL CODE § 4607.2 (West Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.619(2) (West 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1992); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.4(d) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(A) (Anderson
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.755 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.184 (1993); see
also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 311, 407, 408(A), 40803).
1734. 455 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1990).
1735. Id. at 475.
1736. Id. at 474.
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of a protection order. 7  Case law supports the issuance of peace
bonds in domestic violence cases. The court in State v. Weller
7 3
1
held that for a peace bond to issue in a domestic violence case, 1)
the court must hold a separate hearing; 2) the state must present evi-
dence as to the defendant's threat to the peace; 3) the peace bond
must be issued on notice; 4) the court must make specific factual
findings and enumerate prescribed conduct; and 5) the peace bond
must have a specified duration.1 13 9 Peace bonds may also issue to
ensure compliance with specific provisions of a protection order. In In
re Marriage of Rodriguez,7" the court conditioned limited visita-
tion in a protection order on the respondent posting a $10,000 bond
based on the respondent previously violating a temporary protection
order by failing to return the minor child to the petitioner
mother.7 4' The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the mother had
standing to execute the bond after the father failed to return the child
as ordered.' 42
Q. Modification, Extension, and Duration of Civil Protection Orders
1. Modifications of Civil Protection Orders
Twenty-seven jurisdictions permit either party to move for modi-
fication of an existing civil protection order.74 3 Careful analysis is
required when courts consider modifying an existing civil protection
1737. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1993) (maximum $10,000); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1 (1993) (appearance bond as condition of pretrial release).
1738. 563 A.2d 1318 (Vt. 1989).
1739. Id. at 1321-22.
1740. 545 N.E.2d 731 (111. 1989).
1741. Id. at 732.
1742. Id. at 734.
1743. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(b) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-209 (Michie 1993); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(c) (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1989); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 586-9 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-6313 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (West Supp.
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(e) (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2136B
(West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19. § 766 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 4-507 (Supp. 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A. § 3 (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-050.2 (Vernon Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(11)(a) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(3) (1992);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West Supp. 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6B (Michie 1993); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 844 (McKinney 1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.6 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 107-730 (1991); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(b) (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 204-70 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-10 (1984); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 71.14 (West 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1B, 279.1B (Michie Supp.
1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.130 (1986).
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order. Since most battered women make two to five attempts to flee
their batterer's before they succeed,t" many women who receive
civil protection orders may attempt to reunite with their batterers after
the civil protection order has been issued. When this occurs one or
both of the parties should request modification of the civil protection
order to remove the stay away provisions while retaining in effect the
no abuse clause. This practice is recommended by the National Insti-
tute of Justice study on civil protection orders. 4 '
In some cases, however, the respondent will seek modifications
in an effort to maintain control over the petitioner. Wary of such
requests, the court in Todd v. Todd746 refused to modify a consent
civil protection order on the respondent's request despite a finding
that the petitioner had refused to abide by the custody terms of the
order.747 In other cases, petitioners will seek modifications of the
civil protection order where its terms are unworkable, to change visi-
tation times, or to add a stay away provision if the parties were liv-
ing together at the time the civil protection order was issued and they
have now separated.1748
2. Extensions of Orders/Reissuance in Writing
Twenty-eight jurisdiction's statutes specifically state that civil
protection orders are extendable.749 Most courts extend protection
1744. Lewis Okun, Termination or Resumption of Cohabitation in Woman Battering Rela-
tionships: A Statistical Study, in COPING WITH FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES 113 (Gerald Hotaling et al. eds., 1988).
1745. NIJ CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 53.
1746. 772 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
1747. Id. at 15.
1748. See, e.g., Casey v. Shy, 712 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing a modifi-
cation of a consent civil protection order which increased the weekly child support award
from $20 to $50 despite the mother's claims that the expenses were greater than she antici-
pated and the child's needs were neglected).
The Casey case also provides an excellent example of what happens when a civil
protection order respondent is represented and the petitioner is not. In the earlier civil pro-
tection order action that resulted in a consent agreement there was a dramatic power imbal-
ance. It is not at all uncommon for unrepresented domestic violence victims to bargain away
financial relief for safety when faced with a represented batterer. Courts should be particularly
sensitive to such conditions that existed at the time the civil protection order was issued
when considering modifications generally. See also Ross v. Ross, 543 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1989)
(refusing to modify wife's protection order to include an additional provision giving her tem-
porary exclusive occupancy of the marital home while the divorce action is pending where
she did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the husband committed family
offenses which would require him to stay away from the marital home).
1749. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(c) (1991); ARtZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp.
1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (Michie 1987) (where threat of domestic violence still
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orders based on continued fear without the requirement of additional
acts of violence against the petitioner. In Barry v. Iverson,1750 the
court held that the petitioner's reasonable continuing fear of the re-
spondent was sufficient to extend the duration of the civil protection
order for one year.
175'
In Cruz-Foster v. Foster,1752 the court held that, in deciding
whether to extend a civil protection order beyond one year under the
Intrafamily Offense Act, it should consider the entire history of abuse
between the parties. 753  Specifically, the court reversed a trial
judge's denial of extension of a protection order where the judge
"gave no consideration, at least explicitly, to the 'entire mosaic"' of
the parties relationship."M In Maldonado v. Maldonado,175  the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, as an abuse of dis-
cretion, a trial judge's denial of an extension of a protection order
based solely on the fact that the husband was incarcerated, where the
husband could technically be released prior to the expiration of the
civil protection order, could escape from jail, could continue to harass
and threaten the respondent from jail, and where the husband consent-
ed to the extension. 75 In Capps v. Capps,'757 the Missouri Court
exists); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5756 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West
Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004
(1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (1993); 750
ILCS 60/220 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 34-4-5.1-5 (West Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(6) (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (West 1982);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(6) (West Supp. 1992); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 3(i) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6) (West Supp. 1993); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 455.040 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4(II) (Supp.
1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(B) (Michie Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113-
31(E)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.725 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-
15-3(2) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-70 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-10-1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1103 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(2) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-5(d) (Supp. 1993); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4)(c) (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-21-106 (Supp. 1993). For a discussion of the standards of proof for extension, see su-
pra notes 1526-38 and accompanying text.
1750. No. C8-90-801, 1990 WL 119349 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1990).
1751. Id. But see Ferris v. Clark, 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1215 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 19, 1993) (refusing to extend a restraining order based on no finding of physical abuse
during existence of order). This decision demonstrates the dire need for judicial training on
domestic violence. The tone of this decision displays clear prejudice and bias against this
specific battered woman.
1752. 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991).
1753. Id. at 930.
1754. Id. at 931.
1755. No. 93-FM-199, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 227 (Sept. 13, 1993).
1756. IU. at *5-*13.
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of Appeals held that renewal of a civil protection order did not re-
quire that petitioner allege new acts of abuse so long as the circum-
stances which formed the basis for the initial order continued unabat-
ed.' 8 The court extended a civil protection order against a husband
based on evidence that while he came to pick up his son for a week-
end visit, he screamed "bitch" at the petitioner and drove off sud-
denly while the petitioner's hands were still on the frame of his
car.
1759
In Knuth v. Knuth,17 1 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld
the extension of a civil protection order based on the respondent's
continued and frequent presence in the petitioner's vicinity, including
moving within two blocks of the family residence, following the
petitioner, loitering around the family home and domestic violence
shelter where petitioner stayed, and looking into the petitioner's
house. 76' The court held that such behavior placed the petitioner in
fear of imminent bodily harm sufficient to extend the protection or-
der.'762 These courts recognize the pivotal role that the civil protec-
tion order may have played in reducing the violence between the
parties during the order's initial term. Only by reviewing the totality
of violence in the relationship and the totality of the present circum-
stances of the relationship and actions between the parties can a prop-
er determination be made.
Respondents must have actual notice that petitioner has requested
a civil protection order extension. In Jenkins v. Jenkins, 763 the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals held that personal service upon the respondent
was not required for an extension of a civil protection order since the
1757. 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
1758. I4 at 552.
1759. Id. at 549. But see Bandelier v. Bandelier, 757 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(reversing a civil protection order in light of the facts of this case finding that the
petitioner's claim that the respondent was in her home several times since the issuance of the
original order did not establish immediate and present danger of abuse sufficient to renew the
order or issue a new one); Keith v. Keith, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1984).
The court refused to extend a civil protection order beyond a year against a father who sexu-
ally abused his minor daughters even though his close proximity caused them stress, fear, and
emotional strain since no new abusive acts occurred during the proceeding year. This court
appears to have entirely ignored the key role the civil protection order undoubtedly played in
preventing such further abuse. The civil protection order's success in preventing abuse does
not necessarily mean that the continued need for the protection order has been eliminated.
1760. 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
1761. Id. at *1.
1762. Id. at *3.
1763. 784 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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respondent was personally served with the original civil protection
order, the motion to extend was filed prior to the expiration of the




3. Duration of Orders
The growing statutory trend is to increase the duration of civil
protection orders. A number of progressive states now issue civil
protection orders lasting for several years or indefinitely. Six states,
Colorado, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
Washington place no limit on the duration of civil protection or-
ders. '7 California and Hawaii's courts issue civil protection orders
for a full three years, ' 7' and in Illinois and Wisconsin, courts issue
civil protection orders for a full two years.1767 While only a small
minority of the states still issue civil protection orders for less than a
year,176 over half of the states still issue protection orders for one year.7a
1764. Id. at 643; see also State v. Jankowski, 496 N.W.2d 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(ordering the trial court to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him for
violating a domestic abuse injunction on the grounds that the injunction was a nullity as it
had been improperly extended without notice or hearing).
1765. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102 (West Supp. 1993); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.14 (West 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 22, § 60.4(F) (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.060(2) (West Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 306, 307
(All orders are to be issued ex parte for these functions: (1) enjoining abuse against the
petitioner, (2) prohibiting contact with the petitioner, (3) requiring the respondent to vacate
the premises, (4) requiring the respondent to stay away from petitioner, (5) granting tempo-
rary custody to the petitioner, and (6) prohibiting exchange of personal property. Either party
can request a hearing within 30 days following service; at the hearing, the ex parte order can
be modified and additional relief may be granted.).
1766. CAL. FAm. CODE § 5756 (West 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5 (Supp. 1992).
1767. 725 ILCS 5/112A-20 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 35-21 (West 1992).
1768. ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.020 (1991) (twenty days); ARi7_ REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3602(J) (Supp. 1993) (six months); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(d) (West Supp. 1993)
(ninety days); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(c) (Supp. 1991) (six months); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2136(D) (West 1982) (ninety days); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (1992); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(B) (Michie Supp. 1993) (six months); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-70
(Law. Co-op. 1985) (six months); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5 (1992) (four months); W. VA.
CODE § 42-A-6(b) (Supp. 1993) (sixty days); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-106 (Supp. 1993) (three
months with unlimited extensions of additional three month durations, each on a showing of
good cause).
Furthermore, even in states where longer protection orders may be available, a very
small minority of courts may, under certain circumstances, issue civil protection orders for
less than the full statutorily permitted time. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52
(Minn. CL App. 1987) (holding that the trial court's issuance of a civil protection order for
three months rather than the statutorily permitted one year was not an abuse of discretion1
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Social science research supports the need for increasing the dura-
tion of civil protection orders.1" Battered women who leave their
abusive partners are sometimes followed and harassed for months and
even years."' Some batterers continue to harass and beat their
partners twenty-five years after the victims have left them. 772 Phys-
ical abuse continues after separation for two-thirds of battered wom-
en.'" 3 Over one-half of the homicides of female spouses and inti-
mate partners are committed by male batterers after their partners
have left them.t" 4 Over the past ten years, our newspapers have
been filled with stories of women like Agnes Scott whose batterer
husband tracked her down after seven years and mutilated her.' 7
where the alleged abuse occurred two months before the petitioner filed for the order, both
parties were in treatment for chemical dependency, the respondent expressed an interest in
staying away from and not contacting the petitioner, and the petitioner may request an exten-
sion of the order if circumstances warrant it in the future); Brookhart v. Brookhart, 17 Pa. D.
& C.3d 795 (1991) (holding that the temporary support awarded in a civil protection order
would become void in two weeks if the petitioner did not file for support under the Civil
Procedure Support Act within that time). These shorter protection orders offer little protection
to domestic violence victims in that they require repeated court appearance for extensions and
often do not last long enough to protect victims throughout the separation period required
before they can file for divorce or secure permanent custody and child support orders.
1769. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(b) (Michie 1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(b) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(d) (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(7)(b) (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(5) (1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-5.1-5(c) (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(e) (West Supp. 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(2) (West Supp.
1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(i) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(6)(b) (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-17(2) (Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(6) (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-924(3) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33.080(3) (Michie 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4(III) (Supp. 1992);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(b) (1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113-31(E)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.718(1) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6108(b) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(2)
(Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b)
(1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71-13(a) (West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1103(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(B) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.60(2) (West Supp. 1993).
1770. See supra notes 599-604 and accompanying text.
1771. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 114 (1987).
1772. See ANN JONES, WoMEN WHO KILL 298-99 (1980).
1773. D. Kelso and L. Personette, Domestic Violence and Treatment Services for Victims
and Abusers (1985) (unpublished report, on file with ALTM Associates, Anchorage, Alaska).
1774. PATRICK A. LANGAN & CHRISTOPHER A. INNES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 2 (1986).
1775. JONES, supra note 1772, at 299. In half the states in this country, the homicide
rates of women victims in partner homicide increased by 75% between 1976 and 1986.
Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Gender-Specific Effects on Patterns of Homicide Perpe-
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Clearly, courts cannot presume that a batterer's attempts to control
and injure the abuse victim will end in a month, a year, or ten years.
To be truly effective, civil protection orders should last indefi-
nitely, leaving either party the right to return to court to request mod-
ification or termination of the order. Custody, visitation, and child
support provisions contained in civil protection orders should also
remain in effect until they are modified by a subsequent court pro-
ceeding or until the children reach the age of majority. This approach
has the advantage of minimizing the need for parties in domestic
violence cases to continually meet in court under circumstances
fraught with conflict.1" 6 For pro se litigants, such an approach will
make the court more accessible by eliminating the need for multiple
hearings in different courts, before different judges, applying different
laws and court procedures. Where the parties in the civil protection
order proceeding are unmarried, this approach allows the parties to
solve all legal issues between them in one court proceeding. If the
terms of the civil protection order are working, the parties will not
need to meet each other again in court. For married parties who will
need to return to court to obtain a divorce, this approach may pro-
mote greater numbers of more amicable, uncontested divorces. Fur-
ther, this approach will preserve court time and resources that may be
better devoted to the smaller percentage of cases that are truly con-
tested and require the full attention of the court to diffuse the conflict
and offer protection. Litigants who are not satisfied with the terms of
the original order of the court may return to court at any time to
amend, modify, or rescind that order by filing a petition either before
the civil protection order judge or in a custody, divorce, or child sup-
port proceeding and by providing notice to the opposing party. 7"
In the alternative, three year extendable civil protection orders
are recommended. This time-frame provides protection of sufficient
tration, Paper Presented at the American Psychological Association of New York, (Aug.
1987).
1776. This approach would also prevent such unfortunate instances as in the case of State
v. Jankowski, 496 N.W.2d 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), in which the conviction of a defendant
for three violations of a domestic abuse injunction was reversed on the grounds that the court
did not have the authority to extend the injunction, making it a nullity. If the petitioner had
not been required to go into court to extend the order in the first place, the initial injuction
would have served to adequately protect her from the continued abuse of the defendant.
1777. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 213, at 155. ("The Task Force sees no reason why
parties who are often unrepresented should be required to file separate court actions for per-




duration for the parties to complete divorce, custody, and child sup-
port litigation. These orders protect the victim and her children during
what can be an emotionally charged and volatile time. Whenever civil
protection orders are issued with specific termination dates, it is still
advisable to ensure that their custody, visitation, and child support
provisions remain in effect indefinitely until modified by subsequent
court action.
4. Duty to Provide a Forum
Case law and statutes confirm that courts must provide a forum
to petitioners to hear civil protection order requests, and courts must
rule on the merits of a civil protection order petition. The state of
Maine requires the court to grant the petitioner the opportunity to
testify on the merits of her civil protection order petition.""8 The
Supreme Court of Oregon, in Marshall v. Hargreaves,"779 held that
a circuit judge did not have the discretion to deny a hearing to deter-
mine the existence of immediate or present abuse for purposes of
issuing an ex parte temporary protection order even though the peti-
tioner has twice before requested, received, and then dismissed such
orders based on essentially the same allegations. 7 '° Requiring courts
to hear civil protection order complaints despite petitioner's previous
unwillingness to follow through with a civil protection order action is
sound public policy, because it recognizes that, statistically, battered
women vacillate between seeking help and returning to their batterers
two to five times before ultimately leaving..78' These policies assure
that the courthouse doors always remain open to victims in need. To
adopt any other approach would cut off help to those who need it
most.
1778. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765-3-A (West Supp. 1992).
1779. 725 P.2d 923 (Or. 1986).
1780. Id. at 925; see also Sablo v. Russell, 472 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding trial court was without authority to issue an advisory opinion which found the do-
mestic violence statute unconstitutional and dismissed the civil protection order petition where
the defendant was never served process and was never before the trial court); NIJ CPO
STUDY, supra note 19, at 28 (providing explanation for why petitioners may fail to appear or
request withdrawal of orders).
1781. See Lewis Okun, Termination or Resumption of Cohabitation in Women Battering
Relationships: A Statistical Study, in COPING WITH FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY
PERsPEcTIvEs 107, 113 (Gerald T. Hotaling et al. eds., 1988).
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R. Immunity
1. Judicial Immunity
Judges issuing protection orders are immune from suits brought
against them by batterers. In Agnew v. Campbell,7' the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that judicial immunity protected the trial judge
from the respondent's suit after the judge issued a civil protection
order against the respondent, held respondent in contempt for violat-
ing the protection order, and ordered a psychiatric examination of the
respondent. 3 In Patten v. Beauchamp,"" the court held that a
judge issuing a protection order performs a judicial act and therefore
is immune from civil damages.
785
2. Prosecutorial Immunity
Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin place specific responsibil-
ities on prosecutors in domestic violence cases. Minnesota prosecutors
must notify a victim of a decision not to prosecute and inform the
victim of the procedure and benefits of seeking a protection or-
der." ' Washington requires prosecutors to notify domestic violence
victims within five days if charges were not filed and inform the
victim of procedures to initiate a criminal proceeding. 71 In Collins
v. King County,7 11 the Washington Court of Appeals held that the
county prosecutor enjoyed absolute prosecutorial immunity from lia-
bility where the children of a domestic violence victim who was
murdered by her batterer, despite requests to the police to arrest him,
sued for wrongful death, emotional distress, negligence, and federal
and state civil rights violations.1789 Wisconsin takes an innovative
approach and requires that prosecutors issue guidelines for the han-
dling of domestic violence cases. 17' However, recently in Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 7 1 the United States Supreme Court clarified prose-
cutorial immunity and held that while state prosecutors enjoy absolute
prosecutorial immunity when functioning as an advocate, the prosecu-
1782. No. 3-90-1130, 1990 WL 188723 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1990).
1783. Id. at *2.
1784. 599 F. Supp. 288 (D.N.D. 1984).
1785. Id. at 294-95.
1786. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.0315 (West Supp. 1993).
1787. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.060 (West 1992).
1788. 742 P.2d 185 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
1789. Id. at 187-89.
1790. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.075 (West Supp. 1993).
1791. 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
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tors have only qualified immunity when performing investigatory or
administrative functions.' Under the "functional approach," wheth-
er a prosecutor receives absolute immunity depends on the "nature of
the function performed, not on the identity of the actor who per-
formed it."'793 Prosecutors have absolute immunity when they act as
an advocate for the state in the "initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution including the presentation of the state's case at tri-
al.""'7 ' Such conduct is given absolute immunity because it is "inti-
mately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal pro-
cess."' 1
795
However, a prosecutor's acts of investigation or administration
are subject only to qualified immunity. 79 Such activities, when
performed by police, are entitled to only qualified immunity, and this
same standard applies to prosecutors who perform those tasks."
While absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to the prosecutors
professional evaluation and presentation of evidence, qualified immu-
nity extends to a prosecutor who performs the detective's role in
seeking evidence to establish probable cause.79 The court conclud-
ed that "[a] prosecutor neither is, nor should.consider himself to be,
an advocate before he has probable cause to have any one
arrested."'1799 Therefore, in domestic violence cases, when a prosecu-
tor acts as an investigator of the crime, he is entitled to only quali-
fied immunity. However, his discretion in prosecuting the crime once
probable cause is established is still protected by absolute immuni-
ty. ° Finally, in Parrotino v. City of Jacksonville,' the court
held that where the prosecutor's office promised to secure a restrain-
ing order for an abused victim, where she relied on this specific
promise and failed to seek protection elsewhere, and where the
prosecutor's office misplaced these documents and the victim ulti-
mately was killed by her batterer, the prosecutor's office may be
liable for negligence for violating its duty of care."
1792. Id. at 2617.
1793. Id. at 2613 (citation omitted).
1794. Id. at 2613.
1795. Id. (citation omitted).
1796. Id. at 2616.
1797. Id. at 2615.
1798. Id. at 2616.
1799. Id. at 2616.
1800. Id. at 2615.
1801. 612 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1802. Id. at 590.
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3. Suits Against Court Employees
Both state statutes and case law encourage and require court
employees to assist petitioners in filing for civil protection orders.
Twenty-two states permit designated court employees to assist with
preparation and filing of petitions for protection orders." 3 These
1803. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-203 (Michie 1987) ("It]he clerks of the court shall provide
simplified forms and clerical assistance to help petitioners with the writing and filing of a
petition under this chapter if the petitioner is not represented by counsel"); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10. § 946 (Supp. 1993) (court provides forms and instructions in simple understandable
English; court staff shall assist in filling all necessary forms); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(3)
(West Supp. 1993) (clerk provides a copy of law, simplified forms, financial affidavit and
clerical assistance for the preparation and filing of such petitions and affidavits by an unrep-
resented victim); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(d) (1991) ("Family violence shelter or social
service agency staff members designated by the court may explain to all victims not repre-
sented by counsel the procedures for filling out and filing all forms and pleadings necessary
for the presentation of their petition to the court. The clerk of the court may provide forms
for petitions and pleadings to victims of family violence or to any other person designated by
the superior court . . . authorized to advise victims on filling out and filing such petitions
and pleadings. The clerk shall not be required to provide assistance to persons in completing
such forms or in presenting their case to the court. Any assistance provided . . . shall be
performed without cost to the petitioners. The performance of such assistance shall not consti-
tute the practice of law .... "); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-3(d) (Supp. 1992) (family court
designates employee or nonjudicial agency to provide forms and assist the person completing
the application); 750 ILCS 60/202(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.730 (Michie Supp. 1992) (provide accept and file forms requesting protection order);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2138 (West Supp. 1993) (make forms available for applications,
provide clerical assistance to the petitioner, advise indigent applicants of the availability of
filing in forma pauperis, and provide notary services); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 764(2)
(West Supp. 1992) (provide forms and clerical assistance in completing and filing complaint
and other necessary documents; assistance may not include legal advise; clerk provides written
notice of resources where plaintiff may receive legal and social service assistance); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4) (West Supp. 1993) (court provides simple forms and clerical assis-
tance to help write and file petitions; court shall advise petitioner of right to file a motion
and affidavit and to sue in forma pauperis and shall assist in writing and filing the motion
and affidavit; court shall assist in serving respondent by published notice); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 455.508 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (explain to unrepresented petitioners the procedures for filing
all forms and pleadings; advise petitioner of right to file a motion and affidavit to sue in
forma pauperis; notice of available clerk assistance will be conspicuously posted; assistance is
provided without cost to petitioners); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.050 (Michie 1985) (clerk
of court shall assist any party in completing and filing the application, affidavit, and any
other paper or pleading necessary to initiate or respond to petition; assistance does not consti-
tute the practice of law); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(c) (West Supp. 1993) (clerk or other
designated employee assists petitioner in completing necessary forms for filing summons, or
other complaint); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 823 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (rules of court authorize
probation service to confer with potential petitioner's about filing petition); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 60.2(D) (West Supp. 1994) (at request of petitioner the clerk of the court shall pre-
pare or assist the plaintiff in preparing the petition); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(3) (1991)
(clerk provides forms and instruction brochure explaining the rights under the statute); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit 23, § 6106(g) (1991) (courts and hearing officers shall provide simplified
forms and clerical assistance in English and Spanish to help with writing and filing of the
1993]
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statutes are constitutional. In State v. Errington,' 4 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that subsections of that state's Domestic
Abuse Act"05 which required the "court" to assist abuse victims in
writing and filing petitions, advise petitioners of their right to file a
motion and affidavits and assist with the same, did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine because "court" should be interpreted to
mean "clerk of the court" and not the court itself."
Not only are court employees required to assist domestic vio-
lence victims, but they may be liable for failing to do so. When court
employees deter abuse victims from filing petitions for protection
orders, a cause of action may lie against them. In Bruno v.
Codd,' the court held that a cause of action may lie against court
employees who deter domestic violence victims from filing civil pro-
tection order petitions." In order to bring suit against court em-
ployees, however, petitioners must first exhaust their administrative
remedies within the court." 9 In Bruno, the court denied injunctive
relief against the nonjudiciai family court personnel since the peti-
tioners had failed to first seek redress from the Chief Judge of the
Family Court."" However, the importance of Family Court clerk
assistance to battered woman seeking protection orders is reflected in
the following observation by the Bruno court:
[i]n concept and in fact, the Family Court fulfills a unique function
in our system of justice. Though its legal ministrations are not di-
rected to the indigent alone, the social and economic factors that
generate its mass of sensitive, emotion-laden and highly individu-
petition for protection by an unrepresented petitioner, advise petitioner of right to file an
affidavit in forma pauperis and assist with the writing and filing of affidavit); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-10-3 (1992) (provides petition forms with instructions for completion); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-4 (1992) (provide forms and assistance in preparing and filing complaint
to unrepresented petitioners; inform of possibility of filing in forma pauperis and of mans
available for the service of process); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.030(3) (West Supp.
1993) (all clerks offices provide forms, instructions, and informational brochures, and names
and numbers for community resources free of charge; assistance provided by clerks is not the
practice of law); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-4(e)(1) (Supp. 1993) (provide forms and assistance
for the filing of petition); WYO. STAT. § 35-21-103(e) (Supp. 1993) (provide standard forms
with instructions for completion).
1804. 310 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1981).
1805. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B (1980).
1806. 310 N.W.2d at 682-83.
1807. 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
1808. Id. at 981.
1809. See id.
1810. Id. at 980-81.
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alized cases-including those which feature the interspousal violence
on which the plaintiffs focus-in practice flood its calendars with
pro se litigants who must depend on the court rather than counsel
to instruct them in the niceties of the legal process.""
S. Appeal of Civil Protection Order
Both state statutes and case law place limits on appeals of pro-
tection orders." 2 Nevada affirmatively mandates that protection or-
ders remain in effect and cannot be stayed pending an appeal." 3
Maine and Vermont only permit appeals of civil protection orders
based on error of law or an abuse of discretion.1
4
Courts consistently hold that a party waives the right to appeal a
civil protection order on any issue he or she does not object to at the
hearing at which the civil protection order was issued. 5  Courts
have denied civil protection order appeals where a respondent failed
to challenge at the hearing whether his conduct constituted
abuse, t1 16 where respondent failed to object to the sufficiency of
evidence to warrant a vacate order,18 1 7 and where respondent failed
to make due process objections when the court issued the emergency
protection order without notice based on affidavits. 8  An appeal,
however, may be taken successfully from a civil protection order
where the trial court failed to consider all relevant evidence. In Mat-
1811. Id. at 977.
1812. See, e.g., Steeves v. Campbell, No. CI-93-1612, 1993 Min. App. LEXIS 1164
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1993) (noting that an order denying a new trial motion in domes-
tic abuse proceeding is not appealable).
1813. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(3) (Michie 1985).
1814. Ms. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768(1) (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1109 (1992).
1815. Cf. People v. Torres, 581 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that since the
defendant failed to object at his criminal domestic violence trial to evidence that he laughed
at the degree of the injuries he inflicted on his wife, he failed to preserve the issue for
appeal). Although this is a criminal domestic violence case, the result is equally applicable in
a civil protection order hearing.
1816. Knisely v. Knisely, 441 A.2d 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that where the
respondent husband never filed exceptions challenging whether his actions constituted abuse at
the hearing, he waived the issue on appeal).
1817. Lucia v. Lucia, 465 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that respondent failed
to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of evidence to support an order excluding him from
his marital home because he did not file exceptions to the order).
1818. Sanders v. Shepard, 541 N.E.2d 1150 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that where re-
spondent failed to make due process objections at the civil protection order trial when the
court issued an EPO without notice based on affidavits, he cannot later raise those objections
on an appeal of a finding of indirect civil contempt).
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ter of M.D.,1"9 the court reversed on appeal the trial court's deci-
sion to extend a civil protection order denying visitation since the
trial judge failed to read a psychiatric report which challenged the
recommendation against visitation and failed to read the findings
underlying the civil protection order on which the court relied.'
A party appealing a trial court's contempt decision must meet a
high burden of proof. In State v. Lipcamon," the court held that
it would not reverse the trial court's decision whether to hold a re-
spondent in contempt unless it finds a gross abuse of discretion."'
The trial court had refused to hold the respondent wife in contempt
for violating a no contact order when she retrieved needed diabetes
medicine from the marital home."r
T. Confidentiality of Abused Party's Address
Seventeen state statutes specifically limit disclosure of the abused
party's home address." 4 The California and Delaware statutes are
the most effective and comprehensive in that they prevent disclosure
not only of petitioner's home address, but also the address of
petitioner's school, job, children, and child care service."' This in-
novative and comprehensive approach recognizes that batterers will
often attempt to discover the address of a location the petitioner fre-
quents in order to locate her and follow her to the undisclosed ad-
dress. This danger posed by the batterer extends not only to the
1819. 602 A.2d 109 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992).
1820. Id. at 117; see also Selland v. Selland, 494 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1992) (holding that
the husband's appeal of a permanent protection order was proper because the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing his demand for a change of venue).
1821. 483 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1992).
1822. Id. at 607.
1823. Id.
1824. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(B)(1) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
206(e) (Michie 1987); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5517 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10,
§ 946(b) (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/203 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 766-A (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504(b)(2) (Supp.
1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 8 (West 1992); MiSs. CODE ANN. § 93-21-9(7)
(Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.510(3) (Vernon Supp, 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-
4-121(12) (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-25(c) (West Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 23.
§ 6112 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(1)(e) (Supp. 1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.11 (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040(1)(c) (West Supp. 1993);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(5) (West Supp. 1993). The District of Columbia protects the
confidentiality of the abused party's address through court rules. See also MODEL CODE,
supra note 15, § 304.
1825. CAL. FAM. CODE § 5517 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 946(b) (Supp.
1993).
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home, but also to other locations frequented by petitioner and to
which the batterer could have access and opportunity to injure or
intimidate the petitioner. To further protect the safety of domestic
violence victims, the court in Michigan Welfare Rights Organization
v. Dempsey"' enjoined the Department of Social Security from dis-
closing the addresses of abused AFDC recipients to their
batterers. 8""
II. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS8 28
A. Introduction
According to the National Institute of Justice Study:
Enforcement is the Achilles' heel of the civil protection process,
because an order without enforcement at best offers scant protection
and at worst increases the victim's danger by creating a false sense
of security. Offenders may routinely violate orders, if they believe
there is no real risk of being arrested . . . . For enforcement to
work, the courts need to monitor compliance, victims must report
violations, and, most of all, police, prosecutors, and judges should
respond sternly to violations that are reported. m
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia enforce protec-
tion orders through contempt." ° Twenty-four of those states and
1826. 462 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
1827. Id. It is not at all uncommon for batterers to call government agencies, particularly
agencies which provide financial payments, food stamps, or health benefits to their spouse,
and either attempt to obtain information about the victim's whereabouts or provide informa-
tion that will result in the cessation of benefits to the victim and her children. Such informa-
tion might include incorrect information that the victim is working or earning money that
would make her ineligible for benefits.
1828. For a more detailed discussion of the process of preparing for and litigating civil
protection order contempt actions, see ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 49.
1829. NIl CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 49; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §
314 (requiring registration and enforcement of civil protection orders from other jurisdictions);
Id. § 313 (requiring registration of all protection orders issued in the state within 24 hours).
1830. ALA. CODE § 30-5-10(b) (1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-36021 (Supp. 1993);
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 144-105 (West
Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(g) (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1005(f) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-30(9)(a) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-13-6(a) (1991); 750 ILCS 60/223(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.8 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.760 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137(A) (West
1982); Ms. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-508 (Supp. 1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(6) (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14)(c) (West
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the District of Columbia enforce a civil protection order by civil or
criminal 'contempt."' Five of these states only enforce civil pro-
tection orders through criminal contempt. 2 In three states, civil
contempt is the only contempt enforcement option. 3  In other
states that offer civil contempt as an option, criminal statutes classify
violation of a civil protection order as a misdemeanor, which is gen-
erally the primary form of civil protection order enforcement."-
Forty states and Puerto Rico prosecute a violation of a protection
order as a misdemeanor.' 5 In seven additional states, violation of a
Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173B:8(Il) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr
§ 846-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(a) (1989); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14.07.1-06 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(1)(b) (Anderson Supp.
1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.720(4) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6114 (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8.1-3, 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610 (1991); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(a) (West 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(3)
(West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-7 (Supp. 1993).
1831. ALA. CODE § 30-5-10(b) (1989); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-36021 (Supp. 1993);
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(g) (West
Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(f) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-30(9)(a) (West
Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(a) (1991); 750 ILCS 60/223(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (1993);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.760 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 769 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-508 (Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14)(c) (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (Supp.
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:8(I) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West Supp.
1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(1)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.720(4) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS 88 8-8.1-3, 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-610 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.110(3) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-7 (Supp. 1993).
1832. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137 (West 1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2950(6) (West 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-06 (Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 6114 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989).
1833. ALA. CODE § 30-5-10(b)(1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-36021 (1992), IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West 1992).
1834. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950 (1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 209A, § 7
(West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (1992).
1835. ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (Supp. 1993); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.740(b) (Supp. 1993);
ARK CODE. ANN. § 9-15-207 (Michie 1987); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(g) (1989);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 273.6 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5 (West Supp.
1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-107 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 950 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-31 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
13-6(b) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-11 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312 (1993);
750 ILCS 60/221(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-6-3(h) (West Supp.
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(g) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.763(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (West Supp. 1992);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7
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civil protection order results in a warrantless arrest, but the statutes
are silent on how the action is to be charged.'8" Twenty-one states
will enforce civil protection orders through contempt or as a
misdemeanor. 37 The civil protection order statutes of Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Washington now prosecute
some violations of a protection order as a felony. 8" Washington
state may also force a defendant who violates a civil protection order
to submit to electronic monitoring. 9 The statutory trend in recent
years is to augment contempt enforcement with misdemeanor charg-
es,'m and to heighten the criminal classification for a violation of a
(West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14)(a) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 455.085(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-626 (1993); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-924(3) (Supp. 1992); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.100(i) (Michie Supp. 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(E) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5013-4 (1992);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-6 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.27 (Anderson
Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6 (West 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6114 (1991 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8.1-3, 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-25-50 (1976); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-6-6 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-253.2 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(1) (West Supp.
1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10(d) (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(8) (West Supp.
1993); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-404, 35-21-106(c) (Supp. 1990); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 628
(Supp. 1990); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 202.
1836. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12 (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1)
(West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:8 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2c:25-21(3)
(West 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 133.310(3)(a)-(c) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
14.03(b) (West Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a)(2) (1991).
1837. ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-10, 30-5A-3 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-207, 210
(Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-107 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950 (Supp. 1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741-31 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6 (1991); 750 ILCS
60/223 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3107, 3110 (1993); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 403.760, 763 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 769 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-508, 509 (Supp. 1993);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06
(Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L) (Anderson Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 8-8.1-3 (Supp. 1993); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.2, 16.1-279.1(c) (Michie
Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-
2A-7, 10(d) (Supp. 1993).
1838. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(7) (felony for
civil protection order violation if evidence of prior violations within the last five years); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2919.27 (Anderson 1993)
(felony for temporary protection order violation if two or more violations of this or another
protection order); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(b) (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.110(4) (West Supp. 1993).
1839. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(1) (West Supp. 1993).
1840. In twenty-one states, civil protection order violations may be prosecuted either as
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protection order."" For example, states like Colorado and Kansas
recently began prosecuting violations of civil protection orders as
misdemeanors while also retaining contempt enforcement of protection
orders.'842 Minnesota, Texas, and Washington, have heightened the
criminal classification for a civil protection order violation from mis-
demeanor to felony.18 3 When petitioners bring contempt actions to
enforce civil protection orders, courts may award attorney fees to a
petitioner who seeks a contempt conviction. In Linda D. v. Peter
D.," the court awarded $2500 in attorney fees to a petitioner who
sought to prosecute a petition for a violation of a protection order
even though she eventually withdrew the underlying petition after the
respondent consented to a modified and expanded protection or-
der." 5
The distinction between criminal and civil contempt is that in
criminal contempt cases, the courts seek to punish the past violation
of the law, while in civil contempt cases the court seeks to coerce
future compliance with the law. Neal v. Brooks" 6 illustrates this
distinction. In Neal, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the appel-
lant was found guilty of criminal as opposed to civil contempt when
he was sentenced to 10 days in jail for violation of an order of pro-
tection." The violation was criminal rather than civil contempt be-
contempt and/or as a misdemeanor. ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-10, 30-5A-3 (Supp. 1993); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-207, 210 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5 (West
Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-107 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 950 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741-31 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-13-6 (1991); 750 ILCS 60/223 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3107,
3110 (1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.760, 763 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-508,
509 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L) (Anderson Supp.
1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-3 (Supp. 1993); Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16 (West 1986
& Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.2,
16.1-279.1(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110 (West Supp. 1993);
W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-7. 10(d) (Supp. 1993).
1841. See supra notes 1835-38.
1842. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-4-105, 18-6-803.5 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-3107(g), 60-3110 (Supp. 1993).
1843. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(b) (West
Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(4) (West Supp. 1993).
1844. 577 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Fain. Ct. 1991).
1845. Id. at 355-56.
1846. No. 88-127-111, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23,
1988).
1847. Id. at 11-12.
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cause the imprisonment was not remedial or coercive in nature."'
The court did not seek to compel the defendant to do something;
rather, the court sought to punish the defendant for violating the
protection order and sought to vindicate the authority of the law and
the courts."8 9 In Cipolla v. Cipolla,185° the court held that deter-
minate sentences for violating a civil protection order are based on
adjudications of criminal, not civil contempt."
B. Enforcement of Protection Orders on Federal Land, Native
American Reservations, and in Other Jurisdictions
1. Full Faith and Credit
Six states have provisions in their civil protection order statutes
which authorize their courts to give full faith and credit to the laws
and orders of other state courts." 2 Nevada and New Jersey specifi-
cally allow their courts to accept the order of a sister state as evi-
dence of facts. 853 Nevada alone allows its courts to issue its own
civil protection order based upon a sister state's finding of facts, and
to register certified copies of orders from other courts." The Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1993, which passed the Senate and
House of Representatives in November of 1993 and is expected to go
to conference in May 1994,' provides that any protection order
issued by the court of one state shall be accorded full faith and credit
by the court of another state and enforced as if it were the order of
the enforcing state." 6 Full faith and credit will only be afforded to
civil protection orders that issue following the filing of a petition, if
the court has jurisdiction over the parties and matter and the opposing
party is given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.',"
Mutual civil protection orders that have not met these criteria will be
1848. Id.
1849. Id.
1850. 398 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
1851. Id. at 1055.
1852. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.090 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:11-6 (Supp.
1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13a (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6
(Michie Supp. 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3(e)
(Supp. 1993); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 314.
1853. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.090 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West Supp.
1993).
1854. Nnv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.090 (1992).
1855. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).






Courts are authorized to issue and enforce state civil protection
orders for incidents of violence occurring on federally owned military
installations."' In Cobb v. Cobb, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld the issuance of a protection order to a member
of the armed forced and her minor son who lived and worked on a
military installation." 9 The court noted that "[t]he order was, of
course, effective against the defendant as to his conduct while not on
ceded land.' ' "a In the absence of any indication that such an order
interfered with the federal function, the order properly also applied to
the defendant while he was on the ceded land. The New York court
in Tammy S. v. Albert S.,"as1 held that a protection order may issue
to residents of a federally owned military installation and that the
military authorities shall enforce the state civil protection order by
apprehending the respondent and delivering him to the civil authority.
This approach assures that state civil protection order protections
reach all victims needing protection where they live and are most
vulnerable. In Albert S., the court concluded that the petitioner, the
wife of a member of the armed forces, was a victim of domestic
violence requiring the Family Court's aid and could receive and de-
mand enforcement of a protection order on the military base.' 2
In addition to a state civil protection order, a person who works
or resides on a military base may also seek a military protection
order. 8 ' While infrequently used, the advantage of a military pro-
tection order over a state civil protection order is that since the mili-
1858. Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989 (noting that court may issue and
enforce a civil protection order on a federal military base); Tammy S. v. Albert S.. 408
N.Y.S.2d 716 (Fam. Ct. 1978) (explaining that state has jurisdiction to enforce civil protection
order even though the parties live on military base).
1859. 545 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Mass. 1989).
1860. Id. The official rate of reported abuse in military families is 23.4%. Among enlisted
men the rate is 27.1%. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CHtLD AND SPOUSE ABUSE STATISTICAL
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1993). These reported figures probably reflect only a portion of
the abuse actually occurring, since resistance to reporting spouse abuse would be equally
strong or stronger among military families than the general population, due to the close con-
nection between the batterers' work and home environments.
1861. 408 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1978).
1862. i at 716.
1863. Interview with Whitney Watrose, Project Manager, United States Marine Corps.,
Coordinated Community Response to Spouse Abuse, E.S., Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 4,
1994).
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tary always retains jurisdiction over members of the armed forces, the
military may enforce its military protection order even if the respon-
dent flees to another state.1 4
3. Native American Lands
Similar problems arise regarding the issuance and enforcement of
civil protection orders for parties who live or work on Native Ameri-
can lands. Within the United States there are over 500 tribes and,
therefore, an equal number of tribal customs, laws, and codes.)'
Each tribe determines whether its tribal code allows for protection or-
ders. " While state and tribal courts theoretically may have to re-
spect and enforce each other's laws and orders, in practice, state and
tribal protection orders often operate independently. Charon Asetoyer,
an experienced women's advocate, explains that a domestic violence
victim who lives or works on a Native American reservation should
seek both a state civil protection order, which will be enforced off
the reservation, and a tribal civil protection order, which will protect
her on the reservation."s7 In practice there is no cross jurisdiction,
so the victim should not expect either protection order to be enforced
outside of its respective jurisdiction.1" For example, in St.
Germaine v. Chapman," the court held that the state courts did
not have the authority to enter a domestic abuse injunction against a
tribal member, as the state's exercise of jurisdiction violated the
tribe's right to govern itself. The court further concluded that the
tribe's enactment of a domestic abuse ordinance virtually identical to
the state statute entitled it to exclusive jurisdiction over the matter
and warranted a reversal of the lower court's injunction.
18 70
C. Civil Contempt
Civil protection order violations, typically enforced through civil
contempt, include failure to pay child support or other monetary
relief, and failure to vacate a residence' or turn over property. In
1864. Id.
1865. Telephone Interview with Professor Nell Newton, The Washington College of Law,
The American University (Sept. 15, 1993).
1866. Id.
1867. Interview with Charon Asetoyer, Director of the Native American Women's Health
Resource Center, in Lake Andes, S.D. (Oct. 5, 1993).
1868. Id.
1869. 505 N.W.2d 450 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
1870. Id, at 451.
1871. This may also be prosecuted as criminal contempt. See City of Columbus v.
1993]
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Sanders v. Shepard,872 the court held the respondent in civil con-
tempt for failure to produce a minor child according to the terms of
the civil protection order.1873 Failure to produce the child was civil
contempt because the incarceration was not punitive, but rather effect-
ed to incur respondent's remedial compliance." 4 Placing the burden
on the respondent to prove he was unable to produce the child,
through no fault of his own, did not violate his due process rights in
a civil contempt proceeding.875
D. Criminal Contempt
1. Acts Constituting Criminal Contempt
In Dunkelberger v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole,76 the court held that a parolee's conviction for violating a
protection order, which prohibited him from contacting his daughter or
her mother, provides a criminal basis for parole revocation.' The
court specifically held that "a finding of criminal contempt under the
Protection From Abuse Act is a crime.""' The court further conclud-
ed that because "'[c]riminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental
respect ... a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both,"' and the respondent parolee was
found in criminal contempt under the Protection From Abuse Act, he
committed a crime punishable by imprisonment within the meaning of
the Parole Act. 79
In addition to a violation of a protection order being a criminal act
in and of itself, courts have identified a broad variety of violent acts
that constitute criminal contempt. Death threats and threats to harm the
petitionert" or those close to the petitioner,88' in person and by
Patterson, No. 82AP-47, 1982 WL 4556 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1982) (holding defendant in
criminal contempt when he failed to vacate in compliance with a temporary protection order).
But see Hayes v. Hayes, 597 A.2d 567, 571 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (maintenance
order in protection order not enforceable in later divorce action because intent was only to
bridge emergency situation).
1872. 541 N.E.2d 1150 (IMl. App. Ct. 1989).
1873. Id. at 1154.
1874. Id. at 1158.
1875. Id. at 1159.
1876. 593 A.2d 8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
1877. Id. at 10.
1878. Id. at 9.
1879. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).
1880. People v. Allen, 787 P.2d 174, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant found guilty of
contempt for violating stay away order where he went to wife's residence, broke into her house,
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telephone, 882 have been found to constitute criminal contempt. Courts
have also found child abduction and concealment to constitute criminal
contempt." 3  Other violent acts that constituted criminal contempt
include marital rape and sexual assault,"" beatings and battery,"' s
stalking,""s assault, 8  damaging petitioner's car,'" 8  kicking in
the door of petitioner's home, 8 9 and breaking into petitioner's
and threatened to kill her); United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in par, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (de-
fendant found guilty of criminal contempt for violating stay away order by threatening and
assaulting petitioner); People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding
respondent in contempt where he called petitioner a "fucking whore," and a "dead bitch" and
told her a plot was waiting for her); Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918, 919 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985) (holding respondent in contempt where he threatened wife's life, abused and beat her,
and stalked her by waiting in her driveway).
1881. Brown v. State, 595 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that going
to petitioner's house, shouting obscenities, and vowing to beat up petitioner's boyfriend con-
stitutes contempt).
1882. People v. Lucas. 524 N.E.2d 246, 247 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that calling
petitioner, making threats over the telephone, and breaking into the marital home constitutes
contempt of a protection order); Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(holding that defendant violated protection order by kicking down wife's door, damaging her
car, and threatening her over the telephone).
1883. In re Marriage of D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 798 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (trial court
found father in indirect criminal contempt for absconding with his son and concealing him for
two years during the course of the parties' divorce proceedings, in violation of civil protection
order which specifically prohibited him from taking the child from the jurisdiction or concealing
him); People v. Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (11. App. Ct. 1987) (trial court found
defendant guilty of child abduction, residential burglary, and battery).
1884. Cole v. Cole, 556 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (Fain. Ct. 1990) (contempt based on finding of
marital rape).
1885. People v. Townsend, 538 N.E.2d 1297, 1298 (Il. App. Ct. 1989) (trial court held
defendant in contempt when he entered the petitioner's residence and struck her on the face
at least once); Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d at 1034; Commonwealth v. Allen, 486 A.2d 363, 365
(Pa. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985) (respondent violated civil protection order by
forcibly entering petitioner's residence and physically abusing her); Wagner v. Wagner, 564
A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding husband in indirect criminal contempt for violating
order prohibiting him from harassing, threatening, or abusing his wife); Eichenlaub v.
Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). But see Commonwealth v. Zerphy, 481
A.2d 670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding defendant not in criminal contempt where defendant
struck petitioner twice in the face with his fists and threatened her with a rifle in her home).
1886. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d at 918.
1887. United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759
(1992), affid in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (finding defendant guilty of
criminal contempt for violating stay away order, threatening, and assaulting petitioner).
1888. Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (finding that defendant
violated protection order by kicking down his wife's door, damaging her car, and threatening
her over the telephone).
1889. State v. Andrasko, 454 N.W.2d 648, 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (convicting defendant




Courts have held batterers in criminal contempt for a broad variety
of conduct in addition to violent acts. They have often found criminal
contempt when the respondent violates a stay away or no contact order
by coming to or within a certain distance of the petitioner's home."9'
Coming to the petitioner's home during a nonvisitation day is sufficient
grounds for criminal contempt."' The respondent's failure to va-
cate..93 and failure to return children also constitutes criminal con-
Gilbert, 765 P.2d at 1209.
1890. People v. Allen, 787 P.2d 174, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant found guilty of
contempt for violating stay away order where he went to wife's residence, broke into the house,
and threatened to kill her); People v. Townsend, 538 N.E.2d 1297, 1298 (111. App. Ct. 1989)
(defendant held in contempt when he entered the petitioner's residence and struck her on the
face at least once); People v. Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (defendant
guilty of child abduction, residential burglary, and battery); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 553
N.E.2d 915, 916 (Mass. 1990) (defendant violated civil protection order when he came to
petitioner's residence and then attempted to forcibly enter her residence); Commonwealth v.
Allen, 486 A.2d 363, 365 (Pa. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985) (respondent violated
civil protection order by forcibly entering petitioner's residence and physically abusing her).
1891. Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 59 (Alaska 1987) (affirming the sentencing of
defendant to an 18 month suspended sentence and four years probation for repeatedly violating
a no contact order); United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1759 (1992), affrd in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (finding defendant
guilty of criminal contempt for violating stay away order, threatening, and assaulting petitioner);
People v. Zarebski, 542 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989) (defendant violated protection
order by harassing petitioner and entering her residence); Gordon, 553 N.E.2d at 916; People
v. Stevens, 506 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (Oswego City Ct. 1986) (finding that defendant willfully
violated stay away order by going to his wife's residence); City of Reynoldsburg v.
Eichenberger, No. CA-3492, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1613 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1990)
(defendent convicted of violating civil protection order which prohibited him from visiting or
approaching his family, their home, employment, or school without consent of the court when
he was arrested outside of the marital home); Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918, 919 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (respondent threatened wife's life, abused and beat her, and stalked her by
waiting in her driveway); Dunkleberger v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation Parole, 593 A.2d 8
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding respondent in criminal contempt when he contacted petitioner
and her daughter in violation of the protection order); Lee v. State, 799 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (defendant violated stay away order by going within 200 yards of former
wife's house).
1892. Leonetti v. Riehl, 546 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (App. Div. 1989) (respondent jailed for
violation of protection order where he went to petitioner's house on a nonvisitation day); see
also Shafer v. Shafer, No. 93 CA 16, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5955 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 1,
1993) (affirming lower court's decision not to hold petitioner-mother in contempt for with-
holding father's visitation when she thought he had been abusive to the children). But see State
v. Haley, 629 A.2d 605 (Me. 1993) (vacating a criminal contempt finding based on harassment
where respondent repeatedly called petitioner, because harassment was not statutorily provided
for in the protection order statute).
1893. Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d I (Md. 1993) (affirming respondent's sentence to 60 days
imprisonment for violating vacate order); City of Columbus v. Patterson, No. 82AP-47, 1982
WL 4556 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1982) (defendant held in contempt when he failed to vacate
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tempt.' Other actions considered criminal contempt include tele-
phoning petitioner,"" filing a frivolous lawsuit against
petitioner,"' following petitioner in a car, 97 placing a box of
clothes covered with tomato juice on petitioner's doorstep, engaging in
telephone hang-ups, calling petitioner's parents, sending petitioner
unwanted flowers, and having unwanted pizza delivered to petitioner's
home.89 In State ex rel. Delisser v. Hardy,89 the court held that
the defendant could be held in contempt for violating a restraining
order where he entered the multi-unit apartment complex in which the
petitioner's apartment was located and, on a separate occasion, entered
the complex and put a letter under the petitioner's door. 9"0 The court
specifically noted that the "defendant did not need directly to threaten
plaintiff in her apartment in order to threaten or menace her within the
meaning of the restraining order.""''
in compliance with a temporary protection order).
1894. In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 545 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ill. 1989) (father held in contempt
of ex parte order granting petitioner custody of minor child when he failed to return the child
to the mother).
1895. State v. Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (defendant held in
contempt for telephoning petitioner in violation of restraining order); State v. Horton, 620
N.E.2d 437 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (defendant held in indirect contempt for contacting petitioner);
People v. Darnell, 546 N.E.2d 789 (I1. App. Ct. 1989) (harassing telephone calls violated civil
protection order); Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant held
in contempt when he made unwanted telephone calls to petitioner and petitioner's family, made
hang-up calls, and had unwanted pizza and flowers delivered to petitioner); State ex rel. Emery
v. Andisha, 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant violated protection order when he
called his son); City of Columbus v. Kostrevski, No. 92AP-1257, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1188
(Feb. 23. 1993) (affirming conviction and probation revocation of defendant-wife where she
made abusive telephone calls in violation of protection order); State v. Kiser, No. 90-1192-CR.
1990 Wis. App. LEXIS 1028 (Nov. 14, 1990) (defendant violated harassment injunction when
he made five telephone calls to the petitioner during a thirty minute period); State v. Moore,
No. 89-0553-CR, 1989 Wis. App. LEXIS 915 (Sept. 1, 1989) (husband telephoned his wife in
violation of a civil protection order). But see State v. Haley, 629 A.2d 605 (Me. 1993)
(vacating a criminal contempt finding based on harassment where respondent repeatedly called
petitioner, because harassment was not statutorily provided for in the protection order statute).
1896. Agnew v. Campbell. No. C3-90-1130, 1990 WL 188723 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4,
1990) (defendant held in contempt when he filed frivolous suit seeking to enjoin the petitioner's
pending marriage).
1897. People v. Whitfield, 498 N.E.2d 262, 265 (IR1. App. Ct. 1986) (defendant violated civil
protection order by following his former wife in his car).
1898. Saliterman. 443 N.W.2d at 842-43.
1899. 749 P.2d 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).




2. Multiple Crimes and Multiple Contempts
When a defendant is alleged to have committed more than one
violation of a protection order, courts may consolidate the actions
against the defendant for trial purposes. This is beneficial to the effec-
tive functioning of the judicial system as the facts, witnesses, and
information necessary for adjudication will often be the same or similar
on many if not all counts. Even though these offenses are consolidated
for procedural purposes, they retain their individual character as
separated from each other by both time and circumstances.
The criminal case of State v. Schackartt" illustrates the impor-
tance of recognizing the individuality of violent acts against the same
victim, acts which involve separate criminal intent and separate criminal
infringements on the victim's rights. Here, the defendant first pulled a
gun on his estranged wife and ordered her to remove her clothes.
Forty-five minutes later he sexually assaulted her. Based on this
conduct, he was convicted of sexual assault and aggravated as-
sault."93 He appealed his convictions on several grounds, one being
that he had been subject to a double punishment for a single act which
had continued over a period of time. The court held that he was
correctly charged with both offenses since they were separate and
distinct in time and nature."
Prosecuting and sentencing multiple civil protection order violations
should be approached in the manner in which the Schackart court
approached the prosecuting and sentencing of separate offenses against
the same victim. Where individual acts are committed against another
person and are separated by at least forty-five minutes in time, they
should be prosecuted and punished separately, even where consolidated
for trial purposes. This policy justly considers the seriousness of the
individualized impact each offense has on the victim. It recognizes that
each violation of the order is a "volitional act of criminal behav-
ior'" 5 which subjects the abuse victim to distinctively painful
infringements on her freedom. It also serves to deter the defendant from
committing future acts which can give rise to additional charges and
1902. 737 P.2d 398 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
1903. Id. at 399.
1904. Id. at 400; see also People v. Healy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that defendant, who inflicted multiple batteries against cohabitant over time, could be
charged with multiple violations of cohabitant abuse statute as opposed to being charged with
a continuous course of conduct offense).
1905. James R. Thompson & Gary L. Starkman. Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guarantee
of Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L. 621, 642 (1973).
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subsequent sentences.
Violations of civil protection orders are usually punishable as
contempts or misdemeanors which are most often deemed to be petty
offenses as their penalties do not usually exceed a six month term of
imprisonment for any individual offense." In fourteen states, the
maximum penalty for a violation of a civil protection order is six
months or less." 7 Petty offenses are considered minor and do not
carry a right to jury trial, and are therefore an exception to the Sixth
Amendment."
When petty offenses are consolidated for trial purposes, in many
states the fact that the aggregated sentence may exceed the penalty for
a single petty offense does not entitle the defendant to a jury trial that
he could not have demanded if each petty offense were tried separate-
ly.'" In other states, however, courts have not clarified whether the
possibility of aggregate sentences exceeding six months for civil
protection order criminal contempt may give rise to a right to a jury
trial. t ° As the court stated in Scott v. District of Columbia,1911
1906. Crimes carrying penalties of up to six months in prison have repeatedly been held by
the Supreme Court to be petty offenses. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974);
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
1907. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137(A) (West 1992) (six months); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 4-509(a) (Supp. 1993) (maximum 60 days); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(6)
(West 1986) (penalty for violating restraining order is not more than 90 days imprisonment);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (Supp. 1993) (six months); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-626(2)
(1993) (same); NEv. REV. STAT. § 33.100(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) (if accompanied by violent act,
sentence to a maximum of six months); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West 1993) (minimum
30 days); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 846-a (McKinney Supp. 1983) (six months); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6114(b) (1991) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (maximum
30 days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610 (1991) (six months); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(a)
(West 1986) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989) (same); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-
7(b) (Supp. 1993) (maximum of 30 days). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 5807 (West 1993) (one
year); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(c) (1992) (same); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312(1) (1993) (same);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06
(Supp. 1993) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6(A) (West 1992) (same); I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-15-3(3) (Supp. 1993) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(5) (Supp. 1993) (same).
1908. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (jury trial not required in
prosecutions for petty offenses); Cheff v. Schackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (same); District
of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, (1937) (same); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.
63, 72-73 (1930) (same); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-72 (1904) (same); Natal v.
Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621. (1891) (same); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (same);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (same); see also Thompson & Starkman, supra note
1905, at 622.
1909. See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C. 1956); City of Ft.
Lauderdale v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Janes, 415 P.2d
543, 546 (N.M. 1966).
1910. See Scott v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1956).
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"[w]e see no reason why consolidation of a number of petty offenses
in one information should confer upon the defendant a right he would
not have had if the charges were brought in separate
informations."' 19 2 In Scott, the fact that two criminal contempt viola-
tions were being tried together, and that their aggregated penalty
exceeded that authorized for a single petty offense, did not change the
nature of the hearing and did not entitle the defendant to the right to
a jury trial.
19 13
National case law shows that several jurisdictions are in agreement
with the Scott court,' 9"4 and clearly indicates that the defendant
should not be granted additional rights because he engaged in repeated
incidents of criminal conduct rather than one single act. If the
defendant does not have a right to a trial by jury for any one of his
violations, he does not have that right when the violations are tried
together in a single hearing.9 5 Requiring that defendant have a jury
trial' 916 in these cases ignores the individuality of the acts committed,
and fails to acknowledge that the acts are being consolidated for
procedural purposes only. Substantively, they are distinct and may be
treated accordingly. Each separate act carries its own separate penalty
and generates certain defendant rights.
3. Criminal Contempt Standard and Burden of Proof
To establish criminal contempt, the petitioner has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the pro-
1911. Id. at 581.
1912. Id. at 581.
1913. Id.
1914. See, e.g., City of Fort Lauderdale v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
City of Monroe v. Wilhite, 233 So. 2d 535 (La. 1970); State v. James, 415 P.2d 543 (N.M.
1966) (three petty misdemeanors do not become a felony when consolidated for trial even if
their aggregated penalty would be classified as a felony). But see Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d
1547 (10th Cir. 1983); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974).
1915. The question of a batterer's right to a jury trial will only arise when a victim files
several contempts simultaneously. This problem can be totally avoided if victims can be
encouraged to file contempt motions as the violations occur. For many battered women,
however, this approach is not practical. Battered women will most often await several violations
of their civil protection order before attempting to enforce it. They may be too afraid to act
initially, or they may believe the violence will stop. When a battered woman notifies counsel
of several civil protection order violations, it is advisable to research local criminal law on petty
offenses and to file separate contempt motions in order to avoid a a jury trial, if the
jursidiction will award a jury trial when the counts are consolidated. If the contempts are filed
separately, they may still be consolidated for trial if the defendant agrees to waive any right
to a jury trial that he may arguably have in a particular jurisdiction.
1916. See supra notes 1667-70 and accompanying text for more information on jury trials.
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tection order.917 New York's statute states that there must be "com-
petent proof that the respondent willfully failed to obey any such or-
der."' t 8 Similarly, in State v. Lipcamon,91 9 the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that to prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt the state
must show that the defendant willfully and intentionally violated the no
contact order with a bad or evil purpose.9
The holdings in domestic violence criminal cases are both
instructive and relevant to illustrate how petitioners may meet this
burden in criminal contempt proceedings. The petitioner's testimony
may be enough to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court
in People v. Blackwood9 2' illustrated how this higher standard can
be met. In that case, the Illinois Appeals Court upheld a contempt
conviction based on the petitioner ex-wife's uncorroborated testimony
that the defendant called her a "fucking whore" and a "dead bitch," and
told her that he had a plot waiting for her."9 Her testimony alone,
absent other witnesses, met the higher standard of proof to show
contempt of a civil protection order. 9 3 Further, in People v.
Stevens,92 4 the court held that, for purposes of a hearing to revoke
bail based on an alleged civil protection order violation, the prosecutor
did not have to prove that an order of protection was issued to the
defendant since the court could determine from reviewing its records
that the defendant was informed of the civil protection order and its
requirements."
Some domestic violence victims may choose to bring contempt
motions alleging a course of contemptuous conduct rather than seek a
1917. See, e.g., State v. Lipcamon. 483 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1992) (state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the petitioner violated the no contact order); Vito v. Vito, 551 A.2d
573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Neal v. Brooks,
No. 88-127-Il, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731 (Nov. 23, 1988) (same).
1918. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 846-a (McKinney 1983).
1919. 483 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1992).
1920. Id. at 607.
1921. 476 N.E.2d 742 (il. App. Ct. 1985).
1922. lit at 743. But see State v. Lehikoinen, 463 N.W.2d 770, 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(where, in a criminal case, the victim recanted on the witness stand her earlier reports that her
physical injuries were due to the defendant's physical abuse). In Lehikoinen, the petitioner
testified at trial that her injuries resulted from respondent defending himself against her attack
and from a subsequent fall. Id. The appellate court reversed the trial court's conviction finding
no evidence of abuse since no one else testified, and the earlier police reports were not entered
into evidence. Il at 772.
1923. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d at 743.
1924. 506 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Oswego City Ct. 1986).
1925. Id. at 999.
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separate sentence for each individual violation. In these cases, criminal
domestic violence actions are also instructive. In People v. Thomp-
son,192 6 a husband was charged and convicted of spousal abuse after
he raped, sodomized, and beat his wife with a breadboard. The court
held that the prosecutor was not required to elect which act was the
basis of the charge because domestic violence falls within the
continuous course of conduct exception.9 7 It meets this exception
because the spousal abuse statute contemplated protecting victims from
a continuous series of acts over a period of time. Pro se victims are
often forced to prosecute criminal contempt actions without the assis-
tance of counsel or the state prosecutors. The ability to prove a course
of conduct as opposed to individual acts of contempt can be a great
help in enabling them to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden
of proof."'
4. Batterer's Duty to Obey Civil Protection Order Absent Court
Action to Rescind or Modify Order
Courts have consistently ruled in proceedings to hold respondents
in contempt for violation of protection orders that a respondent must
obey the order until the court vacates it, even if the respondent has
reason to believe such order was illegally issued.929 A court will also
hold a respondent in contempt for violating an existing protection order
even though the appeals court later vacates that order.930
1926. 206 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
1927. Id. at 519.
1928. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 945, at 153-54. In a study of all civil protection order
cases in 1989 in the D.C. Superior Court, the Task Force found that 75% of all contempt
actions were filed pro se. The Task Force expressed grave concern that so few petitioners were
represented in contempt proceedings. In these mostly criminal contempt actions, respondents are
entitled to appointed counsel, due process, and proof of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The inherent imbalance in the proceedings when prosecution is left to a pro se victim has led
to the low rate of contempts proven at trial. Contempt was found in 55.1% of cases tried and
only 14.2% of contempts filed. Il at 154 n.272. Because an imbalance exists due to the
victim's lack of representation, the Task Force recommends that steps be taken to ensure that
petitioners are represented by counsel in proceedings to enforce civil protection orders by con-
tempt. Id. at 154; see also Czapanskiy, supra note 23, at 250 n.11 (noting that in Maryland
only 11% of litigants in domestic or family law cases received needed legal assistance).
1929. See Nickler v. Nickler, 45 D. & C.3d 49 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1985) (holding respondent in
contempt for violating civil protection order that his attorney told him to ignore on the belief
that the order was illegal).
1930. See State v. Andrasko, 454 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (defendant, who went
to his wife's residence and kicked in the door, was convicted for violating a protection order
in existence at the time and was not relieved of the consequences of violating the order even
though the order was later vacated by the appeals court).
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Courts must also have continuing jurisdiction to enforce their
orders for violations that occur during the existence of a civil protection
order even if the petitioner does not bring the enforcement action until
after the order terminates. Courts should enforce such orders post-
termination to emphasize the importance of respect for court orders. As
in Nickler v. Nickler"' and State v. Andrasko, 293 1 where the sus-
pected illegality or later vacation by a higher court did not excuse the
respondent's willful violation of a court order, orders should be
enforced if a violation occurred during the life of the civil protection
order whether or not the contempt motion is filed before the civil
protection order expired. In Andrasko, the court held the respondent in
contempt for violating a civil protection order which the appeals court
later invalidated.9 3 3 Respect for court orders and protection of family
violence victims demand such a response. If a court may rightly hold
a respondent in contempt for violating a civil protection order which
a higher court later vacates, a court should have the ability to address
a violation of an unchallenged civil protection order even though the
enforcement action was not initiated until after the order expired. The
proper inquiry is whether the order was in effect at the time of the
violation.
Under this analysis, a petitioner can enforce a civil protection
order to obtain a monetary judgment that comes due during the life of
such order. However, a petitioner may not seek payment for expenses
that accrued after the protection order expired. In Drake v. Drake,9M
the Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed a contempt motion for failure to
pay utilities ordered in a civil protection order where the petitioner
sought payment for utilities used after the protection order had
expired.
935
Additional contempt issues that courts have addressed include a
determination that courts may still enforce a civil protection order's
property provisions despite a transferor's bankruptcy, 6 and that a
civil protection order against a minor respondent must be enforced in
the juvenile court.937 The Washington Court of Appeals in State v.
1931. 45 D. & C.3d 49 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1985).
1932. 454 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
1933. Andrasko, 454 N.W.2d at 649.
1934. No. C.A. 9114. 1985 WL 7861 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1985).
1935. Id. at *1.
1936. Rayan v. Dykeman, 274 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1990) (civil protection order was
not null and void as a result of transferor's bankruptcy, and the court could impose $2500 in
sanctions for refusal to transfer property as ordered in the civil protection order).
1937. Diehl v. Drummond, 2 D. & C.4th 376 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1989) (civil protection order
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Horton938 held that the prosecutor, under the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, has the discretion to elect whether to charge civil
protection order violations as misdemeanors or contempts since the pur-
pose of a particular charge may be to coerce rather than punish.1939
5. Reunification
Battered women typically make between two and five attempts to
leave violent relationships before they successfully leave their
batterers.'" Twenty-six percent of victims and thirty-one percent of
batterers interpret battering as a sign of love. 94' Ninety-three percent
of battered women are willing to forgive and forget the first beating
that they suffered from their partners.'942 While batterers are often re-
morseful following a battering incident9 3 the percentage of batterers
who are remorseful declines over time as violence continues.9
The most dangerous time for battered women is when they attempt
to separate from their abusers. Women who leave their batterers assume
a seventy-five percent greater risk of being killed by them.'945 Many
battered women have finely honed survival skills that have allowed
them to survive in the relationship. Battered women need to be able to
against 16 year old minor must be enforced in the juvenile court).
1938. 776 P.2d 703 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
1939. Id. at 704-05.
1940. Okun, supra note 1781, at 113 ("The average number of previous separations among
women who resumed cohabitating with the batterer was 2.42, compared to 5.07 among shelter
residents who never resumed cohabitating after they left the shelter.").
1941. June Henton et al., Romance and Violence in Dating Relationships, 4 J. FAM. ISSUES
467, 474 (1983); Demie Kurz, Social Science Perspectives on Wife Abuse: Current Debates and
Future Directions, 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 489, 493 (1989) (25% of wives and 33% of husbands
think that "a couple slapping one another was at least somewhat necessary, normal, and good").
1942. GILESPIE, supra note 119, at 147. Following the first beating, 50% of women tried
harder to comply with their husband's wishes in an attempt to control the battering. Irene
Hanson Frieze, Perceptions of Battering by Battered Women, Paper Presented at the National
Family Violence Research Conference, Durham, N.H. (July 1987). Among college relationships
where violence occurred, 26% to 37% of students claimed that the relationship improved or
became more committed after the assault, with twice as many men as women making this
claim. BROWNE, supra note 166, at 42.
1943. Batterers are reported to be seductive and charming when they are not being violent,
and women fall for their short-lived, but persuasive, promises. See BATrERED WOMAN, supra
note 4, at 55, 129.
1944. Over 87% of batterers showed sorrow and remorse after the first incident; this declines
to 73% after the second incident, and only 58% after the third or one of the worst incidents.
Angela Browne, Assault and Homicide at Home: When Battered Women Kill, in 3 ADVANCES
IN APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 68 (MJ. Saks & L. Saxe eds., 1984).
1945. National Estimates and Facts About Domestic Violence, NCADV VOICE, Special
Edition: Battered Women in Prison, Winter 1989, at 12.
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assess when it is safest to leave. When battered women turn to the
police or the court system for help, they will follow through with the
court process only so long as they see that the judicial system is help-
ing to stop the violence. If court intervention does not effectively hold
the batterer accountable and stop the violence, she may reengage in
prior survival strategies and return to her batterer t96 This will be
particularly true where the batterer successfully assumes control of the
court process.
Both the state legislatures and courts support the continued validity
and enforcement of protection orders despite the intervening reunifica-
tion of the parties."97 Eight state statutes affirmatively maintain that
reunification of the parties does not preclude enforcement of a
protection order.' 8 Courts have also sanctioned this approach and
enforced protection orders subsequent to a reunification of the parties.
In State v. Kilponen,"9  the court, in a criminal prosecution for
burglary, admitted a restraining order against the defendant husband into
evidence to show unlawful entry. The court noted that the order had
not expired when the defendant entered the home and he "could not
1946. Ganley, supra note 21, at 45. Judges who are not schooled in the dynamics of do-
mestic violence, too often focus their inquiry on the relationship and the abused party. This
approach fails to place responsibility for the violence with the perpetrator and supports his
minimization, denial, and rationalization of his violent behavior. It also provides him with
excuses for his conduct. Id. at 34.
1947. These statutes and cases follow a well established rule in divorce cases that a victim's
continued relationship with the respondent does not constitute condonation to excuse fault. See,
e.g,, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 162 A.2d 453 (Md. 1960) (cohabitation after acts of cruelty does not
constitute condonation).
1948. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13710(b) (West 1992) (the terms and conditions of the protection
order remain enforceable, notwithstanding the acts of the parties, and may be changed only by
court order); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949(d) (Interim Supp. 1993) (only the court may
modify an order and the reconciliation of the parties shall have no affect on the validity of any
provision in the order); 40 ILCS 2312/20 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (petitioner cannot excuse violation
by invitation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.8 (West Supp. 1993) (petitioner cannot take
action/inaction which alters the civil protection order's effectiveness); MtNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(6)(d) (West Supp. 1993) (an order granting protective relief is not voided by the
admittance of the abusing party into the dwelling from which the abusing party is excluded);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B:01(14)(g) (west Supp. 1993) (the admittance into petitioner's
dwelling of an abusing party excluded from the dwelling under an order of protection is not
a violation by the petitioner of the order for protection); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173B:4V
(1992) (temporary reconciliation of parties shall not revoke order); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
§ 6113(g) (1991) (resumption of co-residence on the part of the plaintiff and defendant shall
not nullify the provisions of the court order directing defendant to refrain from abusing the
plaintiff or minor children); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16 (west Supp. 1992) (petitioner may
not give respondent permission to ignore a protection order and order remains valid unless the
court changes it); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 308.
1949. 737 P.2d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
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change the court's order."' 9
Courts have held that the civil protection order lies between the
respondent and the court. The petitioner cannot invite or excuse a
violation of a court order. 9" In Cole v. Cole,952 the court held
that reunification of the parties for a two month period after the
issuance of a protection order did not waive the petitioner's right to
enforce the civil protection order, and did not act as a waiver to a
contempt charge for marital rape.9 3 In that case, the parties resumed
cohabitation after the court entered a protection order prohibiting the
respondent husband from harassing, menacing, assaulting, attempting to
assault, or recklessly endangering the petitioner. After the cohabitation,
which resumed after the civil protection order was entered, had ended,
the respondent forcibly entered the petitioner's home and sexually
assaulted her. The court held that:
[t]he validity of the court's order was in no way impaired, affected,
nor nullified, by the petitioner's consensual cohabitation with the
respondent after entry of the order. As stated in the order itself, the
order remains in full force and effect until such time, if at all, as the
order is modified or terminated by a future order of a court having
competent jurisdiction.
The court holds that acquiescence by a petitioner in cohabitation
by a respondent after an order of protection is issued does not
constitute a waiver by the petitioner of the right to be free from
intrusions by the respondent after cohabitating terminates, upon either
the rights of safety or the rights of privacy secured by the order. A
victim of domestic violence who has procured an order of protection
is entitled to the court's protection from further violence throughout
the duration of an order of protection, even if the victim is desirous
of pursuing a goal of voluntary reconciliation with the offender. At-
tempts to salvage the otherwise beneficial aspects of a relationship
which is afflicted by unlawful behavior would be discouraged if the
law permitted the very attempt of salvation to result in a loss of
protection from the sinister aspect. The law does not impair an
individual's choice to pursue a relationship with one whose prior
conduct has evinced a need for judicial limits upon destructive
behavior. 9 4
1950. Id. at 1029.
1951. Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 308.
1952. 556 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Fan. Ct. 1990).
1953. Id. at 219.
1954. Id.
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Similarly, in City of Reynoldsburg v. Eichenberger,"955 the court
held the defendant, an attorney, in contempt for violating a stay away
and no contact order despite his argument that an intervening attempt
at reunification vacated the effectiveness of the civil protection
order. 9s The court refused to dismiss the contempt charge despite
the wife's request, since the purpose of the contempt proceedings was
to punish the defendant for purposely violating a court order. In People
v. Townsend,"957 the Illinois Appeals Court held the defendant in
contempt for violating conditions of an order of protection when he
entered the petitioner's residence at her invitation, and struck her in the
face.95' The court held that the petitioner's invitation to violate a
protection order did not shield the defendant from a contempt
conviction.959 Moreover, several states, such as Maine and Minnesota,
confirm by statute what has become a standard assumption at the trial
level in most jurisdictions, that a petitioner may not be found in viola-
tion of her own protection order."
Finally, even in New Jersey, the only state where courts had
previously interpreted the New Jersey domestic violence statute to
automatically vacate a protection order upon reunification of the
parties, t%1 case law has interpreted the 1990 amendment to the New
Jersey domestic violence statute"92 to preclude vacating a civil
protection order upon parties' reunification. Torres v. Lancellotti ' 6
limited the reach of pre-1990 case law. In Torres, the court refused to
1955. No. CA-3492, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1613 (Apr. 18, 1990).
1956. Id. at *4.
1957. 538 N.E.2d 1297 (I1. App. Ct. 1989).
1958. Id. at 1298-99.
1959. Id. at 1299.
1960. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766.8 (West Supp. 1993) ("Criminal sanctions may
not be imposed upon the plaintiff for violation of any provision of the plaintiff's order for
protection."); MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14)(g) (West Supp. 1993) (petitioner is not in
violation of her civil protection order if she allows the respondent to return to their residence);
see also Shafer v. Shafer, No. 93 CA 16. 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5955 (Dec. 1, 1993)
(petitioner cannot be held in contempt of her own civil protection order where she denies visi-
tation based on belief that father was abusive to children).
1961. See Mohamed v. Mohamed, 557 A.2d 696, 698 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(holding that the parties' intervening 16 month reconciliation destroyed the viability of the initial
protective order). The court reasoned that since the purpose of the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act is to provide emergent, not long range, relief to the parties, the intervening recon-
ciliation requires that prior orders be dismissed sua sponte. Id. The abuse victim must petition
anew in light of the present circumstances. ld.
1962. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 1992).
1963. 607 A.2d 1375 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
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automatically vacate a temporary restraining order based on the parties'
reconciliation which amounted to sexual relations on one occasion
followed by continued harassment. The court held that in light of the
1990 amendment's directive to courts to provide abuse victims with
both long term as well as emergent relief, no protection order under the
act should be vacated upon reconciliation of the parties without
consideration of the continued need for protection and restraints on the
respondent."
Before a New Jersey court may vacate a protection order under the
pre-1990 Mohamed discussion, the court must determine that a true
reconciliation occurred and that the need for protection no longer exists.
Any court considering vacating a civil protection order due to the
parties reunification must take the following factors into account to
determine the need for continued protection: 1) the previous history of
domestic violence between the parties, 2) the existence of immediate
danger to person or property, 3) the financial circumstances of the
parties, 4) the best interest of the victim and dependents, 5) the exis-
tence of a verifiable civil protection order in another jurisdiction, and
6) proof of changed circumstances since the entry of the prior or-
der."95 The Torres court concluded that attempted reconciliations of
short duration do not amount to true reconciliations and, therefore, the
civil protection order should remain in effect."
Courts in all jurisdictions should follow the lead of the courts in
Eichenberger,97  Kilponen,1  Cole," and Townsend"9' °  and
clarify that civil protection orders can and do continue in effect despite
the parties' reunification or petitioner's invitation to enter her residence.
If the parties do reunite, the civil protection order remains enforceable.
The preferred approach would be for the parties to return to the court
and obtain a modification of the civil protection order to reflect the
changed circumstances between the parties. The civil protection order
could be modified to allow contact between the parties but to preclude
future acts of violence."" When parties reconcile, civil protec-
1964. Id. at 1377-78.
1965. Id. at 1377.
1966. Id. at 1378.
1967. No. CA-3492, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1613 (Apr. 18, 1990).
1968. 737 P.2d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
1969. 556 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Fain. Ct. 1990).
1970. 538 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
1971. See NI CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 53 (discussing preferred practices regarding
modifications).
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tion orders may be modified to remove the stay away provision or no
contact provisions. Simple procedures for modification should be
available in all jurisdictions."" Should petitioner wish to separate
again and respondent refuses to comply, she may return to court to
have her civil protection order modified to re-impose the stay away
and no contact provisions. Evidence of post-reunification violence and
petitioner's desire to have the respondent stay away from her would
constitute sufficient evidence for courts to grant petitioner the modifi-
cation.
Courts across the country also issue civil protection orders to
parties who have not decided to separate. These orders play an impor-
tant role in shifting the balance of power in the relationship so as to
reduce or eliminate continued violence. For many domestic violence
victims, these orders provide them with the first opportunity for a
reduced level of tension and violence at home. Many battered women
who sought such orders explain that the orders enabled them to begin
to work toward ultimately leaving their batterers and creating a safe
life away from the violence. In light of research that indicates that
most battered women make between two and five attempts to leave a
batterer before they succeed,19" it is very important for courts to
issue civil protection orders to parties whether or not they are ready
to separate permanently. Battered women should not be punished or
left without protection because they have attempted to save their
relationships when they seek civil protection order enforcement after
parties have reconciled. Enforcement will help to preclude future
violence.
6. Protection Order Contempt Trials
To convict the defendant of contempt of a protection order, the
state must prove that the defendant had notice of the order." 4 The
court may establish notice from its own records. In People v.
Stevens,1975 the court held that the prosecutor in a criminal contempt
1972. When parties reconcile and civil protection order modifications are requested, the
modified civil protection order should function as a new civil protection order for the maxi-
mum term so that in most states petitioner can have continued protection for at least one
year following reunification, a time when she will need the greatest protection.
1973. See supra note 1940.
1974. See People v. Darnell, 546 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (respondent, whose ha-
rassing telephone calls violated a protection order, was not convicted of contempt because the
state failed to prove that respondent had notice of the order).
1975. 506 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Oswego City Ct. 1986).
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trial need not prove that the protection order was actually issued to
the defendant where the court, upon review of its own records, found
that the defendant had been informed of the protection order and its
contents at the civil protection order hearing.' 6
Courts in domestic violence contempt proceedings should have
latitude similar to courts hearing criminal domestic violence cases.
Courts should have the discretion to limit what the defendant may
argue to the court. The reasoning in State v. Moore,'" a criminal
contempt case, should apply to arguments made to the court in a
criminal contempt proceeding. In Moore, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
prevented the defendant from appealing to the jury's sense of justice
and fundamental fairness to nullify the conviction despite the
defendant's technical contempt of a no contact order."' Similarly,
the voluntariness of guilty pleas in criminal contempt actions should
parallel case law in criminal domestic violence prosecutions. In
Saliterman v. State,9 ' the court of appeals held that where the de-
fendant agreed to plead guilty to two charges of violating a protection
order if the state dropped three harassment charges, the defendant's
guilty pleas were voluntary."'
An important trial issue concerns the role of a child's testimony
where a civil protection order issuance or enforcement is sought on
behalf of a child. Tne Missouri civil protection order statute directly
addresses this issue and provides protection for minor children of
petitioners.Y" The statute provides that hearings for a child's civil
protection order may be open or closed and that the child's testimony
may be in camera or videotaped. Case law supports this approach. In
Desmond v. Desmond,"92 the court held, in a custody case where
severe spousal abuse was alleged, that an in camera interview outside
the courthouse in a local park or other nonintimidating environment
with the parties' children is appropriate to lessen the children's anxi-
ety and encourage the children to be more open."" The Georgia
1976. Id. at 998.
1977. No. 89-0553-CR, 1989 WL 143052 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1989).
1978. Id. at *2.
1979. 443 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
1980. Id. at 844.
1981. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.516.1 (Vernon 1993).
1982. 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
1983. Id. at 981.
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Court of Appeals' decisions in Young v. State9 " and Watkins v.
State,19 both criminal prosecutions, provide an analysis for an in-
novative approach that could be adapted to cases where a mother
seeks a civil protection order or enforcement of such an order through
criminal contempt on behalf of a child without requiring that child to
testify at the hearing. In Young, testimony of other witnesses was ad-
mitted in lieu of the victim's testimony. The court of appeals held
that the trial court properly found that the defendant beat the victim's
head against the floor, wall, and refrigerator resulting in severe head
injuries based, in part, on the testimony of the victim's mother, child,
and cousin about the incident at issue and prior violent behavior.19
The approach of the court was to admit testimony of police officers
as to the victim's statements and injuries when the victim refused to
testify.
In Watkins, the appeals court held that the trial court properly
found that the respondent beat the petitioner with a chair, threatened
her with a gun, and stabbed her with scissors, even though the victim
recanted earlier statements at trial, based on the testimony of police
officers as to the victim's statements at the time of the assault, the
presence of fresh puncture wounds, the presence of weapons in the
house, and the general disarray of the scene." The court specifi-
cally held that the petitioner's statement to the police at the time of
the respondent's arrest was substantive evidence of the respondent's
guilt in a criminal trial. 988 These decisions provide support for an
approach that would supplant the child's testimony with that of the
mother's or law enforcement officer's to establish abuse sufficient to
issue a civil protection order on behalf of a child. When the quantum
of proof required to issue a civil protection order is a preponderance
of the evidence, such testimony should be clearly adequate. When the
child's testimony is needed for a criminal contempt action where the
burden of proof is identical to the standard used in the Young and
Watkins criminal proceedings, it may also be possible to avoid calling
the child as a witness if other testimony is available to prove the
violence against the child beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both Young and Watkins also illustrate that victim cooperation is
1984. 348 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
1985. 360 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
1986. Young, 348 S.E.2d at 135-36.
1987. Watkins, 360 S.E.2d at 48-49.
1988. Id. at 48.
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not always necessary to hold a respondent in contempt of a protection
order. Testimony of the police, family members, and other witnesses
to the violence and injuries may support a finding of contempt where,
as in Young and Watkins, such testimony can support a criminal
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt even absent the victim's will-
ingness or ability to testify.
Another trial issue in criminal domestic violence cases, which is
relevant in civil protection order and contempt proceedings, is wheth-
er the petitioner or prosecutor must elect which specific act is the
basis for the domestic violence charge. In People v. Thompson,"
the court held that the crime of spousal abuse falls within the contin-
uous course of conduct exception where the acts are so closely con-
nected that they form part of the same transaction." ° Consequently,
the prosecutor need not elect, and the jury need not agree unanimous-
ly, on which act the guilty verdict is based.""' Similarly, in a civil
protection order contempt trial, when the petitioner files for contempt
based on a series of contemptuous incidents, the court should not
need to identify any one act in a series of acts which together violat-
ed the civil protection order, unless the victim is seeking to have
each violation punished separately.
E. Contemnor's Due Process Rights
A respondent in a civil protection order case cannot be found in
contempt of an order unless he has been given notice of the order's
issuance." He must be given notice of the time and place of the
hearing." 9 The protection order itself must give respondent suffi-
1989. 206 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1984).
1990. lad at 518.
1991. The same is true in a proceeding for issuance of a civil protection order, where
petitioner need not prove each allegation in her complaint. Proof of any one incident or act
is sufficient.
1992. See, e.g., People v. Damell, 546 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (no contempt
where state failed to prove that respondent had been served with papers or otherwise had
knowledge of protection order). But see People v. Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (there is no statutory requirement that notice of a possible protection order be
given to a respondent; however, respondent is entitled to due process, and thus had the re-
spondent been surprised by the court's determination to impose such a protection and had he
asked for time to present evidence in opposition to it, the court should have granted such a
request).
1993. See, e.g., Neal v. Brooks, No. 88-127-IR, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731, at
*12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 1988) (in criminal proceedings, the contemnor is entitled to
notice as to the time and place of the hearing); Vito v. Vito, 551 A.2d 573, 575-76 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (new trial ordered due in part to the trial court's failure to give conternor
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cient notice of the specific acts which he is prohibited from commit-
ting. 19
4
As in any criminal proceeding, the alleged contemnor is entitled
to representation by counsel,"995 is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," cannot be compelled to give
evidence against himself, 997 can secure the attendance of witness-
es, 199 may cross-examine the witnesses against him, and is pro-
tected against hearsay testimony." Furthermore, double jeopardy
attaches in a criminal contempt proceeding and therefore the petitioner
may not appeal a finding of not guilty of criminal contempt of a
protection order.' The alleged contemnor does not, however, have
a right to jury trial." ! Further, due process is not violated when
respondent is held pre-trial in a criminal contempt case. In Common-
wealth v. Allen," the alleged contemnor was properly held pre-
trial on a contempt charge for nine days, then sentenced to time
notice of the contempt proceedings).
1994. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 595 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (court in
contempt proceedings ruled that defendant had sufficient notice of the specific acts for which
he could be punished); Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1209-11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(state's protection from domestic abuse act not unconstitutionally vague so as to deny defen-
dant due process in connection with protection orders; he had sufficient notice that kicking
down his wife's door, breaking out the rear window and damaging the grill of her car would
be violations of the issued protection orders); Neal, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731, at
*12.
1995. See, e.g.. Thompson v. Thompson, 559 A.2d 311, 314-15 (D.C. 1989) (holding that
the trial court could not deny a continuance in a criminal contempt proceeding based on the
respondent's failure to secure counsel prior to the hearing where he was not notified until
trial date that he was entitled to a court-appointed counsel if he could not afford his own, or
that the contempt charge would be treated as criminal rather than civil).
1996. See. e.g., State ex rel. Hathaway v. Hart, 690 P.2d 514, 516 (Or. Ct. App. 1984),
aff'd, 708 P.2d 1137 (1985) (guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in contempt
proceedings); Vito, 551 A.2d at 577 (same); Neal, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731, at
*13 (same).
1997. See, e.g., Neal, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 731, at *13.
1998. See, e.g., Hart, 690 P.2d at 516 (defendant has right to secure the attendance of
witnesses).
1999. See, e.g., Vito, 551 A.2d at 577 (new trial granted in part because trial court al-
lowed hearsay testimony during contempt proceedings).
2000. Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (where respondent
found not guilty of indirect criminal contempt for willfully violating a protection order the
petitioner wife could not appeal since the criminal safeguard of double jeopardy attaches in
the contempt proceeding).
2001. See, e.g., Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (statute
providing that defendant in contempt proceeding does not have right to jury trial on such
charge enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality, and because it does not clearly, pal-
pably, and plainly violate constitutional provisions for jury trial, it is not unconstitutional).
2002. 486 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985).
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served plus a $750 fine and costs.
Whereas the respondent facing criminal contempt possesses many
of the due process rights granted to criminal defendants, the due
process rights for a civil contemnor are more restricted.2W°3 In Sand-
ers v. Shephard,2°  for example, the court decided that in a civil
contempt proceeding the respondent has the burden of proving that he
was unable, through no fault of his own, to comply with the protec-
tion order. Such placement of the burden on him does not violate due
process because the court's orders were in the nature of civil, rather
than criminal, contempt.2
Sentencing contemnors may be different than sentencing persons
in other criminal matters. In Wagner v. Wagner,' the court up-
held a six month jail sentence for a civil protection order violation.
The court explained that the minimum and maximum sentencing
requirements of the sentencing code do not apply to sentences im-
posed under the Protection from Abuse Act.' The court further
stated that while a contempt proceeding under the act is criminal in
nature, it does not receive all of the protections that regular criminal
proceedings receive. Sanctions imposed, therefore, are best left to
the discretion of the offended court subject to only a few legal re-
strictions.
1. Double Jeopardy
Double jeopardy does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution
for the same act for which a civil protection order is issued.'
Courts should not permit the existence of a criminal prosecution to
delay the issuance of a civil protection order to a domestic violence
victim °' °
Moreover, double jeopardy does not preclude a subsequent crimi-
2003. See State v. Dumas, No. C8-92-2312, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 556 (Minn. App. Ct.
June 1, 1993) (affirming the denial of respondent's motion to retract guilty plea to contempt
of order, the plea was the basis for dismissal of other charges).
2004. 541 N.E.2d 1150 (III. App. Ct. 1989).
2005. Id at 1159.
2006. 564 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 415 (Pa. 1990).
2007. Id. at 163-64.
2008. Id.
2009. See Commonwealth v. Allen, No. 3458, 1988 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 13, at *30
(Commw. C.P. Ct. Mar. 7, 1988) (boyfriend's criminal complaint filed after girlfriend's pro-
tection order petition was not barred by double jeopardy but rather by collateral estoppel).
2010. ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 22-28; see also supra notes 1581-85 and ac-
companying text.
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nal prosecution for violation of a different civil protection order pro-
vision from that which formed the basis for a criminal contempt
finding. For example, in People v. Allen,"1' the court held that a
subsequent criminal prosecution for burglary, criminal mischief, crim-
inal trespass, and menacing, after the defendant was held in contempt
for violating a stay away protection order by breaking into the
petitioner's home and threatening to kill her, did not violate double
jeopardy since the proof required for the criminal offenses was greater
than the proof needed to establish indirect contempt of the stay away
provision.""
However, both state civil protection order statutes and case law
address the more difficult issue of possible double jeopardy where the
state pursues a criminal prosecution based on the same incident for
which the defendant was or may be held in criminal contempt of a
civil protection order. A number of state domestic violence statutes
specifically confirm that a civil protection order does not preclude
other civil or criminal remedies. 13 Missouri law states that en-
forcement of protection orders through criminal contempt does not
preclude criminal prosecution, or visa versa."' 4 Indeed, the courts
have clearly identified the need for this approach. In Commonwealth
v. Smith,""t 5 the court noted that to bar subsequent criminal prose-
cutions because of a finding of criminal contempt would gravely
impair either the state's interest in punishing crime or severely under-
mine the practical utility of the Protection from Abuse Act in pre-
venting physical and sexual abuse.
2011. 787 P.2d 174 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
2012. Id. at 175-76; see also People v. Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987)
(husband entered petitioner's home, beat her, and took their child in violation of a protection
order, double jeopardy did not bar criminal prosecution for residential burglary and battery
but did bar criminal prosecution for child abduction where defendant was previously held in
indirect criminal contempt for child abduction).
2013. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010(d) (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5518 (West Supp.
1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(h) (West Supp. 1992); 38 ILCS 112A-14(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-13-3.F. 40-13-6.H (Michie Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-2 (1988); see
also 40 ILCS 2312-23(a)(1 1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (abuse victim may prosecute both a
civil protection order violation and other crimes committed in violation of a civil protection
order); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (same); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1992) (same). But see 40 ILCS 2312-
23(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (contempt and criminal prosecution may be barred); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 403.760(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (civil and criminal punishment
for the same violation of an order is mutually exclusive).
2014. MO. REv. STAT. § 455.358.5 (Supp. 1993).
2015. 552 A.2d 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1247 (Pa. 1989).
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On July 29, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first ruling
ever in a domestic violence case. In United States v. Dixon, 2016 the
Court ruled that double jeopardy would not bar a battered woman
from enforcing her civil protection order through criminal contempt
while the state proceeds against her batterer criminally for his crime,
as long as the contempt proceeding and the criminal prosecution each
require proof of additional elements under the Blockburger "same ele-
ments" test.2° 7 This ruling assures that battered women with civil
protection orders will no longer be forced to choose between criminal
prosecution and proceeding to enforce civil protection orders through
criminal contempt when civil protection order respondents commit
new crimes against petitioners.
In a separate criminal proceeding,"' the United States
Attorney's Office obtained a grand jury indictment for the respondent
2016. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). This case was a consolidated appeal of two actions: United
States v. Dixon, a drug related contempt action, and United States v. Foster, a criminal do-
mestic violence prosecution.
2017. Id. at 2859-64 (noting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932),
overruled by Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980)). The Supreme Court's ruling in
Dixon confirmed the validity of decisions rendered in several states which had ruled similarly
that double jeopardy did not attach when a criminal prosecution followed a contempt proceed-
ing. See People v. Totten, 514 N.E.2d 959, 965 (l1. 1987) (prosecution for aggravated battery
following and arising out of an adjudication for direct criminal contempt was not barred by
double jeopardy); Sanders v. Shepard, 541 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Il. App. Ct. 1989) (holding
that father's subsequent imprisonment for contempt for failure to produce a minor child and
previous conviction for abduction did not violate double jeopardy since elements of the
crimes were different); People v. Lucas, 524 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (subse-
quent criminal prosecution for aggravated assault and battery arising out the same conduct for
which defendant was held in criminal contempt did not violate double jeopardy since the
criminal offenses of assault and battery required proof which the contempt charge did not);
Commonwealth v. Allen, 486 A.2d 363, 364 (Pa. 1984) (holding that since the Protection
from Abuse Act has its roots in equity and is essentially civil in nature, the court's use of
contempt to enforce its orders under the Act does not bar a later criminal prosecution); Com-
monwealth v. Zerphy, 481 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1984) (where defendant was found not guilty
of indirect criminal contempt for violating a protection order, a subsequent prosecution on
charges with respect to the defendant's conduct toward the police officers answering the
domestic violence call did not violate double jeopardy); Commonwealth v. Smith, 552 A.2d
292, 294-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (double jeopardy does not bar criminal assault prosecution
even though the defendant entered into and violated a consent agreement with wife under the
Prevention from Abuse Act and was held in contempt for the same incident), appeal denied,
568 A.2d 1247 (1989); Commonwealth v. Allen, 469 A.2d 1063, 1069-70 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) (criminal prosecution for rape and trespass was not barred by double jeopardy since
the charges of criminal trespass and rape each required the presentation of evidence on ele-
ments beyond the proof needed to convict for contempt), affid in part and rev'd in part, 486
A.2d 363 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985).
2018. For procedural history, see United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1991), affid
in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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on several counts of felony and misdemeanor assaults and threats
against his wife. Some of the incidents included in the indictment
stemmed from the same incidents for which the respondent was
charged and convicted of criminal contempt. The trial court, in ruling
on the respondent's motion to dismiss as double jeopardy, ruled that
the contempt conviction and the criminal prosecution were separate
offenses each containing an element not contained in the other, and
thus under Blockburger, the criminal prosecution was not barred by
double jeopardy. 19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the trial court's ruling and held that defendant Foster could
not be tried in a criminal prosecution for the same conduct for which
he was found in criminal contempt of the civil protection orders.20
The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Grady v.
Corbin'2t as controlling on the double jeopardy issue.2 '2
In Grady, the defendant Corbin received two traffic tickets after
his automobile crossed the center line and struck two oncoming cars,
killing one person and injuring a second. Corbin appeared in traffic
court and pleaded guilty to the traffic charges. The judge accepted the
plea, imposed a $300 fine, and suspended Corbin's license for six
months. When a grand jury indicted him two months later on several
charges, including manslaughter, Corbin challenged the indictment on
double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court upheld the state court's
ruling of double jeopardy.' 2
In Grady, the Supreme Court took note of the Blockburger test,
which set out the traditional test applied in double jeopardy cases.
Where the same act constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not. 24 The Supreme Court held in Grady that
in order to avoid double jeopardy, in addition to passing the "same
elements" test of Blockburger, the subsequent prosecution must also
satisfy a "same conduct" test.2" The Grady "same conduct" test
2019. Id. at 728-29.
2020. Id. at 731.
2021. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
2022. Dixon, 598 A.2d at 730.
2023. Grady, 495 U.S. at 524.
2024. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), overruled by Whalen v.
United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
2025. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510, 515-16.
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stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecution in
which the government, to establish an essential element of the subse-
quent offense, will need to prove conduct that constitutes an offense
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.' -6 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded in Dixon that the
conduct underlying Foster's contempt prosecution was the very same
conduct for which the government now sought to try him in the
pending criminal case.'a Therefore, Grady precluded the subse-
quent criminal prosecution.
The United States appealed the court of appeals' Dixon decision
to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court re-
versed, °"' clearing the way for battered women to bring contempt
actions against their batterers to obtain swift enforcement of civil
protection orders and thereby secure their immediate safety without
jeopardizing the state's ability to vindicate society's interests in prose-
2026. Id. at 510.
2027. Dixon, 598 A.2d at 731.
2028. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). Prior cases overturned by Dixon
include: State v. Kipi, 811 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Haw. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 194
(1991) (prosecution for burglary in the first degree, with a maximum penalty of 10 years in
jail, and three counts of terroristic threatening in the second degree, with a maximum sen-
tence of one year imprisonment for each count barred by no contest plea on contempt of a
civil protection order charge followed by a sentence of five months incarceration); In re
Marriage of D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 801-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that removing
and concealing of a child in violation of a custody order constitutes the same offense as
child abduction, and prosecution for both violates double jeopardy under the Blockburger
"same elements" test); People v. Gartner, 491 N.E.2d 927, 932-33 (1. App. Ct. 1986) (hold-
ing that double jeopardy barred the defendant's prosecution for aggravated assault where the
defendant had been found in contempt of a protection order based on the same facts), rev'd,
People v. Totten, 514 N.E,2d 959 (1987); State v. Tatro, No. L-84-308. 1985 WL 7096
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1985) (double jeopardy bars subsequent assault prosecution based on
the same facts as a previous domestic violence conviction); Commonwealth v. Aikins, 618
A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that, under the Grady test, a subsequent prosecution
for burglary is precluded by conviction for indirect criminal contempt arising out of protec-
tion order which protected premises burglarized); Commonwealth v. Allen, 469 A.2d 1063,
1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that defendant's subsequent prosecution on assault charg-
es based on the same conduct which supported the contempt finding was barred by double
jeopardy because the assault and criminal contempt charge did not each require proof of an
additional fact), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 486 A.2d 363 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
842 (1985); State v. Magazine, 393 S.E.2d 385, 396 (S.C. 1990) (sentence of five years
imprisonment and fine of $1,188 restitution barred where defendant had been previously
found in contempt of a civil protection order and was sentenced to one year imprisonment
which was suspended upon a payment of a fine of $1,500 and future compliance with the
civil protection order); Jivers v. State, 406 S.E.2d 154, 156-57 (S.C. 1991) (where conduct
supporting criminal domestic violence conviction was the same conduct supporting the later
charge of assault and battery with intent to kill, the subsequent prosecution violated the dou-
ble jeopardy clause).
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cuting the batterer.
In a fragmented opinion, a majority of six Justices 2 9 agreed
that the Double Jeopardy Clause posed no bar to criminal prosecu-
tions against Foster for counts relating to assault with attempt to kill
and threats against his wife. The reasoning behind this conclusion
differed greatly among the Justices. Four Justices agreed that the
Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion of Foster for any of the offenses that were also addressed in
Foster's contempt proceeding. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Thomas found that the "same elements" test in Blockburger did not
bar any of the criminal charges in Dixon.2'3 Each further concluded
that the "same conduct" test in Grady was badly reasoned, unwork-
able, and should be overruled. Justice Blackmun, the fourth Justice to
concur that the Double Jeopardy Clause posed no bar to Foster's
criminal prosecution on any count, found that contempt cannot be the
same offense as a substantive violation of the criminal laws.03'
However, Justice Blackmun saw no need to overrule Grady. He stated
that "the interests served in vindicating the authority of the court are
fundamentally different from those served by the prosecution of viola-
tions of the substantive criminal law."'2 32
Justices Scalia and Kennedy ruled that Foster's subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution for simple assault was barred by Blockburger's "same
elements" test because Foster's simple assault charge did not contain
any element not found in his previous contempt offense.2 33 Justices
Scalia and Kennedy based their conclusion on Dixon's unique facts.
In Dixon, Foster was charged with simple assault in violation of D.C.
Code § 22-504, based on the same event that was the subject of his
prior contempt conviction for violating that provision of the civil
protection order forbidding him to assault his wife and his mother-in-
law. In reaching this conclusion, Justices Scalia and Kennedy take
note of the fact that it is not obvious that the word "assault" in the
civil protection order was intended to carry the same exact meaning
that the word "assault" does in the criminal code under § 22-
2029. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Thomas, and Blackmun.
2030. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2865.
2031. Id. at 2868.
2032. Id. at 2881.
2033. Id. at 2859; see also Hernandez v. State, 624 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that defendant, previously convicted of violation of protection order injunction, can-
not be tried again for criminal contempt based on violation of same order).
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504.234 However, since Judge Murphy, the trial judge who heard
the civil protection order contempt action, construed the term "as-
sault" in the context of the civil protection order to mean "assault
under § 22-504" and that interpretation was never appealed, Justices
Scalia and Kennedy found that, under the trial judge's unchallenged
interpretation of "assault," the subsequent criminal prosecution would
be barred under Blockburger.35 Therefore, according to Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, if the assault forbidden under the civil protection
order were defined in a manner different from "assault under § 22-
504," the subsequent prosecution, even under the criminal assault
statute, might be permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In those few remaining criminal assault cases where double jeop-
ardy may pose a bar to the subsequent criminal action if the contempt
motion goes forward before the criminal action, the court and
petitioner's counsel should first determine whether the contempt ac-
tion can be decided in such a fashion so as to avoid double jeopardy
issues. For example, after hearing the evidence in the case, instead of
finding that the respondent assaulted his wife, the trial judge could
have found in Dixon that respondent approached petitioner in viola-
tion of the stay away provisions of the civil protection order, grabbed
her, and threw her against a parked car.
Despite the fact that double jeopardy will no longer pose a bar
to criminal prosecutions that follow contempt proceedings in the vast
majority of cases, there is a continuing need for cooperation and
coordination between domestic violence victims bringing contempt
motions and state prosecutors. Coordination will prevent poorly word-
ed contempt findings from unwittingly precluding criminal prosecu-
tions in some cases, as occurred on one count in Dixon. In addition,
appointment of counsel for civil protection order petitioners pursuing
enforcement through contempt would help eliminate conflicts that may
arise, and assist the petitioner in successfully prosecuting her criminal
contempt case. It is strongly urged that each jurisdiction adopt such a
practice.
2. Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel can arise in the domestic
violence context. In the case of Commonwealth v. Allen, 34 a girl-
2034. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858 n.3.
2035. Id. at 2864.
2036. No. 3458, 1988 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 13 (Commw. C.P. Ct. Mar. 7, 1988); see
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friend and boyfriend both filed protection orders against each other.
The girlfriend prevailed on her request for a protection order, while
the boyfriend failed to meet his burden of proof, and thus his request
to have a protection order issued against his girlfriend was de-
nied.' 37 Subsequent to the protection order hearing on both peti-
tions, the boyfriend brought a private criminal complaint, and the
girlfriend argued that such an action would constitute double jeopar-
dy. The court held that rather than constituting double jeopardy, such
an action was barred by collateral estoppel. 0 38  The boyfriend's
criminal complaint was based upon a set of facts that had already
been adjudicated against him in the civil protection order case. When
issues have been decided by a valid judgment, those issues cannot be
relitigated between the same parties. The boyfriend whose civil pro-
tection order request had been denied in a civil case could not bring
a criminal complaint to gain renewed access to his victim.0 39
F. Sentencing
The cycle of violence can end in the death of the victim or a
separation. In such cases, the batterer often moves on to a new vic-
tim." 4  The violence may also stop as a result of negative experi-
ences such as social and legal sanctions,"°' loss of children, and
social embarrassment." 2 Dr. Anne Ganley states:
Domestic violence is repeated because it works. It gets overtly,
covertly, and inadvertently reinforced by all of society's institu-
also People v. Roselle, 602 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 1993).
2037. Allen, 1988 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 13, at *6.
2038. Id. at *30.
2039. Id.
2040. See TERRIFYING LovE. supra note 4. at 71-72 (95% of men who sought treatment
for battering behavior admitted abusing more than one woman); Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of
Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 377 (Lloyd Ohlin & Mi-
chael Tonry eds., 1989); Lenore E. Walker & Angela Browne, Gender and Victimization by
Intimates, 53 J. PERSONALITY 177, 192 (1985) (at least half of batterers who complete treat-
ment programs continue their violent behavior with new partners).
2041. Over time, the possibility of new court involvement becomes the strongest deterrent
of future violence. See generally Jeffrey Edleson & Maryann Syers, Relative Effectiveness of
Group Treatments for Men Who Batter, 26 SOc. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS 10, 10-17
(1990).
Domestic violence is repeated because it works and is covertly, overtly, and inadver-
tently reinforced by society's institutions. Since battering is learned behavior, courts can pro-
vide batterers with motivation for change. Battering stops when batterers are held accountable
and choose to stop. See Ganley, supra note 21, at 34, 40.
2042. Fagan, supra note 2040. at 389 (social stigmatization).
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tions .... The pattern of domestic violence.., allows the perpe-
trator to gain control of the victim through fear and intimidation.
The fact that most domestic violence is learned means that the
perpetrator's behavior can be changed. Most individuals can learn
not to batter when there is sufficient motivation for changing that
behavior. The court plays a strong role in providing perpetrators
with sufficient motivation to change and participates in the rehabili-
tation process by holding perpetrators accountable for both the vio-
lence and for stopping the pattern of coercive control. Most impor-
tantly, the court plays an essential role in protecting the abused
party during the perpetrator's rehabilitation process, and in monitor-
ing that process to ensure the perpetrator's compliance.' 43
1. Considerations at Sentencing
In all domestic violence cases, the goals of sentencing domestic
violence offenders are identical. This is true whether the sentencing
follows a criminal contempt conviction for violating a civil protection
order, or whether the sentencing follows a criminal trial for crimes
committed against family members." 4 The need to hold the
batterer accountable for his actions, and the need to be cognizant of
the harm the batterer's actions have caused the victim, remain con-
stant in all domestic violence contexts. The most important sentencing
goals which address issues common to all batterers and victims are:
1) stopping the violence; 2) protecting the victim, the children, and
other family members; 3) protecting the general public; 4) holding the
batterer accountable for the violent conduct; 5) upholding the legisla-
tive intent to treat domestic violence as a serious crime; 6) providing
restitution for the victim; and 7) rehabilitating the batterer. 45 The
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges advocate that
every sentence imposed in a family violence case should order of-
fender involvement in activities specifically designed to reduce future
violence, require an alcohol and drug evaluation where appropriate,
mandate successful completion of treatment, and provide for formal
supervision and monitoring of compliance.1 6 These all-inclusive
2043. Ganley, supra note 1519, at 30-31 (citations omitted).
2044. Cf Grageda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv.. No. 92-70322,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33634 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1993). Note that in Grageda, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that spousal abuse is a crime of "moral turpitude" which can be the basis for an
alien's deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
2045. NANcY D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BENCHGUIDE FOR CRIMINAL CASES 151
(1989). cited in ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 37.
2046. Family Violence Project, The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,
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sentences are most effective in protecting the abused party.
State statutes provide insight into how various jurisdictions ap-
proach sentencing of domestic offenders.2 "7 Thirty-four jurisdictions
statutorily authorize jail time for civil protection order violations, thir-
ty-one of which stipulate either a minimum or a maximum number of
days to which the defendant can be sentenced."s Thirty-two states
Family Violence: Improving Court Practice 41 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 16 (1990). See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040 (1992) (electronic monitoring as condition of release
paid for by defendant).
2047. For a detailed guide to sentencing acts of domestic violence within one jurisdiction,
see P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§ 631-636 (1990). Puerto Rico's statutory sentencing provisions
in this area are very specific. A single incident of abuse and abuse by threat warrant a fixed
12 month jail term. Id. § 631. Extenuating circumstances diminish the sentence to 9 months,
while aggravating circumstances increase the sentence to 18 months. Id. Aggravated abuse
leads to a fixed term of 3 years if one or more of the following exists: (a) in the case of
spouses or cohabitors, when they are separated or there is an order for protection excluding
one of the parties from the residence, the person enters the dwelling of the person or the
place in which he/she is lodged and the abuse is committed therein; or (b) when grave bodi-
ly harm is inflicted on the person; or (c) when it is committed with a lethal weapon under
circumstances that do not indicate the intention of killing or maiming; or (d) when committed
in the presence of minors; or (e) when it is committed after an order for protection or reso-
lution has been issued against the person charged, in aid of the victim of abuse; or (f) the
person is induced, incited, or forced to be drugged with controlled substances, or with any
other substance or means that alters the will of the person, or to become intoxicated with
alcoholic beverages; or (g) when child abuse is committed and simultaneously incurred. Id.
§ 632. When the defendant is found to have restricted the victim's liberty, he/she faces a
fixed 3 year term, to be increased to 5 years if there are aggravating circumstances and to
be decreased to 2 years if there are extenuating circumstances. Id. § 634. Sexual assault is
placed into several categories which cover a sentencing range of from 10 to 25 year fixed
terms. Id. § 635. If the defendant uses force, violence, intimidation, or the treat of imminent
bodily harm, he faces a 30 year fixed term, increased to 50 years when aggravating circum-
stances exist and decreased to a minimum of 20 years when extenuating circumstances exist.
Id. § 635. If in addition, the sexual abuse occurred in the home or immediate environment of
the home of the victim and the parties were living apart, the sentencing range is 40 to 99
years imprisonment. Id. § 635.
2048. ARK. CODE § 9-15-207 (Michie Replacement 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5807 (West
1993) (a willful and knowing violation of a restraining order is a crime punishable under
§ 273.6 of the Penal Code); COLO. REv. STAT. § 186-803.5 (Supp. 1993) (class three misde-
meanors); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(e) (West Supp. 1993) (punishable by a term of
imprisonment of not more than 1 year and a fine or not more than $1,000, or both); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1005(f) (1989) (violation of any temporary or permanent order issued under
this chapter shall be punishable as contempt); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312.1 (1993) (punishment
not to exceed 1 year in jail and a fine not to exceed $5,000); 725 ILCS 5/112A-23(f)
(Smith-Hurd 1992) (penalty shall be the penalty that generally applies in criminal or contempt
proceedings); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West 1993) (the defendant shall serve a jail sen-
tence); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 46 § 2137 (West 1992) (may be punished by a fine for not
more than $500 or jail for as long as 6 months, or both); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993) (not more than 2 and 1/2 years in a house of correction); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 4-509 (West Supp. 1993) (fine not exceeding $500 or imprison-
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statutorily authorize the imposition of fines for civil protection order
violations and set maximum dollar amounts. 9 Some states provide
ment not exceeding 60 days, or both); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(6) (West 1986)
(imprisoned for not more than 90 days and may be fined not more than $500); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01(14) (West Supp. 1993) (defendant must be sentenced to a minimum of 3
days imprisonment, among other things); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (Supp. 1993) (court
may punish the defendant by imprisonment for not more than 6 months or a fine of not
more than $1,000, or both); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085.7 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (violation is
a class A misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(3) (Supp. 1992) (class II misdemeanor);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993) (violation is a class A misdemeanor); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.100 (Michie Supp. 1993) (guilty of misdemeanor;, if violation accom-
panied by violent act the court shall sentence him to imprisonment for not fewer than 5
days, but no more than 6 months, among other things); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West
Supp. 1993) (any person convicted of a second or subsequent nonindictable domestic violence
contempt offense shall serve a minimum term of not less than 30 days); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT
§ 846(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (jail term not to exceed 6 months); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.27 (Anderson 1993) (varies with number of previous convictions for violation of
order, if any); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6(A) (West 1992) (punishable by a fine of
not more than $1,000 or by a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or both); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.718(3) (1991) (punishable by a fine of up to $300, a jail term or up to 6
months, or both); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6114(b) (1991) (imprisonment of up to 6 months or
a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993) (punished by
a fine of no more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-25-30 (1985) (must be punished by a fine of not more than $200 or im-
prisonment of not more than 30 days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610 (1991) (upon violation
of the order the court may hold the defendant in contempt and punish him in accordance
with the law); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(b) (West Supp. 1992) (violation of order may
be a felony punishable by a fine of as much as $10,000 or by imprisonment for as long as
10 years, or both); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(5) (Supp. 1993) (class A misdemeanor carry-
ing penalties of fine and imprisonment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1030 (West Supp. 1993)
(imprisoned not more than I year or fined not more than $5,000, or both); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(8) (West Supp. 1993) (punishment not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than 9 months, or both); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-7 (Supp. 1993) (imprisonment of up
to 30 days and a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both).
2049. ARK. CODE ANN § 9-15-207(b) (Michie 1993) (one thousand); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 5807 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(2) (West Supp. 1993) (five thou-
sand); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(c) (West Supp. 1993) (one thousand); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1005(f) (1989) (one thousand); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.31 (West Supp. 1993)
(five hundred); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312(1) (1993) (five thousand); 725 ILCS 5/112A-23(g)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (unspecified fine); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 46 § 2137 (West 1982)
(five hundred); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769(i) (West Supp. 1992) (two thousand);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-509(a) (Supp. 1993) (five hundred); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993) (five thousand); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 60.2950(6) (West 1986) (five hundred); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(18) (West Supp.
1993) (seven hundred); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1993) (one thousand); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 455.538A(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (one thousand); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(3)
(1993) (one thousand); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (1988) (five hundred); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.100 (Michie Supp. 1993) (two thousand); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West
Supp. 1993) (one thousand); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(5) (1985) (one thousand); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.27 (Anderson 1993) (two hundred-fifty); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 60.6(A) (West 1992) (one thousand); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(3) (1991) (three hundred);
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that a sentence can include a fine and jail time."' In contempt cas-
es in New York, the court may modify a civil protection order, issue
a new civil protection order, or put the defendant in jail for up to six
months.""
Factors which have been considered by the state legislatures and
courts to increase a domestic violence offender's sentence include:
prior criminal convictions, prior treatment for domestic violence, prior
history of domestic violence, substance abuse, history of threats to
others, great bodily injury or threats of great bodily injury, vicious-
ness and callousness, use of a weapon, a victim who is particularly
vulnerable, multiple victims, planning or sophistication indicating
premeditation, and tying, binding, or confining.2 52 These factors
should be considered and weighed, whether a judge is sentencing a
defendant for a civil protection order violation or for another act of
domestic violence being prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a felony. In
all criminal domestic violence cases, the problems these factors pres-
ent, and the issues they raise, are similar regardless of the context in
which they are considered.
Some civil protection order statutes specifically provide that the
sentencing judge may consider aggravating factors. Illinois and Okla-
homa, for example, stipulate that the court must consider evidence of
aggravation or mitigation.' 53 Illinois adds that the criminal court
may consider other civil protection order violations in sentenc-
ing."54 Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Ohio, and
Illinois provide that further violations increase the defendant's sen-
tence,' °5' and Oklahoma's statute states that no probation or sus-
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(b) (1991) (one thousand); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-5-3(3)
(Supp. 1993) (one thousand); TEX. FAM. CODE "ANN. § 71.16(b) (West Supp. 1993) (ten
thousand); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(5) (1990 & Supp. 1993) (one thousand); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 1030(a) (Supp. 1993) (five thousand); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-7(b) (1992 &
Supp. 1993) (one thousand); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(8) (West Supp. 1993) (same).
2050. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(f) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(3)
(1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(b) (1991).
2051. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 846-a (McKinney Supp. 1994). These options are regularly com-
bined at the trial level in many states.
2052. DOMESTIc VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 138-40.
2053. 750 ILCS 5/112A-23(f)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §60.6(B)
(West 1992).
2054. 725 ILCS 5/112A-23(f)(3)(i) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
2055. 725 ILCS 5/112A-23(f)(3)(ii) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.085(7)
(Vernon Supp. 1993) (violation of civil protection order is a felony); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-14 (West 1992) (second violation of a protection order requires a minimum thirty
day sentence); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993) (second or subsequent violation
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pended sentence can reduce the sentencing minimum.2 Wisconsin
calls for a maximum two year increased penalty for an act of domes-
tic violence which occurs within twenty-four hours of an arrest for
domestic violence.0 57
Statutes and court cases recommend that specific sentences be
imposed in domestic violence cases. These statutes and case law
provide that a sentence may include no contact with the victim,258
a fine or community service and a term of incarceration, 2" reim-
bursement of plaintiffs attorney's fees,' reimbursement of
plaintiff's medical care due to violence, and counseling at
defendant's expense.' 2 The Massachusetts statutory provisions on
sanctions for civil protection order violations put great emphasis on
victim restitution by specifically listing that the defendant can be
ordered to monetarily compensate the victim for the cost of her shel-
ter and emergency housing, lost earnings, out-of-pocket expenses for
injuries, moving expenses, the cost of obtaining an unlisted phone
number, reasonable attorney's fees, support, and property damag-
of a protection order is a felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.27(B) (Anderson 1993)
(felony for temporary protection order violation if 2 or more previous violations of this or
other protection order); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6B (West 1992) (mandatory imprison-
ment for second or subsequent violation of protection order).
2056. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6(D) (West 1992).
2057. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.621 (West Supp. 1993) (post-arrest act becomes a felony).
2058. See People v. Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211, 1212 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (sentence
for defendant, who was convicted of violating a protection order, included a new protection
order); see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. supra note 23, at 146 (recom-
mending that courts consider issuing a no-contact order, even in those cases where the of-
fenders sentence includes a period of incarceration, to help prevent the defendant from calling
or writing the victim from jail). This is exactly the approach the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia took in Maldonado v. Maldonado, due to its recognition that the wife
would be left open to harassment or threatening communications should he gain access to a
telephone or should he be released early or escape from jail. No. 93-FM-199, 1993 D.C.
App. LEXIS 227 (D.C. Sept. 13, 1993). With regard to prohibiting contact by telephone, the
court stated, "[a]lthough threats to commit physical harm by one incarcerated may, in some
instances, not rise to the level of seriousness that physical abuse does, such conduct can
nonetheless have significant adverse effects upon the victim." Id. at *9.
2059. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.100 (Michie Supp. 1993) (one hundred hours of com-
munity service and five days to six months imprisonment).
2060. 725 ILCS 5/112A-23(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.100(c) (Michie Supp. 1993).
2061. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.100(c) (Michie Supp. 1993).
2062. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(4) (1993) (defendant must pay for and complete
twenty-five hours of counseling for him/herself); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.100(d) (Michie
Supp. 1993) (must pay for and complete counseling for him/herself); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
36-5(2) (Supp. 1993) (may be required to pay for defendant's own counseling as well as
victim's counseling).
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es.2"3 This statute follows the position urged by the Attorney
General's Task Force on Family Violence, which seeks to make abus-
ers accountable for their conduct and includes placing financial re-
sponsibilities on batterers at their sentencing. 2"
A study of recent case law reveals that courts have employed
various sentencing methods intended to punish a batterer for past
domestic violence while trying to deter future violent acts. Many
courts allow a contempt sentence to be stayed pending future civil
protection order violations, upon which the defendant may be called
to court for sentencing. 2" This approach has two advantages. First,
for some batterers the threat of the outstanding sentence will be
enough to encourage them to change their behavior and participate in
a batterer's treatment program. Second, if the deterrent is ineffective,
the judge will be asked to impose a sentence on the first violent act
at a time when the defendant has already demonstrated his unwilling-
ness to stop the violence and comply with court orders. Under these
circumstances, even the judges most sympathetic to batterers will be
more likely to impose upon the batterer a longer sentence, one that is
more akin to those given in all other criminal actions.
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges rec-
ommends that batterer's receive enhanced penalties for second or
subsequent crimes involving domestic violence.2" Ohio provides
that in a criminal case where the defendant has been previously con-
victed of domestic violence, subsequent incidents will be charged and
sentenced as felonies rather than misdemeanors." 7 The Wisconsin
Appellate Court held that a harsher sentence for the violation of a do-
mestic abuse injunction was properly based on the finding that the
defendant failed to change his behavior after previous, more lenient
2063. MASS. GEM. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 1992).
2064. ATTrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT 35 (1984); see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 23,
at 146. For a broad range of potential probation and parole conditions that are recommended
by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, see MODEL CODE, supra note
15, §§ 219. 220.
2065. See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 524 N.E.2d 246, 247 (11l. App. Ct. 1988) (contempt sen-
tencing may be stayed pending future civil protection order violations); People v. Whitfield,
498 N.E.2d 262, 264 (11. App. Ct. 1986) (husband received conditional discharge of sentence
after first contempt finding provided he ceased abuse and harassment of wife); see also MOD-
EL CODE, supra note 15, § 218.
2066. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 203.
2067. State v. Amos, No. 12-088, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 78 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15,
1988) (where defendant has been previously convicted of domestic violence, subsequent inci-
dents will be charged as felonies rather than misdemeanors).
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sentences for prior violations of such injunction.2 The Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals held that where the defendant was found
to have violated civil protection orders on four counts, revocation of
suspended sentences for earlier violations of some civil protection
orders was proper.'
Only two states have expungement provisions in their statutes
which allow the court to erase a convicted respondent's record under
certain circumstances. Vermont provides that the court may expunge a
civil protection order criminal contempt conviction if two years pass
without the respondent obtaining another conviction."' Arizona al-
lows the court to expunge a conviction if the complete sentence is
served without a new violation."7'
These expungement policies are not advisable for several reasons.
First, they treat criminal behavior against intimates less seriously than
other criminal behavior. In addition, they base expungement upon
cessation of violence for a fairly short period of time against one
victim rather than focusing on the batterer's treatment and rehabilita-
tion. In most instances, batterers will continue battering multiple part-
ners over time.' The expungement statutes not only fail to ac-
count for the fact that the batterer may be in a new abusive relation-
ship with another woman after his separation from the victim in-
volved in the conviction, but expungement prevents future victims and
future courts from obtaining basic conviction information available on
all other criminals. Domestic violence is often hidden from public
scrutiny, and if a batterer's record is expunged, it may destroy the
one means the public has of assessing the danger he presents to soci-
ety and other potential victims. Further, the fact that no further con-
viction has occurred in two years is not an accurate measure of
whether or not his violence has truly ceased. A batterer may use the
need to have two years pass before he may qualify for expungement
as an incentive to keep tight power and control in future relation-
ships. The availability of expungement in these cases may actually
2068. State v. McDaniel, 502 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
2069. Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (where defendant was
found guilty on four counts of violating domestic abuse act, revocation of suspended sentenc-
es for earlier violations of some earlier protection orders was proper).
2070. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(b) (1989).
2071. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(H) (Supp. 1993).
2072. TERRWYNG LOVE, supra note 4, at 72 (95% of men who sought treatment for
battering behavior admitted abusing more than one woman); Fagan, supra note 2040, at 377-
425; Walker & Browne, supra note 2040, at 17 (at least half of the batterers who complete
treatment programs continue their violent behavior with new partners).
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encourage even more violence. Through threats or intimidation, a
batterer may be very effective in preventing his present or future
victim from reporting new incidents.
2. Victim Impact Statements
A victim impact statement is a statement read into the record
during sentencing in a criminal trial to inform the court of the impact
the crime had on the victim and her family.tn 3 The purpose of vic-
tim impact statements is well articulated in the 1982 Report for the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime:
Judges should allow for, and give appropriate weight to, input at
sentencing for victims of violent crime .... [E]very victim must
be allowed to speak at the time of sentencing. The victim, no less
than the defendant, comes to court seeking justice .... Defendants
speak and are spoken for often at great length, before sentence is
imposed. It is outrageous that the system should contend it is too
busy to hear from the victim.' 4
These statements are very important in domestic violence cases,
as there are often no witnesses to the abuse the victim has suffered.
Additionally, if the victim is economically dependent on the batterer,
the judge will need this information so that the sentence imposed
does not force the victim to have to return to the batterer as her only
means to stave off indigence.'
Use of victim impact statements does not violate due process, so
long as certain conditions are met. The statement must be made under
oath, and the defendant must have notice that the witness offering the
victim impact statement will be testifying or will be available so that
the defendant may cross-examine her. 76  In Buschauer v.
2073. Deborah P. Kelly, Have Victims Gone Too Far-Or Not Far Enough, A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST. 22 (1991).
2074. 1982 REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, quoted in
ORLOFF & KLEIN, supra note 26, at 46.
2075. In sentencing domestic violence offenders, courts should be aware of the economic
consequences of their sentences. Courts can structure sentences in some cases in such a way
that the victim does not become economically devastated. The court may wish to sentence the
defendant with a work release so that he may continue providing the economic sustenance on
which the victim is often completely dependent.
2076. See, e.g., State v. Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (awarding
restitution for medical expenses based on victim impact statement); State v. Kinley, No. 2826,
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3272 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1993) (upholding admission of victim
impact statement in domestic murder prosecution).
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State, 77 the court held that a victim impact statement made by
defendant's mother-in-law which contained specific details regarding
defendant's history of domestic violence violated due process, because
defendant received no notice that his mother-in-law would offer the
statement, the statement was not made under oath, and the defendant
was given no opportunity for cross-examination."7
3. Sentences Upheld
The U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence
concluded in its final report that: "In all cases when the victim has
suffered serious injury, the convicted abuser should be sentenced to a
term of incarceration. In cases involving a history of repeated abusive
behavior or when there is a significant threat of continued harm,
incarceration is also the preferred disposition."2" 9 A study of the
case law reveals that the types of sentences that have been upheld in
domestic violence cases include jail terms, monetary sanctions, bonds,
probation, and injunctions.
For violations of civil protection orders, state courts have upheld
a variety of sentences, including: six months in jail for violating an
order which prohibited respondent from threatening, abusing, or ha-
rassing his wife;2" six months imprisonment for wilful violation of
a protection order;2 ' ninety days imprisonment for stalking, beat-
ing, and hospitalizing wife;.. 2 nine days and $750 fine for forcibly
entering plaintiff's residence and physically abusing her;2" 3 eighteen
months suspended with four years probation for repeated violations of
an order prohibiting contact with former wife;' thirty days in jail
2077. 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990).
2078. Id. at 1048.
2079. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 2064, at 34;
see also NU CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 58.
2080. Wagner v. Wagner, 564 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (upholding six month jail
sentence for violating civil protection order).
2081. Murdock v. Murdock, 583 N.Y.S.2d 501 (App. Div. 1992).
2082. Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
2083. Commonwealth v. Allen, 486 A.2d 363, 365 (Pa. 1984) (trial court found defendant
in contempt of protection order, ordered him to pay a fine of $750 and costs, and discharged
him from prison where he had been held for nine days).
2084. See, e.g., Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 62 (Alaska 1987) (upholding
respondent's sentence for repeated violations of court order prohibiting contact with former
wife proper, where respondent's contempt prejudiced his former spouse's right to be left
alone, his contempt was properly punishable by imprisonment upon revocation of probation as
court can authorize sentence of imprisonment when right or remedy of a party to the case
has been defeated or prejudiced by the contempt).
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for wilful violation of a protection order;" imprisonment for six
hundred days, after finding respondent guilty of four separate criminal
contempts of petitioner and her mother's civil protection orders;2'
revocation of probation and six months in jail for going to wife's
home and threatening residents, and for telephoning wife;2' six
months in jail for breaking into plaintiff's residence and threatening
to kill her;"' 8 revocation of parole and seven days imprisonment
for violating no contact provision of order;"89 $2,500 in sanctions
for violating provision of order;2" and probation for twelve
months, conditioned on sixteen hours of public service work and
imprisonment of two days for harassing former wife."l' A father
who was found in contempt of a custody order for failing to return
the child to the custodial mother was ordered to post a $10,000 penal
bond and was allowed limited visitation with the child.1 ' 2
Sentencing in domestic violence criminal cases of contempt
should be guided by the criminal courts which have upheld sentences
of batterers convicted of domestic violence offenses. The act of con-
tempt of a civil protection order is also a criminal act, such as an
assault, for which batterers can, but may or may not, be prosecuted in
criminal court. Criminal courts can likewise look to the civil protec-
tion order courts to understand how a criminal sentence must protect
the victim from further abuse at the same time it holds the batterer
2085. Duquette v. Ducatte, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1984).
2086. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2854 (1993) (trial court found defendant
to have violated the civil protection orders beyond a reasonable doubt on four separate occa-
sions and was sentenced to 150 days for each count with sentences to run consecutively).
2087. State v. Martinez, 495 N.W.2d 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding sentence to
two consecutive six month terms and probation revocation for two violations of protection
order).
2088. People v. Allen, 787 P.2d 174, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
2089. Dunkelberger v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 593 A.2d 8 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991).
2090. Rayan v. Dykeman, 274 Cal. Rptr. 672, 674 (Ct. App. 1990) (violator of order
sanctioned $2,500 for refusing to transfer real estate property; bankruptcy does not bar en-
forcement of order).
2091. People v. Whitfield, 498 N.E.2d 262, 264 (11. App. Ct. 1986) (respondent's condi-
tional discharge was revoked upon second contempt and he was sentenced); see also State v.
Ramsey, 831 P.2d 408, 413 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the portion of the domestic
violence statute which required prosecutorial concurrence with the judge's decision to defer
the entry of guilt and place offender on probation violates the separation of powers doctrine;
judge may defer the entry of guilt pending a showing that the offender has successfully
completed probation).
2092. In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 545 N.E.2d 731, 732 (IIl. 1989).
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accountable for his actions. State v. Sutley ° 3 shows how similar is-
sues are relevant when sentencing occurs following a case of domes-
tic violence, whether after a criminal trial or contempt proceeding.
The behavior being punished is often the same, and the goals of
sentencing, holding the batterer accountable and protecting the victim,
are the same. Here, the court held that the probation order restric-
tions, which ordered respondent to remain outside one section of his
home county and to stay away from the victim and her family, were
proper as they were related to the crime and helped to insure that
defendant would remain law abiding? '
4. Sentences Overturned
Appellate courts have been careful to keep in mind that domestic
violence offenders must receive the same treatment as all other crimi-
nals. The goals of sentencing are to hold the offender accountable
and protect his victim from further abuse."° 5 The court in State v.
2093. No. 90-A-1495, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1990).
2094. Id. at *10; see also People v. Burts, No. 1-90-0768, 1993 Il. App. LEXIS (I1.
App. Ct. Nov. 29, 1993) (upholding thirty year sentence for first degree murder of intimate
partner); People v. Brown, 620 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (upholding fifty year sentence
for first degree murder of ex-wife, plus an additional twenty years for attempted murder, both
to run consecutively); People v. Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (uphold-
ing the conditioning of probation on ninety days in prison and the issuance of another pro-
tection order where defendant, originally convicted for violating a protection order obtained by
his ex-wife and sentenced to six months probation, subsequently violated probation by damag-
ing the property of ex-wife's relatives); Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1 (Md. 1993) (upholding
thirty year sentence where defendant was convicted of serious assault of wife by striking her
in the head and back with a steam iron, sixty day sentence for violating vacate order, and
six month sentence for telephone harassment); State v. Christopherson, No. C4-92-900, 1992
Minn. App. LEXIS 1243 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1992) (upholding sentence ordering defen-
dant to undergo chemical dependency and domestic abuse counseling, pay restitution, and
have no contact with victim-former wife); State v. Whitaker, 397 S.E.2d 372 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990) (upholding nine year sentence after guilty plea to assault with a deadly weapon where
trial court found aggravating factors that assault was committed while defendant was on pro-
bation for previous assaults on wife and acts were done with premeditation and deliberation);
State v. Weller, 563 A.2d 1318 (Vt. 1989) (trial court that placed defendant on probation and
required an appearance bond reasonably concluded that the defendant's failure to report to his
probation officer increased the risk that he would not appear in court); State v. Gipson, 499
N.W.2d 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding thirteen year sentence of defendant convicted of
sexually assaulting his stepson where the offense was serious, defendant had prior convictions,
and a history of domestic violence). But see State v. J.F., 621 A.2d 520 (NJ. Super. Ct.
1993) (vacating part of defendant's sentence that banished him from the state because banish-
ment is not among the remedies authorized by the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act).
2095. Cf MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 217 (residential confinement in home of victim
prohibited).
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Huletz' upheld these principles when it overturned the sentence of
a defendant convicted of fourth degree assault on his live-in girl-
friend. The Alaska Appellate Court held that where the offense is
punishable by one year in jail and a fine of $5,000, or both, and
there were no mitigating circumstances, the trial court's no contact
order plus a $250 fine and forty hours of community service was too
lenient.2'9
In State v. Hobbs,"'95 the Washington Court of Appeals held
that a trial court's finding that the defendant was extremely distressed
at the time of the offense did not support the trial court's conclusion,
when imposing an exceptional sentence, that defendant's capacity was
significantly impaired at the time of the offense.' The court fur-
ther found that the existence of a present harmonious relationship
between the defendant and the victim did not justify the imposition of
an exceptional sentence.2"' Further, the court added that it lacked
discretion to decide whether the exceptional sentence should be sus-
tained for reasons on which the trial court did not rely.210' Here,
the court was clearly aware of the need to hold the defendant ac-
countable for the abuse he inflicted, and thus barred defendant from
presenting an excuse for his behavior and prevented entry of an order
to mitigate the sentence.
Sentences in domestic violence cases have also been overturned
due to procedural errors.2102 Judicial authorities, courts, and legisla-
tures have recognized the danger that diversion or deferred prosecu-
tion programs present in domestic violence cases. The National Coun-
cil of Juvenile and Family Court Judges concluded that "[d]iversion
should only occur in extraordinary cases, and then only after an ad-
2096. 838 P.2d 1257 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
2097. IL at 1258; see also State v. Tenny, 493 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1992) (vacating sen-
tences for three domestic abuse convictions and remanding for resentencing on the grounds
that they did not include the mandatory two day minimum jail term and participation in a
batterer's treatment program); State v. Davis, 493 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1992) (remanding for
resentencing for not including two day minimum jail term required under domestic abuse
statute); Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1 (Md. 1993) (remanding for sentence reconsideration
because a court, in a criminal domestic violence case, may not impose twenty year sentence,
based on victim's life expectancy, for slapping wife in violation of protection order).
2098. 801 P.2d 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
2099. Id. at 1030.
2100. Id. at 1031.
2101. Id. at 1031-32.
2102. State v. Horton, 620 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (vacating sentence of defen-
dant, who stipulated to violation of protection order, for failure to properly admonish defen-
dant about the potential ramifications of his guilty plea).
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mission of guilt before a judicial officer has been entered. 21 3 A
judgment of guilt must appear on the respondent's record. Adopting
this approach, the court in State v. Aguilar21 decided that the sen-
tencing judge did not have the authority to enter a judgment of guilt
under the plea agreement, which provided that upon successful com-
pletion of probation, the judgment of guilt was not to be
entered.2105
IT[. CRIMINAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS'
1 6
A. Definitions of Domestic Violence Crimes
Respondents in domestic violence cases have been criminally
prosecuted for a broad variety of acts committed following the issu-
ance of a civil protection order. Actions which have been criminally




entry into residence followed by physical abuse or harassment;
21 9
2103. FAMILY VIOLENCE PRoiEcr, supra note 687, at 37; see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 144-45.
2104. 831 P.2d 443 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
2105. Id. at 447. In Aguilar, the conviction and sentence imposed were thus reversed, and
the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 449. But see State
v. Sirny, 772 P.2d 1145. 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (where defendant pleaded guilty to
beating his live-in girlfriend and the entry of guilt was deferred placing the defendant on
probation after he served a three month jail sentence under a deferred prosecution program, it
was error to impose a jail sentence).
2106. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 210, 214.
2107. For more criminal cases, see NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, 25 JUV. & FAM. L. DIG. (1993).
2108. People v. Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211 (Ill. App. Ct 1985).
2109. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 588 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(after defendant entered residence of former girlfriend, he was convicted of burglary of a
dwelling with assault, burglary of a conveyance with assault, kidnapping to inflict bodily
harm or to terrorize, aggravated battery, aggravated assault and violation of court injunction
issued to protect against domestic violence); State v. Williams, 582 N.E.2d 1158, 1160 (il.
App. Ct. 1991) (defendant found guilty of unlawful restraint and residential burglary when,
after wife received protection order against him, he entered her residence by crawling through
a basement window and grabbing her from behind, restricting her from leaving and ripping
her clothes amidst a violent fight); People v. Zarebski, 542 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Il. App. CL
1989) (defendant convicted of violating protection order after entering residence of estranged
spouse and harassing her); People v. Townsend, 538 N.E.2d 1297, 1298 (11. App. Ct. 1989)
(defendant convicted of contempt of a protection order after entering residence of recipient of
order and while there striking her on face at least once); People v. Lucas, 524 N.E.2d 246,
247-48 (i1. App. Ct. 1988) (defendant found to be in contempt of temporary restraining order
after making threats to wife over phone; during period before sentencing, defendant again
entered marital residence and held wife in a strangle hold while holding a knife to her
throat, threatened her, and later struck her 8-9 times in the back of the head and neck with
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stabbing; t °" shooting;2 . running a car, in which wife was a
passenger, off the road and subsequently stabbing her twenty-two
times;" 2 placing a box of former wife's clothes covered in tomato
juice on her doorstep and leaving threatening messages on her phone
machine; 13  telephoning the recipient of a protection order;2114
a beer glass leaving pieces of glass in her neck; based on this conduct he was convicted of
aggravated assault and battery); State v. Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (IIl. App. Ct.
1987) (defendant who entered residence of ex-wife when protection order pending, beat her,
and took the child was charged with child abduction, residential burglary, and battery); People
v. Stevens, 506 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (Oswego City Ct. 1986) (after order issued against defen-
dant prohibiting him from going to residence of wife, he broke into the residence and as-
saulted her friend leading to the court finding of contempt of the issued order); Common-
wealth v. Allen, 469 A.2d 1063, 1065 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (defendant found in contempt of
order when, subsequent to plaintiffs receiving a protection order against defendant, he forc-
ibly entered house and abused her); State v. Kilponen, 737 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987) (defendant found in violation of pretrial release and restraining orders prohibiting him
from communicating with his wife and going to family residence when he broke into family
home with intent of tying up his wife and making her watch him commit suicide); State v.
Hamilton. 472 N.W.2d 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant went to premises of apartment
he shared with wife the day after he was ordered to stay away from said apartment for 24
hours). But see Commonwealth v. Zerphy, 481 A.2d 670. 671 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (defen-
dant found not guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating a protection order when he
waited for recipients of order at their home and was holding a rifle).
2110. State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 1993) (affirming defendant's conviction for
first degree murder of his wife after stabbing her 28 times, once in the brain, with a screw-
driver); Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1100-01 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (tem-
porary order of protection issued against defendant but was not recorded in the state's crimi-
nal information system; during period of order's existence, defendant entered recipient of
order's home and stabbed her to death giving rise to this wrongful death action).
2111. White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1993) (affirming defendant's conviction for first
degree murder of former girlfriend by shooting her during period in which she had a re-
straining order against him).
2112. People v. Seaman, 561 N.E.2d 188, 191 (IUl. App. Ct. 1990) (subsequent to wife
obtaining protection order against defendant to prevent further abuse, defendant ran off the
road a car in which wife was a passenger, then stabbed her twenty-two times; during trial
where defendant was found guilty of attempted murder but found to be mentally ill, evidence
of the protection order was considered).
2113. People v. Salvato, 285 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1991) (defendant convicted of six
different charges after leaving tomato juice stained clothing on ex-wife's doorstep and leaving
threatening messages on her phone machine; convictions later reversed due to procedural
error).
2114. See, e.g., People v. Darnell, 546 N.E.2d 789 (1. App. Ct. 1989) (reversing for
prosecutorial error defendant's conviction for harassing by telephone in violation of protection
order); Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant convicted of
violating no contact order by telephoning and sending flowers and pizza to recipient of or-
der); People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Crim. Ct. 1989) (holding that violation of protec-
tion order provision requiring defendant, charged with criminal contempt for threatening his
wife with violence over the telephone in violation of a temporary protection order, to "abstain
from offensive conduct against" his wife could not support the charge of criminal contempt
because the terms of the order were vague and indefinite); State v. Martinez, 495 N.W.2d
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assaulting and threatening recipients of an order including assault with
a deadly weapon;"" writing and following the recipient of an in-
junction against harassment and contacting her friends, parents, and
employers;"" repeatedly contacting former spouse;2 "7  striking
and kicking wife;" and going to wife's apartment and subsequent-
ly bringing wife and children to their family farm.2" 9
When these same types of acts occur between people involved in
domestic relationships, they are prosecuted criminally regardless of
whether a protection order exists. These acts have been criminally
prosecuted as domestic violence: assault, battery, manslaughter, at-
tempted murder, murder,"2°  or kidnapping, 12' and include:
527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant convicted of protection order violation for calling wife
on phone); State v. Kiser, 464 N.W.2d 680 (Wis. CL App. 1990) (defendant convicted of
five counts of violating a harassment injunction after making series of five collect calls with-
in a thirty minute time period to complainant); State v. Moore, 449 N.W.2d 338 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1989) (based on a phone call to wife, defendant convicted of violating domestic abuse
injunction which ordered him to "avoid contacting or causing any person other than a party's
attorney to contact [his wife] unless she consents in writing").
2115. United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1991) (defendant convicted on four
counts of criminal contempt for violating civil protection orders obtained by his wife and
mother-in-law based on assaultive and threatening behavior including an attack with a ma-
chete); People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (defendant convicted of
violating order of protection after threatening and harassing ex-wife by calling her a "fucking
whore" and a "dead bitch" and telling her he had a plot waiting for her); State v. Martinez.
495 N.W.2d 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant convicted of protection order violation for
going to wife's home and threatening the occupants).
2116. State v. Sarlund, 407 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. 1987) (defendant convicted of violating an
injunction which was issued pursuant to the harassment injunction statute by writing her
letters and contacting people associated with her).
2117. See, e.g., Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57 (Alaska 1987) (defendant convicted of
contempt of no contact order which was issued as part of divorce decree). But see State v.
Lipeamon, 483 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1992) (contempt of no contact order could not lie where
wife's contacting husband was necessitated by special circumstances including the parties'
unique living arrangements, their mental and physical conditions, defendant's lack of transpor-
tation, the husband's acquiescence to the contacts, the necessity of medication for the defen-
dant, and the urgency created by their attorneys' actions and correspondence).
2118. People v. Totten, 514 N.E.2d 959 (Ill. 1987) (trial court found defendant in con-
tempt for having violated the order of protection the court had previously entered in
defendant's pending action of dissolution of marriage when he struck and kicked his wife).
2119. State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant convicted of bur-
glary and false imprisonment when, subsequent to wife obtaining domestic abuse injunction
prohibiting him from contacting her directly or going to her residence, he went to residence
and drove the family to a farm).
2120. Additional cases involving lethal acts of domestic violence include: Buschauer v.
State, 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter with
deadly weapon); State v. Walker, 489 A.2d 728 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1985) (defendant charged
with manslaughter for the death of his wife); People v. Vaughn, 417 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Dist. Ct.
1979) (wife charged with attempted murder of husband); State v. Johnson, 381 S.E.2d 732
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harassing; assaulting; 2 2  threatening generally;"' striking and
beating generally;2.24  attacking;.2 5  stabbing;
212 6  shooting;212 7
(S.C. 1989) (defendant convicted of the murder of his estranged wife).
2121. State v. Geiler, Nos. 61660, 62844, 1993 Mo. App. LEXIS 1288 (Mo. Ct. App.
Aug. 17, 1993) (affirming defendant's conviction for child abduction while divorce matter
pending).
2122. State v. Sullet, No. C1-92-2300, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 787 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug.
3. 1993) (affirming conviction of misdemeanor assault for hitting wife in face with fist, beat-
ing her with an umbrella, swinging a frying pan at her, and kicking her in the head); State
v. Lyons, No. A-92-869, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 341 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1993) (sexual
assault upon daughter and wife); Byrd v. Brigono, No. CA93-05-045, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
5692 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1993) (guilty plea to out-of-state domestic violence assault
offense was sufficient basis for parole revocation).
2123. State v. Huletz, 838 P.2d 1257 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (defendant convicted of
fourth degree assault of girlfriend with whom he was living); People v. Holifield, 252 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1988) (defendant convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant);
People v. Falzone, 537 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Crim. Ct. 1989) (defendant charged with threatening
and assaulting wife in family court); People v. Singleton, 532 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Crim. Ct. 1988)
(defendant charged with harassment and assault in family court); People v. Brady, 283
N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (defendant charged with assault in the third degree against his
wife); People v. Johnson, 265 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Dist. Ct. 1965) (defendant charged with second
degree assault against cohabitant whom he held out to the public to be his wife); People v.
Keller, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct. 1962) (defendant charged with assault against mother-in-
law in family court); State v. Humphrey, No. 13790, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4374 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 10, 1993)'(defendant found guilty of domestic violence after threatening wife with
an ax); State v. Norton, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jul. 12,
1990) (defendant found guilty of assault and aggravated assault against wife).
2124. People v. Wilkins, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming conviction of
wilful infliction of corporal injury on spouse after hitting her in the face and neck); People
v. Gutierrez, 217 Cal. Rptr. 616 (Ct. App. 1985) (defendant prosecuted for beating his wife
under statute prohibiting either spouse from inflicting corporal punishment resulting in trau-
matic condition to the other); People v. Dass, 589 N.E.2d 1065 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992) (defen-
dant convicted of battery which constituted domestic violence); People v. Richmond, 559
N.E.2d 302 (IUI. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant who went into victim's apartment and beat her in
the head until she died was convicted of first degree murder); State v. Dickson, No. CA-478,
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5152 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1993) (defendant convicted of domes-
tic violence upon review of evidence that he had slapped child with an open hand so force-
fully that it left a welted hand print); State v. McClure. No. 92-CA-0078, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3060 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 1993) (affirming conviction of domestic violence for
hitting and kicking adopted daughter and pounding her head against the ground); State v.
Amburgey, 621 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (reversing for procedural reasons
defendant's conviction of domestic violence for allegedly striking former wife); State v.
Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (defendant convicted of two counts of do-
mestic violence); State v. Gressner, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 448 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3,
1988) (based on defendant's beating and striking wife, found guilty of domestic violence);
State v. McArthur, No. 53087 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1987) (defendant who struck wife
found guilty of a fourth degree felony of domestic violence); Jivers v. State, 406 S.E.2d 154
(S.C. 1989) (defendant charged with criminal domestic violence arising from an incident
where he physically abused his common-law wife).
2125. State v. Foose, No. 63447, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6501 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24,
1992) (defendant convicted of domestic violence after attacking estranged wife in front of her
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beating wife about the face and head with fists and a clothes
iron;2"' pushing and hitting girlfriend;2"' breaking the jaw and
cracking the elbow of wife;2"3 hitting wife on legs and head with a
baby bottle, resulting in a large bump on the forehead, a cut above
the right eye, a cut on the nose, and a bruised and cut leg;2131 hit-
ting wife with car and striking her about the head and neck with an
opened and closed fist; 1 32 beating victim with a chair, threatening
her with a gun, and stabbing her with a pair of scissors; 3 3 pushing
victim into glass, throwing her on ground and then against cement
stairs;21 splitting lips, breaking ribs, stomping on, striking in the
jaw, back, neck, and arms, and flinging into air;21 31 threatening to
mother's home); State v. Hill, 1991 WL 57186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (defendant who at-
tacked wife and had a firearm with him convicted of domestic violence).
2126. State v. Whitaker, 397 S.E.2d 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (after seriously harming
wife with a butterfly knife, defendant pled guilty to the offense of assault with a deadly
weapon); People v. Williams, 248 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1969) (after stabbing his wife, defendant
was indicted on two counts of assault and counts of burglary and possession of a dangerous
weapon); State v. Kinley, No. 2826, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3272 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24,
1993) (defendant convicted of aggravated murder of girlfriend and her son with a machete);
Titus v. State, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 677 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1988) (after stabbing
girlfriend, defendant convicted of attempted murder; testimony of complainant revealed that
she had lived with defendant for approximately four years and at least on one occasion had
to leave due to his violence towards her).
2127. See, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 831 P.2d 443 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant fired gun
at father of her unborn child and was charged with aggravated assault; conviction reversed
due to trial judge's error in not respecting terms of plea agreement); People v. Kluxdal, 586
N.E.2d 701 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (defendant convicted of murdering his wife and mother-in-
law with a gun during a confrontation regarding daughter amidst divorce proceedings);
Sanchez v. State, 841 P.2d 85 (Wyo. 1992) (defendant convicted of attempted murder based
on his holding gun to wife's head and discharging it saying "you're dead").
2128. People v. Torres, 581 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1992).
2129. State v. Meese, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1467 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1988) (va-
cating sentence of defendant, found not guilty of domestic violence but guilty of the lesser
included offense of assault, because both the domestic violence and assault offenses are mis-
demeanors in the first degree so that assault is not a lesser included offense).
2130. State v. Green, 852 P.2d 401 (Ariz. 1993) (defendant pled guilty to aggravated
assault).
2131. State v. Lehikoinen, 463 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (defendant charged and
convicted of fifth degree assault; conviction later reversed due to lack of evidence at trial).
2132. Commonwealth v. Smith, 552 A.2d 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (wife filed petition
pursuant to Protection From Abuse Act and pressed charges in criminal court; court held that
double jeopardy did not bar defendant's assault prosecution based on the incident in which he
allegedly struck his wife).
2133. Watkins v. State, 360 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant was convicted of
aggravated assault and obstructing an officer).
2134. State v. Cababag, 850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993) (defendant convicted of
abuse of family and household members).
2135. People v. Healy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274 (Ct. App. 1993) (defendant convicted of of-
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kill wife, punching her in the mouth, breaking her tooth, and
knocking her to the ground while continuing to hit and threaten
her;2"3 kicking wife with boots;1 37 grabbing cohabitant and hold-
ing her outside of a window, making her urinate on the floor, and
hitting her; 13 kidnapping at gunpoint;2 39 kidnapping former girl-
friend, and then driving car on wrong side of road threatening to kill
them both, and eventually running into a telephone pole;2 ' striking
wife in face, causing serious bodily harm (wife's nose was pushed
over to the side of her face, her eyes were swollen shut, and she had
bruises on her shoulder);2 4' and attempting to force entry into the
shelter in which wife was staying."42
Rape and sexual assault are common forms of domestic abuse, as
evidenced by the volume of case law in this area.2 143 Acts which
have constituted domestic sexual assault include: sexual assault of
daughter;2 " forcing oral sex and vaginal intercourse under the
threat of a knife;2145 pulling a gun on estranged wife, ordering her
fenses under cohabitant abuse and torture statutes).
2136. State v. Wood, 597 A.2d 312 (Vt. 1991) (defendant arraigned on charge of assault-
ing wife).
2137. State v. Amos, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 78 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1988) (defen-
dant, who was previously found guilty of domestic violence, was found guilty of domestic
violence as a fourth degree felony as a result of his kicking his wife while wearing boots).
2138. People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct. App. 1988) (defendant was convicted of
felony infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant and misdemeanor battery).
2139. State v. Canitia, No. 62492/62639, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3119 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 17, 1993) (defendant convicted of kidnapping ex-wife and other offenses); State v.
Hanna, 378 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1989) (defendant convicted of kidnapping, abduction with the
intent to defile, and burglary after going to former girlfriend's new boyfriend's home and
kidnapping her at gunpoint). But see State v. Middleton, 619 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) (reversing conviction for burglary where present husband entered wife's residence and
beat her because a spouse cannot trespass on another spouse's property).
2140. State v. Hobbs, 801 P.2d 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (defendant was convicted of
kidnapping in the first degree).
2141. State v. Harper, 761 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (defendant convicted of aggra-
vated assault).
2142. State v. Mintz, 598 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (defendant who attempted to
force his way into domestic violence shelter where wife was staying was charged with at-
tempted domestic violence).
2143. See supra part I.C.2 for a discussion on marital rape and sexual assault.
2144. State v. Lyons, No. A-92-869, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 341 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 3,
1993) (defendant sexually assaulted daughter and wife).
2145. Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (defendant was
convicted of spousal sexual assault and involuntary spousal deviate sexual intercourse when,
during period of legal separation, defendant came over to plaintiff's home to discuss child
custody where an argument ensued in which defendant injured plaintiff and forced her to
have oral sex and vaginal intercourse).
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to remove clothes, and sexually assaulting her;2" sodomizing wife
and beating her with a breadboard; 247 forcing nonconsensual sexual
intercourse with girlfriend four times, once under the threat of a knife
and other times by physically beating her;2 4 beating and raping
wife after making threats to cut out her clitoris with scissors and
staple her vagina closed;2149 and kidnapping and raping cohabitant
and mother of child.215
B. Warrantless Arrests and Searches
Warrantless arrests can be made in cases of domestic violence
when police have probable cause to believe that the arrestee is guilty
of the crime of domestic violence.2 ' Arrest warrants are not con-
stitutionally required,2 2 unless the arrest is to be made in a private
home, there are no exigent circumstances, and the occupants have not
consented to entry.1 53 Warrantless arrests are proper when the arrest
needs to be made immediately due to the seriousness of the crime, or
the presence of danger to the victim or the police officers. In domes-
tic violence cases, warrantless arrests are appropriate because requiring
the police to leave the abuse victim with the batterer in order to go
and obtain a warrant would likely subject the victim to further vio-
lence.1
2146. State v. Schackart, 737 P.2d 398 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant was convicted of
sexual assault, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and domestic violence for pulling a gun on his
estranged wife and ordering her to remove her clothes and then sexually assaulting her); State
v. Ulen, 623 A.2d 70 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (defendant convicted on similar grounds).
2147. People v. Thompson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1984) (after sodomizing wife
and beating her with a breadboard, defendant was convicted of spousal abuse).
2148. State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988) (defendant convicted of first, second,
and third degree rape subsequent to forcing nonconsensual intercourse with girlfriend four
times).
2149. State v. C.V.C., 450 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (husband convicted of false
imprisonment and sexual assault).
2150. State v. Bolt, 817 P.2d 1322 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant convicted of kidnap-
ping and raping victim with whom he previously lived and who was the mother of his child;
reversed due to prosecutorial error).
2151. State v. Antill, No. 92 CA 26, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5584 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
16, 1993) (holding that police have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a person if they
receive information from an identified cohabitant who called the police because of a domestic
argument); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 205(A), 205(B).
2152. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrants are not constitutionally
required as warrantless arrests have always been allowed at common law).
2153. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (Fourth Amendment requires neutral
official to make determination that probable cause exists to arrest a person in a private home
due to the magnitude of the intrusion on the person's privacy interest).
2154. See, e.g., People v. Wilkins, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that
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There is a growing national consensus that a violation of a pro-
tection order should be a criminal offense for which states and local
governments should mandate arrest of the abuser.2"55 Experts also
agree that laws and police policies should mandate arrest or permit
warrantless misdemeanor and felony arrests of perpetrators of other
criminal offenses against family members."56
Many jurisdictions statutorily require mandatory warrantless ar-
rests under circumstances involving some form of domestic abuse.
These states have responded to the need to give police officers en-
countering domestic violence clear guidelines to follow. Mandating
arrest is especially useful, as it addresses police officer's reluctance to
make arrests in domestic violence cases which too many untrained
officers had previously considered to be private matters between
spouses, and thus inappropriate for government intervention. 57
These statutes have been passed to counter a long history of police
refusal to intervene on behalf of domestic abuse victims. Police inac-
tion condones batterer's use of violence within the home to maintain
control over their family members. The message to abusers and vic-
tims has been that violence against family members within the home
is not a crime. Mandatory arrest laws have been passed to force
police officers to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence just as they
would arrest perpetrators of crimes against strangers.2. 58 The goal is
the risk of imminent violence resulting in further physical harm to the victim of domestic
abuse was an exigent circumstance requiring immediate action and thus allowing the police to
enter defendant's home to make a warrantless arrest; entrance into home was further justified
by defendant's wife's consent to the entry).
2155. The Violence Against Women Act of 1993, S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
which passed both the House and Senate in November of 1993 and will be conferenced in
the spring of 1994, strives to encourage arrest policies which mandate arrest for violation of
a civil protection order and provide for mandatory or discretionary warrantless arrest for
crimes committed against family members by making mandatory arrest policies a prerequisite
to qualification for federal grants.
2156. Id.; see also NU CPO STUDY, supra note 19, at 59; Catherine F. Klein, Domestic
Violence: D.C.'s New Mandatory Arrest Law, WASHINGTON LAWYER 24 (Nov/Dec 1991).
2157. DALE H. ROBINSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
FAMILY VIOLENCE: BACKGROUND, ISSUES, AND THE STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSE 22
(1992).
2158. In San Francisco, where 40% of all domestic violence calls each year involve weap-
ons, written reports are filed in only 29% of the cases and arrest are made in only 11% of
the cases. Family Violence Leads Cause of San Francisco Women's Death, CALIFORNIA PHY-
StCiAN 23 (Dec. 1993).
The D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence (the "DCCADV") conducted a study of
D.C. police department practices under a "pro-arrest" policy which found that only 5% of
domestic violence calls in the District resulted in arrest. Despite implementation of the D.C.
police department's stated "pro-arrest" policy, the DCCADV study found that arrests were
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
in part to change police officers' attitudes that domestic partners
should be left to resolve their disputes privately, and that violence
against a family member is not a serious crime."59
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia mandate warrant-
less arrests when there is probable cause to believe that the offender
committed any crime against a family member.2 "w The specific in-
stances under which arrest is mandated differ from state to state.
Eleven states require that a warrantless arrest be made when an offi-
cer observes a recent physical injury to the victim. 211' Three juris-
dictions mandate arrest where the alleged abusive actions were intend-
ed to instill fear of imminent bodily injury or death in the vic-
tim. 262 Louisiana and Wisconsin mandate arrest where there is
probable cause of continued violence against the victim.2" Hawaii,
being made in only:
- 13.7% of the cases where the victim was bleeding from her wounds;
- 27.2% of the cases when victims had been threatened or attacked with guns.
knives or other weapons that were visible to the police;
- 11% of the cases when the incident included an attack on a child.
The single factor most highly correlated with arrest was whether the abuser insult-
ed the police officer-arrest rate 32%.
Baker et al., Report on District of Columbia Police Response to Domestic Violence, D.C.
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (November 3, 1989), discussed in Klein, supra note
2156.
2159. Mandatory training on domestic violence for law enforcement officers is also neces-
sary to accomplish this goal. MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 509.
2160. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a)
(West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV.. STAT. § 709-906(2) (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)
(West Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140(1) (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1993) (within four hours); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(l)
(Vernon 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a) (West
1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(1) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(B) (West Supp.
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2.1(2) (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2
(1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.075
(West 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a)(1) (1993); see also Barbara J. Hart, State Codes
on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J.
63 (1992).
2161. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)
(West Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-11(1) (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3 (West 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2711(A) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(B) (1993); S.D. CODED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
3-2.1(2) (1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-10(c) (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2)(2)(b) (West 1993).
2162. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(B)(3) (1993); S.D. CODmD LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2.1(2)
(1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a)(2) (1993).
2163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140(2) (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.075(2)(2)(a) (West 1993).
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Rhode Island, and Washington mandate arrest where the batterer is
found in violation of a criminal no contact order.2t Four jurisdic-
tions mandate arrest where the arrest can be accomplished within a
certain period after the violent incident."65 Six states mandate arrest
where a felonious assault or other crime has transpired.2 Arizona
and Iowa mandate arrest where the batterer used a dangerous or dead-
ly weapon."'
There is a growing national consensus that mandatory warrantless
arrests must be required where there is probable cause to believe
there has been a civil protection order violation." Twenty-five
states and Puerto Rico express by statute that the police must make a
warrantless arrest where there exists probable cause to believe a pro-
tection order has been violated."'a Two of these states limit this
warrantless arrest to where the protection order violation occurs in the
officer's presence.
2170
2164. HAw. REv. STAT. § 709-906(4)(e) (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(B)(5)
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (West 1990); see also MODEL CODE,
supra note 15, § 209 (mandatory arrest for violation of conditions of release).
2165. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1993) (mandating arrest if abuse occurred
within four hours of arrest); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(l) (Vernon Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-29-3(B) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2.1(2) (Supp. 1993);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993).
2166. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2) (West Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-
2140(1) (West Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. fit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-29-3(B)(1) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2.1(2) (Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(b) (West 1990).
2167. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)
(West Supp. 1993).
2168. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 206.
2169. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-4-104(1) (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12 (West Supp. 1993); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 403-760(2) (Baldwin 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140(1) (West Supp.
1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 6 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B-01A(b) (West Supp. 1993); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 455.085(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (1992); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.136 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8 (1992);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(3) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(c) (1992); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50B-4b (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3)(a-c) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 12-29-3(B) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (Law Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a)(2) (1991); Tix. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(b) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8 (Supp. 1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(a)
(West 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 813.125(b), 813.12(7) (West Supp. 1993); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 8, § 628 (Supp. 1990).
2170. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 171.136 (Michie Supp. 1993); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 14.03(b) (West Supp. 1993).
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Many other states provide for discretionary warrantless arrests in
similar instances. Twenty-one states authorize a warrantless arrest
when there is probable cause to believe a protection order has been
violated." Twenty-two states allow a discretionary warrantless ar-
rest when there is probable cause to believe physical abuse has oc-
curred.2" 2 Four states authorize discretionary warrantless arrests in
2171. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(L) (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
4-104(l) (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-4(d) (1992); 725 ILCS 5/112A-26(a) (Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAw § 4-509(b) (Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 171.136 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 594.10 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-21(3) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7(B)(5) (Michie 1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-11(1)(a) (Supp. 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113(a) (1992);
TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-
10(c) (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 7-20-102(a) (1992); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.35.010-
.060 (1991 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-6301-6317 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-
3101-3111 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson Supp.
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101-09 (1989 & Supp. 1993), cited in NU CPO STUDY,
supra note 19, at 54-55.
However, since 1985 the clear trend is to move from discretionary arrest for violation
of civil protection orders to mandatory arrest. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-15,
46b- 38a-f (West Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.715-.785 (Baldwin 1984 &
Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2131-2142 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 761-70 (1981 & Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§§ 6-9 (Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15(b) (West Supp. 1993); MO. ANN.
STAT. §§ 455.010-.230 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (Law. Co-
op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601-614 and § 40-7-103 (1990 & Supp. 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-8 (1953), as amended by § 30-6-8 (Supp. 1993).
2172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (Michie Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/112A-26(a) (Supp.
1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 764.15(b) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341
(West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:9 (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7(B)(5) (Michie 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-11(1)(b) (Supp. 1993); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Anderson Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3(B) (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 7-20-102(b) (Supp. 1993); see
also NIl CPO STUDY. supra note 19, at 54-55 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.35.010-.060
(1991 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15(70) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-4-20(b) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-6301-6317 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-
1-1 (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing arrest if probable cause that battery with bodily injury
has occurred); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3101-3111 (1983 & Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 403.715-.785 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(a)
(Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (Law Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-
601-614 and § 40-7-103 (1990 & Supp. 1993); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (West
1993)).
Maryland does not have a specific warrantless arrest provision in its family law code,
but a criminal law statute authorizes warrantless arrest when: (a) the violence involves spous-
es, (b) there is evidence of physical injury, (c) the incident is reported to the police within
two hours, and (d) unless there is an arrest, there will be further harm to the victim, the
assailant will get away or evidence will be destroyed. MD. CODE ANN., CRtM. LAW
§ 594(B)(d)-(e) (Supp. 1993). Since the mid-1980s, states have been moving from discre-
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some circumstances and mandate arrests in others.1  Wisconsin
stipulates that a police officer's decision not to arrest cannot be solely
based on an absence of visible injury or impairment." Tennessee
specifies that an officer can make a discretionary arrest without a
warrant if the plaintiff and defendant are present and the police offi-
cer sees the violence or has probable cause to believe there will be
continued violence.2175 Texas allows a discretionary warrantless ar-
rest if there is probable cause of assault resulting in bodily inju-
ry.2
176
Warrantless arrests of domestic violence perpetrators are consis-
tently upheld when challenged in court.
2" In Watkins v. State,217 1
the court, in interpreting the meaning of "probable cause" in the
Georgia Code, which provides that "an arrest for a crime may be
made by a law enforcement officer ... without a warrant ... if the
officer has probable cause to believe that an act of family vio-
lence ... has been committed," held that a warrantless arrest was
proper where petitioner made an uncontradicted statement that she had
been beaten with a chair, threatened with a gun, and stabbed with a
scissor and the officers saw a fresh stab wound, found weapons in
the house, and viewed the disordered condition of the residence. 79
The petitioner's statement and the officer's observances gave the
officer the requisite probable cause to believe that an act of family
violence was committed. The court in LeBlanc v. State,21 80 which
also involved a warrantless arrest of a domestic abuse perpetrator,
held that the state statute authorizing warrantless arrests where the
officer has probable cause to believe defendant beat his wife, based
tionary to mandatory arrest for crimes committed against family members, because discretion-
ary arrest procedures were not resulting in arrests. See, e.g., prior statutes in ARZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3602 (Supp. 1987-88); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2131-2142 (West 1982
& Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 6-9 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-8 (1953), as amended by § 30-6-8 (Supp. 1993).
2173. HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(2) (Supp. 1993); IOwA CODE ANN. § 236.12.2(a)
(West Supp. 1993) (mandating arrest if injury occurs); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.085(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a-b) (West Supp. 1993).
2174. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.075 (West Supp. 1993).
2175. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7)(A) (Supp. 1993).
2176. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a)(4) (West Supp. 1993).
2177. See State v. Miller, No. 8-93-11, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5477 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
26. 1993) (holding that probable cause exists for arrest when defendant admits in writing to
domestic violence offense).
2178. 360 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
2179. Id. at 49-50 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20(a) (Supp. 1993)).
2180. 382 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1980).
1993]
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on evidence of bodily harm or reasonable belief that the victim is in
danger, is constitutional.2"
To the contrary, warrantless dual arrest of the victim and her
abuser have not been upheld. 2  In Gurno v. Town of
Laconner,181 the police arrested both the victim and perpetrator of
2181. Id. at 300 (discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15(b) (West Supp. 1993)); see also
People v. Wilkins, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 754 (Ct. App. 1993) (officers had probable cause to
arrest defendant on charge of wilful infliction of corporal injury when upon responding to a
domestic violence report, they discovered the victim waiting for them on the porch having
just been assaulted and injured by her husband still in the house); City of Grafton v.
Swanson, 497 N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1993) (officer was justified in stopping defendant, convicted
of driving under the influence of alcohol, due to his concern that domestic violence was
imminent based on his being called to the residence four hours earlier to investigate a poten-
tial domestic matter, and his knowledge of the woman's statements that she had argued with
the defendant who damaged her property and was drunk, and that she did not want him to
return); District of Columbia v. Murphy, No. 92-CV-283, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 324 (D.C.
Dec. 29, 1993) (explaining that police may arrest a party whom they have probable cause to
believe has unlawfully entered the apartment of a woman with whom he is in an abusive
relationship); State v. Naegele, No. 920, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1980) (holding that
police can arrest an accused defendant solely on the basis of reasonable cause without violat-
ing the constitutional principle that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty). But see
State v. Scott, 555 A.2d 667 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a warrantless
arrest for violation of protection order and possession of marijuana was unlawful where offi-
cer who made arrest found marijuana while making arrest for violation of protection order
and did not know the contents of the order).
2182. As many states have instituted mandatory arrest, some untrained police officers,
unwilling to make arrests at all, have retaliated against victims who called for help by mak-
ing dual arrests. A study in Connecticut found that in 37.7% of family violence incidents in-
volving arrest, both parties were arrested. STEVEN D. EPSTEiN, THE PROBLEM OF DUAL AR-
REST IN FAMILY VIOLENCE CASES 1 (Discussion Paper prepared for the Connecticut Coalition
Against Domestic Violence).
With proper training, police can learn that in order to arrest either party, the officer
must be able to make a probable cause determination as to each party independently. If, for
example, the officer finds cuts and bruises on the woman, and the batterer says that she
started it or slapped him first, and there is no evidence corroborating his bald statement, only
he should be arrested. In order to address the serious problem of dual arrests, some states
have included "primary aggressor" language in their statutes requiring the police to determine
which party is the primary aggressor and mandating arrest only of the primary aggressor. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1(B) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.137(2) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:9 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(b) (West 1990); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 968.075 (West Supp. 1993). Other state statutes discourage dual arrests and order the
police to consider possible self-defense by one party. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.342
(West Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West Supp. 1993). In order to encourage
the proliferation of these statutes, adoption of laws that preclude dual arrest and encourage
arrest of only a primary aggressor will be a prerequisite for federal funding under the Vio-
lence Against Women Act. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., TitleII, Subtitle B, § 1901(b)
(1993).
2183. 828 P.2d 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
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abuse after arriving upon the scene of violence. The court held that a
warrantless arrest of a domestic violence victim for "provoking" an
assault by arguing with the perpetrator of the violence was inval-
id.2""4 Where police make a dual arrest of a victim they did not
have probable cause to arrest, an action against the police for false
arrest will be successful. Gurno illustrates the need for the police to
understand the dynamics of domestic violence and not approach do-
mestic violence calls with the assumption that both parties must be
responsible for the violence. Mandatory arrest policies based on prob-
able cause with police training and proper implementation would help
prevent dual arrests. The police could arrest both parties and be safe
from a successful false arrest lawsuit only if each individual arrest
was premised on a separate finding of probable cause. Police need to
understand, whatever their personal beliefs are on the propriety of
using violence at home, that dual arrests in domestic violence cases
can leave them open to liability.
Warrantless searches are proper when the police respond to a
domestic violence call.2 55 There are several exceptions to the war-
rant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Warrantless searches are
constitutionally sound when there are exigent circumstances. Courts
have consistently ruled that domestic violence presents exigent cir-
cumstances sufficient to sustain a warrantless search, particularly since
batterers are often extremely volatile and violent actions recur fre-
quently."s' Additionally, it is well documented that as domestic
violence escalates, batterers often begin using weapons against their
victims."8 7 Therefore, it may be necessary for the police to search
the home of a domestic violence victim or perpetrator or the
perpetrator's person to ascertain whether the officer or the victim are
in present jeopardy due to the presence of weapons on the premis-
es.
2t 88
2184. Id. at 54.
2185. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, § 207; see also supra notes 1333-43 and accom-
panying text.
2186. Forty-seven percent of husbands who beat their wives do so three or more times a
year. Martin E. Wolfgang, Interpersonal Violence and Public Health Care: New Directions,
New Challenges, in SURGEON GENERALS WORKSHOP ON VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
SOURCE BOOK 19 (1985). Forty percent of abused women who killed their spouses report
being battered at least once a week. EWING, supra note 180, at 35.
2187. GOOLKASIAN, supra note 780, at 2 (over 1.7 million Americans face a spouse
wielding a knife or a gun); KLAUS & RAND, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that weapons are
used in 26% of violence crimes committed by spouses).
2188. See, e.g., State v. Noakes, No. 92-3020-CR, 1993 Wis. App. LEXIS 1604 (Wis. Ct.
19931
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Warrantless searches are also permissible when one who has
authority to do so consents to the search. In Commonwealth v.
Rexach,25 9 the court demonstrated an in depth understanding of the
dynamics of domestic violence when it upheld a warrantless search of
a batterer's residence. In Rexach, the police responded to the wife's
call on a domestic violence matter, and upon arrival found the defen-
dant holding his wife and shouting threats at her. She was screaming
and had two black eyes. In the presence of the police, the defendant
continued to shout, threatened to kill his wife, and told the officers
he had broken her nose two weeks earlier. After some discussion, the
police convinced the defendant to leave the home, and one officer
followed him into his bedroom where he commenced packing his
belongings. Upon entry into the bedroom, the officer saw and seized
narcotics, which eventually led to defendant's drug convictions. De-
fendant appealed the convictions, claiming that the search of the
bedroom was a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against
warrantless searches and seizures. The court held that the warrantless
search was valid on the wife's consent to the police entry into the
home.21 Further, the officer's act of following the defendant into
the bedroom was justified by the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement.219 The court held that Fourth Amendment
issues have unique dimensions in cases of domestic abuse as the do-
mestic violence statute requires that officers use all reasonable means
to prevent further abuse.2"" The officer, therefore, had a duty to
use his best judgment to protect the wife. Where the defendant con-
tinued to behave in an alarming manner after the police arrived in his
home, the officer could reasonably conclude that in order to ade-
quately protect the wife and maintain safety in the household, he
App. Dec. 14, 1993) (upholding warrantless search of defendant's home where defendant was
alleged to have pointed gun at live-in girlfriend threatening to kill her). But see State v.
White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (officer not justified in immediate frisk of defen-
dant when responding to domestic violence call absent suspicion of present danger).
2189. 478 N.E.2d 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
2190. Id. at 746; see also State v. McGee, 757 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(upholding warrantless entry on grounds that a co-occupant has equal authority as defendant,
who was arrested for domestic violence, to allow police access to apartment).
2191. Id. In fact, when police officers assist a domestic violence victim in her home and
fail to undertake actions while in the home to protect the victim like following the batterer
into the bedroom, if the victim is harmed or murdered by the batterer while police are pres-
em, the police officer has no immunity from a negligence suit brought against him by the
victim. See, e.g., Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1991).
2192. Id.
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should follow the defendant. Therefore, the officer's entrance into the
bedroom fell within the scope of consent given him, and the evidence
discovered as a result of his entrance was admissible in court against
the defendant. The court noted that "the salutary purpose underlying
the family abuse law would be frustrated if it were to be interpreted
in an overly restrictive manner.
' 2193
Exigent circumstances which give rise to warrantless searches,
such as those in Rexach, are frequently found in cases of domestic
violence. In People v. Johnson,2211 the court held that where police
officers were dispatched to a residence to investigate a complaint of
domestic violence and upon arriving heard a woman scream not to
shoot a gun, the police officers were justified in making a limited
search for the gun without a warrant.219 In State v. Lynd,2196 the
court held that the warrantless search of defendant's home which led
to discovery of marijuana was justified under the emergency excep-
tion since, among other things, an incident of domestic violence had
just occurred.2197 In Johnson v. State,2 9s the defendant appealed
from a decision denying his motion to suppress a handgun seized
without a warrant prior to his arrest for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. The district court of appeals in Johnson held that the
officer was acting within his authority when he saw the gun in plain
view in defendant's van, thus justifying detention to check the
defendant's criminal record.2 99 Further, the officer had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for violation of a domestic violence
injunction at the time the gun was seized, since the officer was re-
sponding to a call from the defendant's ex-wife, who had obtained
the injunction.' The search and seizure of the gun, therefore, was
2193. Id. But see State v. Gissendaner. No. ICA-CR 92-1500, 1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS
124 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 24. 1993) (affirming suppression order because authorization to
search extends only to victim's residence, and when police left the scene of the battering
incident, entered an adjacent open door to locate defendant, and found him with drug para-
phemalia there were no exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search); State v. Scott,
555 A.2d 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that to sustain a warrantless search,
the officer must know the contents of the restraining order he believes he violated).
2194. 585 N.Y.S.2d 851 (App. Div. 1992).
2195. Id. at 853.
2196. 771 P.2d 770 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
2197. Id. at 773.
2198. 567 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
2199. Id. at 33.
2200. Id. at 32-33; see also State v. Nakachi, 742 P.2d 388 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing that police did not violate state constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures
when they discovered a weapon in a car after ordering the occupants out of the car on the
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justifiable as incidental to an arrest."0
C. Right to Counsel
Defendants prosecuted for domestic violence crimes and for
misdemeanor violations of civil protection orders have a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, a right made applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright.' °2 The right
may attach at different points in the proceedings. Case law supports
the defendant's right to counsel whenever the sentence that will be
ultimately imposed is greater than a minimal fine, including jail time
and probation. In People v. Dass,'0 3 for example, the defendant
charged with battery requested counsel and was denied. The trial
court reasoned that it would not sentence defendant to jail, but to one
year of court supervision conditioned upon completion of a domestic
violence program, and therefore he was not entitled to counsel. The
appellate court held, however, that there is a right to counsel in all
criminal cases except where the penalty is a fine only.' Thus, in-
digent defendants are entitled to appointed counsel.
Defendants in domestic violence criminal prosecutions not only
have a right to counsel, but to effective counsel. Several cases in
which battered women who killed their spouses were prosecuted for
murder illustrate the threshold for effective assistance of counsel in
domestic violence cases. The court in State v. Felton' 5 specifically
defined what constitutes effective counsel for a battered woman
charged with killing her abuser. Where petitioner was charged with
first degree murder for shooting her husband while he slept, and her
defense was that she was a battered spouse and acted in self-defense,
the trial lawyer's failure to inform himself of statutes authorizing a
heat-of-passion, manslaughter defense to the charge of first degree
murder, to give due consideration to the defense of not guilty by
reason of mental disease or defect, and to make any meaningful in-
vestigation of the facts with respect to this defense constituted inef-
basis of information that the occupants were involved in a domestic dispute and that one of
them possessed a gun).
2201. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that a warrantless search of
the area within defendant's immediate control may be conducted when incidental to a legal
arrest).
2202. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2203. 589 N.E.2d 1065 MI. App. Ct. 1992).
2204. Id. at 1067.
2205. 329 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1982).
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fective assistance of counsel entitling defendant to a new trial."
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse"2 7  presents a similar situation in
which counsel did not sufficiently address defendant's contention that
she was a battered woman and had killed her batterer in self-defense.
Here, trial counsel was deemed ineffective for failing to request a
jury instruction on the cumulative effect of the three years of physical
and psychological abuse suffered by the defendant; specifically, coun-
sel failed to present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome as
evidence of self-defense." 8
These cases show that it is essential for all counsel representing
battered women to be schooled in issues of domestic violence. This is
equally true whether counsel is representing a batterer, or a battered
woman who killed or assaulted her abuser, who is seeking a civil
protection order, who is prosecuting her batterer for contempt, or who
is seeking child custody. It is especially imperative that counsel ade-
quately inform the trier of fact about "battered woman syn-
drome."" The dynamics of domestic violence underscore the im-
portance of taking evidence on and considering the entire history of
abuse within the relationship. This history often reveals why a bat-
tered woman justifiably feels she is in imminent danger at the time
she performs an act of self-defense against her abuser. It will also
explain the battered woman's demeanor when testifying, and help the
trier of fact understand why a victim delayed reporting the violence
or stayed with her batterer. If the trier of fact does not have access to
this information and the psychological profile, it could be left with a
severe misunderstanding of the battered woman and may attempt to
measure her behavior against personal experiences that are out of the
context of domestic abuse."' Without expert testimony, the bat-
tered woman's ability to present an effective case or defense is likely
to be completely ineffective leading to loss of custody, a guilty ver-
dict, or denial of a much needed protection order.
2206. Id. at 165-67, 169.
2207. 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).
2208. Id. at 784.
2209. See infra section II.D.2.
2210. ORLoFF & KLEmI, supra note 26, at 26. "Furthermore, victims may be traumatized,
withdrawn and non-responsive. Many suffer from low self-esteem and have developed short-
term coping patterns which . . .limit their freedom .... All of these factors ...may ...
explain behavior of the victim that would not make sense against another background." Id.
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D. Defenses
1. Defenses in Cases Where the Defendant Has Been the
Primary Perpetrator of Violence in the Relationship
Perpetrators of domestic violence have consistently raised a broad
variety of "defenses" to explain or justify the crimes they commit
against family members which have been rejected by the courts."'
That the protection order was vacated after a violation of the order is
not a defense to the violation.' 2  Additionally, domestic violence
statutes that permit prosecutors to charge protection order violations
as either misdemeanors or contempt have withstood equal protection
challenges." '3 Maine provides by statute that voluntary intoxication
is not a defense to a domestic violence offense 2t4 Provocation is
not a defense to the crime of domestic violence.215 Finally, a
spouse who forces another spouse to have intercourse and is prosecut-
ed for spousal sexual assault cannot argue in defense that in light of
the parties' marital relationship, there was implied consent to the
intercourse.2 6
2211. However, some courts acknowledge the affirmative defense of proper parental disci-
pline to a charge of domestic violence against one's child. See, e.g., State v. Kaimimoku,
841 P.2d 1076 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing domestic violence conviction on grounds that
father-defendant was exerting proper parental discipline over seventeen-year-old daughter dur-
ing alleged abuse incident); State v. Hicks, 624 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that "proper and reasonable parental discipline" does not include corporal punishment which
creates a substantial risk of serious physical harm to child).
2212. See, e.g., State v. Andrasko, 454 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding
conviction of defendant for violation of protection order, even though the order was vacated
after the violation).
2213. See, e.g., State v. Horton, 776 P.2d 703 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that pros-
ecutorial discretion in bringing either misdemeanor or contempt charges for protection order
violation did not violate defendant's right to equal protection).
2214. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768.34 (1992). Not only is intoxication not a de-
fense to domestic violence, but courts have used evidence of drug and alcohol abuse to justi-
fy enhanced sentences for domestic violence offenders. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 139.
2215. See Tandy v. Tandy, 355 N.E.2d 585 (111. App. CL 1976) (noting that wife's pro-
vocative, abusive, or insulting language without overt act did not justify physical assault by
husband); State v. Carrion, 616 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (noting that provocation is
not a valid defense to an act of domestic violence).
2216. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (hold-
ing that withdrawal of implied consent defense merely puts the married accused on the same
footing as the unmarried accused and thus is not a violation of equal protection right, and
that spousal sexual assault statute does not violate individual's right to privacy).
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2. Battered Woman Syndrome?" 7
By admitting evidence which may prove that a victim or defen-
dant in a domestic violence prosecution is experiencing "battered
woman syndrome," the courts reflect their understanding of the justi-
fiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically
abused and controlled over a period of time. As suggested in Domes-
tic Violence, The Crucial Role of the Judge in Criminal Court Cases:
A National Model for Judicial Education:
The court should examine the perpetrator's patterns of violence and
control of the victim, the perpetrator's belief systems that support
the violence, the impact of the violence and abuse on the victim,
how the victim has attempted to protect herself and the children
from the violence in the past, the reasons the victim stayed in the
relationship or returned to it, and the reasonableness of the victim's
belief or apprehension that the perpetrator is going to inflict serious
bodily injury or death. It is important that the court view the
victim's behavior within the context of the impact of the violence
on the victim." '
Testimony concerning battered woman syndrome can assist courts that
issue civil protection orders, decide custody matters, hear contempt
proceedings, and, preside over domestic violence criminal prosecu-
tions. Such testimony may help courts understand the dynamics of
domestic violence and psychological factors affecting the parties com-
ing before them.
Expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome has been
used in many types of cases to bolster and bring understanding to the
testimony of a victim of abuse. 19 In State v. Frost,m° the court
held that battered woman syndrome evidence was admissible to bol-
ster the victim's credibility in a prosecution for assault." The
prosecutor was allowed to use a series of prior assaults on the victim,
calls to the police, and reconciliations over a period of time to ex-
2217. See also infra part V.A.
2218. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL COURT CASES, supra note 23, at 117.
2219. The importance of the self-defense claim and expert testimony is not limited to
criminal cases. A battered woman may need to prove self-defense using battered woman
syndrome testimony in civil protection order cases when her batterer petitions for a civil
protection order based on an incident when she used violence to fend off his attacks. This
testimony may also be extremely important for victims who face judges who might wrongly
consider issuing mutual protection orders.
2220. 577 A.2d 1282 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
2221. Id. at 1288.
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plain why the victim remained with the defendant and visited him in
jail. In State v. Cababag, 2  expert testimony on battered
housemate/spouse syndrome was admitted into the trial of an alleged
male batterer of a woman with whom he was living, in order to ex-
plain why the woman had recanted her pretrial accusations that she
was battered by the defendant. The testimony could be used to assist
the jury in assessing the woman's credibility.' As the court stat-
ed, "th[e] seemingly bizarre behavior [recantation, minimization, and
other related behavior] of alleged victims is beyond the knowledge or
understanding of lay persons who normally serve on juries ... and
does require a special expertise to understand."'m4 In State v.
Ciskie, 2  the court held that the state's expert testimony on bat-
tered woman syndrome was admissible to assist the jury in under-
standing the victim's delay in reporting the alleged rape and failing to
discontinue her relationship with the defendant."
Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome may also be
considered in custody cases, and as self-defense evidence in criminal
prosecutions of battered women who have killed or severely injured
their perpetrators. In Knock v. Knock,' 7 the court found that the
trial court properly considered expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome in making its custody determination. In McMaugh v.
State,m the defendant appealed a murder conviction and the court
found, based on evidence of abuse and expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome, that her husband's infliction of severe mental and
physical abuse upon her coerced her into describing the homicide in a
way that would be favorable to him but prejudicial to her own best
interests. The court concluded that the evidence indicated that the
husband's domination through a focused pattern of abuse prevented
the defendant from assisting her attorney and presenting a reasonable
defense.m
2222. 850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993).
2223. Id. at 722.
2224. Id. at 719.
2225. 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988).
2226. Id. at 1171. Testimony on battered woman syndrome has also been offered as evi-
dence of mental illness. See People v. Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (describ-
ing expert testimony that a defendant who murdered her children suffered from an affective
disorder that could have been caused by extensive physical abuse by her spouse).
2227. 621 A.2d 267 (Conn. 1993).
2228. 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992).
2229. Id. at 733. But see Cox v. State, 843 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
trial court's decision to exclude evidence on battered spouse syndrome as not relevant in
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As the McMaugh case illustrates, battered women who resort to
killing their batterers because they have found no other way to put an
end to the abuse are prosecuted as perpetrators of domestic violence.
In these prosecutions, testimony on battered woman syndrome is
presented as evidence that the killing was done in self-defense.'
There is a wealth of scholarly research written on battered women
who kill." t Rather than duplicate those efforts here, we have cho-
murder conspiracy prosecution where defendant testified she was not in danger when accom-
panying husband to meet undercover agent before arrest).
2230. See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. CL App. 1986) (holding that evi-
dence of abuse warranted submission of self-defense instruction); People v. Torres, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358 (Crim. Ct. 1985) (holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
was admissible where defendant shot her husband three times as he sat in a chair in their
apartment); People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that admission of
evidence of defendant's history as a battered woman was proper where defendant shot and
killed her husband in his sleep); Betchel v. State, No. F-88-887, 1992 Okla. Crim. App.
LEXaS 73 (Okla. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 1993) (holding that the trial court erred in not allow-
ing battered woman syndrome testimony); Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963 (Pa. 1991)
(holding that defendant, convicted of murder, was entitled to admit evidence of abuse to
support self-defense claim); State v. Gibson, 384 S.E.2d 358 (W. Va. 1989) (affirming second
degree murder conviction of battered woman who killed her husband when he came to her
apartment in violation of protection order); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1982)
(holding that battered woman syndrome testimony could be offered where defendant shot and
her husband in his sleep). But see State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d I (S.D. 1993) (affirming
trial court's decision not to allow defendant, who killed her husband alleging he abused her
over a long period of time, to admit expert testimony that she was a battered woman be-
cause the testimony went to the heart of the ultimate issue of self-defense and therefore
invaded the jury's province).
2231. GILLESPE, supra note 124; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME (1984); Erich P. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 363 (1992); Julie Blackman, Potential Uses For
Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 227 (1986); Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., The Defense of Battered Wom-
en Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 427 (1987); Charles P. Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense:
A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579
(1990); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to
the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989); Rebecca Hudsmith, The Admis-
sibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome in Battered Women's Self-Defense
Cases in Louisiana, 47 LA. L. REV. 979 (1987); Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's
Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393 (1988); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Bat-
tered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991); Cathryn Jo
Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting A Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered
Women who Kill, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 11 (1986); Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence,
and Women Who Kill their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Equal Rights to Trial For Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
REV. 623 (1980); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149
(1978); Regina A. Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the
Courtroom, 16 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 273 (1992); Jeanne-Marie Bates, Comment, Expert
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sen to focus our research on other aspects of domestic violence law,
and refer the reader to these sources for further discussion on battered
women's self-defense. In reading this Article together with those
materials, it is important to remember that early identification of
battered women and early justice and social service system interven-
tion can grant many battered women a way out of a violent relation-
ship before the violence escalates to such a point where killing the
batterer is seen as the only means to stop the violence. There is a
direct correlation between increased services to battered women and a
reduction in the numbers of women who resort to killing their hus-
bands in order to bring an end to the violence." 2 Research indi-
cates that from 1979 through 1984, the period of time in which there
was a dramatic increase in shelters and other resources available to
assist battered women, the rate of homicides committed by women
against male intimates declined by twenty-five percent. 3
E. Procedure in Domestic Violence Criminal Prosecutions
Numerous courts have delineated the appropriate actions prosecu-
tors may undertake in domestic violence criminal prosecutions. Courts
have allowed prosecutors to make general statements about the do-
mestic violence crisis, but have limited their ability to make specific
reference to other unrelated notorious crimes. In Titus v. State, '
the Texas Appeals Court upheld a prosecutor's reference, in closing
argument, to the domestic violence epidemic reasoning that a prose-
cutor may properly "refer to the crime problem in general terms...
Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Maryland, 50 MD. L. REv. 920 (1991);
Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr., Note, The Battering Parent Syndrome: Inexpert Testimony as Charac-
ter Evidence, 17 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 653 (1984); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses
to Domestic Violence: V. Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers. 106 HARv. L. REV. 1574
(1993); Sarah Crippen Madison, Comment, A Critique and Proposed Solution to the Adverse
Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State v. Hennum,
74 MINN. L. REv. 1023 (1990); Mira Mihajlovich, Note, Does Plight Make Right: The Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. LJ. 1253
(1987); Kerry A. Shad, Note, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women
Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C.L. REV. 1159 (1990); Elizabeth Topliffe, Note, Why Civil
Protection Orders are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders
are Not, 67 IND. LJ. 1039 (1992); Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1430
(1990) (reviewing GILLESPIE, supra note 124).
2232. Browne & Williams, Resource Availability for Women at Risk: Its Relationship to
Rates of Female-Perpetrated Homicide, Paper Presented at the American Society of Criminolo-
gy Annual Meeting (November 11-14, 1987).
2233. Id.
2234. No. 01-87-00177-CR, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 677 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1988).
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[and] make inferences about the relationship of the defendant's con-
duct to that problem so long as he does not depart from reasonable
deductions or common knowledge."" 5  However, in State v.
Bolt,'- the Oregon Appeals Court reversed a domestic violence
conviction for kidnapping and rape where the prosecutor, in closing
arguments, made reference to many unrelated and yet notorious
crimes against women. 7 These cases suggest that while a prose-
cutor may inform a jury about the magnitude of the domestic vio-
lence crisis, they may not refer to specific notorious crimes commit-
ted by other individuals.
In criminal domestic violence actions, case law conflicts on the
question of whether prosecutors need to identify a specific act on
which the conviction must rest. In People v. Thompson," 8 the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeals held that where the defendant sodomized his
wife and beat her with a breadboard, neither the prosecutor nor the
jury had to elect which specific act formed the basis of the domestic
violence conviction because domestic violence acts are so closely con-
nected that they form part of the same transaction, and thus fall with-
in the continuous course of conduct exception." 9 However, in Peo-
ple v. Salvato,"  the court of appeals reversed the defendant
husband's conviction for dissuading a witness, his wife, by threat of
violence, terroristic threats, obtaining signatures by extortion, and
sending extortionate letters, when the prosecutor did not elect which
of a series of distinct acts he relied on in charging the defen-
dant 422"
Courts have upheld convictions for both the crime of domestic
violence and for lesser included offenses. In State v. Amos" 42 and
2235. Id. at *6-*7.
2236. 817 P.2d 1322 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
2237. Id. at 1325.
2238. 206 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1984).
2239. Id. at 518-19. Note that Thompson "did not concern the prosecutor's power to
charge multiple offenses where the victim has suffered multiple criminal acts at one time" or
the number of convictions a defendant could suffer, but it dealt with the issue of jury una-
nimity where the prosecutor charged only one count of abuse but the victim testified to mul-
tiple incidents. People v. Healy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the
prosecutor may charge defendant with multiple offenses for the same act when defendant
subjected cohabitant to multiple injuries over time).
2240. 285 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1991).
2241. Id. at 842; see also State v. Larson, 764 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that a judge may not grant a misdemeanor compromise in a domestic violence case without
the prosecutor's recommendation).
2242. No. 12-088, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 78 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1988).
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State v. Shuber,2243 the courts upheld convictions of both domestic
violence and the lesser included offense of disorderly conduct. The
court in Amos concluded that the purpose of the domestic violence
statute-to protect family and household members from vio-
lence-does not mean the court could not instruct the jury as to the
lesser included offense of disorderly conduct." In defining which
acts may be considered as lesser included offenses of domestic vio-
lence, the court in State v. Meese" 5 held that assault could not be
characterized as a lesser included offense of the offense of domestic
violence.2246
The speedy trial acts may also affect domestic violence prosecu-
tions. In State v. Mintz,2247 the court held that the defendant's right
to a speedy trial was not violated where he conditionally waived his
right to trial for attempted domestic violence upon entry into a do-
mestic violence diversion program. "  Entry into the programs
tolled the time for a speedy trial. However, in People v.
Denman, 49 the appeals court reversed the defendant's battery con-
viction where he waived his speedy trial rights by entering into a
domestic violence diversion program, was then denied entry into the
program, and yet still was not brought to trial within the statutorily
required 30 days. The speedy trial time began to run again once the
defendant was refused entry into a diversion program.' Thus, the
Denman case provides a further example of why diversion is not
advisable in domestic violence cases. Ordering domestic violence
perpetrators into diversion programs leaves the victim open to the risk
that if her batterer fails to comply with the terms of the diversion, he
might also avoid prosecution if the prosecutor does not learn of his
failure to comply and does not act to bring the case to trial in a
timely manner." Acknowledging the problem, the court in Clark
2243. No. 1-89-64, 1990 WL 352454 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1990).
2244. Amos, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 78. at *9.
2245. No. 87AP120096, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1467 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1988).
2246. Id. at *2.
2247. No. WD-90-4, 1991 WL 334942 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 1991).
2248. Id. at *4.
2249. 193 Cal. Rptr. 863 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983).
2250. IdL at 866; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 218.
2251. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends against
diversion in domestic violence cases. "Alternative dispositions and diversion in family vio-
lence cases are frequently inappropriate, and send a message to both, the victim and the
offender, that the crime is less serious than comparable crimes against non-family members.
When these alternatives are proposed, judges should ascertain that they are in the interest of
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v. State2"2 ruled that the action was not barred under the speedy
trial doctrine where the defendant caused delay by coercing the victim
not to testify. z3
Trial courts and defense attorneys have also been found to com-
mit errors in criminal domestic violence prosecutions. In People v.
Darnell,' the court reversed a domestic violence conviction for
harassment where the trial judge's interruption of the prosecution to
initiate plea discussions denied the defendant a fair trial." 5 In Peo-
ple v. Torres,' the appellate court held that since the defendant
failed to object at his criminal domestic violence trial to evidence that
he laughed at the degree of the injuries he inflicted on his wife, he
failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 7
F. Bail Issues
Judicial authorities, recognizing the danger release from custody
or incarceration can pose to domestic violence victims, recommend
that prosecutors, courts, and correctional facilities notify victims of
batterers' impending release.ms In an effort to provide even greater
protection to abuse victims, states are increasingly placing conditions
on ball and pretrial release for domestic violence perpetrators." 9
These conditions on the batterer's bail and release include no contact
with the petitioner at her home, work, or school, 60 no harassment
justice and not simply devices for docket management or unsuitable use of diversion." FAMI-
LY VIOLENCE PROJECT, supra note 687, at 14; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 213.
2252. 629 A.2d 1322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
2253. Id. at 1327.
2254. 546 N.E.2d 789 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989).
2255. Id. at 791.
2256. 581 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1992).
2257. Id. at 868-69.
2258. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 211, 222.
2259. See, e.g., 725 lLCS 5/112A-2 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-929 (Supp.
1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.26 (Baldwin 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711
(Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFmD LAWS § 23A-43-4.2 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (1990)
(criminal statute); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 637 (Supp. 1990); see also Pelekai v. White, 861
P.2d 1205 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a trial judge improperly relied on bail schedule as the
standard to determine bail amounts in domestic violence case); MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§§ 208, 220, 221.
2260. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(M) (Supp. 1993); 725 ILCS 5/110-10 (Supp.
1993) (criminal protection order statute conditioning bail on no contact and staying away
from the petitioner's residence); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-929 (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-26(a) (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-13(1) (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.720(4) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-4.2 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-3 (1992) (criminal statute); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040(2) (West Supp.
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of the petitioner or her relatives," no weapons possession,'
counseling,' 3  issuance of a temporary protection order,22" and a
mental health examination if there have been prior violations of civil
protection orders.265 The new Delaware statute requires a court to
consider prior violations of protection orders before granting
bail.22 New Jersey specifically requires conditions on bail to be in
writing, and mandates that once bail is set it may not be reduced
without prior notice to the petitioner and the prosecutor.' 7 In addi-
tion to placing conditions on a batterer's bail and pretrial release,
some statutory codes will reject bail and pretrial release entirely under
certain circumstances.22 Six states disallow bail or bond prior to
the batterer's arraignment.22  Minnesota denies bail if the
respondent's release poses a threat of bodily injury to any party. 0
A Minnesota court may also require a maximum bond of $10,000 to
deter further civil protection order violations.227
Like the numerous state statutes, case law also supports the
issuance of temporary protection orders as a condition of pretrial
release.2272 In State v. Naegele,22 3 the court of appeals sustained
1993) (criminal procedure statute); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075 (West Supp. 1993); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(1) (1989).
2261. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26(a) (West 1992).
2262. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26 (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040
(West Supp. 1993) (criminal procedure statute).
2263. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(M) (Supp. 1993); NEB. Rev. STAT. § 42-929
(Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 107-720(4) (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1002(b) (1992).
2264. 725 ILCS 5/112A-2(a) (Supp. 1993); N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(2) (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
36-3.2(a) (1990) (criminal statute).
2265. Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2937.23(b) (Anderson 1993) (allowing a court to order a
mental health examination prior to setting bail if respondent has previously violated protection
order).
2266. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 940(g) (Supp. 1992).
2267. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26(e) (West 1992).
2268. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 637 (1993) (court may refuse bail); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-3.1 (1993) (court may refuse bail on clear and convincing evidence of substantial
danger to petitioner).
2269. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(M) (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 144-104
(1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.14 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-929 (1992); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-612 (1993). Many other juris-
dictions adopt this approach by structuring court procedures and police department guidelines
in a manner that provides no opportunity for release prior to arraignment.
2270. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 (West 1993).
2271. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14(d) (West 1993).
2272. See People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Dist. Ct. 1981) (holding that protection
orders may be condition of release on ball); State v. Dawson, No. 79AP-565 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 18, 1979) (conditioning domestic violence pretrial release of defendant on a temporary
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the issuance of a temporary protection order as a condition of pre-
trial release, holding that attachment of a nonmonetary condition to
pretrial release does not violate a defendant's right to bail where the
state has a strong interest in protecting the defendant's family from
further violence. 74  In Commonwealth v. Allen, 75  an alleged
contemnor was properly held pre-trial on a contempt charge for nine
days and then, upon conviction, sentenced to time served plus a $750
fine and costs." 6 This approach has the added benefit of offering a
victim the immediate protection she needs during the very dangerous
pre-trial periodY
IV. NEGLECT AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTSn2a
Living with a violent parent is an abusive and frightening experi-
ence for a child, even when the child is not the target of the vio-
lence."' Studies reveal that between seventy-five and eighty-seven
percent of children from violent homes witness the abuse.' Social
science research on children of batterers indicate that these children
are at greater risk of substance abuse, juvenile delinquency,28 ' and
suicide. In addition to psychological and behavioral problems, children
who witness violence in the home are seventy-four percent more
protection order which prevented him form entering his home). But see State v. Beauchamp,
621 A.2d 516 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (holding that the trial court may not impose
conditions on parole but may impose a protection order that is valid during incarceration and
remains in effect upon release).
2273. No. 920 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1980).
2274. Id. at n.l. But see State v. Wood, 597 A.2d 312, 313 (Vt. 1991) (holding that the
trial court could not impose a cash bail solely because the defendant was found to be a
threat to the integrity of the judicial process and a danger to the particular victim, but rather
cash bail can only be imposed to address the risk that the defendant would not appear).
2275. 486 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1984).
2276. Id. at 365.
2277. Ganley, supra note 21, at 43-44; see also supra note 1582.
2278. For a full discussion of the nexus between child abuse and neglect cases and do-
mestic violence, see Jacqueline Agtuca et al., Child Abuse, Neglect and Termination of Pa-
rental Rights Cases Where One Parent Abuses the Other, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL
COURT CASES, supra note 21, at 224.
2279. Child abuse and neglect often co-exist with spouse abuse. FREDERIC J. COwAN,
ADULT ABUSE, NEGLECT. AND EXPLOITATION: A MEDICAL PROTOCOL FOR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS AND COMMUNITY AGENCIES 39 (1991).
2280. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 59.
2281. Sherry Ford, Domestic Violence: The Great American Spectator Sport, OKLA. COALI-
TION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL ASSAULT 3 (Jul.-Aug. 1991); Peter G. Jaffe et al.,
CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 28-29 (1990).
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likely to commit violent crimes.21 2 Studies also indicate that there
is intergenerational continuity in family violence. One study reveals
that boys who witness the abuse of their mothers are ten times more
likely to batter their female partners as adults." 3 While witnessing
one parent batter another is traumatic enough, studies also strongly
indicate the significant coincidence of child and spousal abuse. Sev-
eral national studies found that in seventy percent of families where
the woman is battered, children are battered as well.' Another
study found that fifty percent of mothers of abused children are bat-
tered women." The researchers concluded that wife "battering is
the most common context for child abuse."'  Some researchers
conclude that a batterer may abuse a child to maintain coercive con-
trol over the abused parent."'
Experts on child and spousal abuse conclude that in light of the
evidence of the coincidence of abuse against children and the other
parent "the most effective means of protecting child[ren] may be to
fashion remedies that protect both the abused parent and the
child[ren] from the perpetrator."" Protection of the battered parent
is a critical means of protecting an abused child.' Indeed, re-
search indicates that child abuse, by fathers or mothers, is likely to
decrease once the battered parent separates from the violent parent
and receives protective services.' Consequently, the experts on
spousal and child abuse urge early court intervention aimed at inquir-
ing about both spouse abuse and child abuse in child abuse and ne-
glect cases, and recommend carefully considering spousal abuse in
crafting remedies.9 This early intervention aimed at protecting
both the abused child and parent will halt the escalation of violence
2282. Women and Violence, supra note 789, at 131.
2283. Id. at 93.
2284. BROKEN BODIES AND BROKEN SPIRITS: FAMILY VIOLENCE IN MARYLAND AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (Family Violence Coalition, Maryland, June 1991).
2285. Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspec-
tive of Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH SERv. 97, 104 (1988).
2286. Id. at 97.
2287. See id. at 111-12.
2288. Agtuca et al., supra note 2278, at 245.
2289. Ganley, supra note 21, at 19, 53; DePanfilis et al., CHILD MALTREATMENT AND
WOMAN ABUSE: A GUIDE FOR CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES INTERVENTION (NWAPP ed.,
1989).
2290. Jean Giles-Sims, Longitudinal Study of Battered Children of Battered Wives, 34
FAM. RELATIONS 205. 209 (1985).
2291. Agtuca et al., supra note 2278, at 247; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
§ 409.
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and facilitate child adjustment. 92 In abuse and neglect proceedings
brought against abused spouses, courts have held that when a state
agency is allowed to psychologically examine the mother, she is
entitled to psychological examination by her own psychologist at the
state's expense." 3
Clearly, witnessing violence in the home has a profoundly dis-
turbing affect on children. Consequently, courts have consistently
terminated batterer's parental rights in homicide cases. These cases
include when the batterer committed acts of spousal abuse and
stabbed the mother to death in front of the children," when the
batterer repeatedly abused the mother during a six year marriage and
ultimately plead guilty to murdering her, 5 and when the defendant
was acquitted of murdering his wife but his son firmly believed his
father was guilty and testified as such.' Specifically, in Kenneth
B. v. Elmer S.," the court concluded that spousal abuse is a factor
in determining parental fitness, and upheld the termination of parental
rights of a father, convicted of murdering his wife, in light of his
conviction and history of spousal abuse.' 8
For the same reasons, courts have terminated parental rights and
denied custody in non-homicide spousal abuse cases. In In re
2292. Agtuca et al., supra note 2279, at 247. The authors of the State Justice Institute
funded DOMESTIc VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES, supra note 21, recommend a number of
remedies a court should consider in cases where both a child and parent is abused. These
remedies include: require Child Protective Services to investigate alleged spousal abuse; order
Child Protective Services to work with abused parent to develop a safety plan to protect
parent and child from offender, order stay away and vacate orders against abusive parent;
order abusive parent to attend domestic violence counseling before permitting contact with the
children; and order counseling for children who have witnessed the violence. See id.; see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 15, §§ 409, 511, 514. School personnel and state, county, and city
educators must also receive domestic violence training. Id. §§ 513, 514.
2293. In re Stanley, No. 93AP-972, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5848 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7,
1993).
2294. In re Sean H., 586 A.2d 1171 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (terminating parental rights of
father who abused and then stabbed to death the children's mother even though he only
physically abused one child, since his conduct denied the children the care, guidance, and
control needed for their physical and emotional well-being).
2295. Nancy R. v. Randolph W., 356 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1987) (upholding finding that
father was unfit to be a parent and denial of custody where he repeatedly abused the mother
during six year marriage and plead guilty to murdering her).
2296. T.V.N. v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 586 So. 2d 227 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)
(terminating father's parental rights where he was acquitted of murdering his wife but where
his son believed he was guilty and testified to his belief).
2297. 399 S.E.2d 192 (W. Va. 1990).
2298. Id. at 195.
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Theresa,' 9 the court terminated the parental rights of both parents
after it found that the respondents had continuously engaged in mutu-
al domestic violence in front of the children for over ten years. °
In Kimmel v. Kimmel," t the court reversed a custody award to the
mother after she ignored an existing protection order by allowing her
abusive partner back into the residence and leaving her son in the
abusive partner's care, thereby placing his welfare in jeopardy.'
V. EVIDENCE
It is important that we examine the evidentiary issues which arise
in civil protection order and domestic relations cases, contempt pro-
ceedings, and criminal cases involving domestic violence. The eviden-
tiary issues raised in criminal domestic violence cases can be very
relevant in civil protection order, domestic relations, and contempt
cases. The evidence typically presented in domestic violence cases
may include only the victim's testimony,' 3 which courts have
found to be sufficiently credible to meet a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof in a criminal domestic violence case.'
Other forms of evidence frequently offered include witness testimony
regarding injuries, medical records, police reports, photographs,'
protection orders from other jurisdictions, or expert witnesses. Cases
confirm that in all civil protection order trials, whether for issuance
of a civil protection order or for contempt hearings, both parties must
2299. 576 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1991).
2300. Id. at 938-39.
2301. 392 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
2302. Id. at 908; see also In re The Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action
No. S-113432, No. 2 CA-JV 93-O3, 1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 9,
1993) (upholding termination of abusive father's parental rights); Cote v. Henderson, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 275 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting prior civil court action ruling that a man has no parental
rights to a child conceived by rape); People in Interest of J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming termination of mother's parental rights based upon her involvement in
domestic violence and showing that counseling was ineffective in helping her avoid domestic
violence); In re RJ., 495 N.W.2d 114 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (terminating battered woman's
parental rights where she continued to permit her abusive boyfriend to abuse her sons); In re
J.M. v. D.M., No. A-92-270, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 371 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 7. 1993)
(affirming termination of battered woman's parental rights because she would not leave her
batterer and would not protect her children).
2303. Judicial authorities emphasize that spousal privilege is inapplicable in family violence
cases. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 215.
2304. See People v. Williams, 248 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1969).
2305. See, e.g., Zuccaro v. Zuccaro. No. 0058468, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1750, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 16, 1993) (photographs offered to support victim's testimony); see also
infra notes 2339-40 and accompanying text.
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be allowed to testify fully.23 It is important that courts and attor-
neys hearing or presenting evidence in domestic violence cases be
aware that the cycles of violence and the power dynamic in abusive
relationships can dramatically affect the type, quality, and quantity of
evidence available to the court.
When battered women present testimony, particularly those who
have been victimized over a long time, research indicates that they
will tend to underestimate both the frequency and the severity of the
violence they experience. 37 Other battered women, out of fear of
their batterer's retaliation, will minimize and deny the violence, re-
quest that court proceedings be dismissed, or accept the batterer's
promises to stop further violence from occurring.' All of this will
flavor the evidence presented at trial. Judges and attorneys who have
been schooled in the dynamics of domestic violence will be best able
to understand the testimony and judge its credibility. For example,
frequently a batterer will testify about "justifications" for the battering
that can provide a fact finder important insight into the existence of
power and control in the relationship.'
The vast majority of batterers are only abusive or violent to their
wives and lovers or children. Only twenty-eight percent of men who
batter are violent both within and outside the home.2 10 Experts
working with abusive men" agree that batterers greatly
underreport their violent actions, minimize or deny assaultive behavior
against their wives, and claim more involvement by the victim of
2306. Betts v. Floyd, No. CX-91-2155, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 257 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 12, 1992) (reversing issuance of civil protection order where trial judge prevented re-
spondent from completing his testimony); State v. Wiltse. 386 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that in a contempt proceeding respondent must be allowed to explain his
presence at the petitioner's home in violation of the civil protection order).
2307. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KIL 10 (1987) (police reports,
hospital records, and witness statements reveal much more violence than women are willing
to admit).
2308. Ganley, supra note 21, at 41-47 (discussing how power and control affects domestic
violence victims in the court system).
2309. Batterers will minimize or deny that the violence occurred. They might attempt to
explain their behavior, focusing on actions by the victim that supposedly caused the violence.
Focusing on the specific incidents of violence rather than what led up to or followed them
will help focus the case on the violence rather than the excuses for it. Id. at 36-38, 40
(Ganley provides a useful list of procedural tactics batterers typically use to control court pro-
ceedings).
2310. James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE 133, 143 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
2311. See Ganley, supra note 21, at 21-41 (for a full discussion of the cycle of violence
and the dynamics of power and control as they affect abusers).
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their violence than witness or police reports would support."' Few
men, even the most severe batterers, think of themselves as men who
beat their wives. The abuser's tendency to minimize problems is
comparable to the denial by alcohol and drug abusers."' Courts
have noted the importance of expert testimony on the dynamics of
domestic violence.
Many battered women who have suffered violent injuries at the
hands of their abusers may not have medical records to help docu-
ment these injuries. Battered women who are injured do not necessar-
ily seek the medical treatment they need. Only about two-thirds of
the battered women who need medical assistance seek treatment.'
Following the worst incident of abuse, forty-five percent of battered
women felt they needed medical attention. Yet, only thirty-two per-
cent sought medical treatment and only twenty-two percent actually
told the doctor the cause of their injuries. Twenty percent of battered
women believed they needed medical treatment but did not seek it,
mostly out of fear of retaliation from their batterersY' 5 Proof of the
violence becomes more difficult to obtain when so few seek medical
treatment and present medical records to help substantiate their cases.
A. Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Battered Woman
Syndrome and Other Expert Testimony" 6
Increasingly, courts admit expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome into domestic violence criminal trials"' 7 In civil
protection order cases or in custody and divorce actions where there
has been domestic violence between the parties, introduction of expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome and the dynamics of domestic
violence may be useful as well. This evidence helps courts better
understand the dynamics of the relationships in question, and can
2312. Frieze & Browne, supra note 304. Dobash and Dobash interviewed battered women
to identify the main source of conflict in the typical battering incident. Forty-four percent
stated possessiveness and sexual jealousy on the part of the batterer, 17% reported arguments
over money, and 16% cited husband's expectations about domestic work. NATIONAL CLEAR-
INGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, STATISTICS PACKET 38 (1990).
2313. David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge, 33
BOSTON B.J. 23, 24 (1989).
2314. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 25.
2315. Daniel G. Saunders & Karla Rose, Attitudes of Psychiatric and Non-psychiatric
Medical Practitioners Toward Battered Women: An Exploratory Study', in STATISTICS 78 (Na-
tional Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, 1990).
2316. See infra notes 2218-30 and accompanying text.
2317. See sources cited supra note 2231.
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provide the basis on which to properly evaluate the evidence present-
ed. In both criminal and civil court cases, this testimony must be
admissible to support a domestic violence victim's self-defense claim.
However, it is equally important that this testimony be admissible to
explain a victim's reticence to testify, reluctance to follow through
with a protection order, reunification with her batterer, or emotional
state at trial to judges and jurors in both civil and criminal actions
whenever domestic violence is an issue.
Prosecutors have been allowed to present expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome in criminal prosecutions of batterers. In
State v. Ciskie,23"8 State v. C.V.C., 9 and State v. Frost,2320 the
courts admitted testimony on the "battered woman syndrome" in
criminal prosecutions of alleged batterers to bolster the credibility and
explain the actions of the victim witness. In Ciskie, the court admitted
evidence on the battered woman syndrome to help the jury understand
the victim's delay in reporting four rapes by her batterer during their
twenty three month relationship and her failure to end the relation-
ship. 3 ' In C.V.C., the court held that the wife's failure to report
the domestic violence at her first opportunity did not make her testi-
mony inconsistent or incredibleY The court in Frost, recognizing
the lack of societal awareness of domestic violence issues, held that
"battered woman syndrome" evidence is admissible to bolster the
credibility of the victim witness in her batterer's prosecution for as-
saultY Indeed, the court specified that the prosecutor may proper-
ly use a series of prior assaults on the victim, calls to the police, and
reconciliations over a period of time to explain why the victim re-
mained with the batterer and visited him in jail. 24
The battered woman syndrome has also played an important role
in criminal prosecutions of battered women who kill their batterers in
self-defense." In State v. Gallegos,'26 the court not only admit-
2318. 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
2319. 450 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
2320. 577 A.2d 1282 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
2321. Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1165.
2322. C.V.C., 450 N.W.2d at 463.
2323. Frost, 577 A.2d at 1282.
2324. Id.; see also State v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in batterer's
trial for battery to provide an explanation for the victim's recantation of her original battery
complaint).
2325. State v. Gallegos. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (admitting testimony on bat-
tered woman syndrome in manslaughter trial in which defendant killed her former husband
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ted evidence of the battered woman syndrome and a self-defense in-
struction, but it also admitted the deceased's former wife's testimony
that the deceased had subjected her to sexual and physical abuse."
In People v. Torres, 28 the court held that the defendant who killed
her batterer could introduce testimony on the battered woman syn-
drome as evidence bearing substantially on her justification defense.
The court concluded that testimony on the battered woman syndrome
is beyond the experimental stage and meets the standard for presenta-
and claims self-defense); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. 1985) (holding that testi-
mony on battered woman syndrome is admissible as a defense and meets standard for ad-
missibility as expert scientific evidence); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App.
1992) (noting that a trial court must admit expert testimony on battered woman syndrome);
Commonwealth v. Dillion, 598 A.2d 963 (Pa. 1991) (holding that it was reversible error to
exclude defendant's testimony of violence inflicted on her by the murder victim); Common-
wealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989) (holding that battered woman syndrome is a
defense to a charge of homicide, and trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert
testimony on the syndrome); McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992) (holding that post
conviction relief is available based on expert testimony that the murder defendant suffered
from battered woman syndrome). This approach has been supported by Congress. See DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL CouRT CASES, supra note 23, at 118 (quoting the Attorney General's
Task Force on Family Violence recommendation that courts permit expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome in order to provide the judge and jury with a clear understanding
of the dynamics and complexities of family violence). But see People v. Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d
770 (Il1. App. CL 1987) (holding that while trial judge acknowledged evidence of physical
abuse against defendant by her former husband in her trial for murdering her two children, it
was harmless error for the judge not to take judicial notice of ex parte protection orders
against the defendant's former husband); People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div.
1984) (holding that where defendant who murdered her batterer alleged fear of immediately
being killed when he awoke, the prosecutor could show how defendant ignored offers of help
during this time and evidence of available alternatives); State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that evidence of battered woman syndrome is admissible only
to establish imminent danger of death as an affirmative defense of self-defense); Common-
wealth v. Miller, No. 01210. 1993 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3878 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1993)
(holding that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is relevant and admissible to
show the defendant's state of mind when she killed her boyfriend, but her attorney's failure
to present such evidence is not per se ineffectiveness of counsel).
2326. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
2327. Id.; see also Register v. State, No. CR 92-179, 1993 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 882
(Ala. Crim. App. May 28, 1993) (holding that evidence of prior sexual conduct involving
natural daughter is admissible in sexual assault case where victim was defendant's step-daugh-
ter); In re Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432, No. 2 CA-JV 93-0003,
1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1993) (affirming the admittance of prior
bad acts to establish a pattern of behavior). But see State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va.
1987) (expert testimony about individual incidents of violence committed against the defen-
dant by the murder victim was not admissible under the battered woman syndrome theory
and the testimony of the mother of the decedent's former wife on specific incidents of vio-
lence by the decedent were too remote in time).
2328. 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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tion of expert scientific evidence. 29 This same standard would al-
low for introduction of this evidence in civil cases. Following the
lead of criminal courts who admit evidence of battered woman syn-
drome in cases where the standard of proof is higher and the due
process rights of the batterer are highly protected, the evidence should
also be admissible in any civil action for a protection order or custo-
dy.
Courts agree that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
should not be confined to criminal prosecutions of the batterer or
defense cases of the abuse victim, but rather it should also play a
significant role in civil protection order and custody hearings. As the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas noted in Popeski v.
Popeski, 3" "[t]he protection from abuse statute was enacted to alle-
viate the 'battered wife syndrome' and has been expanded to protect
parties in other close relationships." 3  Therefore, when seeking
civil protection orders, particularly in cases where custody is contest-
ed, attorneys should present evidence on the effect of prolonged abuse
on the petitioner. In cases where this evidence will help explain
petitioner's failure to come forward sooner, or in which petitioner
attempted to defend herself in one of the key incidents underlying the
petition, expert testimony can be valuable in assuring that petitioner
receives the protection order. Attorneys must emphasize that a court's
denial of a civil protection order reinforces the senses of isolation and
subordination which contribute to the battered woman syndrome.
In addition to evidence on the battered woman syndrome, courts
should admit expert testimony regarding the physical and emotional
trauma sustained by an abuse victim and her children as a result of
ongoing physical abuse. 332 This information is particularly valuable
in determining whether joint custody or unsupervised visitation may
have detrimental effects on the children. While psychological experts
are very valuable and relevant to a court's decision in both criminal
2329. Id.; see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (reversing trial
court's refusal to admit expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in the murder
prosecution of a battered woman); McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992) (granting a
petition for post-conviction relief after petitioner sustained her affirmative defense based on
the battered woman syndrome). But see State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1992) (hold-
ing that the trial court properly refused to admit expert testimony, which went toward her
self-defense claim, that defendant, convicted of killing her husband, was a battered woman).
2330. 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 200 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1989).
2331. Id. at 204.
2332. Nancy K.D. Lemmon. Custody and Visitation, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL
COURT CASES 216 (The Family Violence Prevention Fund ed., 1992).
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and civil cases, such experts should be schooled in the dynamics of
domestic violence. In Bruscato v. Avant,' 3 the court reversed a
custody award to a batterer, in part, because the only psychologist to
interview and evaluate both parties admitted that she was not trained
in the dynamics of domestic violence. The Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals concluded that absent testimony from a trained domestic vio-
lence expert, the trial court did not have enough evidence to deter-
mine the child's best interests." 3
B. Admissible Evidence
A wide range of categories of evidence is admissible in protec-
tion order, domestic relations, contempt, and criminal domestic vio-
lence cases. Evidence of an alleged batterer's history of abuse and
prior protection orders are relevant and should be admitted to support
issuance of a civil protection order. The New Jersey civil protection
order statute is illustrative. It admits into evidence, in a civil protec-
tion order hearing, the batterer's history of domestic violence and the
existence of a protection order in another jurisdiction '35 The courts
in civil protection order cases have also routinely admitted evidence
of past abuse" and prior protection orders' 37  to support the
2333. 593 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
2334. Id.; see also In re The Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-
113432, No. 2 CA-JV 93-0003, 1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1993)
(affirming the admission of expert testimony presented by two social workers and a psycholo-
gist in a termination of parental rights case); State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993)
(holding that expert testimony may be offered to assist the jury in interpreting the facts in a
domestic violence case; expert need not have degree in psychology or psychiatry, but an
extensive educational background, work experience, and research in the area of battered wom-
an syndrome is sufficient).
2335. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 1992).
2336. Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (evidence of past abuses
admissible to show present intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or
assault); Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (husband made threats about
killing wife if she "jerks him around with custody" after the filing of a divorce occurred;
court held that the record of verbal threats in the context of past abuse can inflict fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault and is sufficient to support issuance of a
protection order); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (affirn-ing
the admission prior acts of domestic violence to support issuance of a civil protection order);
Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992) (holding that past abusive actions of the
defendant are admissible and can assist the court in determining whether domestic violence is
actual or imminent for the purposes of issuing a temporary protection order); Snyder v.
Snyder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (upholding trial court's discretion in admitting
evidence of recent prior abuse in protection order hearing to show the history and escalation
of the violence); Wippel v. Wippel, No. 7230, 1992 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS (Commw. C.P.
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issuance of a civil protection order.
In criminal domestic violence or homicide cases, courts have
admitted physical evidence including photographs of the scene, 338
photographs of the victims's injuries, 3 9  physical evidence of the
victim's injuries,' a blood stained shirt," and the defendant's
history of victim abuse when he raised a self-defense claim.2342 In
People v. Torres,'3 3 the trial court admitted evidence that the de-
fendant was laughing about the injuries he caused his wife when he
was arrested for beating her about the face with his fists and a steam
iron. In Rodriguez v. State,' the court in a criminal domestic vio-
lence trial held that it was not prejudicial error for the prosecutor to
refer to the victim's shaking and crying while testifying to show the
victim's fear.
Criminal courts also routinely admit evidence of prior civil pro-
tection orders, 5  prior contempts of civil protection orders,'
Ct. Dec. 24, 1992) (holding that where defendant, in a protection order proceeding, put his
intent at issue, evidence of his past abusive behavior is admissible to show his intention in
making the threat in question); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1979)
(holding that a court can consider past incidents of abuse to add weight to the possible de-
velopment of a trend culminating in the recent acts which give rise to a petition for protec-
tion).2337. See, e.g., Boniek, 443 N.W.2d at 196.
2338. State v. Norton, No. 319, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Jul. 12, 1992) (holding that evidence of physical trauma to victim's body and photographs of
the scene of the crime is admissible in a criminal trial for aggravated assault).
2339. State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 1993) (holding that, in a capital murder
prosecution, six photographs of murder victim taken shortly after her arrival at hospital, intu-
bated, connected to a ventilator, and covered by hospital sheets, were properly admitted to
illustrate neighbor's testimony about wounds and show the manner in which the defendant
husband killed his wife); State v. Kinley, No. 2826, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3272 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 24, 1993) (admitting photographs of the victim's injuries in a domestic violence
criminal trial); State v. Gressner. No. 87-193-111, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 448 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 3, 1988) (same).
2340. Norton, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453.
2341. Rodriguez v. State, 588 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that it was
harmless error for prosecutor to display blood stained shirt to size against the defendant's
frame).
2342. Garibay v. United States, No. 92-CM-1497, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 303 (D.C. Dec.
6, 1993).
2343. 581 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1992).
2344. 588 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
2345. Brown v. State, 611 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (no discovery violation
when defendant was cross-examined, in his sexual battery and attempted second-degree murder
trial, concerning previous ex parte injunction against domestic violence); People v. Seaman,
561 N.E.2d 188 (1I. App. Ct. 1990) (prior civil protection order admissible in criminal trial
for attempted murder of the domestic violence victim); People v. Richmond, 559 N.E.2d 302
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (prior civil protection order admissible in trial for murder of domestic
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prior domestic violence convictions,' prior bad acts in criminal
trials," and the batterer's history of domestic violence 39  in
criminal domestic violence and murder trials. In People v.
Richmond,35  the court admitted prior acts of domestic violence in
a criminal murder trial because the "[e]vidence that the defendant was
violence victim); People v. Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d 770 (IlL App. Ct. 1987) (noting that court
should take judicial notice of ex parte protection orders); Commonwealth v. Gil, 471 N.E.2d
30 (Mass. 1984) (holding that in a spousal murder case, trial court, which admitted evidence
of prior restraining order issued against husband to show status of marital relationship and
husband's motive for murder, has discretion to determine whether order was too remote in
time from killing to be admissible); State v. Johnson, 381 S.E.2d 732 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that it was harmless error for court to admit prior civil protection order into evi-
dence in trial for murder of defendant's wife).
2346. Holt v. State, 774 P.2d 476 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (upholding trial court's admis-
sion of evidence pertaining to defendant's prior contempt of protection order).
2347. State v. Curtis, No. C1-92-2247, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 864 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 1993) (holding that prior domestic violence conviction is admissible in assault case
where the victim was the same); State v. Wendling, No. 12015, 1990 WL 197957 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 6, 1990); State v. McArthur, No. 53087 (Dec. 17, 1987).
2348. Mitchell v. United States, No. 91-CF-705 (D.C. App. Jul. 22, 1993) (holding that
testimony of defendant's prior misconduct toward his wife was admissible to show motive in
murder case where victim is third party with clear nexus to initial misconduct); State v. Davi,
504 N.W.2d 844 (S.D. 1993) (holding that trial court properly admitted evidence of prior bad
acts, including physical confrontation between the decedent and defendant, in the defendant's
trial for murdering his former wife).
2349. Brown v. State, 611 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (victim's testimony
concerning rocky relationship with defendant and his past threats were admissible as relevant
to show motive in committing sexual battery and attempted second degree murder); Young v.
State, 348 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (victim's mother was properly allowed to testify
about prior incident of violence to rebut the defendant's testimony that he had never struck
his wife before the episode leading to the instant charges); People v. Williams, 582 N.E.2d
1158 (IM. App. Ct. 1991) (in criminal domestic violence trial defendant's intent to unlawfully
restrain petitioner inferred from history of violence toward victim); People v. Richmond, 559
N.E.2d 302 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (evidence of past abuse admissible in criminal murder trial);
People v. Folk, 574 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (App. Div. 1991) (in a manslaughter case, trial court
properly admitted defendant's girlfriend's testimony that the defendant abused her and attempt-
ed to strangle her in the same manner as he allegedly strangled the murder victim); State v.
Hanna, 378 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1989) (court admitted evidence that defendant had committed
acts of domestic violence against victim in the past in a domestic violence criminal trial for
kidnapping and abduction with intent to defile); State v. Kinley, No. 2826, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3272 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1993) (testimony concerning defendant's past abuse and
threats to girlfriend-victim admitted to demonstrate motive in murder trial); State v. Hill. 1991
Ohio App. LEXIS 1649 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 11, 1991) (in criminal domestic violence case
the court admitted evidence of prior violence); State v. C.V.C., 450 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. CL
App. 1989) (evidence concerning an incident two years prior was properly admitted for the
limited purpose of showing the wife's state of mind). But see State v. Taylor, 1990 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4749 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1990) (holding that the defendant was not denied
a fair trial when the court admitted evidence of alleged other acts of violence by the defen-
dant).
2350. 559 N.E.2d 302 (II. App. CL 1990).
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involved in prior incidents in which the decedent suffered similar
injuries was admissible to show the presence of intent and the ab-
sence of accident."3 51
In divorce and custody cases, courts will admit photographs of
an abused party's injuries, '52 evidence of past abuse,253 and evi-
dence of a party's plea in a murder trial.' Courts have also ad-
mitted the testimony of other witnesses. In Taylor v. Taylor,2355 the
court admitted the testimony of the battered woman's mother about
the past history of abuse in the parties' relationship to show the ex-
treme cruelty in a divorce action.
In protection order contempt proceedings, courts have also ad-
dressed a number of evidentiary issues. In Commonwealth v.
Gordon,"3 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that evidence
of a prior confrontation between the parties, during which the defen-
dant called his wife abusive names, was admissible in the defendant's
contempt trial. Evidence that the petitioner and her children stayed in
a domestic violence shelter prior to the civil protection order violation
is also admissible evidence. In People v. Zarebski,"3 the appellate
court held that the defendant was not denied a fair jury trial when the
state questioned the petitioner as to her and her children's where-
abouts at a domestic violence shelter prior to the incident that violat-
ed the protection order.
Spontaneous or excited utterances may be admitted into evidence
in domestic violence criminal prosecutions and should also be admis-
sible in civil cases. In State v. Gibson,'5 where a battered woman
2351. Id. at 306.
2352. Taylor v. Taylor, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2313 (Ohio Ct. App. June 7, 1989) (pho-
tographs of battered spouse admissible to show gross neglect and extreme cruelty in a di-
vorce action).
2353. Id. (testimony of battered spouse's mother about abuse of battered spouse admissible
to show gross neglect and extreme cruelty in a divorce action); Manz v. Manz, 805 S.W.2d
183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judicial notice could be taken of prior adult abuse proceedings in
an action for divorce); Nancy R. v. Randolph W., 356 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1987) (admitting
evidence of spouse abuse during six year marriage in a custody hearing). But see F.T. v.
State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993) (court may not take judicial notice of protection order as
evidence of father's history of abuse in custody case where no testimony or orders were
actually entered into evidence).
2354. Nancy R., 356 S.E.2d at 464 (evidence of father's plea in murder trial to first de-
gree murder of child's mother is admissible in a custody hearing).
2355. 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2313 (Ohio CL App. June 7, 1989).
2356. 553 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1990).
2357. 542 N.E.2d 445 (I1. App. Ct. 1989).
2358. 384 S.E.2d 358 (W. Va. 1989).
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met her initial burden of producing evidence of self-defense when she
killed her husband, the state could introduce spontaneous statements
which reflect on her motive to overcome her self-defense claim. 59
In addition to expert witnesses, other witnesses may also testify
in criminal domestic violence and civil protection order trials.' In
People v. Woodson," s' a domestic violence prosecution for the
murder of the abuse victim and her daughter, the court held that the
trial judge properly admitted the testimony of the victim's sisters.
Similarly, in Young v. State,' the court admitted the deceased
victim's mother's testimony that the defendant had battered the victim
in the past, had threatened the mother and victim with a straight
razor, and that the defendant's child now suffers from a nervous
condition after witnessing the brutal assault on her mother. In the
same case, the court also admitted testimony by the victim's cousins
regarding the defendant's prior acts of violence and testimony by the
defendant's child, who witnessed the violent assault at issue. 3 In
Snyder v. Snyder, 36  the court issued a protection order based on
evidence that included the testimony of the victim's mother and pas-
tor concerning the victim's injuries from the abuse. Courts generally
2359. But see State v. Ortiz, 845 P.2d 547 (Haw. 1993) (holding that wife's statement that
husband struck her was not an admissible "excited utterance" as it was made more than
twenty minutes after alleged incident so it was not reasonably contemporaneous with startling
event); State v. Baker, 822 P.2d 519 (Haw. 1991) (holding that statement made by an abused
family member as a result of police interrogation was not admissible as an excited utterance
where the statement was not reasonably contemporaneous with the alleged abusive incident to
be either proximately caused by the event or spontaneous); State v. Walker, 489 A.2d 728
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that, in a criminal manslaughter trial where the
defendant killed an abuse victim, the victim's statement, "Don't hit me John," made by the
victim weeks after the attack but shortly before her death, was not admissible as a spontane-
ous utterance because the court could not determine if the victim was reliving the assault at
the time she made the statement).
2360. Courts should take special care to protect all witnesses who testify as to a
defendant's violent behavior. As a recent appellate decision in California notes,
[a]s our society becomes increasingly violent in its daily human interactions, more
and more people are called upon to be witnesses in the prosecution of those caus-
ing the violence. Yet, as the number of these potential witnesses grows, so also
does the likelihood that they, or their families, will be subjected to violence by the
very criminal defendants against whom they will give testimony.
Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113 (Ct. App. 1993).
2361. 581 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
2362. 348 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
2363. For a discussion of creative ways to use child witnesses or to avoid having to make
children testify in domestic violence cases, see supra notes 1981-88 and accompanying text;
see also infra notes 2392-97 and accompanying text.
2364. 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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admit children's testimony in civil domestic relations cases 65 and
in criminal prosecutions. '
A variety of witnesses may testify at civil protection order hear-
ings. The District of Columbia's domestic violence statute provides
that the court may secure the petitioner's or the respondent's family
as witnesses by providing a notice of hearing.' 7 West Virginia will
allow a witness to testify unless there is a finding of disruptiveness or
a court rule prohibits it? Courts will also admit expert testimony.
In Cooke v. Naylor,' the court issued a civil protection order on
behalf of a minor child against an allegedly sexually abusive father
based, in part, on expert testimony as to the child's physical and
psychological state. The court ruled that the evidence was well
grounded in established authority and sufficiently reliable. 7 Simi-
larly, in State v. Harper,7t the court issued a civil protection order
based on a physician's testimony regarding the severity of the
petitioner's injuries.
C. Inadmissible Evidence
Several categories of evidence are often inadmissible in criminal
and civil domestic violence cases 72 Courts have been reluctant to
2365. Er parte Harris, 461 So. 2d 1332 (Ala. 1984) (holding that it was reversible error
to disallow children's testimony in divorce case); Jarman v. Jarman, 540 So. 2d 444 (La. Ct.
App. 1989) (citing with approval the daughter's testimony in divorce proceeding based on
cruelty); In re Luz P., 595 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 1993) (child diagnosed as autistic and
classified as retarded allowed to testify as to sexual abuse by her parents in a child protec-
tive proceeding against her parents); Desmond v. Desmond, 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct.
1986) (approving the use of a park to lesson the emotional distress of testifying for children
in domestic violence custody case); Jethrow v. Jethrow, 571 So. 2d 270 (Miss. 1990) (child's
testimony admitted in divorce case where cruel and inhumane treatment was the ground for
divorce); Kreutzer v. Kreutzer, 359 P.2d 536 (Or. 1961) (child's testimony admitted in custo-
dy modification case); Nichols v. Fleischman, 677 P.2d 731 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (child's
testimony admitted in divorce case where cruel and inhumane treatment was the ground for
divorce).
2366. State v. Paolella, 561 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1989) (child competent to testify against
father in kidnapping and assault case involving mother); State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118
(N.C. 1993) (children's testimony regarding defendant's specific instances of prior misconduct
toward them and their mother was properly admitted to show motive, opportunity, intent, and
preparation in absence of mistake or accident in trial in which defendant was found guilty of
first degree murder of his wife).
2367. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004() (1992).
2368. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(c) (1992).
2369. 573 A.2d 376 (Me. 1990).
2370. Id. at 378.
2371. 761 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2372. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding
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admit evidence of a party's unsuccessful civil protection order petition
to weigh against granting custody to that party in a divorce proceed-
ing. In Campbell v. Campbell, 37 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that a trial court awarding parental rights in a divorce
case may consider one parent's unsuccessful petition for a protection
order against the other only if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the parent willfully misused the protection order
process in order to gain a tactical advantage in the divorce proceed-
ing, and (2) in the particular circumstances, the willful misuse tends
to show that the acting parent will have a lessened ability and will-
ingness to work with the other parent in sharing joint responsibilities
for the children. 74 The court noted that the heightened standard of
clear and convincing evidence was required to prevent a chilling
effect on the protection order process, and that a trial court must
carefully weigh the public interest served by protection orders in
preventing domestic violence against the private interest in the admis-
sion of relevant evidence in a parental rights determination.' Ulti-
mately, the court warned that a trial court should arrive at its decision
in a manner that does the least damage to the strong public interest
in an accessible and expeditious protection order process. 76
A number of state statutes protect confidential communications
between an abuse victim and her domestic violence counselor from
forced disclosure over the victim's claim of privilege." In
Eichenberger v. Eichenberger,"375 the Ohio Appeals Court held that
there was no prejudice when, in a contempt proceeding, the trial
judge permitted the petitioner to invoke a confidentiality privilege and
thereby prevent the parties' marriage counselor from testifying about
the petitioner's mental state. The court explained that where the peti-
that in a civil protection order case, an entry in a diary the wife's lawyer directed her to
keep, fell within the work product doctrine and did not have to be produced to her husband).
2373. 604 A.2d 33 (Me. 1992).
2374. IU. at 34.
2375. Id. at 37.
2376. Id.; see also State v. Knotts, No. 8-93-8. 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5475 (Ohio CL
App. Oct. 19, 1993) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the
number of questions directed toward the domestic violence victim about her marijuana test).
2377. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1037 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
38c (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.608 (West 1992); 40 ILCS 2312-27 (Smith-Hurd 1992);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236A.1 (West 1992); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 27A-2157 (West
1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-C:1, 2 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.15 (West
1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1 (1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 70.123.075 (West 1992); WyO. STAT. § 1-12-116 (1992).
2378. 613 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
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tioner does not waive the confidentiality present in such relationships,
the privilege must be affirmed absent demonstrated prejudice."'
The court acknowledged the fact that the problems of domestic abuse
arise from the batterer and are not related to the relationship, marital
or otherwise, between the batterer and the victim." In State v.
Kilponen,"5' the court of appeals held that the marital privilege in
the statute, which governed the testimony by a spouse in a criminal
prosecution, did not apply to a case in which there was evidence that
the defendant intended to commit a violent crime against his
wife
82
Courts have limited the context in which victim impact state-
ments may be used in domestic violence cases. In Buschauer v.
State,' s3 the court held that a victim impact statement given by the
defendant's mother-in-law during the defendant's manslaughter trial
violated due process where the defendant received no notice, the
2379. Id. at 681.
2380. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Lambaer, 558 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (find-
ing that absent a waiver of privilege, the trial court improperly ordered deposition of
mother's psychiatrist and release of hospital records). Several criminal cases have addressed
this issue. See Lovett v. The Super. Ct. of Fresno County, 250 Cal. Rptr. 25 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that, in a rape trial, the communication between the rape victim and the sexual
assault counselor was privileged where the defendant failed to establish good cause for dis-
covery of that information or show that his constitutional right of confrontation overrode the
privilege); State v. Lizotte, 517 A.2d 610 (Conn. 1986) (holding that the communications be-
tween the victim and the sexual assault counselor were privileged because the act was not
retroactive); State v. Magnano, 528 A.2d 760 (Conn. 1987) (holding that, in a battered
woman's murder trial, it was harmless error for the trial court to admit privileged communi-
cations between the defendant and battered woman's counselor since testimony by other wit-
nesses clearly established occurrence of domestic violence); State v. J.G., 619 A.2d 232 (NJ.
Super. App. Div. 1993) (concluding that the victim-counselor privilege extends not only to
victims of violent crime but also to indirect victims such as the victim's mother, privilege is
absolute and communications between victim and counselor should not be examined by judge
in camera); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992) (holding that, in rape trial,
the rape victim's records kept at a rape crisis center where she sought counseling are protect-
ed against discovery).
2381. 737 P.2d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
2382. See also People v. Scull, 340 N.E.2d 466 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that the spousal
privilege relates to testimony, not to communications between spouses occurring in a non-
testimonial setting); People v. Kemp, 399 N.Y.S.2d 879 (App. Div. 1977) (applying Scull and
finding that the marital privilege did not apply in a suppression hearing or to wife's disclo-
sure to police of physical evidence when police responded to a domestic violence call, even
though wife could be barred from testifying at trial concerning the privileged communica-
tions). But see State v. Tripp, 795 P.2d 280 (Haw. 1990) (while no absolute disclosure privi-
lege attached to welfare benefits records, the court, after examining them in camera, refused
to admit them into evidence to attack a domestic violence victim's credibility where she
claimed that she was injured by the defendant and not by an accidental fall).
2383. 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990).
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statement was not under oath, and there was no opportunity for cross-
examination.
D. Sufficient Evidence
Case law also addresses the sufficiency of evidence in domestic
relations cases'" and criminal domestic violence prosecutions. In
People v. Williams," a criminal prosecution, the court held that a
former wife's testimony that her former husband approached her on
the street and punched and kicked her was sufficient to find him
guilty of assault. In Young v. State," the court held that a police
officer's testimony regarding the defendant's oral statement following
the violent assault on his wife, the deceased victim's mother's and
cousin's testimony as to the defendant's prior violence, and the
parties' child's testimony as to the violence at issue was sufficient to
find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable
doubt." 7 In State v. Amos,"'ss the court held that the petitioner's
testimony that she felt pain when the respondent kicked her was
sufficient, without evidence of an outward physical manifestation, to
establish the "physical harm" needed to sustain a domestic violence
conviction.389
Criminal domestic violence prosecutions also provide insight. The
court of appeals in State v. Gallegos"9 addressed the sufficiency of
evidence needed to warrant submitting the abused party's self-defense
2384. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 600 S.W.2d 438 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that a wife's allegations that during the marriage her husband scratched her television set,
whipped her as a religious ritual, and poured water on her hair was insufficient in a divorce
action and must be corroborated by another witness); Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, No.
93AP-840, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5282 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1993) (holding that
petitioner's testimony that the respondent threatened to kill her, and that she feared he would
carry out the threat was sufficient to issue a protection order).
2385. 248 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1969).
2386. 348 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
2387. Id. at 136; see also In re Daniel "R." v. Noel "R.", 600 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div.
1993) (noting that a child's out of court statements may be adequately corroborated by expert
'testimony); In re Branden "UU", 597 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div. 1993) (same); Jackson v.
Jackson, Nos. 64284, 64873, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5992 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1993)
(noting that the court is not required to compel a child's testimony in a domestic violence
case).
2388. No. 12-088, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 78 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1988).
2389. See also Betts v. Floyd, No. CX-91-2155, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 257 (Minn. CL
App. Mar. 12, 1992) (upholding civil protection order based on petitioner's testimony, despite
respondent's allegation that she was not credible because she did not report the abuse to the
police when they were called).
2390. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. CL App. 1986).
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claim to the jury when she killed her batterer. The court held that
evidence regarding the events of the day when the abuse occurred
was sufficient, given the history of domestic violence, to warrant
submission of the defendant's tendered self-defense instruction to the
jury.23
91
E. Need for Victim's Testimony at
Criminal Domestic Violence Trials
Another issue courts have addressed is the need for the victim's
testimony at criminal domestic violence trials. Domestic violence
victims may have well-founded fears and reasons for not wanting to
testify against their batterers. Progressive, successful domestic violence
prosecutors no longer require victim cooperation in order for the state
to bring charges against batterers.2392 Therefore, courts should not
dismiss cases based solely on a victim's refusal to testify if other
evidence is available.2393
In Commonwealth v. Hatfield,39 the wife called her employer
to ask for help after her husband had beaten her and left her with a
bloody nose, a black eye, and multiple contusions. The husband was
2391. Id. at 251.
2392. See, e.g., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION PROTOCOL, OFFICE OF THE CITY AT-
TORNEY CITY OF SAN DIEGO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT 9-10 (Apr. 1993).
Criminal charges should be filed in domestic violence cases, irrespective of the
desires of a victim, where the evidence presented satisfies the elements of the
crime, includes photographed visible injuries or documented medical treatment, and
there is independent corroboration sufficient to prevail on a motion in a jury trial
of the matter. Independent corroboration may include:
1. Injuries observed by a person other than the victim;
2. A medical report that indicates injuries;
3. Witnesses who saw the actual crime take place;
4. Witnesses who heard noises indicating that a domestic violence
incident was taking place, i.e., screams, furniture being thrown, etc.;
5. A 911 tape with the victim/witness/suspect's statements;
6. Physical evidence present, i.e., weapon, broken furniture, disarray,
torn clothes;
7. Admission by the defendant.
Id.; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 15, § 212.
2393. See State v. Johnson, Nos. C4-92-2517, C6-92-2518, 1993 Minn App. LEXIS 619
(Minn. Ct. App. June 15, 1993) (holding that a court should not automatically dismiss do-
mestic violence case where victim does not wish to pursue prosecution). But see People v.
Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, in a sexual assault case,
defendant's wife could be compelled to testify against him where victim was wife's room-
mate, despite claim of marital privilege).
2394. 593 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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charged but the wife refused to provide evidence against him. The
trial court held that the interests of justice would best be served by
nullifying the prosecution. 95 This unfortunate decision could have
been avoided if the Haoeld court addressed the possibility that other
witnesses, such as an examining doctor or her employer, could pro-
vide sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Following this more
enlightened approach, in Watkins v. State, 396 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the trial court properly found that the defendant
beat the petitioner with a chair, threatened her with a gun, and
stabbed her with scissors, even though the victim recanted earlier
statements at trial. The trial court based its findings on a police
officer's testimony regarding the victim's statements at the time of
the assault, the presence of fresh puncture wounds, the presence of
weapons in the house, and the general disarray of the scene. The
court specifically held that the petitioner's statements to the police at
the time of the respondent's arrest are substantive evidence of the
defendant's guilt in a criminal trial.2 97
CONCLUSION
In order to reduce the devastating social cost of domestic vio-
lence, every part of our society, including the justice system, the
health care system, schools, churches, and neighborhood groups, must
play a strong role in stopping and condemning violence between
intimates. The civil and criminal courts play a critical role in framing
society's response to family violence. These courts are in a unique
position to provide victims the necessary protection and strongly
convey the message that violence in the home will not be tolerated.
The existence of strong legislative remedies and punishments, com-
bined with the manner in which the judiciary handles domestic vio-
lence cases of persons seeking relief pursuant to these laws, will
ultimately determine the effectiveness of the justice system in ending
domestic violence.
Civil domestic violence statutes and case law have been develop-
2395. Id. at 1276.
2396. 360 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
2397. Id. at 48; see also State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993) (holding that the
victim's prior inconsistent statement was admissible); Dawson v. Commonwealth, No. 92-CA-
001840-DG, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 159 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1993) (concluding that, where
the victim declined to testify, the police officer's testimony as to the victim's statement cou-
pled with the police report were sufficient to uphold the conviction).
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ing at an astonishing pace. This is true despite the fact that the dy-
namics of domestic violence often leads battered women to return to
their batterers rather than appeal an unfavorable decision. However, as
more and more victims of family violence come forward and are
offered better sources of support from domestic violence advocates
and attorneys, greater numbers have been willing to pursue appeals.
In our overview of national case law, we found courts appropriately
addressing many issues that arise every day in civil protection order,
criminal, custody, and divorce courtrooms across the country. There is
much that advocates and courts can learn from decisions being issued
in other jurisdictions. A central goal of this Article has been to create
a resource that makes domestic violence decisions readily accessible
to all, so that judges and attorneys facing important questions for the
first time can learn from the experiences of courts in other jurisdic-
tions.
In addition, there is a critical need for continued expansion and
refinement of domestic violence statutes. No jurisdiction has yet de-
signed the perfect model, although there are innovative pieces of
legislation in many jurisdictions. The research and analysis in this
Article should enhance the deliberations of those contemplating leg-
islative reform and assist creative advocates seeking to obtain effec-
tive, comprehensive relief for domestic violence victims in their juris-
dictions.
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